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PREFACE
The five years of the Indonesian Revolution manifested not 
only the struggle to be free of Dutch colonialism; but also the 
attempt of Indonesian society to resolve its own tensions and 
contradictions, long held in suspension by colonial control. The 
intensity of internal revolutionary conflict in each locality served 
as an index of the social contradictions which had been latent 
beneath the superficial calm of Netherlands India.
For many years Surakarta had been the centre of Javanese 
monarchy and traditionalism. In addition, it had become a major 
centre of colonial penetration, particularly through sugar estates, 
which caused the local people to rise against colonial authority.
Early in the Revolution, this region became the centre for the most 
important badan perjuangan organizations, with the result that the 
city of Surakarta (Solo) became i:he focus of opposition to the 
Republican Government at Jogjakarta during the Revolution. Another 
reason for its selection was the role of the two Surakarta monarchies, 
the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran, in preserving written sources 
at the local level. Surakarta appears to be richer than any other 
Republican-held region in terms of local documentation for the study 
of the Revolution.
This study was conceived while I was attending a colloquium 
on the Indonesian Revolution conducted by The Australian National 
University in Canberra in August 1973. Anthony Reid, who later 
became my supervisor, and other experts on Indonesian history such 
as John Smail, fiance Castles and Michael van Langenberg, encouraged 
me to enlarge my Surakarta case study to cover the period of the 
Indonesian Revolution as a whole.
A number of specific problems have animated this study.
What were the responses to the Independence Proclamation of the 
Surakartans, who had been caught in a feudal pattern for so many 
years? What kinds of factors determined their participation in the 
political and social conflicts of the time? What were the reasons 
for the intensity or the Revolution in Surakarta, including the 
permanent eclipse of its ruling dynasties? Did the Revolution
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really involve the rural people as well as the city-dwellers, or 
was it mostly an urban phenomenon? How far, in total, were the 
people involved in what had to be the key experience of their life 
time?
In an attempt to tackle these questions, I selected certain 
rural areas for careful study, to balance the uroan bias of most 
written sources. Four rural subdistricts (kecamatan) were selected 
to provide a range of conditions. I selected two Kasunanan 
subdistricts with many plantations: Delanggu (Klaten regency)
and Kedawung (Fragen regency) and two Mangkunegaran subdistricts with 
few plantations - Bendosari (Sukoharjo regency) and Jumapolo 
(Karanganyar regency). I hoped these examples would provide a broad 
enough range to examine the different degrees of rural involvement 
in the Revolution. I interviewed persons who had been involved, 
directly and indirectly, in many important activities during the 
Revolution. These interviews were conducted in either Javanese or 
Indonesian. In the villages they were more frequently in Javanese, 
because most of the older generation of villagers did not have an 
adequate knowledge of Indonesian.
The collection of data was also carried out by examining 
documents, local newspapers, other contemporary publications, and 
private memoirs and recollections. I located contemporary Surakarta 
newspapers and journals in the Reksopustoko Library (Mangkunegaran, 
Surakarta), the Sasono Wilopo collections (Kasunanan, Surakarta), 
Perpustakaan Negara (Jogjakarta) and Perpustakaan Islam (Jogjakarta). 
Archival sources were found mainly in the Arsip Mangkunegaran (AMN) 
in Surakarta and Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) in 
Jakarta. The Seksi Sejarah Militer Angkatan Darat (SEMAD), Surakarta, 
also contains documents and materials for the period, many of them 
relating to the badan perjuangan organizations
Most other Republican archives in Java were damaged as a 
result of the scorched-earth policy followed by the Republican 
troops during the Dutch aggressions. This is the main reason for the 
relative scarcity of written sources in the period of the Indonesian 
Revolution. For this reason this study is at times obliged to rely 
on an unsupported oral history approach, although wherever possible oral 
sources are complemented by contemporary written sources.
VACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis was made possible by the award of a Colombo 
Plan Scholarship covering the period December 1977 to February 1982.
I wish to express my gratitude to the Colombo Plan Board for its 
generosity in making possible my study at The Australian National 
University and my field work in Indonesia.
A number of people have contributed directly and indirectly 
to this study. Dr Anthony Reid was largely responsible for making 
it possible for me to come to the ANU. For his support, encouragement 
and interest in my work, I am eternally grateful. As my supervisor, 
he gave me valuable criticism and comments at various stages in the 
writing of this thesis. A debt is also owed to Dr David Marr and 
Dr Glenn May, who provided supervision during Dr Reid's absence 
from August 1980 to August 1981 and cheerfully bore the brunt of my 
finishing the first draft of this work. They also opened up the new 
perspectives for me by apt comparison with Vietnam and the Philippines, 
their areas of study. Dr Bill O'Malley, of the Department of 
Political and Social Change at the ANU, also acted as supervisor 
during the absence of Dr Reid and gave critical comments, questions 
and suggestions on successive drafts of each chapter. Professor 
William Liddle, during his stay as Fellow at ANU, gave me valuable 
suggestions and I would like to express my gratitude to him.
I wani, in addition, Lo thank a number of Indonesian 
scholars who have helped me in many ways. Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo 
has long been my main source of inspiration as a professional 
historian; it was his guidance which enabled me to find my way through 
the twilight zone between history and the social sciences. Dr Taufik 
Abdullah's suggestions greatly facilitated my field work in Indonesia.
Dr Onghokham also took an interest in ray work and through informal 
discussions helped give focus to my study.
My acknowledgments would not be complete without expressing 
my indebtedness to the head of the Department of Pacific and Southeast 
Asian History, ANU, Professor Gavan Daws, and to the staff and 
students of this Department, who helped me see familiar material from
vi
new and different angles. Dr Anton Lucas and Dr Cheah Boon Keng, 
former fellow research students in this Department, helped me in a 
great variety of ways, both personal and professional.
Professor Wang Gung-wu, of the Department of Far Eastern 
History, ANU, through his one year course, helped to broaden my 
understanding of the study of revolutions elsewhere, and Dr Ann 
Kumar, in her course on Indonesian nationalism, forced me to deepen 
my thinking on that subject. Professor James Fox, of the Department 
of Anthropology, ANU, made valuable suggestions in a seminar on my 
research proposal, and I would like to express my indebtedness to him.
To Miss SoemarLini and Mr Machfudi Mungkudilaga of the 
Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia also go my thanks for locating 
many sources. My thanks likewise go to the staffs of the libraries 
of The Australian National University, the Mangkunegaran Library, 
the Kasunanan Library and the Radyopustoko Library, Surakarta, and 
the State Library, the Islam Library and the Sonobudoyo Library, 
Jogjakarta; all kindly provided me with facilities and assistance 
during my research.
I am also deeply appreciative of the contributions of my 
informants. With unfailing kindness, they provided me with their 
invaluable knowledge, and that knowledge is the basis of much of this 
work.
My thanks also go to Pat Gilbert, Secretary of the Department, 
who typed earlier drafts of this manuscript. I would especially like 
to thank Anvida namberts, who tyx^ed the final copy, good-humouredly, 
while under considerable pressure. She also assisted in a lot of 
work, including proof-reading, which was 'above and beyond the call 
of duty'.
My thanks also go to the Rector of Sebelas Maret University, 
who officially allowed me to study at ANU. My thanks likewise go to 
the staff of the Faculty of Art and Culture of Sebelas Maret University 
and its Department of History who helped me in a great variety of 
ways. They had the vision to see value in such a study as I proposed 
and gave me the privilege of a long leave of absence.
I am indebted to my parents, who gave me moral support
vii
and encouraged me all the way through an unconscionably long period 
of schooling.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Nurdiana, for all 
that she has meant to me, and especially for her patience and tolerance 
in taking care of our children in Indonesia while I was studying at 
ANU.
A NOTE ON SPELLING
Indonesian words and place names are spelt in accordance 
with the present new system begun in 1972, except for titles of 
published works, newspapers and other contemporary written sources. 
Personal names have been spelt according to individual preference 
where it is commonly used. Javanese words with an 'o' commonly 
spelt 'a', e.g., jogoboyo, sentono. But in some cases an 'o' because 
of its previously accepted usage, is often replaced with an 'a', 
such as mancanegara. I have retained the older 'oe', instead of the 
modern 'u', in the names of persons, organizations, newspapers and 
other contemporary written sources. A number of commonly used 
Indonesian and Javanese words are italicised the first time and 
thereafter treated as English. A glossary of commonly used words 
and abbreviations can be found at the back of the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
COLONIAL SOCIETY IN SURAKARTA
S u r a k a r t a  h a s  p l a y e d  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  J a v a n e s e  p o l i t i c a l  
and  c u l t u r a l  l i f e  f o r  t h e  p a s t  two an d  a  h a l f  c e n t u r i e s .  F o r  t h i s  
r e a s o n ,  t h e  u p h e a v a l s  w h ich  a f f e c t e d  J a v a ,  f rom  t h e  G i y a n t i  War t o  
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 0 s ,  f r e q u e n t l y  r e a c h e d  t h e i r  c l im a x  
i n  S u r a k a r t a .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  a l s o ,  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  D u tch  was 
draw n to w a rd s  e x e r c i s i n g  some i n d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  r e g i o n .
The i n t e n s i v e  D u tch  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  J a v a n e s e  r o y a l  
h e a r t l a n d  was g r e a t l y  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  e v e n t s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  C e n t r a l  
J a v a  i n  t h e  m id d le  o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  A l a r g e - s c a l e  C h in e s e  
r e v o l t  (1 7 4 1 -4 3 )  was d e f e a t e d  o n l y  w i t h  g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y ,  and  b e c a u s e  
o f  l o s s e s  s u s t a i n e d  i n  t h e  r e v o l t ,  S u su h u n an  Pakubowono I I  moved 
h i s  c a p i t a l  to n  k i l o m e t r e s  e a s t  f rom  K a r t o s u r o  t o  t h e  new s i t e ,  
S u r a k a r t a .  D u r in g  t h e  C h in e s e  r e v o l t ,  two J a v a n e s e  l e a d e r s ,  R.M.
S a i d  and  M a r to p u r o ,  h a d  a l s o  s t r u c k  o u t  a g a i n s t  t h e  S u su h u n an  and  
a g a i n s t  t h e  D u tc h .
I n  1746 P r i n c e  Mangkubumi r e b e l l e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  S u su h u n a n  
who h a d  d e f a u l t e d  on a p r o m i s e  t o  g i v e  l a n d  t o  h im . Mangkubumi 
t h e n  j o i n e d  R.M. S a i d  and  M a r to p u r o  an d  c o n d u c te d  c a m p a ig n s  a g a i n s t  
t h e  S u su h u n an  an d  h i s  D u tch  a l l i e s .  T h i s  r e b e l l i o n  was en d e d  by  
t h e  G i y a n t i  T r e a t y  o f  13 F e b r u a r y  1755 t h r o u g h  w h ic h  t h e  k ingdom  
o f  M ataram  was f o r m a l l y  d i v i d e d . ^  S u r a k a r t a  c o n t i n u e d  t o  b e  r u l e d
1 Uuu S i n ai kundig Ovui «,i t i l l  van NudurInmhiuh IntlJu, IU37,
P e n e r b i t a n  S um b er-S u m b er  S e j a r a h  ( J a k a r t a ,  A r s i p  N a s i o n a l  R I ,
1 9 7 1 ) ,  n o . 4 ,  p . 5 1 .  W ith  t h e  p e a c e  t r e a t y  o f  G i y a n t i ,  S u r a k a r t a  
c o v e r e d  an a r e a  o f  5 5 .3 5 0  c a c a h  i n  N e g a ra  Agung p l u s  3 0 .1 0 0  
c a c a h  i n  M a n c a n e g a ra .  On t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  J o g j a k a r t a  g o t  6 5 .0 8 0  
c a c a h  i n  N e g a ra  Agung an d  3 7 .2 3 0  c a c a h  i n  M a n c a n e g a ra .  On t h i s
p o i n t ,  s e e  G .P .  R o u a f f a e r ,  1V o r s t e n l a n d e n ' ,  A d a t r e c h t b u n d e l s , v o l . 3 4  
( 1s - G r a v e n n a g e ,  M a r t i n u s  N i j h o f f ,  1 9 3 1 ) ,  p p . 2 3 b ,  2 4 2 .  The
d i v i s i o n  o f  l a n d  i n  N e g a ra  Agung was by d e s a  ( v i l l a g e ) , an d  i n  
M a n c a n e g a ra  by d a e r a h  ( r e g i o n ) . F o r  d e t a i l s  s e e  S o e k a n t o ,
S e k i t a r  J o g j a k a r t a ,  1 7 5 5 -1 8 2 5  ( D j a k a r t a ,  M a h a b a r a t a ,  1 9 5 3 ) ,  
p p .2 1 - 2  3.
2by the Susuhunan, but a new Sultanate of Jogjakarta was created 
under Prince Mangkubumi.
R.M. Said's own rebellious movement did not end until 1757. 
By the peace treaty of Salatiga on 17 March 1757, he was installed 
as Pangeran Midji, under the authority of the Susuhunan.2 3 His 
title, Pangeran Adipati Mangkunegoro, was recognized as legal and 
valid. His position was as a senior pangeran who governed his 
territory, about one-third of the region of Surakarta. Both the 
Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro were supervised by the Dutch through 
the authority of a resident. In spite of the Mangkunegoro being 
under the suzerainty of the Susuhunan, however, there was little 
sign of cooperation between the two rulers. Indeed, the attitude 
of rivalry between the Mangkunegoro and the Susuhunan continued 
until the revolution broke out in August 1945.
CIAS SICAL ST'lUCTURU
The concept of the Javanese state was centred on the 
authority of the king. The Susuhunan was the theoretical source 
of all x^ ower and authority. At the summit of the x^litical structure,
he had political, military and religious powers. There were three
3chief sections of the royal administration: the Kadipaten (internal
palace administration); the Pengulon; and the Kepatihan.
The Kepatihan, or external administrative office, was 
under the Susuhunan's Patih (Grand Vizier). He headed a number of 
bupati jaba (outer regents). The whole of the Patih's administration 
was called the parental! jaba, the outer administration. Inside the 
kraton or the court, affairs were run by the parentah jero, the inner
2 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Ceschicdcnis der Ondornomingcn van het 
Mangkoenagorosche Rijk ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 
pp.26-27. In this treaty the Susuhunan released to R.M. Said 
4000 cacah of land, an amount which was later increased under 
Raffles. For details see Soeyatno, Kolonialisme Barat dan 
Komunduran Radja-Radja Surakarta Abad 19 (Surakarta, I.K.I.P. 
Surakarta, 1972), pxJ.6-7, 9-10.
3 P.W. Fillet, De Verhouding der Vorsten oj! Java tot de Nederlandsch 
Indische Regering ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1Ö95),
pp.154-82.
3administration, under the bupati jero (the inner regents). The 
duties of the bupati jero were connected with court ceremonies, court 
dancing, and other court affairs. The Pengulon, or religious office, 
managed all affairs relating to religion, including inheritance, 
marriage, etc. The Pengulu (religious officer) presided over the 
Pengulon, but the latter was also supervised by the Patih.
The administrative officials below the bupati were the
wedono (district officers), while each wedono administered a number
of panewu (sub-district officers). After 1928 sub-district officers5in the Susuhunan's administration were called assistant wedono, while 
the Mangkunegaran administration still used the term panewu.^
Below the sub-districts were the villages, which were originally 
headed by the bekel. These acted in a similar manner to a village 
head, and organized a certain area of land on behalf of the appanage 
holders, who were called patuh. Originally, the relationship between 
the patuh and the bekel was based on the service of the bekel for 
the patuh in collecting taxes or other deliveries. Thus, the bekel 
obtained the right to exploit the patuh's land.^ The bekels had 
to deliver tax either in cash (bekel majegan) or in kind (bekel maron). 
In addition to these duties, the bekels had to provide the appanage 
holders wich laoour in the event of a marriage or any other important 
ceremony. The bekels also coordinated other burdens which the state 
levied on the people.^
In Javanese terms, there were three main social classes in
gSurakarta society. First, there was the sentono dalem, tine family 
of the king, which constituted the golongan ningrat or nobility. 
Traditionally, this group was placed at the top level of the social
4 Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, 1921, pp.373-74.
5 P.ijksblr.d Surakarta, no. 14, 1928.
6 Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, no.10, 1929.
7 For details of the agrarian system in Surakarta see Adatrechtbundels, 
vol.19, 1921, pp.361-70.
8 Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, p.363.
9 Fillet, op. cit. , pp. 155-57'.
4structure. They resided in particular places in the kraton (the court); 
the pangeran (princes) were in the Kadipaten, under the supervision 
of the Pangeran Adipati Anom; the Keputren was the residence of the 
wives and those children of the king who were not yet adult; the 
Kamisepuhan was for senior princes, or brothers of the Susuhunan, 
who did not have function in the government. The princes who 
actively functioned in the government and were not yet married, 
including the king's adult children, were allowed to reside at the 
Kctd j pa ten. The high and privileged status of the sentono dalem 
derived from their closeness Lo the centre of all power and authority, 
the Susuhunan.10 The pangerans had rights to special titles which 
referred only to them.11 The majority of members of the sentono 
dalem received as income a land allowance, the lungguh, the amount 
of which was defendant on their position, seniority, and blood 
relationship to the Susuhunan.
The second main social class was the abdi dalem or priyayi, 
officials who carried out state administration at the Susuhunan1s 
orders. They were frequently divided into two classes, the priyayi 
gede (the high priyayi) and the priyayi cilik ( the lower priyayi)12 
on the basis of administrative rank. Priyayis were given official 
names by the Susuhunan to replace their personal names. They also 
used certain official titles appropriate to their positions.
10 For the principality of Jogjakarta, see Selosoemardjan, Social 
Changes in Jogjakarta (New York, Cornell University Press, 1962),
p. 21.
11 In 1939, the sons of the Susuhunan had two different titles. 
Mangkubumi used the title KGPH( Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Haryo); 
Adiwidjojo and Purbonegoro used BKPH (Bendoro Kanjeng Pangeran 
Haryo); see Pawarti Soerakarta, no.l, December 1939.
12 For this division, see T. Roorda (ed.), Javaansche Wetten: De 
Nawala-Pradata, De Angger-Sadasa, De Angger-Ageng, De Angger- 
Goenoeng en De Angger-Aroebiroe (Amsterdam, Johannes Muller,
1844), pp.35-68.
13 For example, the bupati used the official titles: Raden 
Turnenggung (RT), Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung(KRT), Raden Mas 
Tumenggung (RMT); the wedono used Raden Ngabehi (RNg) and 
Mas Ngabehi (MNg). See also my research report, Soeyatno, 
'Sejarah Perubahan Sosial di Indonesia: Studi Kasus di Surakarta 
1945-1950', Laporan Penelitian untuk Yayasan ^mu-Ilmu Sosial
( Jakarta, 1979), p.13.
5Culturally, the abdi dalem were defined by the refined priyayi life 
pattern In all respects, Including language, dross and residential 
style.
Third were the kawula dalem (subjects). This group was 
originally referred to as commoners or wong cilik (small people).
They had no privileges, few rights, and many state duties. The 
relationship between wong cilik and Susuhunan was commonly symbolized 
by the phrase manunggaling kawula lan Gusti (unity of the subject with 
the l o r d ) A s  Selosoemardjan has pointed outfJ wong cilik culture 
is thoroughly Javanese: contemplative, non-aggressive, and extremely
respectful, with a strong dislike of social tensions and conflicts 
and with fairly strong elements of traditionalism. The principal sources 
of wong cilik social norms and values are pre-Hindu animism, Islam, 
and the stories of the wayang (Javanese puppet) play. Kebatinan, 
the art of unifying man's spirit with the universe, is of basic 
significance in the culture and has withstood centuries of influence 
from the great world religions. In the eyes of the wong cilik, the 
Susuhunan was a monarch who had supernatural power never possessed by 
ordinary men. The Susuhunan, in the folklore of Surakarta society, 
had a mysterious relationship to the Kanjeng Ratu Lara Kidul (the 
Queen of the South Sea), which enhanced the power and authority of
14 The term kawula-gusti often referred to the religious element, 
and meant the unity of man and God; see Timboel, I, no.5, 1927, 
pp.66-69. In addition to this, Selosoemardjan explained that 
manunggaling kawula lan Gusti should be interpreted as follows: 
manunggaling means to unify or to become one (tunggal = one); 
kawula means subject; Gusti is an aristocratic title used by a 
kawula when addressing members of the upper nobility. See 
Selosoemardjan, 'The Kraton in the Javanese Social Structure', in 
Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvas (eds) , Dynamic of 
Indonesian History (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1978), p.226; cf. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, p.30. For 
further details on kawula-gusti, see Soemarsaid Moertono, State and 
Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period,
16th to 19th Century, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, Cornell 
University, 1963), pp.14-26.
15 Selosoemardjan, 'The Kraton', pp.223-34.
6the Susuhunan and the safety of the stated Thus, the horizontal 
division of classes in Surakarta was based upon distance from the 
Susuhunan's court.
DUTCH EXPANSION
Change in Administration
By the end of the Kartosuro period, when the Susuhunan moved
his capital to Surakarta, the appointments of the Susuhunan's officials
had to be approved by the Dutch authority. The political contract
of 1747 between the Susuhunan and the Dutch changed the administrative
function of the Patih who thenceforth would be a part of the colonial 
•I *7administration. x/
In theory the Dutch residents at the courts of Surakarta
and Jogjakarta were advisers, but in practice they were representatives
of a stronger paramount p o w e r I n  1808, Governor-General Daendels
issued a new regulation governing the role of residents in the courts
of Surakarta and Jogjakarta. Under this new rule, the residents were
to be honoured as the representatives of the highest authority and they
19were thus placed on an equal level with the Susuhunan or the Sultan.
In short, the political contracts made by the Dutch with the Susuhunan 
were aimed at progressively limiting the military force and the 
political and economic power of the Susuhunan.
16 An example might help to clarify this relationship: if the
kraton held the sacral dancing performance of Bedoyo Ketawang, 
the Kanjeng Ratu Lara Kidul was considered to appear as a dancer 
among the other dancers, but only the Susuhunan could see her.
For details, see K G P H Hadiwidjojo, Bedoyo Ketawang (Surakarta, 
Radyopustoko, 1971).
17 J.K.J. de Jong, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost- 
Indie, vol.IX ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1877), pp.434-47.
13 B.H.M. Vlekle, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia (The Hague,
W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1959), p.249.
19 Staatkundig Overzicht, pp.51-52.
7Tlie r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  S u r a k a r t a  r e g i o n  was c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  D utch  p o w e r .  Xn 1 8 4 7 ,  Van N e s ,  t h e  a d v i s e r  to
Vor s t e n  l a n d e n  , g av e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  new v i l l a g e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s
s h o u l d  b e  fo rm e d  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e s  u n d e r  L u ra h  De s a ^  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e
o u t e r  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  1V o r s t e n l a n d e n 1. The m ain  p u r p o s e s  o f  h i s  p l a n  
21w e re  :
Conn k a l u r a h a n  ( v i l l a g e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s )  w i t h  communal 
l a n d  r i g h t s ,
2 .  t o  i n t r o d u c e  l a n d  r e n t ,
3 .  t o  s h i f t  t h e  l a n d  r e n t a l  s y s t e m  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  th e  
a p p a n a g e  s y s t e m .
T h e s e  c h a n g e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w ere  n o t  f u l l y  im p le m e n te d  u n t i l  
t h e  1 8 9 0 s .  Then  v i l l a g e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was r e g u l a r i z e d ,  w i t h  l a r g e r  
v i l l a g e  u n i t s ,  u n d e r  t h e  name o f  k a l u r a h a n , t a k i n g  on  a  more b u r e a u c r a t i c  
s t r u c t u r e  t h a n  b e f o r e .  D u r in g  1 9 1 2 -1 3  t h e  P a t i h  o f  t h e  S u su h u n an  h a d  
s t o p p e d  a p p o i n t i n g  new b e k e l s ,  s i n c e  t h e  k a l u r a h a n  d e s a s y s t e m  was 
i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  f o r m a t i o n . 33 By 1 9 2 4 ,  i n  t h e  S u r a k a r t a  r e g i o n  (K a su n an an  
a n a  M an g k u n eg aran )  c h e re  h a d  b e e n  fo rm ed  1396 s e p a r a t e  v i l l a g e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  o r  k a l u r a h a n . ' 24 E ach  k a l u r a h a n  was u n d e r  a  L u ra h  D e s a , 
s u p p o r t e d  b y  a  s t a f f  c o m p r i s i n g  Ga r i k  D esa  ( s e c r e t a r y ) , K ebayan  (h e a d  
o f  h a m l e t  o r  D u k u h ) , Modin ( r e l i g i o u s  o f f i c e r ) , Jo g o b o y o  ( v i l l a g e  
g u a r d )  an d  J o g o t i r t o  ( t h e  i r r i g a t i o n  o f f i c e r )  ,2 ^
On 1 J u l y  1 9 2 8 ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s i d e n t  o f  S u r a k a r t a  was 
s u p e r s e d e d  by  t h a t  o f  a g o v e r n o r /  and  t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  S u r a k a r t a  r e g i o n  
h a d  an  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s t e m  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  a p r o v i n c e  i n  J a v a ,  
f i n e s t  g o v e r n o r  o f  S u r a k a r t a  was M.B. van d e r  J a g t ,  an  e x t r e m e l y
20 See S t a a t a b l a d ,  n o . 3 7 ,  1 8 4 7 ;  n o . 9 .  1 8 4 8 .
21 A d a t r o c h t b u n d o l a , v o l . 1 9 ,  19 21 .  n . 3 7 2 .
22 R i j k s b l a d  S u r a k a r t a ,  n o s  3 3 ,  34 .  4 3 .  1 9 1 7 :  
n o s  1 0 ,  1 4 ,  1 5 ,  1 6 ,  1 9 1 7 .
Ri j k s b l a d  M an g k u n e g a ra n ,
23 A d a t r e c h t b u n d e l s , v o l . 1 0 ,  1 9 1 0 .  d o . 4 3 - 4 9 .
24 L. Adam, De A u tonom ie  v an  h e t  I n d o n e s i s c h Dorp ( A m e r s f o o r t ,  S.W.
M e l c h i o r ,  1 9 2 4 ) ,  p . 1 3 0 .
25 P e n j o e l o e h , v o l . l ,  n o . 6 .  1 9 3 2 ,  d d . 3 2 4 -2 5 .
26 Ri j k s b l a d  S u r a k a r t a ,  n o . 1 2 ,  1 9 2 8 .
8experienced official. The colonial administrative pattern, because 
the Surakarta region was a principality, was indirect rule.
Scheme of the Administration in Surakarta after 1928
Dutch Javanese
Governor - - - - - - - - -  Susuhunanr !Resident/Assistant Resident - - - Patih
Controleur - - - - - - - -  Bupati
Wedono
Assistant Wedono 
Lurah Desa
------------- = line of responsibility
- = line of cooperation
Although the Dutch colonial administration in Surakarta was 
now under a Governor, most Dutch officials in the afdeling (regency) 
and in the onder-afdeling (district) continued precisely as they had 
before the changes occurred.^ As the scheme above'hints, the Dutch officials 
actually sat in a supervisory capacity with regard to their Principality 
colleagues. Thus the Assistant oversaw the work of the regents, the 
controleurs inspected the efforts of the wedono and assistant wedono, 
and the Dutch effectively controlled the entire administration right 
down to the village level. This situation persisted until the Japanese 
invasion in 1942.
The Expansion of Estate Cultivation
Before the expansion of the Dutch plantation enterprises is
27 He had been resident of Kedu, Central Java, from 17 June 1922
to 30 May 1927. For details, see Memories van M.B. van der Jagt: 
Pud-Gouverneur van Soerakarta (Den Haag, 1955), pp.313-27.
28 For Dutch officials in the regencies and districts in Surakarta, 
see Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch Indie (Weltrevreden, 
Landsdrukkerij, 1925), pp.244-45.
9discussed, something must be said about the agrarian situation in 
Surakarta. Traditionally, there were mainly two kinds of land. First 
v/c.s upx^anage land or tanah lungguh. This land was an allowance for the 
sentono dalem and the abdi dalem who, as appanage holders, were known 
as patuli. The patuh, in turn, appointed bekel, to supervise a certain 
area of land, including the population on it. As we have seen above, 
the bekels were agents for the appanage holders and were responsible 
for delivering taxes and other goods to them.
In Surakarta, each bekel was given the use of one-fifth of 
the arable land in his area by the appanage holder. The remaining 
four-fifths of the arable land was tilled by the peasants, with 50 per 
cent of its production to be delivered to the appanage holders. What 
was left was, of course, for the peasants.
The second kind of land was the royal domain of the Susuhunan, 
divided into two parts, the bumi pemajegan (bumi = land; pemajegan 
from pajeg = tax) and the bumi gladag (gladag = glidig = human force). 
This land came directly under the Susuhunan and the people who resided 
on it had to pay taxes and deliveries to the Susuhunan and to give their 
labour on demand for the kraton.
In reality, after 1755, appanage holders began to rent out
their rights to land to Chinese. The Chinese had the capital necessary
to use this land for production of cash crops on a plantation basis, in
which they were supported by both the Susuhunan and the Dutch. According
to a regulation of the Kasunanan issued in 1781, the duration of this
type of land rental was three years. The increase in European plantation
enterprises brought changes to the land rental system, however. In 1818
the Anggor Sedesu (the Tenth Rule) of the Kasunanan stated that land
30rental could be prolonged to a maximum of six years. In 1857 the
. . j  Imaximum term was extended to fifteen years, and subsequently to twenty.
29 Data on this point is taken from G.P. Rouffaer, 1Vorstenlanden1, 
Adatrechtbundels, vol.34, pp. 299-303; 'Het Grondgebied van 
het Vorstenland Soerakarta', typescript, Surakarta, n.d.
(1924?), AMN.
3Q For details see T. Roorda (ed.), op.cit., pp.35-68.
31 Staatsblad, no.11, 1857.
10
The Cultivation System (cultuurstelsel), which channelled 
forced deliveries of cash crops to the Dutch in lieu of tribute 
in the period 1830-70, could not operate directly in the principalities 
(Vorstenlanden) which were theoretically sovereign. Nevertheless it 
had an indirect effect in encouraging Dutch entrepreneurs to try to 
grow the same croxos - indigo, sugar and coffee in particular - on 
royal or appanage land in Surakarta. Private entrepreneurs, forbidden 
lu opuralu uluuwhuro In Java, funded to cuncunLratu in Lho prlnoipaliLiun, 
(iu| k m .’ I a I I y a I'for I 1142.
In Surakarta noino of the now crops, such as coffuu and
indigo, gained an important place towards the middle of the nineteenth
century. Between 1842 and 1849 total coffee production in the
Mangkunegaran areas was 2,169 quintals while the Kasunanan areas
32produced 39,262 quintals. For the three-year period 1861-63,
these figures increased to 12,127 quintals in the Mangkunegaran and 
38,020 quintals in the Kasunanan.33 In 1863, indigo production in 
Surakarta was estimated at 32,597 kilograms.3^
In 1870, with the introduction of the Agrarian Law and its
further elaboration in the Agrarian Decree, the Cultivation System
35was formally ended throughout Java. The new policy aimed at developing 
private estate enterprises in the colony, which had the effect of 
further increasing the number of private enterprises in Surakarta.
In 1915, the following private enterprises were operating in the 
regencies of Surakarta (see Table i).
Indigo, sugar and coffee remained the most important crops 
through the period of the liberal system. After 1915 a process of 
amalgamation began among the Dutch private estates, reducing their
32 A.K. Pringgodigdo, op,cit., p.45. One quintal = 100 kg.
33 Ibid., p.45.
34 Ibid., p.51.
35 For the effect of the Cultivation System and its abolition, see 
B. Schrieke (ed.), The Effect of Western Influence on Native 
Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago (Batavia, G. Kolff & Co., 
1929), pp.108-14.
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TABLE I
DUTCH PRIVATE PLANTATION ESTATES IN SURAKARTA IN 1915*
Regency Number of estates Kind of crops
1. Surakarta 10 tobacco, indigo, 
agave
sugar, coffee,
2. Klaten 35 tobacco, indigo, 
kapok, rice
sugar, agave,
3. Boyolali 18 tobacco, coffee, 
rubber, kapok
indigo , pepper,
4. Sragen 35 coffee, indigo, rubber, 
sugar, agave, kapok
tea,
Total 98
total number from ninety-eight to eighty by 1 9 2 0 , But the amount of
capital and land involved in estates tended to increase nevertheless.37By a 1906 ordinance, Dutch authority limited the right to rent land 
in Surakarta to two main categories:
1. the Dutch;
2. other Europeans who had businesses and trade associations 
established in the Netherlands Indies.
Dutch private enterprises rented the appanages from the appanage holders,
the patuhs. In practice, they rented the rights of the patuhs, including
the use of the bekels and the population for plantation purposes. This
meant that the villagers, coordinated by bekels, experienced a heavy
A Sourcei LI.jut van Partiullure Ondornumlngan in Nodarlandnch-Indlo, 
Periodiuke Pubiicatie van hot Departement van Binnenlandsch 
Bestuur (Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1915), pp,206-10.
36 See 'Overzieht van de Landbouwondernemingen in het Gewest 
Soerakarta', typescript, Soerakarta, 1927, pp,l-10, AMN,
See Staatsblad, no.93, 1906. See also Soepomo, De Reorganisatie 
van het Agrarisch Stelsel in het Gewest Soerakarta ('s-Gravenhage, 
L. Gerretsen, 1927), p.43.
37
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burden of plantation work. Sugar cultivation in particular required 
very extensive labour.^
Relations between renters and appanage holders were controlled 
by the Patih or the Bupati Nayoko. The system of land rental for 
annual crops was the glebagan (glebag = reverse), a rotation system 
of land use. Land was divided into two plots, marked A and B. Estates 
were permitted to use land A during even years and B during odd years.
When estates were using the land of A plot, the farmers worked the land 
of B plot and vice-versa.
In short, Dutch entrepreneurs gained the rights of the 
appanage holders, while the bekels and farmers were compelled to serve 
on the plantation estates. A similar system operated in Jogjakarta, 
where its harmful results for the bekels and the population have been 
discussed by Selosoemardjan. 40
Impact on the Peasant
European influence on the agricultural system of Java was
very great, especially in the periods of the Cultivation System and the 
41liberal policy. This section will describe briefly the influence of 
Dutch enterprises on villages in Surakarta.
Within the appanage system outlined above, the bekels controlled
a certain land area on behalf of the appanage holders, including the
population of that area. The rights of the population to land, according
to customary law in Surakarta, were only hak anggaduh or borrowing 
42rights. Appanage holders had the right to the agricultural labour of the
38 Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution; The Process of Ecological 
Change in Indonesia (Berkeley, University of California Press,
1963) , p .55.
39 Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, p.370; Soepomo, op.clt. , pp,44-45,
40 Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, pp.33-34.
For this point, see B. Schrieke (ed.), op,cit., pp.103-25, See 
also D.H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society: The
Village Sphere (Ithaca, New York, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
1957).
42 Soepomo, op.cit., pp.80-81.
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population, through services called bau snku (bau ~ shoulder; “
foot) and pasumbang (contribution) , which were required at marriage
or other ceremonies. In addition to these labour obligations, the
villagers also worked on the bekels' land, a task called kuduian
(from kudur = duty). In Surakarta the particular villagers who
owed this service were called kuli pancen (kuli — labourer; pancen —
allocated). Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo, in his study of Banten,
observed that the pancen service was replaced there in 1882 by a poll
45tax of one guilder per head. In Surakarta, however, this fecdal custom 
survived long afterward.
The division of the use of land can be summarized as follows: 
the bekels enjoyed the use of one-fifth of the arable land, the farmers 
two-fifths, and the appanage holders two-fifths. With the rise of the 
Dutch plantation estates, a further division of the use of land occurred 
during the liberal policy, 1870-1900. This division can be summarized 
as follows:46 one-seventh for the bekels; two-sevenths, called bumi 
glebag (rotation land), for the population; two-sevenths as land used 
by the estates (bumi gadangan) and two-sevenths as reserve land for 
the estates (bumi sediyan). Because the appanage holders now received 
land rent from the estates, they no longer received an agricultural 
product from the peasants, but they often continued to receive labour 
obligations, such as the bau suku and the pasumbang.
A regulation concerning compulsory labour took effect in 
47Surakarta on 23 August 1909. Its main goal was to regularize the 
intensive work which the villagers performed on Dutch estates. This 
work was of various kinds. First, there was intiran (distribution
43 P.W. Jonquibre (ed,), Javaansche Wetten Verordeningen en Regelingen: 
Beheersehende de Agrarische Verhouding in het Rijk van Soesoehoenan 
van Soerakarta, translated from Javanese by J.W. Kilian 
(Soerakarta, 1912), pp.69-71,
44 The kuduran was commonly performed with the bekel providing light 
rood buu no wages. See Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, pp.107-08.
45 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888:
Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, A Case Study of Social Movements 
in Indonesia ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p.44.
46 Adatrechtbundels, vol,19, p,370,
47 Some years later the regulation of kerja wajib was reinforced in the 
Rijksblad. For the Kasunanan see Rijksblad Surakarta, no,23, 1917, and 
for the Mangkunegaran see Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, no.23, 1920.
14
little by little) or compulsory agricultural work on the plantations.
The rule for intiran duty was that villagers had to work on the estates
48for a maximum of ten hours each thirty-five days. Second, there
was night guard duty on the estates. Villagers working as night watchmen
had to guard the estates from 6 o'clock in the evening until 6 o'clock 
49in the morning. Third, there was gugur gunung (gugur = fall; 
gunung = mountain), a collective unpaid obligation of the villagers, 
which served general purposes in the villages and on the estates.
Most frequently, this consisted of work on the irrigation system.
Bekels and the villagers were responsible for the physical condition 
of the irrigation system. The only villagers who were free from this 
compulsory labour were the bekels themselves and the wong panumpang 
(villagers having neither house nor land).
In Surakarta, farmers worked on plantation estates under what
was known as the glidig or wage labour system. The glidig system
demanded compulsory labour on the Dutch estates though with payment.
Villagers had to work on estates under the supervision of bekels who
were acting as pangarepe wong cilik (leaders of the little people).
Bekels and villagers who neglected this duty were punished by having
50to work for three months with no payment except light food. In the
51glidig system the villagers had little time to work their own fields.
The regulation governing compulsory labour (kerja wajib)
52was put into effect on sixty-three estates in Surakarta on 1 September 
1909, and on twenty-three more in the regencies of Klaten, Boyolali 
and Sragen on 1 January 1910,
48 Jonquiere (ad.), op,cit., p,77.
49 Ibid,, p.78.
50 for the regulation of glidig in Surakarta, see Rijksblad Surakarta, 
no.24, 1917, and Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, no.11, 1917.
51 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Geschiedenis, p.36.
52 Fifteen of these estates were in Surakarta regency, three in 
Boyolali regency, twenty-nine in the regency of Klaten, and 
sixteen in Sragen regency.
53 Jonquiere (ed.), op.cit., pp.83-84.
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With these additional activities for the Dutch plantations,
the villagers had three distinct burdens of compulsory labour - for
54 55the kingdom (pagawcyan nagara); for the estates, and for the 
irrigation system.^
57The appanage system was abolished in Surakarta in 1918,
signalling a serious program of land reform. Each peasant was
granted inheritable rights to the use of the land, which created
58strong ties between the peasant and his land. The role of the 
bekels was diminished by the abolition of the appanage system, 
which weakened the relationship between peasants and bekels.
During the Great Depression of the 1930s the Netherlands
Indies experienced exceptionally severe economic difficulties.
National and per capita incomes declined sharply. In particular the
export-oriented economy, including the sugar estates of Surakarta,
collapsed as a result of a steep decline in export prices. Although
production of sugar continued to increase until 1930, the value of
sugar exports from Java slumped from 1,049 million guilders in 1925
to 254 million in 1930. The Javanese population was thrown back
59upon the traditional sector for survival.
In Surakarta, too, the population was heavily affected,
and many peasants could not pay the poll-tax. Many of them returned
their individual rights to the land to the Susuhunan, a process 
\ \ 60known as kadedel (withdrawn). This resulted in many of the villagers 
becoming landless peasants. Others, in an endeavour to retain their 
land rights, pawned the land to rich peasants for several years. The 
money was then used for the payment of the poll-tax. In this way
54
55
56
57
58
59
Soepomo, op.cit., p.100.
Rijksblad Surakarta, no.34, 1917, and Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, 
no.16, 1917.
Staatsblad, no.722, 1920.
G.P. Rouffaer, 'Vorstenlanden', p.307.
For Jogjakarta, see Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, pp.219-25.
For details see J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India. A Study 
of Plural Economy (London, Cambridge University Press, 1944), 
p.337 and 303-45 passim; Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia: The
Crisis of the Millstones (New York, D. van Nostrand, 1963), 
pp.64-65.
Interview with Prawiroredjo, 11 March 1979; Pawiro Granggang, 
27 August 1979.
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the economic position of wealthier landowners was strengthened in 
relation to the poor.
POPULAR RESPONSES
As the various changes in labour obligation and in leadership 
style indicate, western enterprises penetrated deeply into the 
Javanese village, in Surakarta in particular. As a result of this 
penetration, there understandably arose a reaction among villagers 
along traditional lines/'1 In an early exhibition of this phenomenon,
villagers in Klaten regency agitated against the estates and murdered
62Dutch planters in 1847. There were other rural protest movements 
which tuid messianic features. Two important movements should be 
mentioned, the Mangkuwidjaja Affair in Klaten in 1865 and the Srikaton 
Affair in Karanganyar in 1888. Mangkuwidjaja, a villager of Merbaung 
village, Klaten regency, had prepared a detailed plan of revolt against 
the Dutch. lie kept a document containing the Jayabaya prophecy stating 
that all foreigners in Surakarta and Jogjakarta would be eliminated.
This movement failed when the Dutch captured most of its leaders on 
8 July 1365. The Srikaton affair took place at the village of Girilayu. 
Imam Redjo, who had gone through an ascetic preparation at Ngawi,
East Java, launched a movement to occupy the Srikaton bungalow of the 
Mangkunegoro, at Girilayu. Imam and his followers planned to establish 
a new Islamic kingdom. The Mangkunegoro troops successfully killed 
Imam and the other leaders. Sartono Kartodirdjo classifies these two
movements as messianic, aiming to set up a golden age in society and
• 64to overthrow foreign dominance of any kind.
61 For details on the stages of western penetration and its result 
on tiie villages, see D.Ii. Burger, passim.
62 Ikhtisar Keadaan Politik Hindia Belanda Tahun 1839-1848, Penerbitan 
Sumber-Sumber Sejarah no.5 (Jakarta, Arsip National Republik 
Indonesia, 1973), pp.46-56.
63 Sartono Kartodirdjo, Tjatatan Tentang Segi-Segi Messianistis 
Dalam Sedjarah Indonesia (Jogjakarta, UGM, 1959), pp.19-20.
54 For details on messianic movements in rural Java in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements 
in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries (London, Oxford University Press, 1973), 
pp.64-105.
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In the twentieth century the latent dislike of foreign 
dominion rose above the threshold of national consciousness. The 
Budi btomo (Glorious Endeavour) or BD, the earliest national 
organisation, which had Javanese nationalism as its basi.s, was 
formed by Javanese doctors and students in 1908^ Its members were, 
in practice, limited to the educated priyayi elite. In Surakarta, 
Narpowandowo, a cultural organization consisting of nobles, was 
formed as part of the BU movement.^ By virtue of this elitist 
composition, the BU did not have much to offer the peasants in 
resisting the further exploitation of Dutch colonialism.
In 1912 the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) or ST was
established, with its impetus coming mainly from batik traders in
Surakarta. Initially, the SI was established to break the strong
Chinese hold on the textile business. According to its statutes,
this organization was limited to business enterprises, but it also
aimed to encourage the development of the economic life of the
67Indonesian people and the Muslim religion. In the event, the SI was
to provide the urban leadership for a widespread movement of rural 
68protest.
During the first years of the development of SI, in 1912-18, 
the discontent of the peasants of Surakarta was manifested in a 
number of social upheavals. The continued expansion of the estates 
brought increasing burdens for the peasants. Despite the abolition 
of the appanage system, the granting of individual land rights and 
the introduction of the poll-tax, conditions in Surakarta were far 
from satisfactory. Although the poll-tax was intended to replace the
65 On the early years of the BU, see Nagazumi Akira, The Dawn of
Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo,
1908-1918 (Tokyo, Insticute of Developing Economies, 1972).
66 R.C. Kwantes (ed.), De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische 
Beweging in Netherlandsch-Indie, vol.l (Groningen, H.D. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1975), pp.57, 113.
67 Sarekat Islam Lokal, Penerbitan Sumber-Sumber Sejarah, no.7 
(Jakarta, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1975), p.327.
68 For details on this point, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest 
Movements, pp.142-85.
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various feudal services, these were still widely imposed in this region. 
The peasants responded to these very real burdens by resisting taxes 
and all kinds of feudal services.
The dangers inherent in the plantation system of Surakarta 
became clear when Haji Misbach entered villages in Klaten regency in 
order to agitate politically. Haji Misbach, the son of a Surakarta
batik dealer, had joined the SI in its early years. According to
69Dutch accounts, Misbach was extremely popular in the region of 
Surakarta. His teaching had elements of indigenous tradition, Islam, 
and Marxism.^ Pringgodigdo^ identified Misbach as 'seorang komunis- 
keagamaan', a religious communist. As a Muslim, Misbach relied on 
the teachings of the Quran. On the other hand, as a communist, he 
objected to the existence of varied classes in society.
72According to two 1920 reports by the resident of Surakarta,
Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Haji Misbach had successfully stirred up
villagers in Klaten to refuse compulsory labour for both the villages
and the estates. Apparently the peasants were angry about the increase
of labour obligations on the estates and complained about the taxes
imposed in the reorganization of the agrarian system in the
principalities in 1918. The radicalism of Tjipto Mangunkusumo was
also of long standing. In the early years of BU, Tjipto had represented
the most radical view of the younger members, and he desired to lead
7 3BU down a more radical course. In 1909 he had resigned from the 
Board of BU and later became one of the prominent leaders of the 
Indies Party (Indische Partij)74 In 1913 Tjipto, charged with
£>g As cited in Ruth T. McVcy, The Rise of Indonesian Communism 
(Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965), p.173.
70 Ibid., pp.171-72.
71 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia (Djakarta, 
P.T. Pustaka Rakjat, 1973), pp.36-37.
72 R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling, vol.l, pp.266-69, 276-78.
73 Nagazumi Akira, op.cit., pp.56, 186: note 87, Tjipto was born
in 1886, entered Stovia on 1 March 1899 and graduated on
28 October 1905.
74 Ibid., pp.54-55.
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subversive activity in this party, was exiled to Banda and then to
75Holland before being allowed to return to Java in 1914. Tjipto 
rejected the world of the kraton and its feudal privileges. He once 
deliberately brought his buggy onto the alun-alun of Surakarta, 
in an attempt to break the Kraton regulation forbidding anybody but 
a noble to do so. 6^
During 1919-20, Tjipto carried his revolutionary activity,
in the name of the Sarekat Ilindia, to the villages surrounding
Delanggu (Klaten regency), including Polanharjo, Tempel, Ketandan
and Ceper. Peasants were urged to refuse obligatory labour -
horendienst, desadlenst and cultuurdienst. Tjipto's propaganda had
its effect. People in the area of Polanharjo alarmed the colonial
authorities by their refusal of cultuurdienst, and their burning
of plantation sheds In April 1920 some 2,200 people attended a
joint meeting of the Sarekat Ilindia (the new name of the Indies Party)
and SI in the district of Delanggu. They heard Misbach talk of
initiating an economic action against the colonial government "J9 
79Dutch spokesmen tended to consider Haji Misbach's followers as a 
terrorist and bandit group because of Misbach's radical propaganda 
when he joined the Sarekat Rakyat in Solo. Sarekat Rakyat was the 
new name of the Sarekat Islam Merah (the Red SI) a rural mass movement
80under the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party).
75 A.K. Pringgodogdo, Sedjarah, p.23.
M. Balfas, Dr Tijpto Mangoenkoesoemo; Demokrat sedjati (Djakarta, 
Djambatan, 1952), pp.38-39.
77 R.C. Kwantes, De Qntwikkeling, I, p.277.
78 Ibid., p.267.
7g E.g., J.Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in
Nederlandsch-Indie (Harrlem, H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1931), p.116.
ßü When Darsono replaced Semaun as the PKI leader in May 1923, he 
formed the Red SI branches and changed the name of the Red SI 
to Sarekat Rakyat. The Sarekat Rakyat was a place for selecting 
militant members for entrance into the PKI. For details see 
A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp.36-37; Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., 
pp.155-57.
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Darsono, who led the PKI from 1923, stressed the importance of influencing 
the SI from within. For such a policy a person like Misbach, who 
accepted communist ideas while being aware of Quranic teachings, was 
extremely important. Emphasizing the similarity of the social 
doctrines of Islam and Communism, Misbach began with the slogan sama rasa, 
sama rata, or 'same feeling, same level'. Misbach asserted that Islam, 
like communism, rejected a class division in society 81
Misbach and Tjij;>to Mangunkusumo both distrusted the 
authorities and the plantation owners, with whom they were constantly 
at odds.8“ They successfully stirred up the villagers in Central Java, 
particularly Surakarta, against the government from 1919 to 1923.
In 1924 their radical career was ended. Tjipto Mangunkusumo, after 
the Indies Party disintegrated as a result of internal conflict, 88 
could find no proper channel for his radicalism. In 1928 he was 
once again exiled from Java by the government. Haji Misbach was also 
exiled, to Manokwari, in June 1924. His wife, who joined him in exile, 
died in 1925, and he himself died in early 1926. 8^
The social unrest of villagers in the plantation areas is 
easy to understand. They were subject to pressure of a dual nature - 
from the rulers and from the planters who exploited the rights of the 
rulers. The sugar estates had always been the focus for this latent 
social unrest. As Jacoby asserted: 88
81 J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, op.cit., pp.115-16. In Javanese 
society the term 'sama rasa, sama rata', as explained by Bodronojo, 
a prominent communist at the regency of Klaten, quite often
means adil (just) in political, economic and social shares. 
Interview with Bodronojo, 13 September 1979.
82 Misbach's attitude was influenced by the Red SI. See Ruth T.
McVey, op.cit., pp.170-72.
83 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.78.
84 Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., p.424.
85 Erich H. Jacoby, Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1949), p.57.
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the area of sugar production has for decades been 
the classical stage for social unrest. It is the 
center of social pressure, latent resistance, and 
open clashes. In the social pattern of Java, the 
sugar plantation, though operating only on rented 
lands, takes the place of large-scale land 
concentrations in other countries of this area.
The peasants' opposition to taxes and other services found
a new channel after the Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta (Association of
the People of Surakarta) or PKS was established in June 1932. Its
founder was Raden Pandji Singgih, who was born in 1894 in Malang,
East Java, and graduated in Law from the University of Leiden. From
1920 he was a member of Dudi Utomo, and in 1930 he served as a
8&secretary of this organization. From 1920 to 1923 he also took
an active role in the Indonesische Studie Club. When the PBI
(Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia - Union of the Indonesian Nation) was
established in January 1931, Singgih was one of its prominent leaders.
Like other leaders of PBI, Singgih also joined actively in the Rukun
Tani (Peasant Association), established in 1932 under the auspices 
87of the PBI. lie was also very active on the staff of the journalQ 0Timboel, based in Surakarta.
From 1932 to 1942 Singgih led the PKS. He was assisted by 
some important aristocrats, including RMTH Sumodiningrat (adviser), 
Gusti Pangeran Haryo Djojokusumo and Mas Pringgowinoto. Sumodinigrat 
was born on 7 May 1904 in Surakarta, the grandchild of Paku Buwono X. 
He graduated from the Leiden Law Faculty in 1935 and thereafter 
represented a crucial link between the nationalist intelligentsia 
and the kraton. While he was in the PKS, Sumodiningrat apportioned
80 Prang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (Djakarta, Gunseikanboe, 
2604 [1944]), p.16. See also A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.53.
87 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp.111-12.
88 Timboel, I, no. 5., 1927.
89 GPU Djoj°kusumo was Lhe son of Paku' Uuwcno X. He was not 
very active in the PKS. Mas Pringgowinoto was an official of 
the Susuhunan and was very active in the PBI and Fukun Tani. 
Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
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his activities among several political organizations. From 1936 to 
1942 he was a deputy chairman of the Surakarta branch of Parindra 
(Partui Indonesia Raya). lie also chaired the cultural and educational 
movement Narpowandowo during the period 1938-45.
The initiative for the formation of the PKS came from leaders
of the PBI, and especially from R.P. Singgih himself. They argued
that an organization with members from all social levels ought to be
91established in Surakarta. Apparently the PKS was also inspired by 
the PKN (Pakempalan Kawulo Ngajogjakarta); it had been established 
in June 1930 by nobles of Jogjakarta, though its members consisted 
mostly of peasants. The goals of PKN were to strengthen the Sultanate 
of Jogjakarta and to achieve better economic conditions for the 
population. ^2
In 1933 the PKM (Pakempalan Kawulo Mangkunegaran) was also
established, apparently in imitation of the PKN and the PKS. The PKM
was of less interest to peasants, probably because its goal was the
unity of the pooulation in the territory oi the Mangkunegaran rather
93than solving the various problems of the oppressed peasants. Three
years after its formation the PKM therefore declined rapidly. Most94peasants who had previously joined the PKM then entered the PKS.
In fact the programmes of the PKS were more closely related to the 
burdens of the peasants.
90 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979. For details see
'Sumodiningrat: Riwayat Hidup/Perjoangan1, typescript, Surakarta,
1977. This may be found in Sumodiningrat1s private collection.
91 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.126.
92 An excellent analysis of the PKN is W.J. O'Malley, Indonesian
In the Gioat Depression: A Study of East Sumatra and Jogjakarta
in the 1930s • ,Ph.D thesis, Cornell University, 1977 (University 
Microfilm, Ann Arbor, 1979), pp.305-41.
Interview with Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, 14 July 1979.
This was clearly seen in the subdistrict of Jumapolo, where in 
1937 most members of PKM joined the PKS. Interview with Darmanto, 
8 October 1979. For the decline of the PKM see also Pringgodigdo, 
Sedjarah, p.126.
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The programmes of the PKS were clearly apparent at its
first congress in 1935, held on the alun-alun kidul (the south
great square) of the kraton of the Susuhunan. Thirty thousand
95members were estimated to have attended. At this congress the leaders 
of tht. PKS announced the goals of their organization: first, to unite
the people of the Kasunanan; second, to improve the living conditions 
of the people; third, to attempt to strengthen the principality.
The PKS had many branches in the villages, especially in 
the regencies of Klaten, Karanganyar and Sragen. Most members of the 
PKS were illiterate farmers, and there were few members from the city 
of Solo. Its organization was as follows: Puser (central PKS),
Jogyantoro (branch), Parantoro (local branch), pembarep (chairman), 
penghulu (secretary), hartoko (treasury) and wargo (members). In 1939 
a youth organization of the PKS, the so-called Bledug Menggala (bledug = 
young elephant; manggala = lucky, prominent) was formed. Most members 
of this organization were young villagers. They were trained in the 
skills of the scout movement by the members of the PBI. From 1939 
to the end of 1941, the Bledug Manggala functioned to guard the 
security of rural meetings of the PKS.^
According to Sumodiningrat, who followed the development of 
the PKS closely, after 1935 the PKS grew very aggressive. The peasants 
began to refuse to pay the poll-tax, and they attempted to replace 
those lurah desa (village headmen) who were identified as helpers of 
the Dutch. Mr Singgih's speeches during his tours of Surakarta rural 
areas in 1935-39 seemed to have an effect. Most of his speeches 
opposed the poll-tax and compulsory labour fo2' the estates.
As a result of the increasing tempo of rural meetings of
the PKS, the Dutch imprisoned many important local leaders of the PKS
in 1937. Licences for PKS rural meetings became very difficult to
obtain. The assistant wedono (sub-district officers) increasingly
9 7controlled all activities of the PKS.
95 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
96 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
97 Interview with pawiro- Granggang, a prominent PKS leader in 
Kedawung sub-district; he was once imprisoned for several weeks 
by the Dutch. Interview, 27 August 1979.
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When the PBI merged into Parindra in 1935 most of the 
aristocratic leaders of PKS followed suit by also joining the new 
party. Although the PKS in this later period was influenced by 
Parindra, this was a less direct political influence than that of 
PBI had been in 1930-35. Parindra members were limited to the priyayi 
group, whereas the PBI, through the Rukun Tani channel, had been able 
to accept peasants as members of the PBI. Accordingly the influence 
oi thu Parindra was only limited to top leaders ol the PKS.
In the period ol Lhu PKS there was also a protest movement 
with messianic features. It occurred .in the regency of Wonogiri in 
1935 and was popularly called the Tambakmerang Affair. The movement 
was led by Kyai Wirasandjaja, a villager who had received ng^lmu 
(teaching), prophesying that the golden age would come and that 
people merely by staying at home would receive gold and diamonds.
This teaching had drawn peasants to leave their villages and their 
work to become the students of Wirasandjaja. Supported by his 
followers, Wirasandjaja declared himself the Ratu Adil (Just King) 
and built a complex of buildings comprising eighteen houses in the 
style of the Susuhunan's kraton. Wirasandjaja's followers served in 
his houses every day and took part in the life of his kraton. The 
movement was ended when the regent of Wonogiri used police to stop 
Wirasandjaja 1s dangerous movement. 98
Wirasandjaja had no relations with the PKS movement. His 
prophecy was apparently in the same tradition as the Mangkuwidjaja 
Affair and the Srikaton Affair, based on the Jayabaya prophecy and the 
coming of the Ratu Adil. 99
Although the PKS movement had the character of a modern 
peasant organization, its leaders also used the Jayabaya prophecy 
as a means of strengthening the goals of their organization. They 
believed that the colonial period was to be succeeded by a golden age
98 Sartono Kartodirdjo, Tjatatan, pp.20-21.
yg For details on an earlier study of Ratu Adil movements in Java, 
see G.W.J. Drewes, Drie Javaansche Goeroe's. Hun Leven, 
Onderricht en Messiasprediking (Leiden, Drukkerij A. Vros, 1925), 
pp.10-49; cf. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements, passim.
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in which the peasants would finally obtain prosperity.
Colonialism had given rise to latent rural unrest in 
Surakarta, which eventually took the form of peasant movements of 
various kinds. The Dutch authority had taken over the feudal rights 
of the Surakarta aristocrats, and had then maximised the obligations 
of the peasants for the needs of a Dutch-dominated modern capitalist 
economy.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION
On 15 February 1942, Singapore fell into the hands of
Japanese military forces. As a result of this, Java lost its powerful
shield.^ The main cities in Java, Batavia and Surabaya were occupied
on 5 and 7 March respectively. On 8 March, General Imamura Hitoshi,
Commander-in-Chief, demanded that his surrender terms be accepted
unconditionally. On 9 March, the Governor-General of Netherlands
India transferred his authority to the Japanese, and control of
2Java passed into the hands of the Japanese military forces.
Java was important to the Japanese in many respects, for it 
had considerable resources and a number of important oil refineries. 
The island, the most densely populated in Indonesia, was the 
administrative, industrial and vital working centre.
The Dutch in Surakarta burned the oil depot at Ngemplak,
in the northern part of the city, on 2 March 1942 to prevent it
3falling into the hands of the Japanese. According to Mangkunegaran
4sources, the Japanese entered the city of Surakarta on 5 March 1942.
1 P.S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia (London, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1951), p.57.
2 For this point, see George S. Kanahele, The Japanese Occupation
of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence, Ph.D thesis, Cornell
University,1967 (University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, 1970), p.22;
A.A. Zorab, De Japanse Bezetting van Indonesie en Haar 
Volkenrechtelijke Zijde (1s-Gravenhage, N.V. Drukkerij Trio,
1954), p.30.
3 See'sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam Daerah Karesidenan Surakarta:
Periode Pertama Tahun 1942-1948, typescript', Surakarta, Sedjarah 
Militer Angkatan Darat, 15 September 1960, p.3.
4 See 'Aanteekeningen Omtrent de Mangkoenegaran. in de Maart dagen 1942', 
typescript, Soerakarta, 1942, p.2. This date was the same as that
in sources kept in the library of the Sedjarah Militer Angkatan 
Darat of Surakarta. See'sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam', p.3. On the 
other hand, Djajusman has given a different date, 7 March 1942.
See Djajusman, Hancurnya Angkatan Perang Hindia Belanda (KNIL), 
(Bandung, Penerbit Angkasa, 1978), pp.189-90.
Dutch forces in Surakarta were very weak and offered no resistance.
With the surrender, the Legion of Mangkunegaran, which had functioned 
to assist the Dutch troops and guard the security of the Mangkunegaran 
territories, was disbanded by the Japanese.^
The commander of the Japanese Military Forces in Surakarta,
H. Funabiki, announced to the people that they should be opposed to
7both the Dutch and the Chinese. Dutch houses in the Bandjarsari
complex and Chinese shops all over Surakarta were sacked by the people.
Some days later, the Japanese announced that the booty from this0
plunder h£id to be handed over to the Japanese authorities.
CHANCES IN THE ADMINISTRATION
The first formal meeting between the Japanese and Susuhunan 
Pakubuwono XI and Prince Mangkunegoro VII was held on 14 March at the
9Sasanamulya, a place of ceremonial meetings for the Susuhunan family. 
This meeting was intended to introduce the new Japanese authorities 
in Surakart£i and to discuss the future government of the Kasunanan 
and the Mangkunegaran. It was continued four days later, on IB March. 
Colonel Nakayama, head of the Public Affairs Department (Somobucho) 
in Batavia, and General Harada, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 16th Army,
5 The Dutch military forces, the KNIL (the Koninklijk Nederlandsche 
Indisch Leger), consisted in Central Java of only one detachment, 
which was a combination of battalions from Jogjakarta, Surakarta 
and Salatiga; it was complemented by units of the Legion of 
Mangkunegaran. Djajusman, op.cit., p.178.
6 'Aanteekeningen', p.2. Initially, Daendels intended the Legion 
to strengthen Dutch troops in Central Java against the British 
invasion in 1811. From its earliest days, the Legion had been 
prepared as an auxiliary force to help the Dutch military forces. 
See H.F . Aukes, Het Legioen van Mangkoe Negoro (Bandung, A.C.
Nix & Co., MCMXXXV [193'»]), pp. 30-31.
7 'Sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam', p.3.
8 Interview with Sudarjo, 3 September 1979.
9 Aanteekeningen', p.3.
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attended both meetings, and discussed the form of the princely
governments. Colonel Nakayama announced at the second meeting:
The status of the Surakarta principality is in 
principle acknowledged as similar co that, under 
the Dutch regime. Jogjakarta and Surakarta 
principalities are not included in the Central 
Java region, but will be directly governed by the 
Japanese Military Administration in Batavia. For 
this purpose the Japanese government would like to 
form a Central Committee for the Surakarta 
principality. 1°
With the establishment of the Japanese Military Administration
in March 1942, the political contract between the Dutch regime and
the Susuhunan was naturally abrogated. In March and April 1942,
according to Zorab1s analysis of the stages of Japanese authority,^1
the Japanese in Surakarta were in the stage of the transfer of
authority. In April, they gave effect to the decisions of the meetings
of 14 and 18 March, setting up the BPK (Badan Pengawas Kerajaan)
12for the principaJities of Jogjakarta and Surakarta. The chairman
of the BPK was a high Indonesian official in Batavia named Kohri,^ -3
and two other principal members were Japanese, S. Yoshigawa supervising
the Jogjakarta principality and H. Funabiki administering the
14principality of Surakarta. On 6 April, Kohri and his staff met with 
the Sultan and Prince Paku Alam; the next day, 7 April, the BPK 
visited the Susuhunan and Prince Mangkunegoro.^-^
With the Japanese Military Administration controlling Surakarta,
10 'Aanteekeningen, pp.4-5.
11 Zorab saw three stages of Japanese authority in Java: the transfer
of authority) conuolidationj and tho period of political chanyuj
op.cit., p.30.
12 Sedhiya Tama, no.94, 11 April 1942.
13 'Aanteekeningen, pp.4-5.
14 H. Funabiki was the commander of the Japanese military forces 
which occupied the city of Surakarta on 5 March 1942. His name 
has been popular thereafter. See 'Sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam',
p. 3.
15 Sedhiya Tama, no.94, 11 April 1942.
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the policy of heightening mass feeling against the Dutch was continued.
In May 1942 the Japanese police announced that inhabitants of Surakarta
were prohibited from keeping awards given them by the Dutch. These
had to be handed in to the Japanese military office. This is
particularly ironic in the face of all the Dutch (and other) medals
and orders that used to wear.^ In the same period, people were
£3rohibited from singing the Dutch national anthem, and even 'Indonesia
Raya.' was banned. Instead the Kimi Gayo, the Japanese national
1 7anthem, was required for formal occasions in Surakarta.
Further steps were taken regarding the prohibition of the 
Dutch language both in daily conversation and on the telephonedü 
Other languages of the Allies were also prohibited. Shops with Dutch 
names had to change them into Indonesian or Japanese ones The 
Japanese also forbade people to read books which described the western 
world.
With the Japanese prohibiting Indonesians from using the 
Dutch language, the importance of Dutch as a means of graceful 
conversation among the cultured group decreased rapidly. In assessing 
Japanese language policy, Takdir Alisjahbana concluded that the invaders 
wanted to make Japanese the main language in the archipelago. In
the early stages of adjustment, however, they had to allow the use of
20the Indonesian language as the most practical step, if the energies
16 This prohibition was issued in a circular letter of the Surakarta 
Police Office, dated 12 May 1942.
17 Letters from the Surakarta Police Office to the Regent of 
Surakarta city of the Mangkunegaran administration; dated
12 May 1942, no.1220/S II/301/7; 19 May 1942, no.1218/302/7.
18 This statement was found in the Pengoemoeman Kantor Besar Poelisi 
Balatontara Dal Nippon di Soerakarta, 29 September 2602 [1942].
It was also found in the circulation letter of the Surakarta 
Kochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan on 10 December 2602, no.A/8130/29.
19 Makloemat SoerakartaKochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan- 5 November 2602;
Kan Po, I, no.5, October 1942, p.15; I, no.l, November 1942,
p. 20.
20 Takdir Alisjahbana, 'The Indonesian Language, By-product of 
Nationalism', Pacific Affairs, vol.22, no.4, December 1949, pp.389-90.
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of the Indonesian people were to be involved in the Japanese war 
effort.21
On 30 July 1942, Hitoshi Imamura, commander of the 16th 
Army und supreme authority over Government affairs in Java, formally 
issued an important order to Paku Buwono XI concerning the status of 
the autonomous areas in Java. Its contents were as follows:
1. The Commander of the Japanese Army appoints Paku 
Buwono XI as the ruler (head of the autonomous 
area) of Surakarta.
2. The Susuhunan shall be subordinate to the 
Commander of the Japanese Army and shall conduct 
government affairs in the autonomous area on the 
basis of the Commander's orders.
3. The jurisdictional area of the autonomous area 
shall be the existing territory of the realm of 
the Susuhunan of Surakarta.
4. The customary privileges exercised by the Susuhunan 
shall be acknowledged in principle.
5. The Susuhunan shall be responsible to the Commander 
of the Japanese Army for conducting the government 
affairs of the autonomous area.
6. For the present, the political structure of the 
autonomous area shall follow the existing pattern 
except where specifically determined otherwise.
7. In order to guide and supervise the government 
affairs of the autonomous area, the Japanese Army 
Commander shall create an Administrative Office in 
the autonomous area and appoint a Director for that 
office.
8. The principles governing the government affairs of 
the autonomous area shall be separately outlined by 
the Superintendent of Military Administration.22
At Batavia, on the same date - 30 July 1942 - Imamura 
installed Susuhunan Paku Buwono XI as Solo Ko (head of principality
21 Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (Washington, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, JPRS, 1959), p.219.
22 Hitoshi Imamura's orders can be found in H.J. Benda et al.,
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected
Documents, Translation Series, no.6, Southeast Asia Studies, 
Yale University, 1965, p.60. For a different translation of 
the orders by the JPRS, see Japanese Military Administration, 
p.145.
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of Surakarta). At this ceremony the commander proclaimed:
On this day, Solo Ko and your family have united 
with Dai Nippon and we hope you and your family 
will live in peace. We also understand Solo Ko 
will do great works in the future .23
Within the system outlined for autonomous areas on 30 July, 
the Mangkunegaran principality was also declared an autonomous area.
On 14 August 1942, Prince Mangkunegoro VII was installed as
p aMangkunegoro Ko by General Imamura. He too was declared subordinate 
to the Japanese Military Administration on the understanding that he 
possessed his previous privileges and administered the Mangkunegaran 
Köchi (Principality). After his installation, Prince Mangkunegoro VII 
instructed his people to obey Japanese military orders, and to work 
together with the Japanese nation to build a new society in Java. 25
The three provinces of Dutch Java were abolished by the
Japanese, and instead seventeen Shü, corresponding to old residencies,
26were set up as the highest regional administrative units, This 
division excluded the four principalities, the Kasultanan, Paku Alaman, 
Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran, which were specially designated as K5chi 
and were placed directly under the Japanese Military Administration 
in Batavia.'“^
Surakarta Köchi was headed by the K5chi Jimu Kyoku ChSkan 
(head of the permanent secretariat for the principality). KeLko Mayano 
was the first Chokan of Surakarta and head of the Japanese Military
23 Kan Po, I, no.l, August 1942; see also Makloemat & Oendang-Oendang 
Balatentara Dai Nippon 1942, pp.13 A-14 A.
24 The installation ceremony was presided over by Colonel Nakayama, 
while Major-General Okazaki read the letter of appointment. On 
the same date, Prince Paku Alam VIII of Jogjakarta was installed
as Paku Alam K5. See Pandji Poestaka, no.20, 22 August 1942, p.686; 
Kan Po, I, no.l, August 1942, p.22.
25 Makloemat Mangkoenegaran Koo, no.l, 20 August 1942.
26 'Regional Government Law of 1942', nos 27 and 28 in Kan Po, I, 
no.l, August 1942, pp.7-8, and Asia Raya, no.114, 31 August 1942.
27 Kan Po, I, no.2, August 1942, p.5.
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28 _Administration there." In practice, both Solo Ko and Mangkunegoro Ko 
lost all of their authority, becoming only symbols of local government. 
Their activities in administration, in military affairs, in law and 
in the economy were limited by Japanese Military Administration rules, 
and their policies were dictated by the Superintendent of Military 
Administration of the autonomous area.^9
At the lower administrative levels, the Köchi were governed
in exactly the same way as the Shu in the remainder of Java. The
K5chi or Shü were subdivided into Ken (the old regency), and Ken
again subdivided into Gun (district). Below the Gun were the Son
(subdistrict), and the Ku_ (village or desa). The heads of these
districts, ail Indonesians, were called Ken Ch5, Gun Cho, Son Chö and
3 0Ku Cho, respectively. There were also Shi (municipality), subdivided 
into Shiku (wards). The heads of Shü were Shü Chokan, most of whom
j Iwere Japanese. Generally, these were experienced civil servants from
32Japan's provincial administration, without any knowledge of Java.
The administrative divisions in Surakarta Kochi, as elsewhere, 
reflected the traditional ones. There were merely changes of titles, 
and in fact Javanese traditional titles continued to be used in referring 
to the new Japanese r a n k s . T h e  Javanese language continued as the means
of social and formal communication within the inner administration of
34the kraton, but Indonesian was often used by Javanese officials to 
communicate with the Japanese.
2.8 Kan Po, I, no.2, September 1942, p.8.
29 For complete instructions from the Superintendent to the head 
of autonomous area, see H.J. Benda, et al., op.cit., pp.62-63.
30 Makloemat & Oendang-Oendang Balatentara Dai Nippon 1942, pp. 
49-51.
31 For a list of the names of Shü Chokan of seventeen Shü, see 
Kan Po, I, no.2, September 1942, pp.7-8.
32 G.S. Kanahele, op.cit. , p,60.
33 For example, Ken Cho could use a title Kanjpngr or .Kanjeng Raden 
Mas Haryo. See Makloemat Mangkoenegoro Koo, no.l, 9 December 1943.
34 Interview with KRT Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979.
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In order to establish a direct chain of command in the 
bureaucratic system as well as to eliminate colonial practices, the 
Japanese abolished the Dutch official ranks of Governor, Assistant
Resident and Controleur. Accordingly, the dualistic feature of Dutch
35rule disappeared.
Because of a lack of Japanese personnel, the Japanese Military
3GAdministration continued to employ the local priyayis. But Japanese 
officials were constantly suspicious of the actions of Javanese officials, 
particularly the Ken Cho and the Ku Chö. After 1943, the suspicious 
Kempeitai (the Japanese Military Police) travelled to villages at least
once every month. A description by one of these visits is given by
37Soekardi, who stressed the suspicion of the Kempeitai,
My father and my father-in-law, who were Ku Cho in 
the subdistrict of Kedawung, were always being 
asked by the Japanese police about meetings held by 
the villagers. The Japanese police were always 
coming with the Son Ch5 to interview my father and 
my father-in-law, about whether they had ever held 
political meetings.
Although the Susuhunan was still on his throne, his authority
35 The same result occurred in the city of Surabaya; see W.H.
Frederick, Indonesian Urban Society in Transition: Surabaya
1926-1946, Ph.D thesis, University of Hawaii, 1978, p.395.
86 H.J. Benda had remarked that in the beginning of the Japanese 
occupation in Java, the Japanese were greatly hampered by a 
shortage of personnel. In addition, the Japanese would continue 
to rely on the priyayi for many years to come. See H.J. Benda, 
'The Beginning of the Japanese Occupation of Java', The Far 
Eastern Quarterly, vol.XV, no.4, August 1956, p.544; cf. Anthony 
Reid, 'The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: 
Northern Sumatra in 1942', The Journal of Asian Studies, vol.35, 
no.l, November 1975, p,50.
37 Soekardi was born on 2 May 1916, the son of the village head of 
Bendungan, subdistrict of Kedawung, Sragen regency. He graduated 
from primary school in 1929. In the Dutch period, he had been
a teacher (1933-34). During the Japanese occupation, he was 
a deputy chairman of the Badan Oeroesan Makanan Rakyat (BOMR) and 
was the leader of Keibodan (Vigilance Guard). Interview with 
Soekardi, 31 July 1979.
38 Interview with Soekardi, 31 July 1979.
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was seriously reduced by the Japanese Military Administration, After
1943, the financial affairs of Solo Ko were regulated and determined
39by the Kochi Jirqu ICyoku Chokan. Various local taxes and other revenues 
collected by the Japanese Military Administration were not given to 
the Solo Kd.‘1() All local industries, whether of production or marketing, 
had to follow regulations set by the Japanese Military Administration.
A regulation of June 1942 limited the batik industry and the textile 
industry to only 25 per cent and 50 per cen: respectively of their 
1941 production .41 Tho resultant decrease in government revenue from 
taxes on these industries contributed to the problem of pangreh praja 
salaries in the principality.
A new administrative institution introduced in the Japanese 
period was Lhe Tonart Guini (Neighbourhood Association). This was formed 
in 1943 as the basic unit of rural organization, and consisted of ten 
to twenty households/1“ The head of a Tonari Gumi, elected by its 
members, was called Kuinjcho. The basic organization of the Tonari Gumi 
was modelled on a Japanese institution set up in cities and villages 
in Japan.
In the Surakarta Kochi, the Japanese issued a special regulation 
on the Tonari Gumi^  even though in practice its functions were exactly 
the same as in other places in Java, There were three main functions:
39 See Petoendjoek Gunseikan Kepada Koo Tentang Penjelenggaraan 
Keoeangan Kooti (Djakarta, 20 May 2603 11943]), pp.1-2.
40 Ibid., p.2. In order to improve tax collections, the Mangkunegaran 
Kochi reorganized the system under new guide lines, giving the
Ku Chö 2 per cent commission on all taxes they gathered. See 
Pengoemoeman Mangkoenegaran Koo, 31 December 2602 (1942), no.6447/24.
See Makloemat Dai Nippon Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 10 June 1942.
42 Himpoenan Oendang-Oendang dan Makloemat: Makloemat Pemerintah
Dal Nippon 2604 [1944], for Tonari Gumi in che Köchi area,
PP.1A-4A. According to Kanahele, the Tonari Gumi was first 
instituted in March 1943 in Bandung and then in Jogjakarta; 
op.cit., p.305, note 34.
43 G.W, Overdijkink, Het Indonesische Problem (1s-Gravenhage, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1946), p.30.
44 Before being formally established, the Tonari Gumi had to be approved 
by Kochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan and Solo Ko. Himpoenan Oendang-Oendang, 
2604, pp.lA-4A, especially article 9.
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1. to make propaganda for all Japanese Military objectives 
in the villages;
2. to form the base on which cooperative work would be 
conducted;
4 S3. to help the Japanese in conducting the war. ^
If these goals were to be achieved, the Japanese needed the 
'i'onari Gumi to function at maximal efficiency and the Kumicho to have 
good leadership. For this purpose, in November 1944, special workshops 
were held throughout Java to train the K u m i c h o In Surakarta Kochi, 
these workshops, called Kondan Kai Tonari Gumi^ (question-and-answer 
forum) were held in each Ken. Problems discussed included foodstuffs, 
clothes, and the training and recruitment of manpower for the defence 
of the motherland.
The Tonari Gumi organization struck deep roots in the society.
On 30 September 1945 the Tonari Gumi in Surakarta changed its name to 
Rukun Tetangga (rukun = in harmony; tetangga = neighbour)^ but 
continued to exist in its old form. With the formation of Tonari Gumi, 
in fact, the Japanese were able to maximize the cooperation of the rural 
people in their war efforts. The mobilization of people was thus more 
easily achieved in the villages.
For some weeks after the proclamation of Indonesian independence 
on 17 August 1945, the Japanese-inspired administrative structure of 
the Surakarta Kochi continued. It was not until after the establishment 
of the KNID (the Komite Nasional Indonesia Daerah - the Regional 
Indonesian National Committee) of Surakarta in September 1945 that the 
administrative structure began to change.
Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, the political 
situation in the courts of Surakarta was dominated by the deaths of
‘‘J Mai Tonari Gumi1, Bendel Djaman Djepang 1944-1945, no.29,
AMN.
46 Kanahele, op.cit., p.145
47 Mai Tonari Gumi1, AMN.
'Laporan Rapat Tonari Gumi Pemerintah Mangkunegaran', typescript, 
Surakarta, 30 September 1945, AMN.
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Mangkunegoro VII and Susuhunan Paku Buwono XI. Prince Mangkunegoro VII,
the first Kö of the Mangkunegaran principality, died on 19 July 1944.
He had been crowned on 3 March 1916, and gained enormous experience in
49organization and administration. His young son BRM Sarosa replaced
him as Mangkunegoro VIII and Mangkunegoro Ko. Sarosa was born on 1
January 1920 and graduated from a Eurooese Lagere School in 1932, from
Mulo in 1936 and from AMS in 1939. In 1941-42 he had attended a
military course in Jlandung (the Reserve Officers Corps). He also
joined in the military training of Peta (Defender of the Motherland)
50in 1943.
Susuhunan Paku Buwono XI was a very weak figure in comparison 
to his long reigning predecessor, Paku Buwono X, or to Mangkunegoro VII. 
This weakness was caused by the opposing influence of certain senior 
princes during his reign and by the fact that Paku Buwono XI, before he 
was crowned, had had little experience outside of the court. As the 
eldest son of Susuhunan Paku Buwono X, he had been raised to his position 
on 26 April ly35, and his death some weeks before the proclamation of 
independence gave him little time to demonstrate any skills in office.
Raden Mas Surjoguritno, born on 14 April 1925, had been 
nominated as the Crown Prince to succeed his father and installed in 
this capacity, with the name KGPH Purubojo, on 16 December 1943.
Crowned on 12 July 1945, he was still only twenty years old when he 
became Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII. Despite the revolutionary times in 
which he lived, Paku Buwono XII's lifestyle emulated more indulgent eras 
of the past. He kept both a legal wife (garwo padmi) and several 
concubines (selir) with him in the kraton. In addition some of his 
sexual adventures outside the kraton became widely known.
Because he was so young, some senior pangerans constituted a 
governing committee to help the new ruler. Its members were GPH 
Hadiwidjojo (chairman), GPH Surjohamidjojo, and GPH Djojokasumo.
In practice, however, daily administration
49 His original name fuid been R.M. Surjosuparto, and he was a son of 
Mangkunegoro V. In brief, his experiences were as follows: 
1902-06, he worked in the Dutch administrative office at Demak, 
Central Java; in 1904 he received the title Bendoro Raden Mas 
Harjo; 1909-13, he studied in Holland; in 1915 he became junior 
conuroleur in the Department of Agrarian Affairs in Surakarta; 
1915-16, he was chairman of Budi Utomo; 1918-21, he was a member 
of Volksraad; Darmokondo, no.128, 14 June 1939; Pewarta Oemoem, 
no.49, 3 March 1941.
50 Based on the archive 'SP Mangkunegoro VIII', AMN.
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and policy were in the hands of the Papatih Dalem (grand vizier),
51Sosrodiningrat, and the . Kanjeng Ratu (the Queen Mother).
During their reigns, the young rulers were used by the
Japanese to increase the mobilization of pemuda (youth) entering the
52Seinendan (Youth Corps). Both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro
addressed various pemuda meetings and also broadcast on the radio .53
In March 1945 when the Gerakan Hidup Baru (New Life Movement) was
begun by the Japanese, the rulers were also involved as local leaders 
54of this movement. The Japanese, it is clear, had no difficulty in 
dominating the young rulers.
Politically, the role of the Mangkunegoro Ko was still seen 
by the colonial power as a means of controlling the Susuhunan, as in 
Dutch days. The rivalry between the Sunanate and the Mangkunegoro, 
which had endured for almost 200 years, was continued by the two young 
rulers. This was a notable feature when crisis overtook the 
principalities late in 1945 and the young rulers faced bitter local 
opposition from mass movements refusing to acknowledge their legitimacy. 
This is discussed in detail in Chapter IV below.
ECONOMIC PRESSURE
Within a few months after the Japanese occupation began,
Javanese society was already beginning to experience economic difficulty.55 
Initially, this was caused by the chaos resulting from the Japanese-
51 This point is from a personal interview with KRT Darjonegoro, 
December 1979.
52 For details on the mobilization of pemuda in Surakarta, see Bendel 
Djaman Djepang 1944-1945, no.56, AMN;
53 The Surakarta radio was called Solo Iiosokyoku, Most programmes 
contained Japanese pro£)aganda to support the spirit of the war.
Its programmes may be found in Berita Radio Solo Hosokyoku, no.8, 
21-27 February 1943.
54 For details on the discussion of the Gerakan Hidup Baru see the 
following pages.
I.J. Brugmans, et al. (eds), Nederlandsch-Indie Onder Japanse 
Bezetting. Gegevens en Documenten over de Jaren 1942-1945 
(Franeker, T. Wever, 1960), pp.486-87.
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inspired looting of factories, Chinese shops and Dutch houses,' This 
campaign was intended to encourage anti-European sentiment, but shortly 
afterwards the Japanese took steps to collect the goods which had been 
stolen during that time of disruption.
The chaotic situation and uncertain atmosphere were added to
by the fact that officials went unpaid for some time after the Japanese
arrival, forcing many people to barter their goods for foodstuffs.
In the months of March, April and May of 1942, a new phenomenon appeared,
with the sides of the roads in such cities as Jakarta and Surakarta
5 7crowded with people trying to sell their secondhand goods.
In the cities of Java, the price of rice increased rapidly.
In 1941, the Dutch government set the maximum price of paddy at f.3.25
per 100 kg for the low quality and f.3.60 per 100 kg for the high
S8 59quality. This meant a rice price of f.6 to f.525 per 100 kg. In
Surakarta, in June 1942, the Japanese Military Administration announced
that the price of rice had risen to f.7.70 per 100 kg for best quality,
60and f.6.50 per 100 kg for low quality. Thus within the first months 
of occupation, the price of rice had already increased about 25 per cent.
In Surakarta, as elsewhere, the Japanese Military Administration 
policy was to regulate the prices of foodstuffs strictly. On 8 June 
1942 a new regulation was announced stating that the prices of rice, 
wheat flour, salted fish, oil, tea, etc., were not to be raised any 
higher than the prices on 1 January 1942.^ For infractions of this 
regulation, a shopkeeper could be given a heavy fine - e.g., f.500 -
56 Soedjito Sosrodidardjo, Perubahan Struktur Masjarakat di Djawa 
(Jogjakarta, Penerbit Karya, 1968), p.40. For the Surakarta 
region specifically see Sedjarah TNI Didalam, p.3.
57 Pandji Poestaka, no.3, 7 November 1942, p.1092.
58 Soedjito Sosrodihardjo, op.cit., p.42.
59 Each 100 kg cf paddy, after milling, yields about 60 kg of rice.
60 See Pengoemoeman Harga Tertinggi Barang-Barang di Soerakarta,
Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 8 June 1942, no.1/A.
61 Makloemat Pembesar Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 8 June 1942,
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62or have his goods confiscated. From June to December 1942, however, 
prices of foodstuffs in the region were not absolutely stable (see Table II) .
TABLE II
THE PRICE OF FOODSTUFFS IN SURAKARTA FROM 
JUNE TO DECEMBER 1942*
Month rice per 100 kg
salted fish 
per 100 kg
coconut oil 
per litre
wheat flour 
per sack
June f .7.70 f .13 f.0.24 f.3.25
July f .8.75 f .13 f.0.24 f .3.25
august f .7.40 f .13 f.0.34 f.6.00
September f.7.40 f .13 f.0.34 f.6.00
October f.7.40 f .24 f.0.34 f.3.25
November f.7.40 f .24 f.0.34 f .3.25
December f.7.40 f .24 f.0.34 f .3.25
*Sourco : Pengoemoeman Harga Tintinggi Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta : 8 June
1942, no.1/A; 1 July 1942, no.2/A; 1 August 1942, no.3/A; 1 September
1942, no.4/A; 1 October 1942, no.5/A; 1 November 1942, no.6/A;
1 December 1942, no.7/A.
Despite the efforts of Japanese authorities in Java to stop 
the increase, food prices continued to rise, for three chief reasons: 
first, food production was decreasing; second, with the inflow of troops
there was an increase in the number of consumers; third, the amount of
63money in circulation was increasing. A Jogjakarta newspaper reported 
after the war that production of paddy in Java in 1941 had been 
899,934,807 quintals, while in 1944 it was only 681,115,550 quintals.
The production of secondary crops in 1941 amounted to 121,525,781 quintals, 
but in 1944 the yield was only 900,556,664 quintals.^4 This was a
62 See Makloemat Koochi Jimukyoku Soerakarta, 31 August 1942. See 
also Kan Po, I, no.3, September 1942, p.20.
63 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 11 February 1946, Cf. Soedjito Sosrodihardjo, 
op.cit., p.41; see also Pandji Poestaka, no.31, 7 November 1942.
64 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 11 February 1946.
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serious decline in food production, especially in an island as food-
deficient as Java, and the people suffered greatly from a shortage of
foodstuffs. Even the Japanese rice exactions fell 100,000 tons short 
65in 1944. Apparently, the chief causes of the decline in food 
(especially rice) production were: the mobilization of the villagers
for para-military organizations; romusha (forced labour), which took 
a lot of men away from their farm lands; and the orders of the Japanese 
to enlarge the areas of cotton and castor oil planting, which means 
that some land was taken out of food production.
In Surakarta, the Japanese Military Administration implemented 
a variegated basic program to tackle the problem of rice shortages for 
the military forces. Initially, in August 1942, Surakarta Gunsei Shidobu 
(the Military Administration Office for Guidance) forbade essential 
goods, including rice, to be brought into or out of the Surakarta 
region.U> In addition, inhabitants of Surakarta who had more than 2,000 kg
r —jof rice were forced to register the amount which they held. These
measures enabled the occupation government to control the movement of
6 ftfoodstuffs and to build up a local stock of rice.
The Japanese Chokan in charge of Surakarta was eager to bring 
order to the local rice trade and to rice distribution in Surakarta.
To this end, in 1943, he established the Kochi Beikoku Kumiai (Special 
Region Rice Cooperation) or KBK,6y directly under the Chökan, as the only 
cooperative which could buy rice and paddy. Big rice dealers, who were
65 See Miyamoto Shizuo, 'Jawa Shusen Shoriki' (Jawa Shusen Shoriki 
Kanokai, Tokyo, 1973). Translation by Akira Oki, awaiting 
publication in Anthony Reid and Akira Oki (eds),‘The Japanese 
Experience in Indonesia', p.38.
66 Based on the regulation of Gunsei Shidobu of Surakarta, 8 August 1942.
67 Kan Po, I, no.l, November 1942, p.20.
68 This policy paralleled the central policy of the Japanese Military 
Administration which prohibited the movement of rice out of any 
Residency in Java. See Miyamoto Shizuo, 'Jawa Shusen Shoriki',
in Anthony Reid and Akira Ori (eds), op,cit., p.40.
69 See Atoevan Baroe Tentang Beras, Gabah dan Padi Boeat Tahoen 2603 
stencilled (Soerakarta, 2603 [1943]), pp.1-2.
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members of the Kochi Beikoku Qroshi Oeri Kumiai (the Special Region
7-0Association of the Big Traders in Rice), could buy rice after being 
recommended by the Chökan.
In each Ken there was a Ken Beikoku Kooeri Kumiai (Regency 
Rice Trader Association) or KBKK. This association sold rice to small 
rice merchants, called bakul, and distributed rice to the people.
Most members of this association were Indonesian; in the Mangkunegaran 
Köchi, of the 1,357 members of the KBKK, only 15 per cent were Chinese.^ 
This was different from the membership of the Kochi Beikoku Qroshi Oeri 
Kumiai, of which Chinuuu murchants made up more than 40 pur cunt.^ 
Through this rice cooperative system, the Japanese sought to control the 
movement and distribution of rice both at the local and at the regional 
level.
Japanese authorities also attempted to increase agricultural
production. On 20 and 27 October 1943, the Chökan of Surakarta Kochi
called a special meeting for leading Javanese on 'Increasing Agricultural
Production'. Takahashi, who led this conference, explained its purpose
and the need to achieve its aims. He indicated that the crops which were
73to be concentrated on were cotton, castor oil, and rice.
In November 1943, a committee called Peningkatan Basil Boemi 
(Committee for Increasing Agricultural Production - or Surakarta Beikoku 
Zosan Kyoshinkai) was set up. This had branches in each Ken, the so- 
called Chip Iinkai (branch office), and its function was to advise 
peasants to work their land better. Methods urged on them included the 
introduction of new techniques of rice planting, new rice seeds, and
70 Ibid., p.2.
71 See Bendel Djaman Djepang 1943-44: Sub Perdagangan Beras,
AMN.
72 By way of comparison, in the Priangan region of West Java reorganization 
of rice cooperative had reduced Chinese members to less than
50 per cent. See I.J. Brugmans, et al., (eds), op,cit., p-490.
73 See the conference report, 'Verslag Persidangan Meningkatkan Hasil 
Boemi Didaerah Soerakarta Koochi 27 Oktober 1943', typescript,
AMN, p.l.
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new members of producing compost fertilizers.
The pangreh praja hierarchy of Ken Cho, Gun Cho and Son Cho
made propaganda for the programme of increased agricultural production
among the people. Moreover, the Ku Chö and Kumichö, who were in direct
contact with the peasants, were charged with seeing that they enlarged
fheir plantings of certain crops. Japanese-inspired organizations,
such as Seinendan (Youth Corps), Kcibodan (Vigilance Corps), and
Fujinkai (women's association), also assisted the Ku Cho in this programme.
The Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro were themselves appointed members of the 
75Zosan Kyoshinkai, and were compelled to propagate its aims actively. 
Early in 1944, the Japanese even managed to get the Susuhunan and 
Prince Mangkunegoro to travel around the villages to make propaganda for 
increasing food production. In the early months of the reign of the 
new young rulers Mangkunegoro VIII and Susuhunan XII, the Japanese 
authorities were still more direct in the way they manipulated them for 
propaganda purposes - in the same sort of way they manipulated other 
local leaders. The effect of this was to reduce the status of the 
rulers to a similar category as that of politicians and youth leaders.
In 1944, a crisis in food and textile supplies had begun
seriously to affect the people. In October 1944, Wonogiri regency, a
dry region of Surakarta, suffered greatly from a shortage of food. A
76report by the Ken Chö of Wonogiri listed some reasons for this. Chief 
among these was the delivery of agricultural produce to the Japanese.
The Japanese made forced purchases at low prices, demanding that at 
least one-third of production be sold to them. Another third was kept 
in the Ku as a food reserve, and the remainder could be retained by 
the peasants who had grown it. A later Japanese demand for
more rice resulted in the depletion of the Ku reserves, 
leaving the peasants with no local buffer stocks.
74 For details on Chio Iinkai, see ibid., p.4.
75 Appointment letter of Chokan of the Surakarta Kochi, 3 January 
1944, no.10/K/04, AMN.
76 See 'Rapot Rahasia', 16 October 1944, Djawatan Ekonomi Wonogiri, 
1944.
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Additional reasons cited for the Wonogiri crisis were insufficient 
rainfall and a lack of local transportation.
In Kedawung subdistrict, the peasants had also been forced 
to deliver one-third of their rice production at half the normal price. 
I.i some cases, the peasants, who had previously been members of the PKS, 
rejected the ordered target and delivered only one-fourth of their 
rice production. This helped to make the Kempeltal suspicious of the 
disbanded PKS organization in rural Surakarta.
As a result of the food shortage, there was serious suffering 
from hunger in rural Surakarta, particularly the poorer areas such as 
Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Boyolali. In 1944 many peasants died of 
malnutrition. To obtain food, peasants sold their property, including 
cattle, land and even gold, to rich peasants. Chinese also played a 
role in buying the peasants' gold. Although many rich peasants became 
wealthier as a result of this process, some were themselves plunged 
into poverty as a result of a Japanese campaign to have them contribute 
their cattle and gold for the war effort.
An additional source of rural hardship was the recruitment 
of villagers as romusha, who were sent to labour on war projects, both 
locally and in other parts of Java - or even to Burma. Many of them 
died as a result of the heavy work with inadequate food and health 
facilities. In 1944 a local source reported that there were about
2,000 men from Surakarta who had never returned to their villages.
77It was not even known whether or where they had died.
As a result of food shortages, another new board was 
established, the Badan Oeroesan Makanan Rakjat (Board of People's Food 
Affairs) or BOMR. Its main goal was to sell food at a normal price.
BQMR had branches at the Ken, Gun and Son levels, and its management 
was in the hands of Indonesians, mostly from the pangreh praja,
Keibodan members and teachers. Tills board did nol fully satisfy the
77 Bendel Djaman Djepang 1944-1945: Sub romusha, AMN»
this source explains that the above number included the heiho.
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people's needs,78 in no small part because of the corruption carried 
out by certain members of the board, commonly called tukang catut 
(tukang = workman; catut = small pliers) 79 As a result of this 
corruption, regional food stocks were depleted and artificial price 
levels affected everyday goods in the market places.
To cope with a shortage of textiles, village women were 
obliged to weave clothing at government looms set up by the Japanese 
in the houses of the Ku Chö. There were special Japanese officials who 
advised and taught the villagers how to use the looms. To supply the 
government looms, the villagers were forced to grow cotton. The gunny 
sack factory of Delanggu, in Klaten regency, was converted for the 
weaving of textiles. According to a member of the managerial staff 
of the factory during the occupation, production was planned to provide 
for the needs of romusha and other laborers, and the basic material 
used was not cotton but jute.8U These efforts were intended to replace 
imports,* 01 so that the village economy could be self-sufficient.
Another Japanese purpose for the village economy was to recruit 
villagers to plant castor-oil plants on the sides of roads and on 
uncultivated land. As the first step, the Japanese delivered the seeds 
to the tillages and the Ku Ch5 divided them among the villagers. Each 
farmer who could produce 1 kg of new seeds from his plants was permitted 
to buy 0.3 litres of petroleum (1 litre of petroleum cost 12.50 cents). 
Through this system the Japanese could increase the number of castor-oil 
plants.32 Because castor-oil was important for the war, central coordination
73
79
According to Soekardi, secretary of the BOMR of Kedawung Son 
Sragen Ken. Interview with him, 26 July 1979.
oudj Lto Sosrodidurdjo, on.clt., p.-V7j ho explains that -ne 
ukang catut carried out corruption without rational plans and that
I was cm i y I in; l dan In l. in I tin broader: moaning, tjjkvwvj— 
oferred to trade activity in which profits were Urge; see 
,j. Drug mans, ut u.L, (uds) , op . ci t. , pp.491-92,
Interview with Gondowidjo jo, 14 August 1979.
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Cf. Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town 
(Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p.60.
See 'Tjara 
Boeah Djarak
Membagi Minjak Tanan Kepada Orang-Orang Jang Mfcnjerahkan 
Bendel Roepa-Roepa Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.29, AMN
44a
was in the hands of the Chokan of Surakarta Kochi.
During the occupation the Japanese authorities in Surakarta 
concentrated on four main plantation crops - sugar, rubber, jute and 
coffee. Production was mainly for war needs, as the traditional export 
market was removed by the war. The Japanese experienced many difficulties 
in their efforts to enlarge estate production. Lack of capital was one 
of the major factors, many Surakarta banks having become bankrupt as a 
result of the war.
Sugar, needing more capital than other plantation crops* was
particularly badly affected. In 1941 the area covered by sugar
plantations in Surakarta was more than 4220 ha and the production
about 71,095 tons. During 1942 and 1943 the planted area decreased
82ato 3152 ha and the production to only 59,232 ton. A similar decline
affected the sugar industry throughout Java. In 1942 there were 85
sugar factories operating in Java. This total decreased to 51 factories
8 2bin 1943, 47 factories in 1944 and 12 factories in 1945.
Another reason for the decline in estate sugar production 
was a lack of the labour normally supplied by neighbouring farmers.
These farmers were burdened heavily with obligatory work on war projects 
and semi-military training, especially for youth. In addition the 
farmers were forced by the Japanese authority to cultivate cotton on 
their own land. At least one-third of the farmers' own land had to be 
used for cotton. All this left farmers with little time to work on 
the sugar plantations.
With Surakarta society oppressed by the economic situation,
the Japanese carried out a plan to collect the gold and diamonds owned
by the population. On 29 December 1944, the Chokan set up a committee
8 3for Gold and Diamond Collection, headed by Nishimia, a Japanese who 
proved very assiduous in his task. Both the Susuhunan and Prince
82a Cula, 1/ no.5, January 1947.
82b Ibid.,
'Kepoetoesan Soerakarta Koochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan', 1944, no.693, 
AMN.
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Mangkunegoro were involved in the central committee, and they in turn 
became the leaders of gold and diamond collection committees in their 
areas. Not surprisingly it was the priyayi who could give more than 
the other social classes. In some villages, particularly in our sample 
areas of Bendosari and Kedawung, the collection of gold and diamonds 
was thwarted by villagers, who defied the Son Cho* 1s orders despite the 
sanctions used against them.^
The results of this collection more than satisfied the
Japanese in Surakarta. In a letter to Prince Mangkunegoro, dated 
85- February 1945, Hiroshi Watanabe, the Chokan of Surakarta, who knew
Indonesian well, expressed his gratitude. On 6 February Watanabe also
sent a letter to the members of the committee, stating that the Surakarta
86region had achieved the largest diamond collection in Java. In such 
collections, many of the nobility lost their treasure, and this was one 
of the reasons thev were to become poor when they lost their positions 
after the revolution.
In all of those programmes, as a part of its economic 
blueprint for the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese government 
regarded the Surakarta region, as it did other regions in Indonesia, 
as a source for obtaining the mctterials demanded by the war.
84 Interview with S. Martodidardjo (village head of Toriyo, 1934-74), 
2Ü August 1979; Sastrosuwarno (a village head of Gayam, 1943-74),
1 September 1979; interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979.
85 This letter was written in both Indonesian and Japanese. It was 
kept in the Reksopustoko Library, and was filed in the Bendel 
Djaman Djepang 1944, no.29, AMN.
86 Ibid.
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MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION
During the Japanese occupation the nationalist movement gained 
considerable strength. One of the important factors behind this was 
the changing attitude of the younger generation, which was heavily under
tne influence of Japanese propaganda and took part in military and
87semi-military activities. Although the Japanese had banned political 
organizations in the early months of the occupation,08 ultimately the
OQJapanese themselves sponsored political organizations on a large scale.
Within a year of the beginning of the occupation, the 
Japanese began to form organizations to support the war effort. In 
April 1943, the Jnpanese started to recruit heiho (auxiliary soldiers) 88 
The heiho were to be trained and deployed within the Seventh Army Area 
mainly in anti-aircraft, tank, field artillery, trench mortar, and 
transport units.81 Commonly, however, it was only the lower classes of 
society who were interested in becoming heiho.
The members of heiho were young men from eighteen tc twenty- 
five years old. With minimal military training, they were sent off to 
Burma and elsewhere as auxiliary military units and as forced labour.
Even with the end of the war, many heiho members never returned, becoming 
simply more victims of the war. Many who did return joined the ranks 
of unemployed. Only a small percentage of them could get jobs, for 
instance in the staff of village administrations.8-
87 gee Jan M. Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian
Politics (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1965), p.18.
88 I.J. Brugmans, et al. (eds) , op.cit. , p.26.
89 See, for example, Benda's description. I I .J. Benda, The Crescent
and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation
1942-1945 (The Hague, W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958), pp.103-19.
90 Asia Raya, 24 April 2603 (1943) ,
9 i See Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army During the Japanese
Occupation of Indonesia (Tokyo, Waseda University Press, 1979), 
p.80. See also Joyce C. Lebra, 'The Significance of the Japanese 
Military Model for Southeast Asia', Pacific Affairs, vol.48, no.2, 
Summer, 3975, p.223.
92 Bendel Heiho 1945, AMN.
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There is no complete data on the total number of the heiho 
in Surakarta. Based, however, on a report of the regent of Wonogiri,
dated 4 October 1945, it can be estimated that the number was fairly
9 3high. From twenty-two subdistricts of Wonogiri regency, there were 678 
persons who became members of heiho, whereas only 271 became members of 
the voluntary army, Peta. In Jumapolo district in Karanganyar regency 
thru e were thirty-three heiho, compared with only twelve Peta and 
three navy auxiliaries.^ J In the capital city of Surakarta, those 
joining heiho from only seven of the many Ku are shown in Table III,
TABLE III
TOTAL MEMBERS OF HEIHO IIS] SEVEN KU IN SURAKARTA CITY AT THE 
END OF OCCUPATION 1945*
Number Name of Ku Date of Ku Ch5 Report
1 59 Manahan September 1945
2 23 Ketelan September 1945
3 73 Mangkubumen September 1945
4 49 Timuran February 1945
5 22 Keprebon February 1945
6 53 Punggawan 24 February 1945
7 76 Gilingan 21 February 1945
^Source : Bendel Heiho 1945 , AMN.
If we project these figures to the whole of Surakarta Kochi,
the numbers registering as heiho may have been in excess of 5,000, a
much higher figure than the average for Java. The estimated strength 
of heiho at the end of the Japanese occupation was 42,000 (Java, 24,873;
93 See 'Djoemlah Ringkasan Adanja Bekas Pradjoerit Heiho dan Peta 
Dalam Daerah Kaboepaten Pangreh Pradja Wonogiri', typescript, 
Laporan Boepati Wonogiri, 4 October 1945, AMN.
94 'Daftar Adanja Heiho dan Peta Dalam Daerah Kawedanan Djoemapolo', 
typescript, Laporan Wedono Djoemapolo, 12 September 1945, AMN.
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95Timor, 2,504; other areas, 15,000). The reasons for this may have been 
hunger, especially in the dry Wonogiri area, but also the element of 
coercion exercised through the pangreh praja hierarchy.
Indonesians had been recruited as auxiliary soldiers in
the Japanese army since the end of 1942. Besides heiho, the Japanese
had trained Indonesian youth in various other para-military organizations.
Tv/o youth organizations, Seinendan (Youth Corps) and Keibodan (Vigilance
96Corps), had been created by the Japanese in early 1943. At the end 
of occupation, the Seinendan had approximately half a million members 
in Java, while the Keibodan had more than one million The main
goal of the Keibodan was to help the police and thus create a kepolisian
98rakyat (people's police). The Surakarta Kochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan 
set the age of Keibodan members at twenty-three to thirty-five years 
of age, while Seinendan members ranged from fourteen to twenty-two years
of age. 99
The leadership structure of the Keibodan of Surakarta Kochi 
comprised: dancho (commander); fuku dancho (deputy commander); komon
(advisers); keiho han (information service); keikai han (traffic 
service); kyuge han (first aid service); boeka han (preventive fire 
s e r v i c e ) I n  the city, Keibodan members were recruited from among the 
pangreh praja, teachers, ordinary people and the Chinese. In the villages, 
n.ost members were farmers, though a few were village teachers and
95 Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army, p.80.
96 A.A. Zorab, op.cit., pp.110-11; Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta 
Army, op.cit., pp.62-63. See also H.J. Benda, The Crescent, 
op.cit., p.252, note 34.
97 Nugroho NoLosusanto, The Pole Army, p.63.
98 The principles of Keibodan can be found in Kan Po, II, no.18, 
May 1943#
99 This regulation can be read in the letter of the Chokan of 
Surakarta, Xöchi to the Patih of the Mangkunegaran, dated 
27 September 1943, no.SKGKH 248/H, AMN.
Bendel Keibodan dan Seinendan 2603 (1943), no.56, AMN.
'i
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village administration staff. It was coordinated from the Ken Ch<5 
down to the Ku Ch5. Both Keibodan and Seinendan attracted large numbers 
of people. In Wonogiri Ken which, perhaps because of widespread poverty, 
had Lhe largest membership Lotals in Surakarta, there were 22,000 members 
of Keibodan while Seinendan had 14,000 members.
The general regulations of Seinenden were issued by the
102Soesoenan Djawa Seinendan. The Surakarta Köchi had a special unit of
103Seinendan, the Kochi Seinendan. It had branches, the so-called boendan, 
at Ken, Gun and Son levels. Some Seinendan were organized for sector 
work, such as the Seinendan pabrik (factory seinendan) and the Seinendan 
perusahaan (enterprise seinendan). The leadership structure of the 
Seinendan was: danchö (commander); huku danchö (deputy commander);
komon (adviser), kanji (administration); sidooin (training leaders).
On 1 July 1943, the Chökan of the Surakarta Kochi opened the 
PoesatLatihan Pemimpin Seinendan Soerakarta (Training Centre for Seinendan 
Leadership in Soerakarta) In the opening ceremony, he said that this 
training was aimed at producing leaders who would have experience of 
discipline, mental and physical training, and the spirit of unity.
This training provided subjects such as Japanese and Indonesian languages, 
art, practical work, agricultural training, military training, sport and 
taisoo (physical exercises). The trainers were both Indonesian and 
Japanese. The Chökan planned that each Son should have one Seinendan 
Rensei Sidooin (Seinendan Leadership Training Centre). The mobilization 
of Seinendan in Surakarta was based on a regulation of the Chökan 
called the Doin Sakiki (regulation of mobilization). All Seinendan
training centres in the Kochi and the Shu had to be approved by the Gunseikan.105
101 1Laporan Hardiowiratmo; Wonogiri Ken Cho', November 
typesrcipt, AMN.
1944,
102 See Soesoenan Djawa Seinendan (Djawa Gunseikanbu 2603 
pp.3-27.
[1943]) ,
103 Ibid.
104 Soeara Matahari, Tahoen II, no.152, 2-7 July 1943.
105 Soesoenan Djawa Seinendan, op.cit., p.16.
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The Japanese also planned to mobilize influential Indonesian 
leaders to increase support for the war effort. In March 1943, as a 
first step to this goal, a Java-wide quasi-nationalist organization 
was set up headed by Ir. Sukarno and Mohammed Ilatta, the best-known 
nationalist leaders. The name given to this new organization was 
Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat - Centre of People's Power) .
Putera1s regulations provided for branches at Shu, Kochi, Ken 
and Gun levels .^0 1 The Putera of Surakarta was immediately set up in March 
1943 and extended down to the Ken level. At Klaten Ken, the Ken Ch5 
himself led the meeting which formed the Putera branch^.0®The Putera 
of Surakarta Kochi was under the leadership of Wurjaningrat, ^ member 
of the Kasunanan nobility and a former progressive member of BU, PBI 
and Parindra. Many of the pangreh praja of Surakarta took an important 
role in the Putera. In the eyes of the Japanese, the Putera of Surakarta 
gave good service, particularly in recruiting villagers as romusha.
In addition, its leaders were involved in preparing for the formation 
of a volunteer army at the end of 1943.
When the Djawa Hökökai (Himpunan Kebaktian Rakyat or People's 
Service Association on Java) was established in 1 March 1944, most 
existing organizations, including Seinendan and Keibodan, became closely 
linked to it-l09 In practice the Djawa Hokokai replaced the Putera, but 
Hök5kai was much more of a mass organization than the Putera. In fact 
the Hokokai had branches reaching into all residencies, regencies, 
districts and villages!^ In Surakarta, the close connection between the
106 The top leadership of the Putera was in the hands of the 'Empat
Serangkai' (the Four-Leaf Clover): Sukarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjar
Dewantara (chairman of Taman Siswa) and Kyai Haji Mas Mansur (former 
chairman of Muhammadiyah). Sec li.J, Benda, The Crescent, p.117,
107 Asia Raya, no.59, 11 March 1943.
108 Ibid., no.73, 29 March 1943.
109 Kanahele, op.cit., p.143
110 H.J. Benda, The Crescent, p.153.
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Ilokokai and other organizations (Tonari Gumi, Seinendan, Keibodan) was
clearly seen at the conference organized by Surakarta K5chi Hökökai 
111on 24 March 1945. This conference discussed the Gerakan Hidup Baru 
(new life movement) and its programme of love of the fatherland, defence 
of the village, self-sufficiency in food and clothes, etc.
The activity of the Djawa Hökökai increasingly integrated 
the functions of the Seinendan and Keibodan, as well as the pangreh 
praja. In Surakarta in early 1945, both Seinendan and Keibodan were 
playing important roles in the implementation of Hökökai programmes.
While these organizations, the Seinendan, Keibodan and Hökökai, 
played some part in mobilizing segments of population in Java during 
the occupation, there were other organizations whose members played 
even more important roles in the final days of the Japanese period and 
in Lluj Lime ol’ revolution that followed, Chief among them was the 
Pota (Pombola Tanah Air - Do fender of the Fatherland). Aluo uignifleant 
were the youth organizations Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) and the 
Hizbullah (Allah's Army).
At the beginning of October 1943, Gatot Mangkupradja, one
of the nationalist leaders of the 1930s, received a summons from
Mr Nagashima and Abdulhamid Ono which said that a proposal Gatot had
made for the formation of a volunteer defence army had been accepted.
He was to present himself at the Beppan office (intelligence section)
in order to meet and be congratulated by General Harada and the
112Gunseikan, General Yamamoto. The Japanese then issued the regulation
Osamu Seirei, no.44 of 3 October 1943, as the operational basis for the
113establishment of the volunteer defence army of Java. It contained the 
following points:
H I  See 'Laporan Ketoea Sidang Gaboengan Solo dan Mangkoenegaran 
Kooti Hookookai', 24 March 2605 (1945), typescript, AMN.
112 Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, 'The Peta and My Relations with the
Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno's Autobiography', (translated
by Haruni Wanasita Evans and Ruth McVey), Indonesia, no.5, April 
1968, p.121.
113 For details, see Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army, pp.69-101,
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1. the members of the Peta army would be Indonesians;
2. within the Peta army, Japanese military personnel would 
be used mainly for training purposes;
3. the Peta army was under the Supreme Commander;
4. it would be a territorial army given the task of defending 
its region;
5. it would resist any attack by the enemy.
Gatot's request had been followed by dozens of similar letters from 
every corner of Java, some written in bloocf/^ After Osamu Seirei 
no.44 was issued, the whole of the Japanese propaganda apparatus was 
mobilized to support Clutol. Manykuprudja' u concept:. * *
According to Gatot Mangkupradja, when the volunteer army was 
formed it was not called Peta, but rather Tentara Sukarela (volunteer 
army). ‘ It was only after the middle of 1944 that the change of name 
occurred, as the result of an initiative by Oto Iskandardinata and 
Jusuf Jahja to form a group to support the families of the volunteers.
AL that time, Oto began to popularize the name of Peta for the 
volunteer defence army.
In October 1943, the Beppan office commenced to train Indonesian
118officer candidates at Renseitai training school in Bogor. From
the way in which things were arranged, it is clear that it was Beppan
119which organized the Peta, and Beppan which chose Bogor as the site 
for Peta officer training. ^
114 kan Po, II, no.28, 2603 (1943), pp.20-21.
115 Ibid., p .98.
116 Ibid. , d .99.
117 Gatot Mangkupradja, op.cit., p .123.
>
118 Nugroho Notosusanto , Pemberontakan Tentara Peta Blitar Melawan
Djepang (14 Februari 1945) , Seri Monografi, no.405-4-2, Lembaga 
Sodjarah llankum, 1968, p.9. Soo also Nugroho Notosusanto, 'Instansi 
Jang Melaksanakan Pembentukan Tentara Peta', Madjalah Ilmu-Sastra 
Indonesia, vol.II, no.2, June 1964, p.287.
119 This is the conclusion of Nugroho Notosusanto, 'Instansi', 
pp.285-90.
120 Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, op.cit. , p.121.
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In Java the first battalions of the Peta were formed in 
December 1943, and the organization reached a total of almost 40,000 
men when the Japanese surrendered in 1945. The structure of the Peta 
organization was as follows: each daidan (battalion) had four chudan
(company), each chudan consisted of three shodan (platoon) and each
shodan had four bundan (squad) One bundan usually had ten members plus
one commander. Hence each daidan had about 535 men including staff 
members. The commander of a daidan was a daidancho, of chudan a
chudanchö, of a shodan a shodanchö, while a bundan was under a
bundanchö.121
There were sixty-six daidan in Java and three in Bali. The
Surakarta Kochi had two daidan , the Surakarta Daidan and the Wonogiri
Daidan. The formation of the Peta army in Surakarta Kochi was preceded
by the establishment there of a preparation committee, the Panitya
Penyiap Tentara Peta. This committee worked together with leaders of
the Putera, such as Dr Kartono (general chairman), RMTH Sumodiningrat
(head of organization section) and Muljadi Djojomartono (head of
122propaganda section).  ^ Beginning in October 1943, Putera leaders held
meetings at the Ken, Gun, Son and lCu levels, propagandizing for the
Peta army. Pemuda enthusiasm for Peta was great. From 11 October
to 30 November, the committee held meetings with the pemuda in various
12 3places and some 9.400 persons attended.
With a Surakarta Kochi announcement on 25.November 1943, 
the registration of Peta candidates commenced. There were tnree 
classes of candidates: soldier, lower officer, and middle (or high)
officer. Applications were addressed to the Surakarta Köchi Chökan. 
Candidates were required to have semangat (spirit), not to be over 
twenty-five years of age and to be in top physical condition. Those 
intending to be higher officers should already be graduates of
121 Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta, pp.105-09, 128-31.
122 'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soerkarela Pembela Tanah Air dan Heiho', 
Bendel Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.56, AMN. Interview with 
Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979.
123 'Hal Pradjoerit1.
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high school. Successful candidates numbered 225 persons for officer 
rank and 1,720 soldiers.
The Surakarta daidan was under daidanchö Muljadi Djojomartono, 
who had experience in the Putera and was a prominent member of 
Muhammadiyah. When he joined the Peta army training at the Renseitai 
in Bogor, he had as a classmate GPH Purbonagoro, who was of the Kasunanan 
nobility and a graduate of Breda Military Academy in Holland.125 
Soon afterwards, Prince Purbonagoro left Bogor and returned to Surakarta
1 ATbecause he could not tolerate the Japanese military regulations.
Apparently his main objection was to the Japanese policy which
desired to place Islam in the forefront of Peta training. In fact the
Prince was replaced by Mohammad Idris, one of the Muhammadiyah leaders
in Solo, who later became the daidanchö of the Wonogiri daidan.
At the highest, most visible level of Peta, therefore, the Japanese
127sought to place Moslem leaders. However, the overall picture is very 
different, as we see from the following table relating to chudanchS.
From this table it is clear that most Peta officers on the 
level of chudanchö were nobility or priyayi. There were two nobles of
1 onthe Kasunanan. The Mangkunegaran family sent three people to join 
Peta officer training at the Bogor Renseitai. Two were sons of 
Mangkunegoro VII, KPH Hamidjojo Sarosa and KPH Hamidjojo Santosa.
124 Ibid.
125 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979; cf. H.J. Benda,
The Crescent, p.253, note 39.
126 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979; see also Panitya 
Pembangunan Monumen Perdjoangan '45 Klaten (ed.), Sejarah Perjuangan 
Rakyat KabupaLon Klaten (Klalcn, 1976) , p.49.
127 Anion Lucan in hLu uludy of PukaLungun, Central Java, arguuu
strongly that only the top level (daidanchö) were Muslim-oriented. 
Below them were mostly priyayi. See Anton E. Lucas, 'The Bamboo 
Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution Against the Bureaucratic
Elite in North Central Java in 1945', Ph.D thesis, The Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1980, pp.350-52, 442-43. Cf. H.J. 
Benda, The Crescent, pp.138-40.
128 Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta, p.108, has incorrectly observed 
that there was only one chudanchö from the Kasunanan nobility.
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TABLE IV
THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF CHUDANCIIO OF THE 
SURAKARTA DAIDAN AND THE WONOGIRI DAIDAN*
No. Name of Chudancho Chudan Daidan Social Background
1 GPH Djatikusumo I Ska nobility of KS
2 KPH Hamidjojo Sarosa II Ska nobility, son of 
Mangkunegoro VII
3 R. Sunarto Kusumodirdjo III Ska middle priyayi
4 RMTH Sumodiningrat IV Ska nobility of KS
5 KPH Hamidjojo Santosa 
replaced by
I Wg nobility, son of 
Mangkunegoro VII
5A Soekarto a KNIL member
6 Suhardi II Wg member of legion of MN
7 Mursito III Wg middle priyayi
8 Soewarniman IV Wg middle priyayi
*Source: (1) Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979; Sunarto
Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979; (2) 'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soekarela
Pembela Tanah Air dan Heiho', Bendel Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.46, 
AMN; (3) an oral source collected in the 'Sejarah Perjuangan Rakyat 
Klaten Kabupaten Klaten', p.49. Note: Ska = Surakarta; Wg = Wonogiri;
KS = Kasunanan; MN - Mangkunegaran.
The other was Noto Hapsoro, a newphew of Prince Mangkunegoro who became 
a shodancho.
Apparently, however, the social backgrounds of the shodancho 
were more varied than those of chudanchö. Shodancho officers were 
students from high school, policemen, members of KNIL or the Legion 
Mangkunegoro, middle priyaryi, and members of other social classes. 
Generally speaking, they were more radical than the chudanch5, 
something that become obvious when shodancho officers of the Wonogiri
daidan established an illegal organization called IPTAS (Ikatan Putera
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I O QTanah Air Sejati - the True Sons of the Fatherland Association).
Its two most prominent leaders were Sutarto and Kusmanto. Sutarto's 
background is as follows: he was born in 1914, in the city of Solo
(Surakarta), and only attended the Sekolah Rakyat (elementary 'People's 
School') until the third class. His father, Wirosunarto, was a 
commoner!When he was about fourteen years old, Sutarto joined an 
illegal national youth movement in Semarang. * 1 In the 1930s Sutarto 
was the leader of the Madiun branch of the SPI (the Suluh Pemuda 
Indonesia - Torch of Indonesia Youth), the radical youth affiliate 
of Per.didikan hasional Indonesia. -^2
Although they did not rebel against the Japanese as did a 
similar Peta group at Blitar, the members of IPTAS nevertheless 
became the core of local military power in the early revolutionary 
period in Surakarta. The AMT (Angkatan Muda Tentara - Army Youth 
Generation), established by Sutarto in August 1945, was a continuation 
of IPTAS. It is not surprising, given his personality and 
organizational skills, that Sutarto became the foremost leader among 
the shodanchö. His important role on the local military scene will 
be detailed at some length in the chapters that follow.
On 8 December 1943, the Surakarta K5chi Chökan established 
the BPP (Badan Pembantu Prajurit - the Board to Assist the Soldiers)
129 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979; Sunarto Kusumodirdjo,
1 August 1979; see also Panitya Pembangunan Monumen Perjoangan 
'45 Klaten (ed.), op.cit., p.51; cf. Parikesit, 'Sekitar 
Pembentukan dan Perkembangan Pasukan Peta Didaerah Surakarta 
dan Jogjakarta', MA thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of 
Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta, 1970, pp.60-61.
l.jO 'Riwajat Almarhum Kolonel Sutarto', typescript, Dinas Pemeliharaan 
Pemakaman Tentara, Divisi Diponegoro (compiled by Sutopo); 
Surakarta, 1 July 1955.
131 Ibid.
132 For the SPI, see Biro Pemuda Departemen PD & K (ed.), Sedjarah
Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia (Djakarta, Balai Pustaka, 1965), 
pp.72-75; for Sutarto, ibid., p.73; see also Benedict R.O'G. 
Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance,
1944-1946 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972), p.366.
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to support Lho Peta and hoi ho. Its members wore drawn from tho nobility, 
priyayi pancjroh praja, teachers, and tho woatorn-oducated intelligentsia. 
Tiie total number of members was forty, plus twenty-two central committee 
members and fourteen advisors. The DPP had sections such as general 
section, finance section, propaganda and spirit section, assistance 
section and equipment section. The BPP ultimately became a useful 
channel for individual contacts between its civilian members and Peta 
officers. These contacts became particularly useful when Haji Mufti 
(head of the finance section), Dr Kartono (head of the propaganda and 
spirit section) and Sumodiningrat (chudancho) headed the revolutionary 
regional government of Surakarta early in the revolution.133
The Peta and its legal and illegal offshoots gained much 
attention and following in the final years of the occupation, and they 
became a crucial focus early in the revolutionary period which 
followed. They were not, however, the only military groups brought 
into existence by the Japanese. 'Two additional organizations, the 
Barisan Pelopor and the Hizbullah, were created in 1944.
The Barisan Pelopor was established as the result of a
134decision of the Java Central Advisory Council in May 1944. Its
principal aim was to act as the spearhead for Hökökai in its nationalist
propaganda efforts. Although not officially established until
September 1944, the principles of its formation were already fully
135developed by August. According to Gatot Mangkupradja, the Barisan 
Pelopor was based on the Suishintai (Promotion Corps), the activist 
auxiliary of the Hökökai's Keibodan, and initially its leaders were, 
like Peta leaders, trained at the Renseitai of Bogor.136
133 For the BPP of Surakarta, see 'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soekarela 
Peta dan Ileiho', AMN.
134 H.J. Benda*, The Crescent, pp. 177-78; see also I.J. Brugmans 
et al. (eds), op.cit., p.63.
135 Sinar Matahari, 19 August 2604 (1944).
136 Raden Gatot Mangkupraja, op.cit., p.122
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In Surakarta, the Barisan Pelopor began to spread out into 
the villages early in December of 1944. In general in the Surakarta 
area its leaders were teachers, pangreh praja and others who had at 
least passed through primary school. The bulk of its members, however, 
were illiterate farmers, most of them between twenty and forty-five 
years old. The structure of the organization followed a military 
model, with daitai (battalion) established at the Ken le^el, chutai 
(company) at the Gun level, and shotai (platoon) at the Son level.138
Although the leaders of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor had
varied political backgrounds, the PNI and pro-Sukarno element was
dominant. The leader in Solo was Soemokartiko (PNI), assisted by
Surjokusumo (priyayi-Parindra), Hadisunarto (PNI, Gerindo), and Anwar
i 39Santosa (son of a Muhainmadiyuh leader). This pattern seemed to be 
similar to the central loadorsV^ There were a few leaders in the 
Surakarta Barisan Pelopor who were actually in contact with central 
leaders like Dr Muwardi and Sudiro. Both Muwardi and Sudiro had a 
lot of opportunities to visit the Barisan Peloj^or at the residency 
level, including Surakarta, in their campaign to mobilize the masses 
behind the Barisan Pelopor. One of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor 
leaders, Hartono, was sent to join the Barisan Pelopor Istimewa in 
Jakarta and attended political courses given by Ir. Sukarno, Mohammad 
Hatta and Sjahrir. At that time Hartono met D.N. Aidit, a young
137 Soekiman Martowirono, 'Laporan Pemeriksaan Barisan Pelopor', 
typesrcipt, 7 December 1944, p.l., AMN.
138 'Laporan Wonogiri ken Hookookai Kaityo', typescript, Wonogiri,
1944, AMN.
139 Detailed discussion of the leaders of thu Surakarta Barisan 
Pelopor who subsequently played an important role in Barisan 
Banteng is in Chapter III.
140 For example, Ir. Sukarno (PNI), the commander of the corps;
Oto Iskandardinata (the Pasundan); R.P. Suroso (Parindra),
Gatot Mangkupradja (PNI); Muwardi (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia), 
Sudiro (Taman Siswa), while others were from Gerindo. For 
details on the central leaders of this corps, see Sudiro, Pengalaman 
Saya Sekitar 17 August '45 (Jakarta, Yayasan Idayu, 1972), pp.
1- 6 .
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communist activist who was also attending the course.^l
From early December 1944, the Barisan Pelopor of Surakarta 
based its activities on a special programme containing the following 
priorities:
1. to assist in recruiting romusha;
2. to cooperate with the Beta army;
3. To work closely with Keibodan, Seinendan, Tonari Gumi, 
the BPP and the pangreh praja;
4. to establish Markas Barisan Pelopor (Barisan Pelopor 
Command Post) in each Gun; and
1425. to replace Japanese with Indonesian terms in drill practice.
Being under the Hökökai, the Barisan Pelopor was able to
exteno down into the villages and to attract other organizations to
associate with it. Built upon people who were experiencing local
conditions, and concerned with propagating nationalist ideology in
the guise of pro-Japanese statements, the Barisan Pelopor had the
143makings of a strong revolutionary movement. The revolutionary impulse 
came to be the guiding factor in the Barisan after it became known 
as the Barisan Banteng in the early revolutionary period.
Another ideologically based corps founded in the war period
was the Hizbullah, which was also to survive the Japanese occupation
and to play a role during the Indonesian Revolution and War of
Independence. The Hizbullah was envisaged as a reserve corps for the
Peta, but it was under the control of the Muslim association, Masyumi,
144and was widely thought to be the army of Masyumi. Its members were 
given a short period of introductory military training at Cibarusa 
in Bogor Residency.
141 Interview with Hartono, 17 August 1979. He was born in 1919 
and was a graduate of Mulo. He was an activist of the Barisan 
Pelopor and the Barisan Banteng.
142 Soekiman Martowirono, op.cit., p.l.
143 Cf. Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics
under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945 (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell
Modern Indonesian Project, 1961), p.48.
144 H.J. Benda, The Crescent, p.179.
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The Solo Hizbullah was organized by local kyai (Islamic
teachers, or ulama) and was led by Bakri, a young man about twenty-
two years old who had gone through the training at Cibarusa. The
Hizbullah was mainly concentrated in the city of Solo and was
financed by Moslem traders, in particular by batik merchants.
In the rural areas it also had a strong base in the Delanggu region
of platen regency where its efforts were coordinated by Kyai Buzairi,
a Masyumi leader who later had strong connections to the Serikat Tani
Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islam Peasant Union), or STII, in 
146early 1947.
The Japanese occupation created in Surakarta large number 
of mass-based organizations with heavy overlapping of task and 
membership among them. Faced with the war effort as their first 
priority, the Japanese continued to employ the traditional priyayi 
in the administrative bureaucracy, and also to utilize them as leaders 
in the new mass-based organizations. The priyayi were more numerous 
among Peta officers than were the Moslem groups, but real initiative 
within Peta was exercised by pemuda who tended to be radical, rather than 
by those who were oriented to traditional priyayi or Muslim values.
The combination of rapid ideological indoctrination within the various 
wartime organizations and the steadily declining economic situation 
of the common people was one which created a volatile atmosphere in 
Surakarta under the Japanese. When the Japanese were no longer a 
factor to be considered that atmosphere was ready to flare.
145 Interview with Bakri, 15 August 1979.
146 For details on Haji Buzairi's role in the Islamic movement, see 
below pp.85-86, 146, 179.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESPONSES TO THE INDEPENDENCE PROCLAMATION; 
AUGUST-DECEMBER 1945
THE FORMATION OF KNI AND BKR
In the days immediately after independence was proclaimed, 
the new Republic moved rapidly to establish a revolutionary government. 
The PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia - Committee for 
the Preparation of Indonesian Independence)/ Set up earlier under 
Japanese auspices, now became the main instrument for forming the 
governmental institutions of the Indonesian Republic. Ir. Sukarno 
was the head of this PPKI, Mohammad Hatta was his deputy, and the 
membership consisted of twenty-one persons.'*' Surakarta was represented 
by BPH Surjohamidjojo, a nobleman of the Kasunanan who was very 
active in the PPKI. Benedict Anderson, commenting on the PPKI, 
noted that it
...was not established within the context of occupation 
politics, in which it would have been important to 
give the pemuda a voice. The PPKI was rather a part 
of the new politics of independence, aimed at the 
problem of creating an Indonesian state....^
The PPKI in its first meeting, on 18 August 1945, ratified 
the Indonesian Constitution and elected Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta 
as President and Vice-President of the Republic. During its second 
session, on 19 August, the PPKI approved the division of Indonesia 
into eight provinces: West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sumatra,
3Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sunda Kecil and Maluku (including New Guinea).
1 According to Mohammad Hatta, nine members were from Java and 
twelve from the various regions outside Java. See Mohammad Hatta, 
Memoir (Jakarta, Tinta Mas, 1979), p.437.
2 Benedict R,0'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation 
and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972), 
p . 65.
?• For details on the sessions of the PPKI, see Moh. Yamin, Naskah- 
Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, vol.l (Djakarta, Prapantja, 
1959), pp.399-473.
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This session of 19 August also discussed the Köchi, the
Japanese-period name for the principalities of Surakarta and Jogjakarta.
Iho PPKI agreed that lor the time being the Kochi should continue
to have the same status as under the former administration. They
would be a part of the Indonesian Republic directly under the Central
Government. Administratively, they thus lay outside the new Province
of Central Java and were themselves on a similar level to a province.
Moreover, President Sukarno, in a decree of 18 August 1945, recognized
the territories of the Sunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta,
including the Mangkunegaran and the Paku Alaman, as special regions
5
(üaeruii Istimewa) . Surakarta was thus excluded from the province of 
Central Java, the Governor of which was to be Raden Panji Suroso, a 
member of the PPKI and a person who later took an important role in 
the Directorate of Surakarta.
On 22 August President Sukarno announced a PPKI decision 
to set up a system of government advised by committees at both 
provincial and national levels. Members of the KNI (Komite Nasional 
Indonesia - Indonesian National Committee) were to come from all 
streams (aliran) and all groups (golongan), such as pangreh praja 
(officials), alim ulama (religious scholars), kaum pergerakan (nationalist 
movement), pemuda (youth) and kaum pedagang (merchants), and in this 
fashion representation was to be brought to Republican political 
institutions. On 29 August the Central KNI, the Komite Nasional 
Indonesia Pusat (KNIP), was inaugurated by President Sukarno.
Mr Kasman Singodimedjo, a former Peta daidanchS in the Jakarta area, 
became its first chairman. The PPKI, after completing its initial 
duties, was absorbed into the expanded KNIP. The additional KNIP 
members were selected by Sukarno and Hatta, mainly from nationalist 
leaders thought to have a widespread following throughout Indonesia.
4 Ibid., pp.445-47.
5 This decree may be found in the Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
6 Osman Raliby (ed.), Documenta Historica; Sedjarah Dokumenter 
Dari Pertumhuhan dan Perdjuangan Negara Republik Indonesia 
(Djakarta, Bulan Bintang, 1953), pp.15-16.
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By October, leadership of the BP-KNIP (Working Committee of KNIP) had 
fallen to Satan Sjahrir, the best known prewar politician who had 
not been involved in the Japanese administration.
At the beginning of October, a small group of prominent
anti-Japanese members of the KNIP embarked upon a plan aimed at
changing the form of government so that the presidential system would
7be replaced by a parliamentary system of government. Their aim was 
to put real legislative power into the hands of the KNIP, to which the 
cabinet would be directly responsible. This 'anti-fascist' group 
aimed at eliminating all Japanese influences from the revolutionary 
government. At the same time the KNIP requested that the President 
enlarge its memberships from 150 to 188 members, so that a number of 
influential leaders not yet included could be added.
During the transitional months prior to this power shift, 
however, the new Republican government had carried on employing many 
of the institutions and Indonesian office-holders from the wartime 
administration. Since the Japanese were still nominally in control 
of the government, this meant that Republican Ministers and officials 
often had dual roles, within both the Japanese-run and Republican
Qadministrations. This was because it was felt that these people 
could more easily obtain co-operation from the Japanese than could 
the 'anti-fascist' elements within the revolutionary government.
On 22 August the PPKI also established the BKR (Badan
Keamanan Rakyat - People's Security Organization) as a section of
the Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (Board of Aid to the Families 
9of War Victims). The BKR was intended to involve former Peta and 
Heiho members who had been demobilized by the Japanese authorities
7 This 4 anti-fascist' pressure group chiefly consisted of Marxists - 
Wikana, Amir Sjarifuddin (afterwards known as Communists);
Sjahrir and Subadio Sastrosatomo ('democratic' Marxists);
Sukarni and Adam Malik (leaders of the Tan Malaka group). See 
Abu Uanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 
1972), pp.110-24.
8 For details see Benedict Anderson, op.cit., pp.110-24.
9 Osman Raliby, op.cit., p.17.
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shortly after the proclamation. The BKR was not intended to be a 
national army hue anther a corps assisting in the maintenance of
IQpublic security. ' The BKR was organized on a territorial basis and 
was to be a local security organization formed and supervised by the 
local KNI.11
The formation of the BKR had been the result of a compromise
between two groups. The supports of Oto Iskandardinata (former adviser
to the security department of the Japanese military administration) in
the PPKI together with a number of high civilian officials, wanted the
BKR to function only to maintain public security. On the other hand,
many former officers of Peta and the KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch
12Leger - the Dutch Colonial Army) wanted to start a national army.
What is important is that the local BKR units were able to function
to disarm the Japanese military forces, and naturally evolved in the
direction of a nacional army. In Java the transfer of arms from the
Japanese to the local BKR units was often followed by small battles
between the BKR, supported by other revolutionary youth groups such
as Barisan Pelopor, and the Kempeitai (Japanese police corps). Fighting
against the Japanese occurred in many cities of Central Java in October
1945, demonstrating and reinforcing the intense patriotism of the BKR 
13memners.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN SURAKARTA
As in other parts of Java, the establishment of the Republican 
Government in Surakarta began in the city. At this time the city was 
still governed by the two rulers. The Susuhunan governed two-thirds 
of the city and the remainder was in the hands of the Mangkunegaran
10 A.H. Nasution, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional Dibidang Angkatan 
Angkatan Bersendjata (Djakarta, Mega Bookstore, 1966), p.58.
11 Ibid., p. 59.
12 Benedict Anderson, op.cit., pp.104-05.
13 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah (Djakarta, Kementerian
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), pp.25-26.
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government. The inhabitants still tended to identify themselves as 
wong Kasunanan (people of the Sunan) or wong Mangkunegaran. By 1945, 
however, this vws coming to seem an anachronistic administrative legacy 
from the past, serving only to bolster the authority of the rulers.
In the economic life of the city, Chinese continued to play 
a crucial role. Their shop-houses lined the main streets of the city, 
especially in ihe areas of Cayudan, Pasar Gede, Pasar Pon and Singasaren. 
A few Chinese succeeded in penetrating the batik industry though this 
was mainly dominated by Muslim traders. A strongly Islamic orientation 
cjave ideological coherence to the leading Indonesian entrepreneurs of 
the city, most of whom invested in batik production and had supported 
Sarekat Islam in its heyday. The traditional divisions of Surakarta 
city placed these Islamic entrepreneurs at such xilaces as Kauman,
1egalsarj, Mangkuyudun, Laweyan and Mutihan. Among the Muslim traders 
were a minority of Arabs, who mainly resided in the Pasarkliwon area.
The demographic features of this traditional city can be seen 
in the last colonial census, that of 1930. The total population of 
the city had then been 713,161, comprising: Javanese - 694,711 men;
Europeans and Eurasians - 3707; Chinese - 13,332; and other "foreign 
Asiatics" (mainly Arabs) - 1411. The population of the whole region 
of Surakarta amounted to only 2,564,975, more than a quarter of whom 
therefore lived in the capital.
During the early revolution sharp ethnic divisions became 
apparent in the city, between Javanese (wong Jawa), Chinese (wong Cina) 
and Arabs (wong Arab). These divisions originated in the economic 
'piural society' of the colonial period, but they became critical 
social and political problems when the revolution broke out. The 
Javanese,worked up by the revolutionary spirit of patriotism, anti­
imperialism and nationalism, became more overtly antagonistic 
to both Ch i neue and Arab nucleiy.
Up to the early weeks of September, revolutionary action in 
Surakarta mainly took the form of raising red and white flags on public 
buildings and factories. In addition a lot of placards with the words 
'mj.lik Republik Indonesia' (property of the Indonesian Republic) were 
stuck on the walls of these buildings. The main activists
13a Indisch Verslag 1931 (Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1931), p.12.
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fGrci fonilGr m°n±>ers of the Baris an Pelopor and Peta, with some local 
politicians.  ^’
On 20 August, Sutarto, a former Peta officer, established
the AMT (Angkatan Muda Tentara - Younger Generation of the Army).15
This replaced the earlier IPTAS organization, a pre-independence
illegal movement cf the Peta daidan in Wonogiri, of which Sutarto
was the leader. The AMT aimed at disarming the Japanese military
forces in Surakarta. Its core was made up of former IPTAS members,
while its membership was drawn from former Peta members of the Wonogiri
and Surakarta daidan, which had been disbanded by the Japanese on
19 August. A few members were also drawn from the Barisan Pelopor,
Heiho and KNIL. The only AMT branch outside the city was in the regency
of Klaten, where many of the Wonogiri daidan had returned after its
disbandment. One former Peta chudanchP and AMT member estimated that
1GiLs total membership was over 500. Sutarto, as the initiator of 
both IPTAS and AMT, was elected leader of the latter organization 
by l ho oLhor ox-l'uUi oflleuru.
In early September a chapter of the KNI of Surakarta was 
organized, with Werjaningrat,17 the former chairman of the Surakarta 
branch of Jawa Hokokai, as chairman. But on 9 September two Ministers 
of State, Mr Sartono and Mr A.A. Maramis, arrived in Surakarta and 
met the former chudanchö, Sumodiningrat. They brought an official 
message from the central government that the Surakarta KNI had to be 
chaired by a former Peta officer. This was because the KNI would take 
over from the Japanese military forces. The ministers demanded that
14 Sedjarah TNI Didalam Daerah Karesidenan Surakarta: Periode
Pertama 1942-1948', typescript, Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, 
Surakarta, 15 September 1960, p.8.
15 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
16 Ibid.
17 Wurjaningrat was born on 18 February 1908 in Solo. He graduated 
from ELS, Mulo, and AMS, and from the University of Leiden in 
1936. From 1937 to 1939 lie worked in the Kasunanan; from 1939 
to 1940 he worked in Malang and then in 1943 was in Jakarta.
Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (Djakarta, Gunseikanboe, 
2604 [1944]), p.22.
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Sumodiningrat become head of the Surakarta KNI, replacing Wurjaningrat 
who was not a Peta officer. Sumodiningrat1s reply was brief: 'I
have no objection to becoming head of the KNI if I am elected, but 
I will reject it if I am simply appointed by the government'.18
On the night of 11 September, an election for the head of
KNI was held, chaired by Wurjaningrat. Four former Peta officers
were nominated: Muljadi Djojomartono (former daidanchö), G.P.H.
Djatikusumo (former chudancho), KPH Hamidjojo Santosa (former
19chudancho) and RMTH Sumodiningrat (former chudancho). With the 
exception of Muljadi Djojomartono, all the candidates were nobles, 
Djatikusumo and Sumodiningrat from the Kasunanan, and Hamidjojo 
Santosa from the Mangkunegaran. Attending the meeting were prominent 
Surakarta leaders from among the pangreh praja, politicians, Barisan 
Pelopor and Peta officers. Sumodiningrat estimated the number attending 
this meeting at about fifty. Invited by Wurjaningrat, they were all 
from the city of Surakarta, with no representatives from the rural 
areas. Sumodiningrat was elected as new chairman of the Surakarta
18 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
19 G.P.H. Djatikusumo was born in 1917 in Solo. He graduated from 
Senior High School (Solo) and Royal Military Academy, Breda,
Holland. In 1944 he was an officer (chudancho) in Peta. See 
Who's Who in the Indonesian Military (Jakarta, Sritua Arief 
Association [SAA], 1977), pp.195-06; KPH Hamidjpjo Santosa was 
Mangkunegoro's son and was a younger brother of GPH Hamidjojo 
Sarosa (later Mangkunegoro VIII). Santosa graduated from Mulo 
(Solo). He went through Peta military training in Bogor and 
then became chudancho. Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 5 June 
1979; RMTH Sumodiningrat was born on 7 May 1904 in Solo. He 
graduated from ELS and HBS in Bandung and from the Faculty of Law 
at Leiden University in 1935. From 1935 to 1940 he was a high 
official of the Kepatihan office. From 1936 to 1942 he was Vice- 
Chairman of the Surakarta Parindra. From 1937 to 1942 he was an 
adviser of the Pokoso. During the occupation he was involved in 
the Putera and Peta. See Sumodiningrat, 'Riwajat Hidup/Perjoangan', 
typescript, Sumodiningrat's private collection, pp.1-2. Muljadi 
Djojomartono was born on 3 May 1898 in Solo. He was a member of 
various Moslem organizations before World War II. He received 
military training in Bogor during the Japanese occupation. In 
December 1943 he joined the Badan Pembantu Pradjurit. In 1947 he 
was a member of the staff of military government in Surakarta.
After 1947 he was an activist in Masyumi and Muhammadiyah. See
The Asia Who's Who 1958 (Hongkong, Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance,
1958), p.208.
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KNI, and at the same meeting the remaining members of this new
KNI were chosen as follows:
Suprapto (head of the court office)
Dr Kartono (a representative doctors)
R Ng Domo Pranoto (the police officer)
Sutopo Adiseputro (a representative of teachers)
Kyai Abdul Mufti (a representative of Moslem scholars and
Moslem merchants)
Hendrokusumo (from the pemuda group)
Sujono (from the nationalist movement group)
Mr Sukasno (a representative of intellectuals)
Sumodihardjo (a representative of railway workers)
Most of these were from the Japanese-sponsored BPP, except for
Sujono, a former communist who became increasingly influential with
youth because of his anti-Japanese stance and radical rhetoric.
When the KNI membership was extended in October, however, 
the leftists who were under Sujono's leadership came to dominate the 
KNi, and the Working Committee of the Surakarta KNI fell into the 
hands of Sujono and Djuwardi, who had been PKI activists in 1926.
Soon after the new KNI was set up, the BKR was formed, 
in the second week of September, by senior Peta officers and AMT 
leaders - Muljadi Djojomartono (daidanchö), GPH Djatikusumo 
Sunarto Kusumodirdjo (both chudancho), Sutarto and Achmad Fadjar (both 
Shodanchö and AMT leaders), and GPH Purbonegoro (retired Peta 
candidate officer). The chairmanship of the BKR was in the hands of 
Muljadi Djojomartono, and Purbonegoro and Sunarto Kusumodirdjo
20 Suprapto graduated from the Faculty of Law in Batavia and then 
joined the court office in Surakarta. During the occupation he 
was a committee member of BPP. See 'Hal Pradjurit Peta dan 
Heiho', Bendel Djaman Djepang 1942-1945, AMN. Interview with 
Sumodinigrat, 2 August 1979. Suprapto was also closely associated 
with the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor leaders. Domo Pranoto was a 
Kasunanan official. During the occupation he was in the police 
office of the Surakarta Kochi, and also was involved in the BPP. 
Sutopo was a junior high school teacher and a member of the BPP.
Hendrokusumo was from a priyayi family and joined the Barisan 
Pelopor. Sujono was a PKI activist in 1926 and was imprisoned 
in Digul for many years. Mr Sukasno graduated from Law School 
and worked in the Kasunanan government. During the occupation he 
was involved in the BPP. Sumodihardjo was a railway official 
and eventually became stationmaster. In December 1945 he joined 
the PBI. Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
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acted as his chief assistants. The main sections of the BKR were: 
operations; equipment and administration; armament; personnel; 
and transportation. The Surakarta BKR in its early stages was estimated 
by Sunarto Kusumodirdjo to have about 4,000 members, both in the city 
of Surakarta and in the regencies. In Surakarta, just as in other 
parts of Central Java, the BKR in its early stages had almost no 
weapons and inadequate organization. When the Japanese ordered that 
the weapons of Surakarta Peta members be surrendered at the headquarters, 
only a few of them resisted this instruction and fled with their weapons.
Wh .in 'ho local Peta was subsequently disbanded on Ic) AnnusL 1945, there­
fore, few Peta members still had weapons which they could bring to the 
BKR. Substantial quantities of weapons were only obtained after the 
BKR disarmed the Japanese military forces.
The members of the Surakarta BKR were drawn from Seinendan, 
Keibodan, Peta and Heiho. The AMT, which had been founded earlier 
with IPTAS as its core, dissolved itself into the BKR, though remaining 
an influential group within it. In the BKR Sutarto was a very important 
figure because his leadership in the IPTAS and the AMT had gained him 
great influence among BKR members.
The main duties of the KNI were to disarm the Japanese military
forces and take over authority from the Japanese in the Surakarta 
—  22Kochi. Three weeks of preparation were needed before action began, 
since the Japanese forces were still very strong with about 1,000 men in 
the city of Surakarta. At each regency town in Surakarta the Japanese had 
about 200 men.
A series of meetings between the KNI, the BKR and the Barisan
Pelopor discussed the rival methods of diplomacy and force and agreed that
ooth were necessary. Finally, on 30 September, Sumodiningrat with other
KNI members met II. Watanabe, the chokan of Surakarta Kochi, and discussed
23the delegation of Japanese authority into the hands of the KNI. The 
meeting continued the following day, reaching eventual agreement on two 
points. Firstly, the Japanese would hand their military and civil authority,
21 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979. Both Muljadi 
Djojomartono and Purbonegoro died several years ago. Sunarto 
Kusumodirdjo himself died in December 1979, shortly after this 
interview.
22 See Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1950 (Surakarta, 
Djawatan Penerangan Kota Besar Surakarta, 1953), p.3.
23 Moh. Saleh, ’Riwajat Singkat Pemerintahan Karesidenan Surakarta', 
Typescript, Surakarta, 15 September 1960, p.l.
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including their military forces and all enterprises, to the KNI.
Secondly, the KNI would guarantee the security of the Japanese in
Surakarta. About 300 officials of Japanese-controlled officers were
waiting outside for the results of this meeting, along with about
243,000 demonstrators. That afternoon there was a massive procession 
through the streets to celebrate the formal delegation of authority 
to tile KNI by the chokan of Surakarta.
In the days which followed, the Japanese forces were disarmed
by the BKR. On 5 October, Muljadi Djojomartono and Sunarto Kusumodirdjo
led a group of BKR and Barisan Pelopor pemuda in disarming the Japanese
garrison troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mase. The
BKR took over all weapons in the headquarters of Mase's Battalion
at Mangkubumen, more than 1,000 weapons in all. Some 350 soldiers
from the Surakarta garrison were then moved to Tampir, in the Boyolali 
25regency. The Japanese air force contingent at Panasan airport was
disarmed without a fight, and about 200 of its men were also interned
at Tampir. Many automatic weapons and much, air force equipment
26were taken over by the BKR and the Barisan Pelopor.
The Kempeitai (military-police), based at Timuran and commanded 
by Major Shato, was the only unit which now refused to surrender its 
?.rms. On 11 October, an introductory meeting took place between Shato 
and the Surakarta KNI (Sumodiningrat, Mr Suprapto, Dr Kartono), but 
Shato refused to accept the KNI demand to hand over the Kempeitai's 
weapons to the BKR. On 12 October the BKR, Barisan Pelopor and many 
townspeople of Surakarta surrounded the Kempeitai headquarters. On 
the same date another meeting was held between Shato and the BKR (Muljadi 
Djojomartono and Suadi). Shato again refused to disarm. That night 
about nine o'clock the BKR and Barisan Pelopor moved against the
24 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 2 October 1945.
25 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
26 See Kodam VII Diponegoro (ed.), Sedjarah Tentara Nasional
Indonesia: Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro (Djawa Tengah)
Sedjarah Militer-Kodam VII Diponegoro, n.d., p.31
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Kempeitai post at Timuran. Action was still going on the following
morning, but ultimately the Kempeitai gave in. About ninety military
policemen were imprisoned at Tampir. Only one of the pemuda group
was killed and another one injured. The BKR carried away five mortars
27and many other weapons, including sten guns, carbines and pistols.
During the disarming of the Japanese, the BKR and the Barisan 
Pelopor diviaod their members into groups, each of which was assigned 
to disarm a post of the Japanese military forces. At the most important 
concentrations of Japanese arms - the Kempeitai at Timuran, the Mase 
battalion at Mangkubumen and the Japanese air force at Panasan air­
port - both BKR and Barisan Pelopor insisted that their units be
present. The Barisan Pelopor itself had nine groups involved in taking
28over the posts of the Japanese military forces.
By Central Government Decree of 5 October 1945, a regular
army was established, the BKR being replaced by the Tentara Keamanan
29Rakyat (the People's Security Army) or TKR. Surakarta became the
base of Division X of the TKR, under the command of GPH Purbonegoro,
one of the founders of BKR. He was appointed by the central government,
perhaps because of his education at the Breda Military Academy. Most
former officers of Peta and the AMT element within the TKR preferred
Sutarto's leadership. In order to prevent an internal conflict in
the Surakarta TKR, an election was held at the end of the first week
of November. Three candidates were nominated: GPH Purbonegoro,
Sunarto Kusumodindjo, and Sutarto. Of about 100 voters present,
three-quarters wanted Sutarto, perhaps 20 per cent supported Sunarto,
30and Purbonegoro received only a handful of votes.
During the time the KNI began to function as the new 
Republican government of Surakarta, the administrations of the Susuhunan
27 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
28 'Sedjarah Pedjuangan Barisan Pelopor Daerah Surakarta', typescript, 
Surakarta, 1959, pp.2-3.
29 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 13 November 1945.
30 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
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and Mangkunegoro continued to function in their own areas. Neither 
ruler exercised any leadership during the disarming of the Japanese, 
and both remained passive while the KNI was being formed. Their 
nobles also were slow to respond to the new Republican government; 
only four Kasunanan nobles were involved in the new government 
institutions - Wurjaningrat and Sumodiningrat in the KNI and GPU 
Purbonegoro and GPH Djatikusumo in the BKR — while no Mangkunegaran
nobles openly embraced the Republican cause.
The two rulers remained rivals, as they had been under the
Dutch colonial regime. This rivalry made it impossible for the
Working Committee of the KNI to unify local government in Surakarta.
Formally the ciLy government of Surakarta should have been headed by
the chairman of the regional KNI, but in actuality the city government
was composed of three separate authorities: the KNI, the Kasunanan
and the Mangkunegaran. Neither the Susuhunan nor the Mangkunegoro had
representatives in the KNI and Sumodiningrat, though a Susuhunan
noble, did not as KNI chairman represent the Kasunanan. He had been
elected by the local leaders and politicians of Surakarta, but faced
with the reality of three separate administrations in the city he was
31little more than a figurehead.
On 13 October the central government appointed Raden
Panji Suroso as High Commissioner (Komisaris Tinggi) in Jogjakarta
32 . 33and Surakarta. Suroso had been active in the PPKI and the KNIP,
and in the PPKI session of 19 August he had been appointed governor 
34of Central Java. As High Commissioner to the Central Java principalities,
he was to function as representative of the central government, with
31 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979.
32 See Republik Indonesia: Daorah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Djakarta,
Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), p.42.
33 Suroso was born in Sidorejo, in East Java, on 3 November 1894. 
In the prewar period, he had been chairman of the Central Civil 
Servants Union, a National Fraction leader in the Volksraad, 
and a member of Parindra. See The Asia Who's Who 1958, p.242.
34 Hatta, Memoir, p.466.
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whom he had direct communication. Because the principalities had been 
given special status by the Presidential decree of 18 August 1945, 
the role of the High Commissioner was only as coordinator of the 
two regions, and Suroso was probably appointed not only because he 
had been active in discussing the köchi in the PPKI meetings but 
also because as the first governor of Central Java he had been charged 
by the central government with the coordination between his province 
and the special regions.
On 19 October Suroso, who had taken up temporary residence
in the city of Surakarta, started to coordinate government activities
.in the Surakarta region. The first meeting between the High Commissioner
and the Surakarta KNI was held on 22 October, with Suroso approving
a KNI proposal to form a Directorate system for the Surakarta region,
on the basis of collegiaal bestuur (collegial administration) between
35the Sunanate, the Mangkunegoro and the KNI. Sumodiningrat, who 
attended this session, described the main goal of the Directorate 
as lol. Jews:
Its goal was to achieve similar regulations for 
the government of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran.
'this was because the Surakarta people did not want 
the region of Surakarta to be governed by different 
regulations. The Directorate government planned 
to coordinate the divided authorities in Surakarta.
The Mangkunegoro was strongly opposed to a Directorate system
based on equal representation of the two rulers and the KNI. He
demanded that any Directorate be comprised only of representatives
appointed by the Sunan and the Mangkunegoro, to the exclusion of the
KNI. This proposal, however, was rejected by the High Commissioner and 
37the KNI.
The first crisis for the Directorate began on 22 October, 
when Prince Mangkunegoro VIII, along with his high officials and
35 See my article, 'Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 
1945-1950', translated by Benedict Anderson, Indonesia, no.17, 
(April 1974), pp.108-10.
36 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979.
37 'Tentang Direktorioem', typescript, pp.1-2, AMN.
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conservative nobles, issued a statement rejecting the formation of
38the Directorate system. The Mangkunegoro did not want his authority 
to be integrated with the Sunanate in the Directorate system. He 
retained his administration in his own hands and boycotted all meetings 
of the Directorate. Moreover, he issued political statements attacking 
the Directorate. This posed problems for the Directorate but it also 
represented the first step in the crisis faced by the traditional 
authorities in Surakarta. The crisis deepened toward the end of 1945 
and in the early months of 1946, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.
THE FIRST PEMUDA ORGANIZATIONS
During the last months of the War, the Japanese had paid 
particular attention to the training and indoctrination of young 
Javanese, both educated and uneducated, through such organizations as 
Seinendan, Peta, Barisan Pelopor and Hizbullah. This resulted in the 
rapid rise of a new group of militant younger generation leaders and 
brought to the radical pemuda a keener understanding of state ideology.
Culturally, the term pemuda in traditional Javanese society
denotes a young man who is entering maturity and is intensively learning
the social and cultural norms of his society. Politically, however,
the term in the context of the Indonesian Revolution came to mean a
young activist, and it is with this connotation that we will be concerned
here. Where in Dr Smail's study of the Bandung revolution, pemuda is
defined only as revolutionary activist, thus including men of any age
39who had a revolutionary activist nature, Benedict Anderson in his 
work on the Indonesian Revolution has treated the pemuda in detail 
from the viewpoint of culture as well as politics. Anderson analyses 
the young revolutionary activist and distinguishes them from the 
elder politicians, and his usage is therefore more relevant tc this 
sLudy than Smail's.
38 Ibid, p ,2; Kenang-Konangan, op.cit., p.4; Moh. Saleh, op.cit., 
p.l; interview with Suwandito, 20 June 1979.
39 John R.W. Smail, Bandung Jn the Early Revolution 1945-1946.
A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution 
(Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, Cornell University, 1964), 
pp.17-18, 156.
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THE PEMUDA IN THE CONTEXT OF JAVANESE CULTURE
Youth in Javanese society can be designated as tnat stage
in life at which one begins to enter maturity. One begins to learn
more deeply the social and cultural norms which are the condition
of maturity. One should practise tata krama (politeness) in daily
communication, especially with one's parents. Most youths, except
for those in strict Moslem families, are taught by their fathers the
basic of elmu Kejawen (the science of Javanism).^  The preliminary
stage of elmu kejawen takes the form of physical training, several
methods of which will be explained here in brief. First there is mutih
(literally white, from the Javanese word putih) in which one does not
eat salt for several days or weeks. Another is ngrowot (literally
fruit and vegetables), when one does not eat rice for several days
or weeks. A third is nguler (from uler meaning caterpillar), when
one can only eat fruit. Still another is patigeni (literally pati =
death; geni = fire), a severe training in which one cannot eat or
41drink anything and must sleep in a dark room for several days.
A youth who has mastered tata krama and has begun the
preliminary stages of elmu kejawen is traditionally said to be wis
Jawa, or to have become a Javanese. The opposite of this is durung
Jawa, or not yet a Javanese. Benedict Anderson and Hildred Geertz
42have analysed the nature of this dichotomy. Hildred Geertz applies 
the term durung Jawa to a person who is not yet civilized, not yet 
able to control emotion in an adult manner, not yet able to speak with 
the proper respectful circumlocutions appropriate to different 
occasions. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson applies the term
40 RNg Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, who led the(Kangkunegaran priyayi 
group in the practice of elmu kejawen in the period 1947-1951, 
informs me that ^lmu kejawen is partly based on the contents
of such Javanese literary classics as the Wedatama, Wulangreh 
and Hidayat Djati. Interview with Sunardjo, 16 July 1979.
41 Interview with Sunardjo, 14 July 1979.
42 See Benedict Anderson, 'The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian
Politics, 1945-1946', Ph.D thesis, Cornell University, 1967, 
pp.2-3. See also Anderson, Jav^ p.4; Hildred Geertz, The Javanese 
Family. A Study of Kinship and Socialization (Glencoe, The
Free Press, 1961), p.105.
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du rung Jaw a to a person who is not yet able to understand the attitude 
of hormat (respect) in social communications. Both, however, have 
neglected the importance of performing elmu kejawen as an attitude of 
a person who is wis Jawa.
Javanese society therefore sees youth as a period of intense 
involvement in and practice with Javanese norms and elements of blmu 
kejawen. These were characteristics also of the pemuda involved 
in the lasykar organizations, and it is not surprising that when the 
lasykar began to fight against the Dutch, most of them put into use 
some practices of elmu kejawen, which Javanese society believes can 
bring slamef (safety and also invulnerability).
Lasykar members who were seriously concerned with the practice
of elmu kejawen were commonly called jago (fighter; literally,
13fighting cock), a term widely used in Java to refer to a person with 
44magical power. In the rural areas of Surakarta, the term jago is 
often applied to those leaders of robbers or brigands who were said to 
be invulnerable to weapons and expert in ^lmu kejawen.^ In rural
c3 Interview with Soekardi, 23 August 1979.
44 For the term jago in the context of Indonesian rural cultures, 
see Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950 
(Victoria, Longman, 1974), pp.56-57, 58 note 28; and in the 
context of urban society, see John R.W. Smail, op.cit., pp.88-89.
In some detail, Rudolf Mrazek relates the jago spirit to 
traditional Indonesian military concepts, in The United States 
and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965 (vol.I (Prague, Publishing 
House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, 1978), pp.17-77.
A nice description of jago in a modern Javanese setting may be 
found in the four heroes of Surabaya proletarian drama described 
by James L. Peacock, 'Anti-Dutch, Anti-Muslim Drama among 
Surabaja Proletarians: a Description of Performance and Responses',
Indonesia, no.4, October 1967, pp.44-73.
45 In rural Surakarta, bands of unruly robbers were called gento
or benggol. Such bands were traditionally widespread in Java, 
for treatment of such people in Pekalongan residency, see Anton 
E. Lucas, 'The Bambo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution
Against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java in 1945',
Ph.D thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1980, 
p. 37.
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areas of Surakarta, a jago is considered to be a person with magical
power who has had training at the hands of a kyai or guru (teacher)
of cblmu kejawen. Many rural people regard the jago as their protector.
Other features of the jago phenomenon were discussed earlier in a 
46Dutch study. This jago pattern common to Javanese society everywhere, 
clearly influenced the social integration of the lasykar organizations, 
for each lasykar unit was likely to have one or even more jago in 
its ranks. The jago, however, was not always himself the leader of 
;he lasykar organization.
Jago were also marked by their expertise in petungan Sawa
(Javanese calendrical prediction). According to the petungan Jawa,
each day in the weekly cycle can have two kinds of meaning, jaya dina
(victory day) or naga dina (literally naga means snake; therefore a
bad day). The position of naga dina can be plotted as it moves
47following the points of the compass. The jago1s advice with regard 
to the petungan Jawa always strictly follows the Primbon (traditional 
guidebook on the subject), and thus there was likely to be agreement 
in the advice as to which days should be chosen to military action.
THE LASYKAR ORGANIZATIONS 
Barisan Banteng
The Barisan Pelopor, established as the key mobilizing
element in the Hökökai, continued to exist as an organization of
activists, mainly urban youths, in the months after the Indonesian
proclamation of independence. From 14 to 16 December 1945 representatives
of Barisan Pelopor branches throughout Java and Madura attended a
special congress in Surakarta. They decided there to change the name
Barisan Pelopor to Barisan Banteng Republik Indonesia (Wild Buffalo
48Ccips of the Indonesian Republic). They standardized the oath which
46 P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian 
Problem (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1949), pp.28-29.
47 Interview with Soekardi, 23 August 1979. In the village of 
Wonokerso, Soekardi is noted for his knowledge of petungan Jawa. 
During the guerrilla war (in early 1949), he advised the pemuda 
on how to choose jaya dina for operations.
48 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 17 December 1945.
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members of the organization were to take:
1. to be loyal to the discipline of the organization;
2. to be ready to sacrifice for the Indonesian 
Republic;
J. to unify the Indonesian people into one nation
(satu bangsa) in one fatherland (satu tanah air) 
with one language;
494. to create social justice.
The congress elected Dr Muwardi, a prominent Barisan Pelopor
leader and a close associate of Sukarno, as head of the organization
and appointed Sudiro, head of Barisan Pelopor's daily secretariat,
50as his deputy. Because of its central location and good lines of 
communication, Surakarta was designed as the site of the Barisan Banteng 
Markas Besar (headquarters).
Organizationally, the Markas Besar was divided into seven 
51sections. A fair number of the headquarters staff, Soemokartiko, 
Tjitromargoso, Suradji, Mangk-usudijonoand Sonhadji, had previously
49 See 'Keterangan Susunan Markas Besar Barisan Banteng sampai Markas 
Daerah di Karesidenan2, Kabupaten2 dan Ketjamatan2', typescript, 
Surakarta, Perpustakaan Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, 1959, 
p.l. Kedaulatan Rakjat, 17 December 1945.
50 Dr Mas Muwardi. was born in Pati, Central Java, on 30 January 1907. 
He graduated from ELS in 1921 and from STOVIA in 1933. He was 
prominent in Jong Java in the early 1920s and in the Boy Scout 
movement in the late 1920s. A prewar Parindra leader in Jakarta, 
he gained an important Putera post before associating with Barisan 
Pelopor during the Occupation. See Orang Indonesia, p.335;
Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p.279 (f.19), p.289 (f.85). 
Sudiro was born in Jogjakarta on 24 April 1911 and also joined 
Jong Java. A school teacher and headmaster in the prewar period, 
he used his Taman Siswa background to become head of a special 
Barisan Pelopor group personally attached to Sukarno. See Sudiro, 
Pcngalaman Saya Sokitar 17 Agustus *45 (Jakarta, Yayasan Idayu, 
1972).
51 These sections were the general secretariat (under Moh. Yusuf) ,-
iasykar (under Soemokartiko): central commission (under Sidik
Djojosukarto); intelligence (under Tjitromargoso and Suradji); 
propaganda and information (under Muljadi Djojomartono); press 
(under Imam Sutardjo); social and economic (under Mangkusudijono 
and Sonhadji). See 'Keterangan Susunan', p.2. This structure 
was confirmed by some informants: interview with Hagnjawigati,
30 July 1979; Suradji, 11 August 1979; Sudijo, 21 October
1979.
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been in the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor. Newcomers from Surakarta
included Muljadi Djojomartono (a Peta officer) and Surjokusumo (a
high priyayi of the Kasunanan). In addition, there were four
leaders from outside Surakarta, Dr Muwardi, Sudiro, Sidik Djojokartiko 
53and Moh. Yusuf.
The regional leadership (pemimpin daerah) for Surakarta was 
distinct from the national headquarters. The three most important 
regional leaders were Hadisunarto (a member of PNI in the 1930s and 
a Barisan Pelopor activist in disarming the Japanese military forces 
in Surakarta), Hanjawigati (also of Barisan Pelopor), and Anwar 
Santosa (a Barisan Pelopor leader in the Kartosuro subdistrict; 
from Moslem family). One younger activist emerged to join these three 
in the Surakarta leadership - Sudijo, a former member of the Barisan 
Pelopor of Kartosuro and a man with a peasant background.
The fact that the leadership of Barisan Banteng headquarters 
was dominated by former members of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor brought 
the local leaders of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng into closer 
association with headquarters than was the case with other branches 
ivi Java. This also meant that the Surakarta Barisan Banteng was less 
independent in its operations, and there could be no question of the 
branch ignoring orders from headquarters, a luxury in which other, 
more distant and independent-minded, branches sometimes indulged.
Smooth relations between the cabang (branches) at the regency 
ievel and the ranting (sub-branch) at district or sub-district level
52 'Sedjarah Perdjuangan Barisan Pelopor', pp.2-3. Soemokartiko 
had graduated from HIS though he was from an ordinary Javanese 
family. Tjitromargoso was a young official of the Kasunanan; 
he had graduated from IIIS. Suradji was born on 15 January 1923 
and graduated from HIS, Solo,(1937) and from Kweekschool (1942); 
he was from a Moslem family. Sonhadji was a HIS graduate, also 
from a Moslem family. Mangkusudijono was a HIS graduate, but 
from a pangreh praja family. Interview with Suradji, 11 August 
1979; Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979.
53 Sidik was born on 7 June 1908 in Blitar, East Java. He graduated 
from Mulo (Surabaya), and had been active in Jong Java, Indonesia 
Muda, Partindo, and Gerindo. He was chairman of Putera and the 
Hökökai of Kediri. Ensiklopedia Indonesia (Bandung, van Hoeve, 
1954-56), p.1248.
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in the Surakarta Barisan Banteng made for a sound organization.
Most members at the ranting level were farmers, including pemuda desa
(village youth) who were likely to be former members either _f Barisan
Pelopor or of such organizations as Seinendan and Keibodan, or, in a
few cases, of Peta (in Kedawung sub-district, on]y one of the three
Peta members joined the Barisan Banteng). Pemuda Pokoso was an
important recruiting-ground in Jumapolo sub-district. At Jumapolo
most members were peasants, while a few were from merchant backgrounds.
Of the two local leaders, Mas Prijowinoto was the village teacher
54while Bahkran was a local merchant and pious Moslem. They had been
the founders of the Barisan Pelopor in Jumapolo and now they became
the builders of the Barisan Banteng. While Bahkran was collecting
funds to finance the organization, Mas Prijowinoto maintained contact
with the headquarters and regional leaders, namely Dr Muwardi, Sudiro 
55and Hadisunarto.
In the ranting of Kedawung, a Sragen sub-district, the Barisan 
Banteng leaders were from the pangreh praja. Sastrobaja, a former 
member of the Sragen Barisan Pelopor and Hökbkai, formed the Kedawung 
sub-branch of Barisan Banteng. He was at the same time head of the 
information section of the sub-district government, and he recruited 
.'Timbers fcr the Barisan Banteng through the authority of the lurah 
there. Although the lurah might not be a member of the Barisan Banteng 
himself, he enrolled members for it from former Seinendan, Keibodan and 
Barisan Pelopor members.
In rural areas, the Barisan Banteng acted to safeguard 
local security. At sub-district level it provided military training 
for village youth and helped village headmen to carry out their 
administration.
Compared wiLli the olhur lasykar organizations Lhu Barisan 
Banteng was quite well off financially. A special bank, the Bank
54 Interview with Bahkran, 11 October 1979.
55 On the role of Mas Prijowinoto our informant was Bahkran. Mas 
Prijo died some years ago. At the time of Barisan Pelopor he 
often gathered pemuda together and gave them political courses.
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Barisan Banteng, financed and supported the organization. It original 
funds had been allocated by the Japanese to the Barisan Pelopor, and 
those had later been supplemented by a donation from the Hokokai.
The Barisan Banteng, in addition to its normal organization,
had a research section, the so-called Bagian P (P = Penyelidik,
researcher). The primary aim of this section was to observe the
political activities of perceived enemies of the Barisan Banteng,
which by early 1946 meant the PKI and PESINDO (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia-
56Indonesian Socialist Youth). This was because both the PKI and 
PESINDO were strongly opposed to Japanese 'collaborators', including 
the Barisan Banteng since this had arisen directly from the Japanese- 
sponsored Barisan Pelopor. Moreover, since the end of December the 
headquarters of Barisan Banteng in the city of Surakarta felt 
threatened by the PKI and the PESINDO, both of which were attempting 
to replace the influence of Barisan Banteng in this vital city.
The total membership of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng branch
was estimated at 12,000. In two of the rural sub-districts I have
researched in some depth, Kedawung ranting had over 200 members and
57Jumapolo more than 250. In the city of Surakarta there were about
4,000 members, and the rural membership would therefore have been 
58around 8,000. The majority of the members of the Surakarta Barisan 
Banteng mast then have been illiterate pemuda from rural areas, many 
of whom would have joined because they were attracted by the popularity 
gained by the Barisan Pelopor through its main leader, Ir. Sukarno.
Barisan Buruh Indonesia
In the middle of September 1945 the revolutionary pemuda
59group of Menteng 31 in Jakarta formed the Barisan Buruh Indonesia
56 Interview with Suradji, 11 August 1979.
57 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bahkran, 11 October 1979.
58 This figure is given by Sudijo and Hagnjawigati Interview,
21 October 1979; 30 July 1979.
59 This pemuda group was dominated by leftists such as Njono, Jahja 
Liman, Pandu Kartawinguna and Kusnaeni. See Sidik Kertapati, 
Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 
1964), pp.133, 135, 138.
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(Indonesian Labor Corps) or BBI, which was recognised on 5 October 
by Iwa Kusumasumantri, the veteran leftist Minister of Labor and 
Social Affairs, as the sole representative of organised labour.
Regional pemuda groups, including one in Surakarta, quickly imitated 
the action of Menteng 31. In October the Surakarta BBI was already 
formed, chairedby Aliman, a young Marxist closely associated with 
such pre-war communist activists as Achmad Dasuki, Djuwardi and 
Sujono.
In its early stages the Surakarta BBI comprised three main
labor organizations - the Serikat Sekerdja Kereta Api (Railway Workers'
Union), chaired by Soemodihardjo, head of the Surakarta Railway office;
the Serikat Buruh Negeri Surakarta (Surakarta State Workers' Union) or
SBNS, led by Suto Sundoro, a radically-minded official in the Kepatihan
of the Kasunanan;^ and the Serikat Pegawai Negeri Mangkunegaran
(Mangkunegaran Civil Servants' Union) or SPNMN, founded by Moh.
Dal jono. ^  Most members of the SBNS and the SSPNMN were lower-level
officials of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran who, as a result
of the financial problems of Lhe Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran during
the first months of revolution, had grievances which led them to
62align with the BBI. By the end of December the Surakarta BBI was
63estimated to have 3,000 members. These consisted primarily of railway 
workers, sugar factory labourers, lower-level officials and teachers.
An important step for the BBI was its national congress of
workers and peasants held from 7 to 9 November 1945 in the city of
Surakarta. This was attended by delegates of BBI branches throughout 
64Java and Madura. The Surakarta BBI was represented by Soemodihardjo, 
Aliman and Moh. Daljono. On 8 November the congress established the 
Partei Buruh Indonesia (Indonesian Labor Party or PBI) and elected
60 Suto Sundoro was strongly opposed to the traditional authorities, 
lie hud been a member of prewar Gerindo, and ho later joined the 
Barisan Pelopor. Interview with Wirodiningrat, 30 October 1979.
Cl Daljono was bon. on 20 May 1912 in Surakarta and educated in 
HIS, Mulo, AMS, HBS (Jakarta). After 1936 he worked in the 
Mangkunegaran. See 'Ilal Riwajat Mr Moh. Daljono Hardjosudiro', 
Surakarta, typescript, 1943.
62 Bendel Serikat Sekerdja 1945-1948, AMN. For further discussion of 
the financial problems of the kraton see below, pp.135-36.
63 'Laporan Rapat BBI Daerah Surakarta 14 January 1946', typescript. 
This report may be found in Bendel Serikat Sekerdja, ibid, AMN.
64 Suara Buruh, no.l, 8 December 1945.
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Sjamsu Harja Udaja as its chairman. Moh. Daljono was elected head 
of a committee to draft the party statutes. Although at this conference 
the BBI was amalgamated into the BBI, the following January it was 
re-established as a separate organization.
It was also decided at the Congress that the BBT would
establish its own armed force, to be called Lasykar Buruh Indonesia,
or LBI. The Surakarta BBI formed a LBI unit in early December, under
the direct leadership of Alimin. Its first activity was to attend
the first national congress of LBI on 30 December in Malang.^
Accordingly, the Surakarta LBI only began military activities in the
early months of 1946. Its members were primarily pemuda interested
in a Marxist ideology. Most were from the city, with only a few from
rural areas, chiefly from sugar and rubber centres. The Kedawung LBI
had less than 100 members (mainly rubber workers) and the Delanggu LBI
6 7more than 200 members ( sugar, cotton and jute workers). In its early 
stages, the Surakarta LBI was called LBI Division VIII and consisted 
of five regiments.^
With the emergency of the LBI as fighting organization, the 
BBI was free to concentrate on social and political questions affecting 
labor organizations. Both organizations were influenced by Marxist 
ideology and active in the struggle for labor rights. Moreover, the 
LBI supported a plan of the BBI and the PBI to nationalize the
65 Singkatan Poetoesan-Poetoesan Kongres BBI pada tanggal, 7, 8, 9 
Nopember 1945 di Soerakarta, stencilled. Sjamsu Harja Udaja was 
born on 23 March 1913 in Binangun, Banyumas (Central Java). He 
was educated in HIS (1929) , Mulo and Taman Siswa (1933-35).
In 1935 he became a teacher in Solo, from 1938 to 1941 a member 
of Parindra (Solo); in 1941-42 he was on the editorial staff 
of the journal Darmokondo and at the same time chairman of a 
Labour Union in Surabaya. See Prang Indonesia, p.290.
66 Sendjata Boeroeh, no.l, January 1946.
67 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bodronojo, 26 September 
1979.
68 See 'Sedjarah Lasjkar Buruh Indonesia Didaerah Surakarta', 
typescript, n.d., p.2. In 1947 the name was changed to 
Battalion 13.
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69enterprises of the Susuhanan and the Mangkunegoro. Subsequently, 
as will be seen in Chapter V, the Surakarta LBI fell under the political 
influences of the PKI.
Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia
The other large lasykar organization in Surakarta with a
national scope was the Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia
(Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia) or BPRI. It was an
organization dominated by the charismatic leadership of Sutomo ('Bung
Tomo' ) , who £:>layed a key role in the fighting against the British in
Surabaya in late October and early November 1945. BPRI was established
on 29 October and replaced the former Pimpinan Pemberontakan Rakyat
Surabaya (Insurgent Leadership of the People of Surabaya t which had
70been formed on 12 October.
The BPRI quickly spread throughout Java. In Surakarta the
BPRI spread through two channels - Bung Tomo's radio speeches on
'Radio Pemberontakan' (radio of revolt), listened to by the pemuda
of Surakarta every night, and those Surakarta pemuda who had been
71sent to Surabaya to fight against the British. Sutomo's radio
speeches inflamed the pemuda spirit to fight against the British in 
72cities in Java.
In November the BPRI of Surakarta had enough strength to 
establish a local organization. There were three levels in its 
organizational structure: a markas besar (headquarters) for all of
Surakarta, markas cabang (branch post) at the regency level, and markas 
ranting (sub-branch post) in the districts or sub-districts. The Surakarta
69 This plan was announced in the regional congress of Lho Surakarta 
labor union on 29 December 1945 by Aliman and Moh. Daljono.
See 'Verslag Singkat Rapat wukil2 Scrikat Boeroeh dan Serikat 
Sekerdja 29/30 1945', typescript, pp.1-2. This report was written 
by Anggoro et aL„ on 31 December 1945.
70 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur (Kementerian Penerangan
Republik Indonesia, 1952), p.916.
71 'Bendel BPRI 1945-1948', AMN.
72 'Sedjarah Singkat BPRI Daerah Surakarta', typescript, Surakarta,
20 April 1959.
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BPRI was founded by Djajusman, a former Gerindo activist and member
of Barisan Pelopor. After December he had maintained close relations
with Sutomo, who often visited the Surakarta BPRI branch. In the
early stages, the Surakarta BPRI consisted of 100 members.73 Although
the BPRI drew some members from rural areas, it was less popular thero
than the other lasykar organizations discussed here. For instance,
there was no BPRI organization in Kedawung, while in Delanggu its
members numbered fewer than 100.7 This is because, unlike Barisan
Banteng and Hizbullah, the BPRI had no roots from the Japanese occupation
in rural areas. Most of its members were illiterate pemuda, although
there were a few students who joined the BPRI and called themselves
BPRI Pelajar (Student BPRI). This BPRI Pelajar, formed on 11 November,
consisted of students of the Ardjuna Private High School of Surakarta.
The spirit of the BPRI Pelajar was expressed in the slogan berdarah
75pcmbcrontak (to have the blood of a rebel).
The BPRI funds came mainly from general contributions and 
amal BPRI (amal = works, or good deeds), which were attempts to raise 
money by performances of Javanese dancing and wayang. Sometimes these
performances were followed by speeches aiming to draw the masses to
. . 76join the BPRI.
The attitude of the Surakarta BPRI imitated that of their 
colleagues in Surabaya who had vowed to let their hair grow until 
full Indonesian independence was achieved. The Surakarta branch, 
following the policy of BPRI headquarters, was strongly opposed to 
any negotiations with the British or the Dutch.
Lasykar Hizbullah
The Lasykar Hizbullah of Surakarta was formed in September 
by Bakri, one of the Hizbullah leaders during the occupation and a
73 'Sedjuruh SingkuL BPRI', p.J.
74 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
75 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 1 December 1945.
/'6 Bendei BPRI 1945-1948, op. cit.
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close associate of Kyai Haji Idris, former daidanchö of the Wonogiri 
77Peta.
The Surakarta Hizbullah was strongly supported financially
by the Moslem batik merchants in Solo, concentrated in such areas
of the city as Kauman, Laweyan and Pasar Kliwon. This was because
the batik merchants shared the Hizbullah's commitment to an Islamic
ideology as the basis for the national struggle. In the city the
Hizbullah worked closely with the Markas Barisan Kyai Surakarta
(Headquarters of Kyai Corps of Surakarta) at Singasaren, which was
led by Kyai Haji Idris. Hizbullah members looked to the Kyai for
78Islamic teaching and general guidance. This link with a prominent 
kyai had in most cases already been established in the Hizbullah of 
the Japanese period. This link strengthened the militancy of 
Hizbullah by cultivating members' semangat bathin (inner spirit). 
Hizbullah ideology emphasized the unity of Moslems and the responsibility 
of Hizbullah as Tentara Allah (God's army) to carry out jihad (holy 
war) against the British or the Dutch.
In the rural areas, as in the city, the Hizbullah appears
to have associated closely with the kyai. In Delanggu, for example,
Haji Buzairi, a prominent kyai during the occupation, became an
79adviser of the local Hizbullah. Buzairi attainted to finance the 
Hizbullah by applying the Islamic concept of zakat (religious tax).
Every Islamic farmer was exhorted to deliver 5 per cent of his 
agricultural production, which was to be used by Buzairi to finance 
the Hizbullah and to aid Moslems. The members of Hizbullah in
77 Bakri was born into a pious Moslem family in Solo in 1922 and 
wau a gruduulu of 1118. During Ilia oceupuLLon hu wan a Hizbullah 
leader and had attended military training in Bogor. Ilis father 
was a Moslem batik trader in Kauman. Interview with Bakri,
15 August 1979.
78 See 'Bendel Markas Barisan Kyai Surakarta', 1947, AMN.
79 Buzairi was born in 1904 and graduated from the following
peasantren: Jamsaren in 1918 (Solo), Termas in 1925 (East Java),
Watutjengkal in 1931 (Central Java) . In 1929 he made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca. Interview, 13 August 1979.
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Delanggu and its surrounding areas were estimated at 300.80 in the 
city of Surakarta the Lasykar Hizbullah had 500 members.8  ^ Apparently 
the local Hizbullah of Delanggu was not strictly subordinate to 
its headquarters, because of the influence of the local kyai on the 
Hizbullah branch.
Vv7e may tuen say that Islamic spirit (semangat Islam) was 
the source of Hizbullah militancy. Close ties between Hizbullah 
members and kyai were felt to be necessary during the first months 
of revolution, to build a feeling of unity in Islam and to carry out 
the holy war against the Allies.
L asykar  Rakyat
Officially, the BKR was replaced by the TKR on 5 October
1945, but in most regions of Java this change was only implemented a
few weeks later. This appears to have been because the BKR was involved
in disarming the Japanese. For instance, the Surakarta BKR was still
busy disarming the Japanese until the middle of October. This would
have postponed the disbandment of the Surakarta BKR, a process which
82was only completed on 1 November.
On 6 November, the Lasykar Rakyat of Surakarta was founded
to embrace former members of the BKR who were not to become members
of the 1KR. it absorbed such small and local armed units as Lasykar
Garuda, Lasykar Satriya, Lasykar Potehi and Lasykar Djanget. The
Surakarta Lasykar was chaired by Iskandar, a Barisan Pelopor activist
83and former member of the BKR. The total strength of this lasykar, 
including its branches in the regencies, was six battalions.84
00 Interview with Ilaji Duzuiri, 13 August 1979.
0.1 Interview with Haji Bakri, 15 August 1979.
82 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 November 1945.
83 Iskandar was a younger brother of Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, and was 
thus from a pangreh praja family; he had graduated from HIS.
84 'Sedjarah Singkat Lasjkar Rakjat Surakarta', typescript (Surakarta, 
n.d.), p.2. This source may be found in the library of Sedjarah 
Militer Angkatan Darat, Surakarta.
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The Lasykar Rakyat established deep roots among the people, 
particularly in the villages, partly, perhaps, because the word 
rakyat (people) attracted the pemuda. At the sub-district level it 
frequently organized asrama (dormitories) where military training was 
supervised by former Seinendan leaders. These asrama provided meals 
for their members through a system of dapur umum (public kitchens), 
which xnvolvcd a wide circle of villagers in delivering meals to the 
asrama. Most members in the villages were illiterate pemuda. The 
rural Lasykar Rakyat functioned chiefly to assume general security 
for villages and to defend rural people against rampok (robbers).
In November and December of 1945, however, many of its members joined
the regular armv in the front lines facing British troops in the city
„ "* 85of Semarang.
Banditry Elements in the Lasykar
The traditional Javanese band was often headed by a leader
who had magical-mystic powers. The leader and members possessed their
own customs, ceremonies and code of honour, and they therefore
86formed a group with strong inner ties.
The rural people of Surakarta referred to the bandit groups
in their area by the local term kecu (robber). Most kecu members
were illiterate. The leaders could be literate, but they were
distinguished primarily by possession of ng'elmu kawedukan (ngblmu =
87mystical teaching, kawedukan = invulnerability).
The purpose of the modern lasykar organizations was quite 
different from the Surakarta kecu, but their members shared some 
of the attitudes of the traditional bandit. For instance, lasykar 
leaders were concerned with ngblmu kawedukan, much as bandit chiefs 
had been. To protect themselves Hizbullah members possessed a charm
85 The defence perimeter for the Republican Army (TKR) in the 
Semarang area ran through such outlying towns as Ambarawa, Bawen, 
Ungaran and Mranggen see 'Sedjarah Singkat Lasjkar Rakjat', p.l.
86 For details, see P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, op.cit., pp.27-34.
87 Interview wxbk Soekardi, 23 August 19 79.
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in the form of magical Arabic words written on a piece of paper.
Other lasykar organizations held powerful objects which provided
protection: Barisan Banteng and BPRI possessed a magical bamboo spear,
88the so-called bambu runcing Parakan. The Bendosari Lasykar Rakyat
members went to Kyai Pentjil, a prominent local kyai, who led them in
doing mutih and growot for several weeks, to induce invulnerability
89while they were fighting against the British or Dutch.
Growing out of the struggle against the Dutch and the 
Japanese, the lasykar organizations also turned against the minority 
groups, and in particular the Chinese and Arabs. Most of their victims 
were local traders. In December 1945 the BPRI and the Barisan Banteng 
entered Chinese textile shops and forcibly took away cloth for their 
uniforms and for making the red and white national flag. The Barisan 
Banteng even seized the house of a rich Chinese to be its headquarters.
A few members of the BPRI, when they returned from the front line 
surrounding the city of Semarang, forcibly demanded the property of 
the people to make good their lack of provisions. Overall, in fact, the 
BPRI showed a more undisciplined record than the other lasykar 
organizations.
Another element of traditional banditry which found its
way into the lasykar organizations was the anti-foreign obsession of
90the political bands. In December the BPRI and the Barisan Banteng 
popularized an action against Nica (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) 
and its followers, the so-called kaki tangan Nica, in the local society 
of Surakarta. These two lasykar organizations warned the masses 'awas
91anjing Nica dan kaki tangannya' (beware of Nica dogs and their followers).
88 This bambu runcing had magical power after Kyai Parakan (a 
prominent kyai of Parakan, near Temanqqunq, Central Java) had 
charmed it. Interview with Sudijo, 30 October 1979.
89 Kyai Pentjil was a poor farmer in Bendosari. During the 
occupation he studied in the pesantren in Ponorogo, East Java. 
During the revolution the villagers of Bendosari regarded him 
as a kyai who had mastered ngelmu kawedukan. Interview with 
Muljadi, 6 August 1979.
90 Wulfften Palthe also links the political bands with the regular 
army. See P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, op.cit., p.45.
91 Interview with Sudijo, 30 October 1979.
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Eurasian youths were sometimes struck in the street as a result of 
these feelings, but there were no killings such as those which occurred 
in Semarang and in the Pekalongan area.
What conclusions can one then draw after discussing the 
local lasykar of Surakarta? The lasykar organizations were the home 
of the revolutionary pemuda who were the vanguard of the newly born 
Republic. Locally, the life of pemuda who were in the lasykar 
organizations was still heavily influenced by Javanese cultural 
tradition. In addition, there is no doubt that the military values 
which had been inculcated by the Japanese in the Peta, Heiho, Seinendan 
and Barisan Pelopor also contributed to the revolutionary attitudes 
of the pemuda which provided the strength of the Republic. The spirit 
of independence was a potent psychological force, spurring pemuda 
enthusiasm for joining lasykar organizations. With ideology and 
rf rrgion providing the motives for the decision as to which organization 
to join, it is not surprising to see a number of organizations, with 
different orientations, rising and flourishing. This very multiplicity 
of organizations, in an already chaotic period, made it almost inevitable 
that control by the central government would not be consistently 
exercised.
ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSES IN THE RURAL AREAS
In most cases the news of the proclamation of independence 
was brought to the villagers of the Surakarta region by the local 
leaders of Barisan Pelopor and Peta or by local officials. The 
villagers of the sub-district of Bendosari learned about the proclamation 
at the end of August 1945. This news was brought by Kasimo, a former 
bundanchö of Peta, when he went back to Bendosari after the Peta
92organization was disbanded by the Japanese authorities on 20 August.
In Kedawung and Jumapolo, the sub-district officials brought the news 
of the proclamation to the village headmen. In the sub-district of 
Delanggu, news of the proclamation reached the people from rumours
92 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979. He was born in 1922 in 
Sukohardjo and had graduated from primary school.
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passed on by Indonesian administrators at the Delanggu sugar factory.
Following closely the moves in the city, the local leaders 
at the level of sub-district began to be very busy preparing the 
formation of the local KNIs. In the middle of September, Kasimo 
received a telephone message from Sumodiningrat, the head of the 
Surakarta KNI, through the district official in Sukoharjo. The message 
conveyed the orders of the central government that former members of 
Peta were to form local KNIs as soon as possible.
At the end of September Kasimo held meetings with local 
leaders to prepare the local KNI. By early October the Bendosari 
KNI was established with Kasimo as its head. Kasimo then began to 
reform the village administration by introducing KNIs at that level 
also. But there was only one village, Toriyo, in which this attempt 
was immediately successful, and here the village KNI was under the 
village head, Martodihardjo. This is because Martodihardjo was a 
member of the Bendosari KNI and closely associated with local 
revolutionary leaders such as Kasimo and Muljadi, the leader of the 
Bendosari Lasykar Rakyat. The Toriyo KNI members comprised former 
leaders of Seinendan and Keibodan, as well as village administration 
officials. The functions of this village KNI were to assist the village 
officials in their duties and to guard the security of the village.
The other sub-districts selected, Delanggu, Jumapolo and 
Kedawung, were only a little slower in responding. There the KNIs 
were led by the sub-district officials and included former Seinendan, 
Keibodan and Barisan Pelopor members and the village headmen. In 
these areas the sub-district KNIs often functioned as information 
centres where the village headmen could be informed about the situation 
of the new Republic.
Mou fly the local KNlu functioned an local political institutions 
and as a means of communication between the regional government and 
rural society. Through the local KNIs the spirit of independence was 
conveyed to villagers in many ways. The KNIs ordered the villagers to 
wear a small emblem of the merah putih and to use the salutation 
‘merdeka: (fret) when meeting each other. These methods, of course,
encouraged the villagers to feel a strong emotional involvement in 
the struggle for independence. Moreover, the villagers created folksongs
91
as a social expression of their spirit of independence. The traditional
Javanese puppet, the wayang, was used to perforin a story about an
independent state in which the proklamasi (proclamation) was referred
93to as the wahyu kraton (divine inspiration of the state). A popular 
story was the Wahyu Makutoromo. According to this story, whoever 
received this wahyu would become the ruler. Therefore, the Pandawa 
group and the Kurawa group fought to gain possession of the wahyu.
In this case, the Pandawa referred to the Republican people who had 
successfully defeated the Republican enemy, the Kurawa.
The rise of various laskyar organizations in general was a 
product of the spirit of independence among the pemuda groups. The 
degree of popularity of different lasykar organizations in the rural 
areas originally depended on the social and economic condition of each 
area. The lasykar organizations more interested in a Marxist ideology, 
such as bßl or L.BI, were evidently quite popular in the plantation areas. 
For instance, the BBI and LBI were more influential than other 
organizations among rural pemuda in Delanggu and Kedawung. The rural 
pemuda who joined the LBI were mostly plantation labourers.
The Barisan Banteng, BPRI and Lasykar Rakyat were more 
influential in the rural areas outside the plantation areas. The 
Barisan Banteng, for instance, was stronger in Jumapolo than in the 
Kedawung plantation area. The Lasykar Rakyat was the strongest lasykar 
organization in Bendosari.
Another important point concerning the village administration 
reform was a plan promoted by the Surakarta KNI in December for 
re-electing village headmen. A person who was successfully elected 
as the new village headman was commonly called the lurah kemerdekaan 
(the independence village headman). From December 1945 to the early 
months of 19 4 L, according Lu the rusults of my research, out of 1Ü0
94village headmen who stood in Sragen regency, eighty were re-elected.
93 Interview with Soekardi,26 July 1979; Martodihardjo, 20 August 
1979. See also my preliminary study in Soeyatno, 'Social and 
Political Changes in Surakarta after 1945', Review of Indonesian 
and Malayan Affairs, vol.8, no.l (Jan-June 1974), p.44.
94 Soeyatno, ibid., p.39.
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The elected village headmen accepted instructions from the new
independent administration, namely from the sub-district KNIs, in
con erast Lo traditional village headmen, who had served the ousuhunan
or Mangkunegoro for many years. Martodihardjo, one of the re-elected
village headmen, described the lurah kemerdekaan as follows:
The lurah kemerdekaan took orders from the 
Republican Government and did not accept orders 
from the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro. The 
lurah kemerdekaan had to possess a revolutionary 
spirit. The lurah kemerdekaan did not serve the 
raja (the king) but served the Republic.^5
In short, we can say that in the first months of Indonesian 
Independence, the Revolution had already produced changes in rural 
society. The spirit of independence had brought a new attitude to 
the villagers, who now saw the village governments as part of the new 
Republican Government.
95 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE FALL OF THE SURAKARTA DYNASTIES
THE PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN CHALLENGE
Surakarta as an oppositionist city became the national centre 
of Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Fighting Front) or PP. Why Surakarta 
should have so focussed oppositionist elements had something to do with the 
legion's revolutionary tradition, but still more to dc with its anachronistic 
administration. Most officials of Lhe Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran 
themselves opposed the rulers,and therefore gave support to Leftist leaders.
The rulers sought the protection of the Republican central government, which 
in Lurn accentuated the opposition of local revolutionaries to that government.
As Benedict Anderson noted, 'almost from the start of the Sjahrir 
cabinet's life ... the elements of a formidable opposition were already in 
existence'.'*" The cabinet had a narrow basis of support because it comprised 
only the Socialist Party leaders and largely apolitical professional men. 
Moreover the cabinet opened talks with the Dutch, a course strongly opposed 
by most of its rivals.
The Persatuan Perjuangan was formed on 6 January 1946 in Purwokerto
by the groups supporting Tan Malaka. The PP rapidly attracted the support of
2143 popular organizations. On Tan Malaka's suggestion, the PP in its session
in Surakarta on 15 and 16 January declared itself a popular front, meant to
build support for the PP program and to co-ordinate the badan perjuangan to
3attack the British and the Dutch. Moreover a planning sub-committee was
4formed, consisting of eleven members, including Sujono of the Surakarta KNI. 
Sukarno, Hatta, and all the ministers were invited but none of them came.
It as clear that the conference was regarded as fundamentally 
oppositionist by the government. The PP adopted the Minimum Program 
proposed by Tan Malika, consisting of seven points, as follows:
1 Benedict R.O'G, Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p.269.
2 Osman Raliby, Documenta Historical Sedjarah Dokumenter Dari 
Pertumbuhan dan Perdjuangan Negara Republik Indonesia (Djakarta, 
Bulan Bintang, 1953), p.188.
3 Muhammad Yamin, Sapta Parma (Bukittinggi, N.V. Nusantara, 1957), 
p .113; Raliby, op.cit., p.194
Benedict Anderson, op.cit., p.293, gives a complete list of 
members. An incomplete list may be found in Osman Raliby, 
op.cit., p .194.
4
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1. Negotiation on the recognition of 100 per cent 
'Merdeka' (Independence)
2. A People's Government
3. A People's Army
4. Taking care of European internees
5. Disarming the Japanese
6. Confiscation of enemy rights and properties
7. Confiscation of enemy industry (factories, 
workshops, etc.) and agriculture (Plantations, 
mines, etc.).J
The working Commit tec of KNIP endorsed the PP's stand and
urged the whole population to join it. When the cabinet thereupon
resigned on 2 8 February,^* Tan Malaka and the PP leaders had triumphed
in over throwing and supplanting the Sjahrir group. Kahin asserts:
Many in the PP coalition, including General Sudirman 
and several other army leaders, while desirous for 
Sjahrir's overthrow, did not want a cabinet dominated 
by Tan Malaka and his group. They feared, with some 
justification, that once having reached that rung in 
the ladder of power, Tan Malaka would attempt to 
supplant Sukarno. The majority of the PP coalition 
wanted Sukarno to remain as president. ... They 
were willing to go along with Tan Malaka's group 
only as far as its first objective, the overthrow of 
Sjahrir.^
When Sjahrir's second cabinet was announced on 12 March, 
if was apparent tnat none of the new cabinet members, ministers orQvice-ministers were leaders of the PP. The new cabinet, in spite 
of the strong agitation of the PP, was still in the hands of Sjahrir's 
group. The PP leaders' opposition to Sjahrir's new cabinet was 
understandably strong.
£
5 Yamin, op.cit., p.112; as translated in Anthony Reid, Indonesian 
National Revolution 1945-1950 (Hawthorn, Victoria, Longman,
1974), p .09.
6 The resignation of Sjahrir*s cabinet actually occurred on
26 February, but it was officially announced on 28 February in 
the KNIP session in Surakarta.
7 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 
p.176.
8 Raliby, op.cit., p.275; Kahin, op.cit., p.177.
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Surakarta and Madiun then developed as the main centres
for Persatuan Perjuangan opposition against the central government
in Jogjakarta. In March, when the PP leaders held meetings in Madiun
to oppose the new cabinet and its programs, the Government rose to
the challenge. On 17 March, the Government arrested Tan Malaka and
other important leaders of the PP - Sukarni, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso,
9Sajoeti Melik, Chaerul Saleh and Muhammad Yamin.
Four leaders, Abikusno, Yamin, Tan Malaka and Sukarni,
were brought to Surakarta on 18 March and jailed in a house at
Baron Street, Kadipolo, for five days. On the night of 22 March
they were moved into a house at Jctis a village in the region
of Pajang, Surakarta. Exactly a month later they were moved again,
this time to Tawangmangu (Karanganyar Regency), a mountain resort on
10the slopes of Gunung Lawu. Initially they were confined to the
11house of Sastroiawu, commander of the local Battalion Lawu.
There they were closely guarded by the special police corps, until 
Major Sastroiawu made himself personally responsible for the prisoners 
find allowed them to move freely around the resort of Tawangmangu.
The continuing political concern of the prisoners is reflected by 
one of them:
While we stayed at Tawangmangu, every day we thought 
about Indonesian politics and the Indonesian 
Revolution. We obtained material from newspapers, 
radio and verbal reports.-^
According to Sastroiawu, the Battalion Lawu, like the 
other battalions of the Panembahan Senopati Division, originally
9 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 20 March 1946; 1 April 1946.
10 See Yamin, op.cit., pp.65-66.
11 The Battalion Lawu was originally Battalion 17, Regiment
27, the Panembahan Senopati Division. According to Sastroiawu, 
besides the four prisoners mentioned by Yamin, other leaders 
of the PP were also jailed there, including Mr Soebardjo,
Samsi and Iwa Kusumasumantri. Interview with Sastroiawu,
13 October 1979. See also Sastroiawu, 'Catatan Peristiwa 
Yang Terjadi di Wetan Bengawan Daerah Karanganyar di Lereng 
Gunung Lawu (Tawangmangu): Sejak Kemerdekaan Negara Republik
Indonesia', typescript, 1979.
12 Yamin, op.cit., p.66.
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ioined in the rise of the PP. Almost all the badan perjuangan 
of Surakarta, including three of the most important - Barisan B=.nteng, 
BBI and the BPRI - enthusiastically joined the PP. However the Barisan 
Banteng and the BPRI shifted to support Sukarno when it became clear 
the PP sought to overthrow Sjahrir's first cabinet. They feared 
that if the PP prevailed Tan Malaka would replace Sukarno as president. 
But most battalions of the Panembahan Senopati Division under Colonel 
Sutarto were still firm members of the PP even after the jailing of 
the PP leaders. Indeed the oppositionist character of the PP seemed 
to be strengthened by its location in Surakarta, where many of the 
most important political forces were strongly opposed to Sjahrir's 
policy of negotiation.
The most critical period in the bitter political struggle
between Tan Malaka's supporters and Sjahrir's cabinet occurred at
the end of June and the beginning of July 1946. On 27 June Sastrolawu
allowed the prisoners of Tawangmangu to move more freely. Muhammad
Yamin went to Surakarta and spent the night at the house of Dr Kartono
13(former Surakarta KNI member) with Iwa Kusumasumantri. The PP
leaders paid special attention to Hatta's 27 June radio speech,
which revealed that the Republican government was prepared to accept
de facto Dutch recognition of the Republic in Java and Sumatra only.
The same night, Sjahrir and some of his companions, who were spending
the night at the former Javaasche Bank in Surakarta after their tour
14in East Java, were kidnapped by a small unit of the Third Division.
This was led by Major A.K. Yusuf, a young commander of a battalion
of one Third Division headed by Major General Sudarsono. The kidnapping
had originally been planned by Yusuf, but its execution was authorized
15by General Sudarsono.
13 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979. See also Yamin, 
loc.cit., p.66.
14 Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 
1972), p.204.
15 For this account, see Yamin, op.cit., pp.66-67; Reid, op.cit., 
p .94; Anderson, op.cit., pp.383-84.
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As commander of the Senopati (Surakarta) Division, Sutarto
also authorized Yusuf's coup, and cooperated in it by giving orders
to cut all telephone communications out of Surakarta. Sastrolawu,
who guarded the prisoners at Tawangmangu, had been ordered by Sutarto
16to assist Yusuf's operation. The victims of the kidnapping were
brought to the village of Paras (Boyolali regency), at the Susuhunan's
bungalow on the slopes of Gunung Merbabu. There they were under the
17-juard of Major Soekarto, the local battalion commander. This
marked the successful completion of the manoeuvre, which has been
described as 'more a peinuda-style daulat operation than a military
,18coup.
Having heard the news of Sjahrir's kidnapping, the Cabinet
proposed chai: Sukarno, as President of the Republic, should take all
power into his hands for the duration of the emergency. Sukarno
accordingly proclaimed martial law in his radio speech of 30 June,
19and took government power into his own hands.
The kidnapping of Sjahrir was followed by a delegation to
President Sukarno consisting of General Sudarsono, Muhammad Yamin
and others on 3 July. They demanded that the Sjahrir cabinet be
disbanded and replaced by a Supreme Political Council (Dewan Pimpinan
20Politik), with Tan Malaka as Chairman. After secret discussions 
between Sukarno and Hatta, Sukarno rejected these demands and ordered 
his bodyguards to arrest General Sudarsono, Muhammad Yamin and the 
other supporters.
Sukarno, who still trusted Sjahrir to lead the cabinet and
16 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979; see also Anderson, 
op.cit., p.385.
17 Major Sukarto headed Battalion 18 of Regiment 27. Interview 
with Sunarto Kusuinodirdjo (Regiment 27 Commander), 1 August 1979.
18 Reid, op.cit., p.94; see also Anderson, op.cit., p.385.
19 The full text of this speech may be found in Raliby, op.cit., 
pp.324-32.
20 A list of Ministers intended to replace the Sjahrir cabinet 
appears in Yamin, op.cit., pp.233-34.
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to continue yhe policy of diplomacy, had successfully demonstrated 
his power against the challenge from the PP. Surakarta's role as a 
centre of radicalism cind opposition to the Cabinet was not over, but 
it would subsequently assume an increasingly communist character.
This will be discussed in the following chapters.
CRISIS OF THE TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES
The formation of the Directorate in October 1945, as
mentioned in the previous chapter, was intended to reform and unify
the government of Surakarta. The Directorate styled itself a
collegiaal bestuur (collegial administration) involving the Susuhunan,
21the Mangkunegoro and the KNI. In essence, however, the Directorate 
never functioned according to the hopes of the High Commissioner.
Both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro attempted to retain their 
powers rather than pass them to the Directorate.
Politically, the first blow against the kratons of Surakarta 
had come in October 1945, when the High Commissioner started to 
coordinate the government of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran.
Ihe political situation of the two kratons deteriorated further with 
the breakdown of cooperation within the Directorate government.
During the period of the Directorate the administrative 
offices of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro continued to have 
their former functions. The majority of the priyayi who served in 
the offices of the two rulers continued to receive their salaries. 
Their traditional titles still lend social prestige to the priyayi. 
Politically, however, these officials were now subject to the orders 
of the Directorate and cut off from the Susuhunan's and the 
Mangkunegoro's direct control.
Officially, the Directorate government was intended to 
carry out the orders of the central government and of the Executive 
Board of the Surakarta KNI. In fact it did not function properly,
See also my preliminary study, 'Revolution and Social Tensions 
in Surakarta 1945-1950', translated by Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, 
Indonesia, 17, April 1974, p.108.
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because of two vital weaknesses. Firstly, the patihs of the Kasunanan 
and Mangkunegaran resisted the formation of the Directorate from the 
beginning. Secondly, the daily administration of the Directorate was 
conducted only by the representatives of the KNI, who had no support 
from the rulers.
In the preliminary meeting on 22 October to plan the formation
of the Directorate, the patihs of both rulers had proposed that 
the executive of the Directorate be the members representing the
Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. This proposal was rejected by the
22high Commissioner. A further meeting between the High Commissioner,
the KNI, the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran was held on 31 October.
In this meeting Partono Handojonoto, the patih of the Mangkunegaran, 
demanded that representation in the Directorate should be approximately 
the same for the Kasunanan, the Mangkunegaran and the High Commissioner. 
This proposal was also rejected by the High Commissioner. On.1 November 
a special session of the Working Committee of the High Commissioner 
was held without involving the rulers' representatives. This meeting 
issued a decree in the name of the High Commissioner announcing the 
members of the Directorate. They were:
Chairman: R.P. Suroso
Members: Susuhunan Pakubuwono XII, Mangkunegoro VIII, RMTH
Atmodiningrat (a high court official and representative 
of the Kasunanan), RT Sarwono Honggopati Tjitrohupojo 
(a high court official and representative of the 
Mangkunegaran), and five members who represented the 
Working Committee of KNI: Mohammad Daljono, Ronomarsono,
Achmad Dasuki, R Ng Prodjosudodo and Djuwardi.^3
The first Directorate session on 7 November decided that
the anggota dewarv or working committee, should consist of the five
24representatives of the Surakarta KNI. Each member was made 
responsible for one of five sections: general affairs (Daljono),
22 See 'Tentang Direktorioem', typescript, 1945, AMN.
23 'Makloemat Komisaris Tinggi', no.l, 1 November 1945, Bendel 
Swapradj a 19 45, AMN.
24 See 'Verslag Rapat Direktorioem Repoeblik Indonesia Daerah 
Soerakarta 7 Nopember 1945', typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1945, 
AMN.
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economic affairs (Ronomarsono)# social affairs (Dasuki), pangreh 
praja affairs (Prodjosudodo) and security affairs (Djuwardi) 
respectively. No representatives of the Susuhunan nor Mangkunegoro 
were involved in the anggota dewan. Their political and administrative 
positions were therefore very weak. Local government policy was in 
the hands of these KNI appointees who were politically on the left.
It should be noted that the KNI itself had been dominated by leftists 
unsympathetic to the rulers since the middle of October when its 
membership was enlarged.
These five men who conducted the daily administration of 
the Directorate were for the most part radical politicians. Daljono 
had assisted the formation of the Labor Party (p b i) on 8 November 1945 
by drafting the statutes of the party, and he was a close associate 
of its chairman, Sjamsu Harjo Udaja.25 Achmad Dasuki and Djuwardi 
were active in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1920s 
ana had been interned in Boven Digul for many years after the 
communist uprising in 1926.26 Ronomarsono was also sympathetic with 
the PKI, something borne out when he joined the Madiun rebellion 
in September 1948. in 1946 he joined the PBI and became a close 
associate of Daljono and Sjamsu Harjo UdajalL,Prodjosudodo was a - 
progressive wedono of Kartosura. He had been actively involved in 
the takeover of arms from the Japanese at Gembongan and was closely 
associated with the local leaders of Barisan Pelopor in Kartosura, 
such as Sudijo and Totosardjono.
The central government appeared to be dissatisfied with 
the Directorate system, in which the political role of the rulers in 
Surakarta's government had been effectively eliminated. Presumably 
the central government saw a more acceptable model in Jogjakarta,
25 Soeara Boeroeh, no.l, 8 December 1945. 
Poetoesan-Poetoesan Kongqres BBI tanqqal 
di Soerakarta, stencilled. ~  "
See also Singkatan 
7, 8, 9, Nopember 1945
26 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979. Benedict 
gives more details about them, Java, p.354, note 43. Anderson
27 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
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and wanted to reform Surakarta in a similar direction. In September
1945 the Sultan of Jogjakarta and the Paku Alam had jointly proclaimed
that the two states were combined into one Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta,
28with the Sultan as its head and Prince Paku Alam as his deputy.
Personally they were aware of the revolutionary trend, as became clear
when the Sultan decided to invite the Central Government to move to
Jogjakarta in December 1945. Because Jakarta could not provide a
proper basis for Government in the atmosphere of armed conflict
between Indonesian and Dutch forces, the Central Government moved to
Jogjakarta on 4 January 1946. Jogjakarta became the capital of the
29Republic and the seat of Government.
In Jogjakarta there was nothing like the Directorate of 
Surakarta, because the Sultan and the Paku Alam had already united 
their territories into a single regional government and invited the 
KNI to involve itself in the government. This was in contrast with 
the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, who did not cooperate with the 
local KNI and insisted on retaining their separate territories and 
governments. Thus the rulers of Jogjakarta simply had a more 
shrewd attitude than those of Surakarta. They were rewarded when 
Suroso withdrew from his High Commissioner position in Jogjakarta, 
and concentrated solely on the region of Surakarta.
In the central government's view the Directorate had to be 
discussed. A Jogjakarta meeting was called on 10 November 1945, 
attended by the High Commissioner and representatives of the central 
government and the Surakarta KNI, to deal with the question of the 
Directorate. Sujono, the head of the Working Committee of the Surakarta 
KNI, informed the central government on the basis of his own experience 
in the region that the Directorate had been accepted by the people of 
Surakarta. Indeed the idea of the Directorate government had come 
from the Surakarta KNI and then been approved by the High Commissioner
28 Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca, N.Y., 
Cornell University Press, 1962), p.42.
29 Anderson, op.cit., pp.356-57; Selosoemardjan, op.cit., p.78.
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on 22 October. The Directorate thus had a legal local base, he 
argued. Because the central government had not authorized the 
Directorate, however, it declined in the Jogjakarta meeting to regard 
t_he Directorate as more than an unofficial government in Surakarta. 3^
Apparently the Jogjakarta meeting, with the government's 
misgivings over the Directorate system, encouraged the Mangkunegoro 
to resist the Directorate. An anti-Directorate campaign was begun by 
high officials of the Mangkunegaran government, using two methods: 
meetings for Mangkunegaran officials and political statements to the 
public. The climax of this campaign was a conference of the Mangkunegaran 
high and middle officials on 21 November. It took three important 
decisions:
1* the Mangkunegaran government rejected the Directorate 
system;
2. the Mangkunegaran government urged the central government 
to form two special regions in Surakarta;
3. the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran would work together.^
This Mangkunegaran officials' statement was enthusiastically 
received by one conservative regent, Sutojo Hardjoreksoko of Wonogiri, 
who was still very loyal to the Mangkunegaran. He invited the regency 
officials to a special meeting on 23 November, which produced the 
oc-called mosi pegawai Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran officials' motion), 
a political statement rejecting the Directorate government.32 Those 
who were anti-Directorate were a small group of regency officials 
directly influenced by the regent. Most of the regency officials
30 'Tentang Direktorioem', pp.1-3
31 See Laporan Panitya Rapat Pegawai Negeri Mangkoenegaran 21 
Nopember 1945', typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN. This 
conference arose from a special order of the patih. Those who 
attended it were officials of the kabupaten kota (city regency)
of Mangkunegaran. Interview with Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo,
6 June 1979.
32 See 'Laporan Rapat Boepati Wonogiri 23 Nopember 1945', typescript. 
Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN. According to KRMT Sanjoto, Sutojo 
Hardjoreksoko was one of senior officials in the Mangkunegaran 
and had been trusted by Mangkunegoro VII to govern Wonogiri
Ken during the occupation. Interview with Sanjoto, 5 Julv 1979.
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outside the city of Wonogiri supported the movement against the 
Mangkunegoro which was led by village teachers.33
In the Kasunanan government it was only the high officials 
of the Kepatihan and the kraton who took part in the movement against 
the Directorate. Their leader was Drs RMTH Sosrodiningrat, the . 
experienced patih of the Susuhunan. Born on 1 December 1902 in 
Suiakarta, he had received a diploma from the Indological Department 
of the University of Leiden in 1935. He was appointed patih in 1939 
after having been a regent from 1927 to 1932.34 During the occupation, 
from 1943 to 1944, he had represented Surakarta in the Tyuo Sangi In 
(Central Advisory Council).35
The political authority of Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII was 
very weak. Born on 14 April 1925, he had succeeded his father, Paku 
Buwono XI, on 12 July 1945, as a young man of barely twenty.36 
Inexperienced in handling government problems, he was surrounded by 
conservative high officials, advisers and experts of the kraton 
government. Some of them were senior pangerans, the sons of Paku 
Buwono X and close relatives of Paku Buwono XI. A few of them were 
former high officials of Paku Buwono X. In all matters of policy he 
depended upon them.37 His advisory committee was called the Paranpara 
Nata (paranpara - adviser; nata - king) and was led by GPH Hadiwidjojo.38 
The advisers who surrounded the Susuhunan, including the Queen Mother 
< Ratu) , strongly influenced the Susuhunan to cling to his
Interview with Sanjoto, 6 July 1979. 
Prang Indonesia, p.102.
Almanak Soeara Asia (Soerabaja, 2604 [1944]), pp.36-37. 
36 Interview with Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979.
37 Madjalah Merdeka, III, no.26, July 1950, p.9. Cf. Selosoemardjan, op.cit., p .82.
Hadiwidjojo was born on 18 November 1888 in Surakarta. He graduated 
rom EnS and HBS (1910-1915), and subsequently worked in the 
Kepatihan In 1915-33 he headed the Narpowandowo organization, 
ana in 1916-21 the Surakarta BU branch. Prang Indonesia, d o .419-20. 
The raranpara Nata consisted of seven members; two pangerans (sons 
o Paku Buwono X), and five high officials; Kedaulatan Rakjat.8 November 1945. — ----------- — --
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inherited po.ver, so teat the nobles would continue to benefit from 
the status of the ruler.
The political situation inside the kraton since October had 
been very chaotic. There were two political groups. The first group 
comprised the supporters of Sosrodiningrat and Kanjeng Ratu, who were in 
alliance for two historic reasons. Kanjeng Ratu was from the Kepatihan family; 
while Sosrodiningrat, who had served as a high official during the reign of 
Paku Buwono XI, was also a close relation of that king. A rival group con­
sisted of nobles who wanted to replace the patih with a less conservative 
person who could respond positively to the new Republic. This group 
supported the candidature of KRMT Judonegoro, the regent of Klaten, as 
patih, and succeeded in having him installed for a short time in February 
1946. There was also an attitude of rivalry between the Susuhunan and 
his youngei' biother Prince Mangkubumi, who sought to replace the Susuhunan 
himself in authority. He was dissatisfied with the way the Susuhunan was 
surrounded by conservative advisers who determined the kraton1s very
conservative response to the local Republican Government. But his plan
39was never realized.
Mangkunegoro VIII, who succeeded his father in 1944, was
also young, having been born on 1 January 1920. He had, however, a
40wider experience of affairs than the Susuhunan. He was also
surrounded by conservative high officials as his advisers, most of them 
being relatives of Mangkunegoro VII.
The bitter rivalry between the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, 
wnich had become institutionalized over the previous 200 years, was another 
reason that the Directorate government did not run according to plan.
Because each ruler opposed it in his own way, the Directorate administered 
the region of Surakarta without either of them. The role of the rulers 
and their representatives in the Directorate was in fact only nominal.
39 Interview with Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979; Wirodiningrat,
30 October 1979.
40 Mangkunegoro VIII graduated from ELS (1932), Mulo (1936) and 
AMS (1939). In 1941 he joined the training programme for Corps 
Reserve Officers in Bandung. In 1942 he was an official of 
agrarian affairs. In 1944 he jointed the Peta. Interview with 
Sanjoto, 7 July 1979; see also Madjalah Merdeka, III, no.26, 
July 1950, p.9.
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On 29 November, the Working Committee of the Surakarta KNI
sent a letter to the Mangkunegaran government ordering it to recognize
41the Directorate government. This was the only official answer given to 
the decisions of the Mangkunegaran meetings of 21 and 23 November.
The central government now intervened in the crisis of the
Directorate by forming the Panitia Tatanegara Daerah Ist.imewa Surakarta
(Committee for the State Structure of the Special Region of Surakarta).
This committee was set up on 27 November under the chairmanship of
Soeprapto, a member of the Surakarta KNI and the head of the local
judiciary office. The committee consisted of eight members, four from
42the Mangkunegaran, three from the Kasunanan and one from the KNI.
Its task was to draft a law for the government of Surakarta which was 
in harmony with democracy. In practice this committee also could not 
work effectively because the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran representatives 
continued to insist that the region of Surakarta be a Special Region 
with two separate territories unlike the Jogjakarta model.
The formation of this committee nevertheless provided the 
pretext for the Mangkunegoro to ignore the Surakarta KNI's order of 
29 November. This became clear when the patih presented a political 
statement to the committee on 22 March 1946 (see below), making clear 
that the Mangkunegoro continued to insist upon a special Region of 
the Mangkunegaran.
During the period the Panitia Tatanegara was officially 
charged with resolving the problems of Surakarta regional government 
the pemuda groups took matters into their own hands. Members of 
Barisan Banteng and the Hizbmllah demonstrated around the kraton of the 
Kasunanan. At the end of December pemuda groups under the leadership 
of the Barisan Banteng stuck placards and posters on the walls of 
the kraton, containing unprecedented attacks or. the Susuhunan.
Slogans such as 'Guritno [the Susuhunan] and his mother must go and
41 See 'Soerat Badan Pekerdja KNI Soerakarta 29 Nopember 1945', 
Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
42 List of names of this committee may be found in 1Laporan Rapat 
KNID dan Wakil2 Kasoenanan dan Mangkoenegaran 27 Nopember 1945', 
Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
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leave the kraton', and 'they must be searched thoroughly', humiliated 
the court family. The nobles were terrified to see how the political 
situation had developed in the city.45
The crisis for the kraton reached a climax in early January 
1946. Santoso and Sudijo, militant members of the Barisan Banteng 
fed up with the obstructionist and anti-Republic stance of the Susuhunan 
under the leadership of Anwar penetrated into the kraton. Hundreds 
of people from the pemuda groups surrounded the main gates of the 
kraton, so that the guards were easily overcome. According to Sudijo 
at least eleven men entered the kraton itself and seized the Susuhunan, 
the Kanjeng Ratu and KPH Surjohamidjojo. This action by the Barisan 
Banteng followed orders from its leader, Dr Muwardi. The kidnappers 
brought the three distinguished captives to the Susuhunan's villa at 
Grogolan, about ten km. west of Surakarta city in Kartosura subdistrict. 
Here the Barisan Banteng leaders pressured the Susuhunan not to continue 
his plan to form a Special Region of Surakarta.44 The Susuhunan accepted 
the demands of the Barisan Banteng leaders, although this proved to 
be purely verbal. Two days later the Barisan Banteng returned the 
Susuhunan and the other captives to the kraton. During the three 
days' power vacuum, state authority was in the hands of the patih with 
the approval of the Susuhunan's advisers.45
The Kanjeng Ratu and Sur johamidjojo (one of the Susuhunan's 
advisers) had been the strongest influences on the political policies 
of the Susuhunan, and it was they who had originally designed the 
kraton s opposition to the Directorate. This appears to be the political 
background for the Barisan Banteng acting to kidnap them.
Kidnapping continued to be used as an expression of the 
hostility of the revolutionary social forces towards the Susuhunan's 
rule. As a continuation of the kidnappings in the Kepatihan office at 
the end of November 1945 (see above), Suto Sundoro (the chairman of
43 See 'Soeatoe Oelasan Mengenai Perkembangar. Swapradja Soerakarta', 
typescript, pp.1-3, Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
44 Interview with Sudijo, 21 October 1979.
45 Interview with Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979.
Sarekat Pegawai Negeri Surakarta (SPNS) and Prodjosudodo (membei of 
the Directorate) led the seizure of the patih himself, Sosrodiningrat 
m  Eebruary i946. Suto was a former Kepatihan official and a close
friend of Wirodiningrat in the Kepatihan office. However, as chairman 
of ehe officials' union, SPNS, he had worked closely with leftists 
such as Sujono, Dasuki, Djuwardi and Prodjosudodo. Accordingly 
Suto and Prodjosudodo had the support of most of Surakarta's left-wing 
leaders. This kidnapping aimed to force the Kepatihan office to accept 
the leadership of the Surakarta KNI and the Directorate. Beyond this, its 
ultimate goal was to destroy the Kasunanan government.4^
Because the Kepatihan office was the fulcrum of the Kasunanan 
administration, the Susuhunan naturally attempted to retain control of 
it. The rival group of nobles immediately urged the Susuhunan to 
instal KRMT Judonegoro, the former regent of Klaten, as new patih.
However, the Suto Sundoro group acted again to kidnap this new patih 
after capturing a few of the Kepatihan guards. In March 
Purwodmingrat, one of the senior nobles inside the kraton, was installed 
by the Susuhunan as the successor of Judonegoro. Purwodiningrat too 
was only a short time in his position. In April Suto Sundoro's group 
and Barisan Banteng members kidnapped Purwodiningrat. Although the 
guards and security officials of the Kepatihan office protected the 
patih, they were not strong enough to withstand the revolutionary forces 
led by Suto Sundoro. For the last time the Susuhunan installed a new 
patih, in the form of RMTH Wurjaningrat, a former head of the 
Surakarta branch of Parindra.48 In May the central government in 
Jogjakarta used the local police to arrest Suto Sundoro, Prodjosudodo and 
the other leaders of the kidnapping actions to put an end to these actions. 
Tnus Wurjaningrat was able to preside over the Kepatihan office without 
interference from kidnappers. Wurjaningrat was a popular figure in
Surakarta, particularly because he had played a prominent role in Parindra 
and Putera.
46 Interview with Wirodiningrat, 30 October 1979; Darjonegoro, 
6 December 1979.
47 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
48 This account is based on interviews with Wirodiningrat and 
Darjonegoro, for whose biographical details see bibliography.
108
This turbulence in the Kepatihan became known by the local
term masa srobotan (the period of kidnapping). This reflected primarily
the hostility of revolutionary social forces towards the traditional
rulers. Also involved, however, were social conflicts between the
rakyat (ordinary people), the priyayi (traditional officials) and the
ningrat (the nobles), something manifested in the popular demand that
the distinguishing titles of the nobility be dropped and the refusal
of common women to continue to become concubines of the priyayi and 
49the nobles. Politically, the chaos in the Kepatihan rapidly 
diminished the credibility and effectiveness of the Susuhunan's government. 
The office of the Kepatihan as the central government of the Kasunanan 
could no longer communicate effectively with the regencies. In practice 
it could only handle government affairs inside the kraton. Most 
middle and lower level officials retired from the Kepatihan and moved 
to the new offices under the authority of the Working Committee of the 
KNI. The governments of the regencies increasingly took their orders 
from the Surakarta KNI and ignored those from the Kepatihan office.
While the Kepatihan was still in chaos the situation inside
the kraton deteriorated as a result of political pressure from the
pemuda group. in the middle of April the Barisan Banteng leaders
under Dr Muwardi met the Susuhunan and forcibly demanded that he
hand over his authority to the people. As a direct result of this
pressure the Susuhunan issued a proclamation on 30 April:
We proclaim to Our people (the people of Surakarta) 
that if the abolition of the Special Region of 
Surakarta Hadiningrat is indeed clearly the wish of 
the people, and has been established as such by the 
government of the Indonesian Republic, then we do 
not object to the surrender of our authority to the 
central government.
Priyayi were traditional officials who typically had no blood 
relationship with the ruler, although a few of them were related 
to the Susuhunan (e.g., through marriage). The ningrat were 
actually descended from the Susuhunan. They possessed darah 
pangeran (blood of nobles) and had special titles: Bendoro
Raden Mas, Gusti Pangeran Haryo, etc.
Kedaulatan Rakjat, 4 May 1946. This proclamation also in 
Merdeka, 3 May 1946, see Anderson, Java, p.359.
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The patih, Wurjaningrat, attached an explanatory supplement pointing 
out that the Susuhunan was fully aware of the democratization process 
in the newly born Republic. Dr Muwardi, as leader of the Barisan 
Banteng, acknowledged* the Susuhunan1 s decree.'"*^ "
Apparently the Mangkunegoro put up a longer resistance than 
the Susuhunan. On 22 March the patih announced the Mangkunegaran 
policy officially before the Panitia Tatanegara Daerah Istimewa 
Surakarta. He proposed three points for inclusion in the draft 
regional government law for Surakarta. Firstly, the Kasunanan and 
the Mangkunegaran would each have a Majelis Perwakilan Kerajaan 
(Principality Representative Council) which should be elected by the 
people; secondly, both the Majelis Perwakilan Kerajaan and the Dewan 
Pemerintah (Government Board) should be chaired by a person appointed 
by the rulers; thirdly, the region of Surakarta should continue 
to consist of two special regions.52 This proposal appeared to retain 
the essence of the old regime rather than to reform according to the 
Jogjakarta model. In consequence of it, the Surakarta KNI representatives, 
including Soeprapto, the chairman of the Panitia, refused to hold 
any further meetings of the Panita.
On 1 May the Mangkunegoro unilaterally announced a new 
constitutional reform proposal for his government, consisting of six 
points:
1. The Mangkunegaran was a Special Region within the Republic 
of Indonesia.
The Mangkunegoro as head of this Special Region was installed 
by the President.
3. The Mangkunegaran had a People's Representative Council 
which was directly elected by the territory's population.
4. This People's Representative Council had a Working Committee.
5. Court affairs were managed by the Mangkunegoro himself.
6. All regulations of the Mangkunegaran would be adapted to 
those of the Kasunanan, Paku Alaman and Kasultanan. ~^3
51 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 4 May 1946.
52 Statement of the patih of the Mangkunegaran to the Panitia
Tatanegara dated 22 March 1946. This may be found in Bendel
Swapradja 1946, AMN.
53 Berita Repoeblik Indonesia, vol.II,. no.12-13, 15 May 1946, pp.124-2$.
Ihe decree of 1 May 1946 and the draft of a new constitution also
appears in the fortnightly journal of the Mangkunegaran, Poestoko
Warti Pradja Mangkoenegaran, vol.I, no.10, 1 May 1946.
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Both rulers hoped for the protection of the central government 
against the anti-kraton movements. The Mangkunegoro1s declaration was 
aimed primarily to obtain support from the central government in his 
efforts to form a Special Region of Mangkunegaran. The central 
government indeed appeared inclined to support the Susuhunan and the 
Mangkunegoro if only they could have combined to form a single Special 
Region of Surakarta on the same basis as the Special Region of Jogjakarta, 
which appeared to work effectively.
The Minister of the Interior, Dr Sudarsono (of the Socialist 54Party), now attempted to resolve the problem of the Special Region
of Surakarta with a plan for a general election in the Surakarta area.
On 17 May the Minister announced that he had formed an electoral
committee for the Surakarta region. This committee would plan and
carry out a general election in Surakarta.55 Dr Sudarsono hoped that
this plan would provide a forum to settle the question of the special
Region of Surakarta. The electoral committee was chaired by Subadio
Sastrosatomo (PS) and its members were Sujono (representing the
Surakarta KNI), Siswosudarmo (Masyumi), Mr Atmodiningrat, Mr Sumardi,
Mr Suwidji and Suhadi (all Surakartans with wide experience of
56government elsewhere).
54 Sudarsono was born on 9 May 1911 in Salatiga, Central Java. He 
graduated from ELS, Mulo, AMS and the Medical Faculty (1938)
was ^airman of the Indonesia Muda. Orang Indonesia, 
p .358; in November 1945 he became a member of KNIP and joined the 
Socialist Party. Ensiklopedia Indonesia, vol.IIl (Bandung, W. van 
Hoeve, 1954-56), p.1286.
55 See 'Riwajat Singkat Pemerintahan Karesidenan Surakarta', typescript, 
Pemerintahan Umum Karesidenan Surakarta, 15 September 1950.
56 Subadio Sastrosatomo was born on 26 May 1919 in Pangkalan 
Bradan, North Sumatra. From 1939 to 1942 he was a student of the 
Faculty of Medicine and then enrolled in the Faculty of Law, Jakarta.
He was a member of the pre-war Indonesia Muda. After independence
he became a member of the KNIP and of the Executive Committee of the 
Socialist Party. See Wilopo 70 Tahun (Jakarta, Gunung Agung, 1979), 
p.439. Sujono was chairman of the Working Committee of the Surakarta 
KNI. He had been imprisoned for six years for his connections 
with the communist uprising of 1926, and after his release had worked 
in the illegal PKI and Gerindo. See Anderson, Java, p.362. 
Atmodiningrat graduated from Lav; School and was the brother-in-law of 
the Susuhunan. Mr Sumardi was born in 1905 in Surakarta and graduated 
from Leiden Law Faculty in 1935. He worked in the tax office 
of the Kepatihan and then in the Surabaya residency. Since 1945 he 
had been general secretary of the Ministry of Defence; Ensiklopedi 
Umum (Jogyakarta, Yayasan Kanisius, 1977), p.1056. Mr Suwidji (cont.
over page)
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The Minister of Interior presumably felt confident that 
Subadio Sastrosatomo and his colleagues had enough political support 
to control the implementation of the general election in Surakarta.
But Sudarsono's efforts came to naught. The electoral committee 
could not function effectively. Sujono, who was extremely anti-- 
swapraja and reflected accurately the attitude of the KNI, boycotted 
the committee. Sujono attempted to make contact with Dr Muwardi so 
that they might cooperate to intensify the movements against the rulers. 
Sujono and Muwardi took a decision to launch a political campaign 
against the central government for its determination to support the 
rulers in attaining Daerah Istimewa status. Muwardi, supported by 
the other leftist groups (PS, PBI, PKI), forwarded a resolution to 
the central government that the Surakarta electoral committee should 
consist purely of political representatives.
Although at a national level the PKI, PB and PS were the 
parties of the Government, expected to support the policies of their 
leaders in cabinet such as Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, the left wing 
in Surakarta was already taking a different line. There the PKI, 
supported by other leftist groups, seem to have opposed the central 
government ever .since the Persatuan Perjuangan was formed. Among the 
reasons for this was that the Surakarta leftists, including the PKI, 
wanted to destroy the Sunan and the Mangkunegoro, and they realized 
that the central government wanted to save them.
This opposition produced a crisis for Sudarsono's plan, and
led to a special meeting between the central government and the Susuhunan
57and Mangkunegoro on 22 May. The central government was represented 
by its central figures - Sutan Sjahrir (Prime Minister), Dr Sudarsono 
(Minister of Interior) and Amir Sjarifuddin (Minister of Defence).
56 was born on 24 June 1910, in Solo, and was educated in HIS, Mulo, 
(cont) AMS and Faculty of Law, Leiden University (graduated 1937).
In 1938 he was an advocate in Surabaya and in 1942 was chairman 
of Perserikatan Kaum Pristen, Solo. See Qrang Indonesia, p.297.
57 'Tjatatan Kecika Ingkang SP Sinoehoen dioendang rapat dengan 
Menteri Mimbitjarakan Keadaan Soerakarta', typescript, Soerakarta, 
22 May 1946, Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
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Iho Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro also attended this session, accornpanied 
by their respective patihs, Wurjaningrat (Ka sun an an) and Partono 
Handojonoto (Mangkuregaran).
The meeting of 22 May discussed the political situation in
Surakarta in the context of the anti-swapraja movement. There was a
special proposal from Wurjaningrat, the so-called 'usul Wurjaningrat'.
This consisted of two points: firstly, the civiele lijst (court
allowance) from the central government should be given directly to
the rulers and not through the Surakarta regional government; secondly,
the Special Region of Surakarta should be directly administered by the
central government, with the day-to-day government in the hands of 
5 8a committee. This committee would consist of representatives from 
officials, the army, 'the people', the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran 
governments. Sjahrir accepted the first point but said he would 
drscuss the second with the Cabinet and the President.
The central government deliberately excluded the anti- 
swapraja leaders from the meeting of 22 May. In addition, on the 
night of 23 May, on the order of the Minister of Interior conveyed 
to the Surakarta police office of Surakarta, Prodjesudodo, Djuwardi, 
and Ronomarsono were arrested for several days. These were all 
noted anti-swapraja figures from the Directorate. On the same date 
four leaders of the Barisan Banteng, Dr Muwardi, Muljadi Djojomartono, 
Mangkusudijono and Hadisunarto were also arrested. A local newspaper, 
Indra, attacked the affair of 23 May as 'political imprisonments',^ 
but the central government explained that the Minister of Interior's 
decision aimed to avoid further social conflicts among the people of 
Surakarta. In the national context the Sjahrir cabinet portrayed
58 Ib:i-d. , p.l. See also Wurjaningrat's account in Wurjaningrat, 
Sekedar Uraian tentang Swapradja Surakarta Setelah Proklamasi 
Kemerdekaan, stencilled, Surakarta, 1950, p.7.
59 'Tjatatan Ketika', p.l.
60 Indra, 25 May 1946. Three of these leaders were from the national 
headquarters and one from the Surakarta branch.
61 Ibid.
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the prisoners as a group who supported Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan 
against Sjahrir's policy in the negotiations with the Dutch.6^
On 28 May a protest demonstration was held by the Barisan
Banteng to urge the central government to release its leaders.63
Sudiro, the acting head of the Barisan Banteng, presented an ultimatum
to the cabinet that the prisoners had to be released within forty-
eight hours. Otherwise he would retire from the organization and would
not be responsible for the chaotic situation in Surakarta.64 The
army also sought to dissociate itself from the 'political imprisonments'.
Sudirman issued a public statement:
In connection with the number of questions put to the 
Supreme Headquarters of the Indonesian Army concerning 
the arrests of several leaders which occurred in Solo 
on the night of 25 May 1946, it is necessary to explain 
that the army did not take part in any way with this 
affair. This is given for public clarification.65
Sudiro must have been confident about the effect of his ultimatum, 
fox he issued it in Jogjakarta where he had gone to meet General Sudirman, 
the Army commander, for informal talks about the prisoners. All 
Sudiro's efforts finally forced the central government to release the 
prisoners. The Barisan Banteng leaders were released on 29 May with 
the special help of the police of Surakarta and Soerjo, the Governor 
of East Java, who had been given full authority by the government to 
resolve _he crisis in Surakarta, replacing R.P. Suroso. 6 Subsequently,
62 For details see Anderson, Java, pp.269-95; A.H. Nasution,
Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, vol.3 (Bandung, Angkasa 
Bandung, 1977), pp.66-121.
63 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 29 May 1946.
64 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.3, pp.113-14.
65 Ibid., p.113.
66 Soerjo was appointed acting High Commissioner by the Minister of
Interior on 23 May 1946. He was charged as a representative of 
the central government in Surakarta. Soerjo, who was the governor 
of East Java and had been closely associated with Bung Tomo in 
fighting the British in Surabaya in November 1945, was supposed to 
help the central government to restore the situation in Surakarta. 
Kedaulatan Rakjat, 25 May 1946. Cf. Anderson, Java, p.363. For 
Soerjo s role in East Java, see Republik Indonesia: Propinsi
Djawa Timur (Djakarta, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1952), p.ll.
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on 31 May, the Directorate group (Ronomarsono, Prodjosudodo, Djuwardi)
67was also released.
During the first five months of 1946 Surakarta people distinguished
in terms of personalities three urban social forces which made up the
anti-swapraja movement. Firstly, the kelompok (group) Dr Muwardi, a
group which was strongly supported by the Barisan Banteng. Secondly,
the kelompok Sujono, comprising the 'men of the left' many of whom
joined Tan Maiaka's Persatuan Perjuangan. A few of them were former
PKi activists of 1926. Thirdly, the kelompok Sutarto, based in the
Panembahan Senopati Division of which Sutarto was the Division
commander. Most of Sutarto's key supporters within this division were
68former members of the AMT. The actions of these three revolutionary 
elements against the traditional authorities were known as daulat 
actions. The word daulat derives from the concept of kedaulatan 
(sovereignty). Surakarta people also refer to the period of the 
Indonesian Revolution as Jaman Kedaulatan (the period of sovereignty) 
in which sovereignty was in the hands of the people (rakyat). Benedict 
Anderson has referred to kedaulatan as the expression of the popular 
will in tliis period. He asserts: 'Mendaulat and didaulat came to
69depict the process of forcible removal from power by "popular" forces.'
The daulat operations in this study were forcible removals of traditional 
rolers by revolutionary groups, through actions such as kidnapping, 
agitation and demonstrations. The daulat phenomenon in Surakarta rural 
areas expressed itself in such actions as replacing or re-electing 
the former lurah. The use of the term daulat operation in the study 
of the Indonesian Revolution may be regarded as a part of the process 
of social revolution.
Following the release of the Dr Muwardi group and the 
Directorate group, a new form of regional government was set up.
67 Interview with Hagnjawigati, 9 July 1979; Sudijo, 21 October 1979.
68 _ Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
69 Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, 'The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian
Politics, 1945-1946', Ph.D thesis, Cornell University, 1967, 
p.503.
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On 1 June Colonel Sutarto, as the Army commander in Surakarta, decreed
on his own initiative that a new government was formed, the so-called
Dewan Pomerlntah Ra'jat dan Tentara Daerah Surakarta (Government Council
70of the People and Army of the Surakarta Region) or DPRT. This council 
consisted of representatives of the army, and of political, social, 
and economic groups.^
The formation of the DPRT on purely local authority was a
reaction against the inability of the central government to control
the political chaos in this region. Sutarto, who had just been promoted
from Colonel to Major General, took over the regional government of
Surakarta under the authority of the DPRT. This DPRT represented a
72preliminary step towards Martial Law in the region. Its formation
was intended to prevent further political conflicts and to restore
73security to Surakarta. On 6 June, President Sukarno officially 
declared a State of Emergency for the region of Surakarta which
74brought the law of the state once more into harmony with the DPRT.
This will be discussed in the following pages.
Sutarto's first decree of 1 June abolished the three distinct
Kinds of government, Kasunanan, Mangkunegaran and Directorate, and
75placed their officials under the DPRT. In his second decree of 
the same day Sutarto appointed the members of the Working Committee of 
the DPRT, consisting of two military men and four civilians. The 
members and their responsibilities were: Sudiro mBah (military) -
chairman; Sudiro (Barisan Banteng) - general affairs; Soemodihardjo 
(PBI) - social affairs; Sujono (KNI) - economic affairs; Djuwardi 
(Directorate) - pangreh praja affairs; Sutarto Pejek (military
70 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 3 June 1946. For details see 'Makloemat 
Kepala Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia Soerakarta', no.l, 1946,
Bendel Ketentaraan 1946, AMN.
71 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 3 June 1946
72 A.II. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.3, pp.115-17.
73 Lasjkar, 3 June 1946.
74 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 7 June 1946.
75 This statement may be found in the 'Pendjelasan Makloemat', no.l, 
3 June 1946. The same decree formed the Dewan Pemerintah 
Kabupaten to govern at the level of kabupaten.
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police) - security.
The DPRT was dominated by anti-Swapraja men and included no 
representatives of the Susuhunan or Mangkunegoro. With the formation 
of DPRT, the anti-Swapraja movement succeeded in forcing the rulers 
to defer to the local authorities of Surakarta. Sujono's and Dr 
Muwardi1s associates were entirely satisfied with the military role 
in the DPRT. This was because Major General Sutarto as chairman of 
the DPRT was inclined towards the leftists of Sujono's group. Moreover, 
Sutarto had taken no part in the arrests of 23 May, which also made 
the military role acceptable to the victims of those arrests. 
Nevertheless the region of Surakarta was still in a state of high 
political tension. The anti-Swapraja men were also, as a group, 
generally opposed to Sjahrir's cabinet and policies.
As mentioned above, the DPRT was a preliminary step towards
martial law for the region of Surakarta. When the law for a State
of Emergency was accepted by the Working Committee of the KNIP,
sitting at Purwokerto on 5 June, then the DPRT was legalized by state 
77law. However, the central government anxious to avoid further
See 'Makloemat Kepala Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia Soerakarta', 
no.2, 1 June 1946, Bendel Ketentaraan 1946, AMN. See also 
Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953 (Surakarta,
Djawatan Penerangan Kota Besar Surakarta, 1953), pp.5-6;
'Riwajat Singkat Pemerintahan Karesidenan Surakarta', p.2.
Cf. 'Sedjarah TNI Surakarta Periode II 1948—1950', typescript, 
Surakarta, 1961, p.l, in the archives collection of the Sedjarah 
Militer Angkatan Darat Library, Surakarta. According to this 
source Soemodihardjo was from the PS. The list of Working 
Committee members also appears in Kedaulatan Rakjat, 3 June 
1946, which however wrote Sujono's name as Sujitno. 'Surakarta 
Hadiningrat dalam baranja api revolusi', compiled by Tukiman 
Notowardojo et al., (typescript, 10 November 1963, in private 
collection), as cited by Anderson, Java, p.365 note 79, gives 
a different list: Sudiro Mbah, in charge of general affairs;
Dr Kartono, social affairs; Sujono, political afffairs; 
Domopranoto, pangreh praja affairs; Sutarto Peyek, security. 
Benedict Anderson compares this with other sources including the 
newspapers, Merdeka, 3 June 1946 and Bulan Sabit, 8 June 1946.
These newspapers however give the same list as Kedaulatan Rakjat.
3 June 1946, and the original source 'Makloemat'. Accordingly, 
we can conclude that the 'Surakarta Hadiningrat' list is incorrect.
77 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 7 June 1946.
117
conflict in Surakarta, and aware that the army favoured the state of
emergency, had effectively no other choice than to accept the PDRT.
On 6 June President Sukarno declared a State of Emergency for the
region of Surakarta, which was extended to the whole of Java the
following day. Vice-President Muhammad Hatta met the members of
the DPRT m  Surakarta on the night of 6 June and explained:
A State of Emergency for the region of Surakarta is 
a preliminary to a State of Emergendy which will be
extended to the whole of Indonesia__the government
of the Army and People in Solo will be adapted in 
harmony with the Law of the State.79
As a result of Sukarno's declaration, the DPRT was changed on 
10 June into the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah Surakarta (the Regional 
Defence Council of Surakarta) or DPD. it consisted of three military 
men, three civilian officials and three representatives of political 
organizations. Most members of the DPD were former members of the
DPRT, with the exception of Sudirman and Siswosudarmo. The authority 
of tne DPD was regulated by the law on the State of Emergency. The 
civil government of Surakarta, including the Kasunanan,and the 
Mangkunegaran, were placed under the control of the DPD. in practice 
Major General Sutarto was given full control of the region of Surakarta, 
as both commander of the Panembahan Senopati Division and chairman 
of the DPD. Within the DPD his leadership was accepted by the two 
key groups of Sujono and Dr Muwardi. The DPD was a face-saving 
formula for the central government, which had had no alternative in 
the end than to accept and legitimize Sutarto's coup.
The complete loss of power of the Susuhunan and Mungkunegoro 
Was ^urn legitimated by a Central Government decree of 15 July 1946.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
Major General Sutarto (military), as chairman; Sudiro Mbah 
(military), first deputy; Sutarto Pejek (military police), 
second deputy; Sujono (KNI); Sudirman (former resident of 
Surabaya); Djuwardi (KNI); Sudiro (Barisan Banteng and PNI)- 
Soemodihardjo (PBI); Siswosudarmo (Masyumi), Kedaulatan Rakjat,
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The territories of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran were temporarily 
incorporated as one residency in the province of Central Java.
Moreover a gemeente bestuur (municipality) was formed for the city of
„ . 81 Surakarta.
We can now say that the social and political crisis in the 
period of the destruction of the Swapraja, from the end of 1945 to 
July 1946, formed part of a real social revolution in the area of 
Surakarta. The old system of traditional government was replaced by 
the new pattern of ehe Republic. The fall of the system of monarchy 
involved also the fall of the ningrat (nobles) in the traditional 
bureaucracy. Many of the conservative priyayi also lost their position 
as pangreh praja. They were replaced by new social classes such as 
nationalist politicians, army elites and badan perjuangan leaders.
The replacement of force of the traditional authorities 
occurred not only in Surakarta urban society but also in the rural 
areas. In early 1946 there was a process of reorganization of the 
village administration. This too formed part of the social revolutionary 
wave during the revolution.
THE DAÜLAT OPERATION IN THE RURAL AREAS
In the rural areas outside the city of Surakarta, the revolution 
began in the same way it had in the city, with the collapse of the 
Japanese authorities. This was followed by the formation of the 
subdistrict KNIs and the lasykar organizations. In a number of cases 
there were also village KNIs. In villages which successfully formed 
KNIs, the KNIs’ authority was evidently more important than that of the 
headmen. ihe traditional attitude of waiting for orders from 
the subdistrict officers and village headmen shifted its focus to the 
KNIs. Villages which had not yet formed KNIs continued to await orders 
from the government hierarchy..
The village KNIs, like the central and regional KNIs, 
acted as legislative bodies. In early 1946 when villagers began to 
form Dewan Desa (village Councils), the village KNIs of Surakarta
Penetapan Pemerintah, no.l6/SD, 15 July 1946.
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gradually chan gad. thsir names uo Dewan Desa. Between February and.
May 1946 , Dewan Desa ware formed both in villages which had formerly 
had KNIs, and those which had not. The Sjahrir government's plan 
to reorganize the village government administration in all of Java 
and Madura was sat out in the decree of the Minister of Interior 
dated 4 December 1945. The High Commissioner of Surakarta, on the 
same date, received a telegram from the Minister of Interior containing 
two points: firstly, villages should hold elections for village headmen;
and secondly, village administrative officials should be replaced.82 
Ihe Minister of Interior envisaged the new village administration as 
a local government which could carry out the orders of the Republic.
In January and February 1946 the subdistrict KNIs in Surakarta, 
including those of our sample subdistricts of Kedawung, Jumapoio, 
Bendosari and Delanggu, began to inform the villages about a plan
O  Ofor the reorganization of village government. In May six villages
in the subdistricts of Kedawung and Bendosari held new elections for
their village headmen. The candidates for election were former
village headmen, other village administrative officials and prominent
villagers (e.g., former leaders of Seinendan, Keibodan, and lasykar
organizations). The electoral committees consisted of the subdistrict
KNIs, the officials of the subdistrict and village administrative
officials appointed by the subdistrict KNIs. The electoral system
was of two forms. In one the electoral committee nominated the former
lurah to be elected directly by the voters. This system was called
jago jero (jago - fighting cock; jero - inside). If the former
lurah were not elected as new village headmen by the voters, then
the electoral committee nominated other candidates from among prominent
villagers or officials of the village administration. This second
84system was called jago jaba (jaba - outside).
Minister's telegram to High Commissioner of Surakarta, 4 December 
1945, in the archives collection of the Reksopustoko Library.
In the subdistricts of Kedawung, Delanggu and Bendosari in early 
January. Interviews with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Haji 
Buzairi, 19 August 1979 and Kasimo, 28 July 1979. In Jumapoio 
it occurred in the end of February. Interview with Darmanto,
8 October 1979.
See also my research report for Yayasan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, Jakarta. 
Soeyatno, 'Sejarah Perubahan Sosial di Indonesia: Studi Kasus
di Surakarta 1945-1950', stencilled 1979, p.60.
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In six villages of the subidstricts of Kedawung and Bendosari
our informants note that there were only two villages (Pengkok and
Kawis, in Kedawung) where the former lurah was rejected as the new
85headman by the voters. This is because these former lurahs had
been very cruel to the villagers during the occupation. They had,
for example, collected by force the villagers' property to fulfil
Japanese demands. Former lurahs of two other villages of Kedawung
subdistrict (Wonokerso and Kedawung) and two villages of the Bendosari
subdistrict (Gayam and Toriyo) were re-elected, largely because they
had acted to form village KNIs. They had been recognized as lurah
86perjuangan (struggle headmen) by the villagers.
The reorganization of the structure of village administration 
also involved the formation of Dewan Desa. The Dewan Desa consisted 
of five members directly elected by the villagers. The lurah became 
chairman of the Dewan Desa. This meant that the village headman 
functioned as both the executive and legislative head in the village 
government. The function of the Dewan Desa was mainly to assist the 
village government to manage village affairs. With the establishment 
of Dewan Desa the villagers could participate in village government.
In the early months of 1946 the formation of the Dewan
Desa was limited to certain villages. There were two reasons for this.
First nor all villages had KNIs, which were able readily to change
their names to Dewan Desa; secondly, there was a lack of formal
communication between the subdistrict KNIs and the villages. As an
illustration, some examples will be shown below. In the subdistrict of
87Kedawung only five out of ten villages established Dewan Desa. Only
two out of eleven villages had Dewan Desa in the subdistrict of
88 89Bendosari, six out of sixteen in the subdistrict of Delanggu,
85 Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979; Prawiroredjo, 11 March 
1979; Pawiro Granggang, 27 August 1979.
86 Lurah perjuangan referred to village heads who adapted to the 
Indonesian Revolution and left the previous traditional pattern. 
Interview with Marcodihardjo, 8 August 1979.
87 Interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979.
88 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979.89
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and two out of twelve in the subdistrict of Jumapolo.
The members of the Dewan Desa in our four subdistricts
were mostly local leaders of the lasykar organizations, village school
teachers and village officials. There were two kinds of members,
the anggota pilihan (elected members), elected by all villagers over
eighteen years old and the anggota tunjukan (appointed members)
appointed by the lurah. In a number of cases the Dev/an Desa was
closely associated with the lasykar organizations. For instance, the
BBI of Kedawung had its representatives in the Dewan Desa, appointed 
91by the lurah. The Dewan Desa of the Jumapolo subdistrict cooperated
92with the Barisan Banteng. This association was limited to jointly 
maintaining the security of the villages and collecting funds.
While the reorganization of village government was taking
place, revolutionary villagers were following the anti-Swapraja
movements led by urban revolutionaries. On 26 April the pamang praja
of Klaten regency under instructions of the Klaten KNI broke off
93their relations with the Kasunanan government. This decision was 
apparently affected by the actions of the Surakarta KNI and the 
Directorate which had refused to work with the Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro 
governments since November. Moreover the KNI of Klaten, like those 
of other kabupatens in Surakarta, included the local leaders of 
badan perjuangan who were firmly against the rulers. The regency 
officials wanted to reform the structure of local government without 
reference to the Swapraja. On 29 April, the Working Committee of the 
Klaten KNI held a meeting of Klaten regency officials who were still 
confused about breaking off their relations with the Kasunanan.
The KNI urged these officials to adapt the Klaten regency government 
to new conditions rather than continue to support the Susuhunan.
The reasons given by the Klaten KNI were that the Swapraja government 
would resist reforms needed for local government in the new Republic.
90 Interview with Darreanto, 8 October 1979.
91 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
92 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
93 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 May 1946.
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The KNI thought that reform could best be achieved by breaking off
94relations with the Kasunanan. The following day, on 30 April, the
Klaten KNI sent a delegation to the Directorate of Surakarta to report
95the result of its special session. On 1 May, the Klaten KNI held
a general meeting for the 'popular masses' (massa rakyat) of the Klaten
region. Bodronojo, one of the Delanggu BBI leaders who attended this
conference, estimated that there were more than 1,000 people present. ^
Ihe conference proclaimed that the ties of the regency government
9 7with the Kasunanan were broken.
Apparently the general meeting of 1 May had a strong impact
in encouraging the revolutionary forces of the areas surrounding
Klaten city to join the anti-Swapraja movements. The subdistrict
of Delanggu, adjacent to the city, participated to the extent of forming
a committee of the anti-Swapraja movement. After returning from the
general meeting of 1 May, Bodronojo formed an anti-Swapraja committee.
On behalf of the BBI he urged the central government to distribute
the tanah konversi (conversion land, former land of the western
enterprises) to the people, thus showing a difference within the
anti-Swapraja movement, where the peasants were mainly concerned about
land, and obtaining it from the estates, while the urban revolutionaries
98wanted to destroy the Swapraja. Bodronojo then met the leaders
of the Klaten PKI and went to Jogjakarta to meet the Minister of 
Agrarian Affairs. The Minister, however, refused his request, saying 
that the problems of tanah konversi would be regulated by a special law.
A similar anti-Swapraja movement in the rural areas occurred 
in the subdistrict of Kartosura, one of the areas where the
94 -_lj.-fg.ft perjuangan Rakyat Kabupaten Klaten. Klaten, Panitya 
P'errbangunan Monumen Perjoangan '45 Klaten, 1976,, pp. 92-93*.
95 Ibid., p .94.
96 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
97 Sejarah Perjuangan, p.94; see also Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 May 1946.
98 Interview witn Bodronojo, 26 September 1979. The conversion rights 
referred particularly to the rights of long lease on land in the 
principalities. The conversion rights seemed to protect the interests 
of the plantations. See Encyclopsedie van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol.4, 
Cs Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1921), pp.633-34.
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Mangkunegoro had a sugar estate. In May and June 1946, the Kartosura
BTI held a series of meetings among the peasants when they demanded
the abolition of conversion rights in Surakarta. These meetings
also rejected any expansion of the Mangkunegoro sugar estates on this 
99area. Apparently this anti-Swapraja movement was affected by Sudijo 
and Anwar Santosa, prominent members of the Barisan Banteng who were 
originally from Kartosura.
Indeed early in 1946 political organizations of Surakarta 
and Jogjakarta, particularly BTI and PKI, had launched their resolution 
to abolish hak konversi (conversion rights) on the land bf the former 
Dutch plantation estates in the principalities.'*'00 Apparently 
the abolishing of conversion rights was included in the land reform 
program demanded by the Surakarta BTI congress in January 1946.
In the context of land reform planning, the BTI not only gave
♦
attention to the problems of abolishing the conversion rights in the
principalities but also demanded that all existing landleases outside
the principalities between the enterprises and peasants be cancelled.
The BTI in Madiun residency was successful in having the planting of
,, a 101estate crops in March cancelled.
A similar development occurred in the subdistrict of
Kedawung, Sragen regency. Shortly after the Sragen KNI broke off
102relations with the Kasunanan on 1 May 1946, Sardjono, chairman of
the Kedawung BBI, met Atmosudarmo, chairman of the anti-Swapraja
103movement of Sragen regency, a teacher, and a close associate of
Panudi, a former Peta officer and one of the leaders of the Angkatan
104Muda Sukawati (Young Generation of Sukawati) or AMS in 1946.
99 Interview with Sudijo, 31 October 1979; Totosardjono, 8 August 
1979.
100 Kementerian Pertanian (ed), Agraria (Djakarta, Pusat Kantor 
Urusan Tani, n.d. ), p .293.
101 Reid, op.cit., p.128.
102 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 May 1946.
103 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
104 Interview with Panudi, 27 July 1979.
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Atmosudarmo instructed Sardjono to form an anti-Swapraja committee 
in the subdistrict of Kedawung.
By the middle of May Sardjono had set up the anti-Swapraja 
committee, which consisted of members of the BBI, the Barisan 
Banteng and the Kedawung KNI. The committee issued a political 
statement that the subdistrict of Kedawung was under the Republican 
Government and not under that of the Kasunanan. The committee also 
demanded that the central government distribute former land of the 
western enterprises in Kedawung subdistrict, estimated at about
300 ha. 105
In the Mangkunegaran rural areas, the anti-Swapraja movement 
was also led by teachers. At the end of January 1946 seventeen primary 
school teachers in the subdistrict of Tawangmangu announced that they 
were breaking relations with the office of educational affairs of the 
Mangkunegaran. They gave as a reason that the Mangkunegaran had 
not increased the salary of primary school teachers and had not paid 
the salary of teachers during the first months of 1946. This was 
because in the months after the proclamation the Mangkunegaran 
government experienced severe budgetary difficulties, as some taxes, 
such as the market tax and land tax, were held at local government 
level (e.g., subdistrict or village) to finance the local offices
and lasykar organizations.
The action of these primary school teachers was followed 
by other teachers in the subdistricts of Karangpandan and Jumapolo. 
The local Army battalion, under the command of Major Sastrolawu, 
supported the action of these teachers. The teachers and the local 
army both made propaganda among the officials of the regency and the 
subdistricts to reject the Mangkunegaran government. This propaganda 
had its effect. In early May the officials of Karanganyar regency 
announced that they had broken off relations with the Mangkunegaran. 
All subdistricts held mass meetings in which the subdistrict KNIs and
105 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
106 Interview with Sanjoto, 26 June 1979.
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badan perjuangan leaders urged the rural masses to refuse the authority
of the Mangkunegoro. In Wonogiri regency the teachers and the
officials of the health office took a leading role in the movement
against the Mangkunegaran. These teachers, for the same reasons as the
primary school teachers of Tawangmangu, rejected the authority of the
Special Region of Mangkunegaran. On 22 May the officials of the
health office announced that they too had broken their relations
107with the Mangkunegaran.
It is clear that the daulat operation against the traditional 
governments occurred not only in the urban bureaucracy but also in 
the rural areas. The urban daulat operation was mainly under the 
leadership of leftist groups and revolutionary badan perjuangan.
In the rural areas the leftist groups (e.g., the BBI) were the most 
powerful social force opposing the traditional authorities. Both 
in urban and rural areas the KNI seemed to be a powerful political 
institution in carrying out the daulat operation to replace or reform 
the old institutions of the traditional government.
107 Lasjkar, 25 May 1945.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RISING SOCIAL TENSIONS
NATIONAL POLITICS, JULY 1 9 4 6 -4 7
The f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  P e r s a t u a n  P e r j u a n g a n  coup  on 3 J u l y  
1946 d i d  n o t  en d  p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n s  a r i s i n g  fro m  p a r t y  an d  i d e o l o g i c a l  
c o n f l i c t s ,  g ro u p  r i v a l r i e s  and  t h e  p e r j u a n g a n  v e r s u s  d i p l o m a s i  q u e s t i o n .  
T h e s e  c o n f l i c t s  becam e ev e n  m ore i n t e n s e  i n  t h e  m o n th s  l e a d i n g  up  
t o  t h e  M adiun r e b e l l i o n  i n  S e p te m b e r  1 9 4 8 ,  a s  w i l l  b e  s e e n  i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r s .
As a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  coup  o f  3 J u l y ,  t h e  Tan
M a la k a  g ro u p  l o s t  t h e  pow er w h ic h  i t  h a d  p o s s e s s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t
m o n th s  o f  1 9 4 6 .^  M ost o f  t h e  t o p  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  P e r s a t u a n  P e r j u a n g a n ,
i n c l u d i n g  Muhammad Yamin and  Tan M alaka  h i m s e l f ,  w e re  i n  d e t e n t i o n
2
a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  t h e  en d  o f  1947 . F o l l o w i n g  t h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  
c o u p ,  S u k a rn o  d e c i d e d  t h a t  a more w i d e l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  G o v ern m en t 
was n e c e s s a r y .  On 2 O c to b e r  1946 t h e  t h i r d  S j a h r i r  c a b i n e t  was 
a n n o u n c e d ,  a f t e r  P r e s i d e n t  S u k a rn o  h a d  i n v i t e d  t h e  f o r m e r  P r im e  
M i n i s t e r  t o  fo rm  a  new p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a b i n e t .  A c c o r d in g  t o  V i c e -  
P r e s i d e n t  H a t t a ,  t h e  t h i r d  S j a h r i r  c a b i n e t  was p r e p a r e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  D u tc h ,  w h ich  w e re  due  t o  recom m ence i n  O c to b e r  
1 9 4 6 . 1 23
S u k a r n o ' s  d e c r e e  o f  29 Decem ber c a l l e d  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  
m e m b e rsh ip  o f  t h e  KNI from  200 t o  514 , t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  h o p i n g  t h a t  
t h i s  e x p e n d e d  KNIP w o u ld  p r o v i d e  a d e q u a t e  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  L i n g g a j a t i  
A g re e m e n t .  Of t h e  314 new m em bers, n i n e t y  w e re  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  f o r t y  t h e  p e a s a n t r y ,  f o r t y  L a b o u r ,  s e v e n t y - e i g h t  
t h e  r e g i o n s  o u t s i d e  J a v a  an d  M adura , and  f i v e  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s ;  t h e
1 G e o rg e  McTurnan K a h in ,  N a t i o n a l i s m  and  R e v o l u t i o n  i n  I n d o n e s i a , 
p . 1 9 2 .
2 Muhammad Yamin, S a p t a  P a rm a , p p . 7 4 -7 6 .
3 Muhammad H a t t a ,  M em oir , p . 4 9 2 .
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remaining 121 members were appointed on the basis of general social
prominence or as representatives of minor parties and irregular
4armed organizations. In this new KNIP, the Sayap Kiri (left wing),
a coalition of Marxist organizations including the Socialist Party,
PESINDO, the Labour Party, and the PKI and its affiliated organizations,
were much stronger than in the 1946 KNIP. The most important reason
for this change was that Sukarno had to save diplomasi. For this
purpose he increased the representation of the Sayap Kiri, which was
then the main pro-government force and which could also claim to
speak more clearly for the people. The extent of this increase is
as follows: Socialist Party and PESINDO (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia)
from thirty-five to thirty-five; PKI, from two to thirty-five;
Labour Party, from six to thirty-five; Workers, from nil to forty;
5Peasants, from nil to forty.
Sjahrir's own position in his third cabinet was much weaker.
His party, the PS, occupied only four posts, including his own
position as Prime Minister. Most of the Masyumi ministers, however,
were from the progressive wing of the party, and they were openly
6supportive of Sjahrir. They could thus be depended upon to back 
Sjahrir's diplomasi policy. Among the thirty-one ministers was 
Wikana, who represented the PESINDO as Minister of State. Although 
he had not yet openly professed his support for communism, his position
7seemed to represent the PKI. The PKI was weak in Sjahrir's cabinet, 
but it was strong in the KNIP and the Communist-Socialist alliance,
4 Kahin, op.cit., p.200; see also A.J.S. Reid, Indonesian National 
Revolution, 1945-1950, p.97.
5 Kahin, op.cit., p.291; Reid, op.cit., p.97. PESINDO was under 
the auspices of the Socialist Party. PESINDO was formed at 
the national Pemuda congress in Jogjakarta on 10-11 November 
1945 and consisted of seven Pemuda organizations with mainly 
educated Pemuda membership. The seven organizations were:
API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia); PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia); 
AMRI (Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia); Angkatan Muda Kereta 
Api; Angkatan Muda PTT; Angkatan Muda Gas Listrik; see 
Kedaulatan Rakjat, 16 November 1945.
6 Kahin, op.cit., p.195.
7 Ibid.
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the Sayap Kiri, obtained seventeen of the forty-seven seats in theQnew Working Committee of the KNIP.
The leadership of the Masyumi and PNI continued to oppose
the cabinet and its diplomasi policy, largely because neither jjarty
could regard the eleven members they jointly had in the cabinet as
9truly representative. The Masyumi as a party was not represented 
in the cabinet, and those Masyumi members who participated in it did 
so only as individuals, not responsible to the party. Thus only 
in a limited sense could the Cabinet be designated as a 'coalition 
cabinet'.
The policy of the third Sjahrir cabinet, culminating in the 
Linggajati Agreement of November 1946,^  sharply divided society 
between supporters and opponents of cabinet policies. The Linggajati 
Agreement, which was initialled on 15 November 1946 and signed on 
25 March 1947, recognized de facto Republican authority only over 
Java, Madura and Sumatra."^ The Republic and the Netherlands agreed 
to establish by 1 January 1949 a federal United States of Indonesia, 
which would consist of the Republic, Borneo and Eastern Indonesia.
The Linggajati Agreement naturally became the major political
issue for the political parties. Opinions both for and against were
intense. The group in favour consisted of the Socialist Party, PKI,
PBI, the Indonesian Christian Party, the Catholic Party, PESINDO,
12BTI, Sobsi, and Lasykar Rakyat. The Marxist parties in this group,
8 Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1953 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964), pp.19-20.
9 Reid, op.cit., p.96.
10 The Linggajati Agreement followed a series of serious meetings 
between the Dutch and the Republic. Both the Dutch government 
and the Sjahrir government had carefully considered the 
meaning and repercussions of the agreement. For an account
of this see C. Smit, Het Akkoord van Linggadjati (Amsterdam, 
Elsevier, 1949), pp.31-91.
11 An excellent analysis of this agreement is in Charles Wolf, Jr, 
The Indonesian Story (New York, The John Day Company, 1948), 
pp.43-44.
12 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, vol.4 
(Bandung, Angkasa Bandung, 1978), pp.227-33.
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and other organizations such as the Lasykar Rakyat and GRI (Gerakan
Rahasia Indonesia - the Indonesian Secret Movement), had coalesced
13into the Sayap Kiri in December 1946. This coalition argued that
the Linggajati Agroemsnt could prevent Dutch aggression and give
Indonesia an opportunity to build new forces to continue the struggle.
Moreover, the Republic still had many difficulties to overcome in
14leadership, defence, and economy.
On the other hand the groups opposing Linggajati, the PNI,
Masyumi, Barisan Banteng, BPRI and the remaining Tan Malaka supporters
and other small organizations such as Angkatan Muda Guru (Young
Generation of Teachers) and Wanita Rakyat (Women of the People),
formed the Bentong Republik (Republican Fortress) on 13 December 1946.
They argued that this agreement did not guarantee a sovereign government
15of the Indonesian Republic either politically or economically.
General Sudirman, the Army Commander, continued to emphasize the
Ifneed for armed struggle and dissociated himself from diplomasi.
Because Sjahrir had become too compromised through diplomasi,
the Sayap Kiri could not maintain its united support for his third
cabinet. On 26 June 1947 several leaders of the Sayap Kiri who were
ministers of the Sjahrir cabinet, such as Amir Sjarifuddin (Socialist
Party), Setiadjit (Labour Party), Abdul Madjid (Socialist Party), and
17Wikana (PESINDO), withdrew their support from Sjahrir. Under strong 
pressure from the Dutch to produce counterproposals, Sjahrir 
had accepted on 8 June the principle of an interim government in which 
the Netherlands would exercise sovereignty. On 20 June he had even 
agreed to the de jure 'special position' of the Dutch Crown's 
representatives in such a government, something which
13 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.4, p.231; cf. Reid, op.cit., p.96; 
Samawi, 25 Tahun Mcrdeka (Jogjakarta, Kcdaulatan Rakjat, 1970), 
p . 50.
14 For details, see A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.4, pp.231-32.
15 Ibid., pp.233-38.
16 Reid, op.cit., p.96.
17 For details on this discussion, see Reid, op.cit., pp.98-99; 
Kahin, op.cit., pp.207-08.
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would give the Netherlands control over Indonesia's foreign relations. 
These concessions caused Sjahrir's own Socialist Party to turn against 
him. Cabinet members from the Socialist Party, PNI, Masyumi and 
PKI withdrew their support from Sjahrir. On 27 June Sjahrir thus 
handed his resignation to President Sukarno.
On 30 June, a meeting was held between President Sukarno 
and the leaders of Masyumi, PNI, the Social Party and Labour Party 
to discuss the formation of a coalition cabinet. Masyumi demanded 
the Prime Ministership and the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs 
and Internal Affairs, which caused the other parties to refuse to 
enter a coalition dominated by the Masyumi. Eventually, on 3 July,
Amir Sjarifuddin, one of the leaders of the Sayap Kiri, was able to 
form a cabinet based on support by three other iarge parties and a 
small, newly emerged party which had split off from the Masyumi, 
the Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Union Party of Indonesia 
or PSSI). Amir Sjarifuddin himself was to hold the posts of Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence.
In Amir Sjarifuddin's cabinet communists or crypto-communist
allies controlled about thirteen of the thirty-four seats, including
Ministries of State. Amir Sjarifuddin, as Minister of Defence both
in Sjahrir's third cabinet and in his own, had an important role in
bringing elements of communist ideology into both the regular army
and the Badan Perjuangan. The PEPOLIT (Pendidikan Politik Tentara -
Political Education for the Army) took root in the majority of divisions
19during the last months of 1947. Major General Djokosujono, a pro- 
PKI former PESINDO activist, as head of PEPOLIT staff coordinated the 
implementation of PEPOLIT in the provinces. Djokosujono had the full 
trust of the Minister of Defence and was also head of the Central 
Lasykar Board (Dewan Kelasykaran Pusat). After the President's 
decree of 3 June 1947 implementing the government policy of integrating 
the Badan Perjuangan into the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - 
Indonesian National Army), Djokosujono had a further role as a member
18 Kahin, op.cit., p.207; Charles Wolf, Jr, op.cit., p.122.
19 See A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.4, pp.439-40; vol.6, pp.94-96.
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20of the central leadership of the TNI.
In Surakarta, PEPOLIT was under the control of Wikana, the 
Minister of State who was appointed Military Governor of Surakarta 
by the Minister of Defence (see below p.141) in August 1947. In 
practice the implementation of PEPOLIT in this region was in the hands 
of Lieutenant-Colonel Samsudin, one of the senior officers in the 
Senopati Division. Samsudin had been a member of the underground 
movement during the Japanese occupation, and was a PESINDO activist 
in early 1946.^
The PEPOLIT contained the essence of Marxist ideology, 
including the nature of the Indonesian proletariat, the anti­
imperialist and anti-feudal struggle, military defence, military 
discipline, and mass organization. While the communists introduced 
Marxist ideology into the army and the Badan Perjuangan through 
PEPOLIT, 'Marx House', a political training centre established in 
Padokan, Jogjakarta, provided a training in Marxist ideology for the
cadres of the left political parties and the labour organizations.
22By April 1947 this had produced 400 cadres.
Two lasykar organizations, the Hizbullah and the Barisan
Banteng, were strongly opposed to the PEPOLIT. This was because
PESINDO, the main support of PEPOLIT, was against Japanese-sponsored
organizations such as Hizbullah and Barisan Banteng had originally
been. Moreover, the Hizbullah, with its Islamic ideology, was
fundamentally opposed to the Marxist content of PEPOLIT. Apparently
the Barisan Banteng, which was inclined to the PNI, also accepted the
PNI's criticism of PEPOLIT and the TNI Masyarakat (Social TNI). The
PNI feared that the body of the army would become dominated by the
left stream rather than comprising all popular forces so that fighting
23democracy would be achieved. The personal conflict which developed 
between Dr Muwardi, the Barisan Banteng leader, and Wikana was partly
20 Ibid., pp.439-40.
21 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
22 See A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.4, p.440; also Reid, op.cit., 
p. 99.
23 Mangunsarkoro, one of the leaders of PNI, had presented this 
criticism in the session of KNIP in November 1947. A.H. Nasution, 
Sekitar, vol.6, pp.94-96.
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24based on the above factors. In a broader sense PEPÜLIT gave rise 
to group rivalries, gang fights between battalions and political 
tensions among the leaders of political parties.
GOVERNMENT CHANGES AFTER THE FALL OF THE TRADITIONAL RULERS
The daulat operation against traditional rule in Surakarta
was completed in July 1946. With the Government Decree (Penetapan
Pemerintah) of 15 July 1946 the residency government of Surakarta
formally commenced. As mentioned above, this determined that the
territories of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro would temporarily
become a residency and part of the province of Central Java. The
decree aimed to prevent further social and political tensions in
25the region of Surakarta.
On 18 July President Sukarno inaugurated Iskaq Tjokroadisuryo
as the first Resident of Surakarta region on the strength of his
2 0revolutionary background. Iskaq, like Sukarno, had been a member
of the Board of Leaders of the pre-war PNI (1927-31). He had been
very active in the Bandung Study Club under the leadership of Sukarno
and was thus an old friend of Sukarno and of leaders of the PNI such
27as Mr Sartono, Dr Budiarto, Dr Samsi and Mr Sunario." During the 
Japanese occupation Iskaq had been a high official in the Japanese 
administration of Banyumas and in the early revolution he had successfully 
taken the Japanese authority there into his hands. Iskaq had therefore
28been a leading figure in Banyumas since the beginning of the revolution. 
Sudiro, who had been a member of the DPRT and the DPD of Surakarta, 
was appointed Vice-Resident and inaugurated by Sukarno personally
24 For details on this point see below.
25 This decree was popularly called the Penetapan Pemerintah 
16/SD. It may be found in Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
26 Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
27 Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Angus and Robertson,
1972), pp.77-78; see also Ahmad Subarjo Djoyoadisuryo, Kesadaran 
Nasional: Otobiografi (Jakarta, Gunung Agung, 1978), pp.175-76.
28 Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Komando Daerah Militer VII 
Dioonegoro (Djawa Tengah), Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII Diponegoro, n.d. 
pp.22-30.
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on the same day as ISKaq. Iskaq and Sudiro were expected to support 
the. policy of Sukarno's government rather than the oppositionist 
groups because bcch had been members of Sukarno's PNI- They could 
rely on the full political support of the local Barisan Banteng and 
PNI. The Barisan Banteng had previously been allied with Sutarto 
and the Surakarta leftists against the Republican Government's 
effort to form the swapraja. However, it was now firmly aligned 
with the central government, having supported the leftists only 
in their move to overthrow the traditional rulers. As far as the 
Barisan Banteng leaders were concerned, the decree of 15 July had 
ended the authority of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, thus 
closing that issue. The appointment of Sudiro as Vice-Resident 
cemented the relationship between the Barisan Banteng and the Government 
In the eyes of Sukarno, this power base should have been sufficient 
to withstand the oppositionist element led by Sutarto, which was 
based chiefly on the local army unit and on the support of Dasuki's 
leftists. Dasuki, however, represented a force not to be under­
estimated, for it was the leftists who dominated the Surakarta KNI 
and had led the anti-swapraja movement since the end of 1945.
Colonel Sutarto, who had participated directly in the
kidnapping of Sjahrir on 26 June, was becoming something of a local
strong man in the Surakarta region. He still held his earlier posts
both as commander of the Senopati Division and as chairman of the
DPD Regional Defence Board. His intention was to accelerate the
process of democratization in this formerly traditional region, using
the DPD to realize his plan to form the Badan Perwakilan Rakyat
(People's Representative Council) or BPR for the region. This was
in apparent alignment with the Government policy of early 1946,
which recommended the formation of BPR both at national and regional
levels. In accordance with this policy, the Central Java Government,
along with other provinces, decided to set up BPR at residency and 
30regency levels. Shortly after the inauguration of Iskaq and Sudiro,
29
29 Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
30 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah (Djakarta, Kernenterian
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), pp.123-24.
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a series of meetings was held between Sutarto, the DPD members and 
the political party leaders in order to prepare for the formation 
of the Surakarta BPR. With the establishment of the Surakarta 
residency, they argued, political parties and Badan Perjuangan 
had to be involved in local government through both executive and 
legislative bodies. The DPD, as the body of regional defence, saw 
itself as being responsible for the local BPR. By 24 July it had
31already set up the Surakarta residency BPR with seventy-five members.
Most members were chosen by the political parties, and the remainder
were appointed by the chairman of the DPD. Masyumi was represented
by twelve members, PBI by nine members, PNI by seven, PKI four, the
Christian Party two, the Cartholic Party two and Partai Rakyat (People's
Party), one. The lasykar organizations had nine members. There were
fourteen members representing the six kabupatens and the Surakarta
municipality. These fourteen were appointed by the DPD. There were
also ten other members who were appointed by the DPD, to represent
32minority groups and the army.
This BPR acted as a legislative body- replacing the former
Surakarta KNI. With the rise of the BPR, the authority of the resident
was restricted by the power of political parties. The resident
would now have to carry out the regional civil government in conjunction
with the BPR. In civil defence the DPD itself was more powerful than
either the resident or the BPR. It appeared, therefore, that Sutarto
could control both the resident and the BPR. At the same time,
following the example of the residency BPR, the regencies also formed
regency BPR. The members of the regency BPR came ordinarily from
three groups - the political parties, the Badan Perjuangan and local 
33leading figures.
For six months, from July to December 1946, the Surakarta 
BPR held a series of sessions to discuss the local political situation, 
especially the movement against the traditional rulers, the position
31 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 30 July 1946.
32 Ibid. Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
33 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 30 July 1946.
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of Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro officials in tne Republican Government,
and various local Surakarta taxes such as the market, industrial
and land tuxes. The residency of Surakarta had enormous problems.
Former officials of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro were still
at their posts. Only a few of them had started to move into the
residency offices. Until the end of 1946 there were about 1,800
officials of the Kasunanan and 900 of the Mangkunegaran still functioning
in their former offices.^ The main cause for this situation was
that the residency government was not prepared to take over the
former offices of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. Moreover,
the residency government still faced the complex problem of how to
deal with traditional Javanese ranks in adapting to the regulations
of the Republican Government. These factors impeded the integration
of these officials into the new bureaucracy of the Republic. All of
the officials were paid by the Republican Government. For instance
the Republic subsidized the Mangkunegaran to the extent of 300,000
rupiahs in 1947, still considerably less than the Mangkunegaran1s
35request for 840,000 rupiahs.
At the same time, both rulers found their independent
incomes shrinking. Since May 1946 their sugar plantation enterprises
had been nationalized by the Republic, along with former Dutch
enterprises and placed under the control of the Badan Penyelengqara
Perusahaan Guin Negara (Board of Management of State Sugar Enterprises)
36or BPPGN, the new owner of all sugar plantations. Moreover the land
tax and most other taxes became the government income of the 
37residency. In 1947 the remaining enterprises of the Susuhunan and
34 Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 6 July 1979; KRT Darjonegoro 
29, 31 December 1979.
35 See Mangkunegoro VIII's letter to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, 17 March 1947, Bendel Swapradja 1947, AMN.
36 The BPPGN was formed on 25 May 1946, in accordance with directives 
set down in Government Regulation No.3, 21 May 1946. For details 
see Gula, I, no.l, 17 November 1946.
37 Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 6 July 1979.
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Mangkunegoro were nationalized by the Republic and coordinated by
Perusahaan Nasional Surakarta (Surakarta National Enterprise) or 
38PNS.
Therefore the rulers lost not only their political authority 
but also most of their incomes. For several months neither ruler 
could pay the salaries of those officials who still served in their 
former offices. This created discontent on the part of these officials. 
These financial difficulties were one of the important reasons why 
in 1947 most of the remaining officials of the Susuhunan and the 
Mangkunegoro left, their former posts and joined the residency 
government. The few who remained loyal to the rulers were those 
officials who continued to believe in the rebirth of the Swapraja 
in Surakarta.
The residency of Surakarta consisted of six kabupatens,
39including a new one called Sukoharjo, and the municipality of 
Surakarta. The DPR was the residency-wide legislative body, assisting 
the executive body headed by the resident. Through its five sections 
the BPR shared in facing the various problems of the Surakarta 
government. The five sections were concerned with government and 
political affairs, security and defence, education and health, 
agriculture and 'conversion land', and economic affairs.40
Even after the Surakarta BPR was set up, however, real 
power still lay in the hands of the DPD chief and Division commander.
98 Gula, I, no.13, 17 August 1947, pp.199-201. Established by 
Peraturan Pemerintah No.9, 1947, the PNS supervised the 
plantations that had been the Susuhunan's (Manisharjo - sugar;
Ampel - tea, coffee, rubber; Karanggeneng - jute; Tegalgondo - 
tobacco) and the Mangkunagoro's (Tasikmadu - sugar; Tjolomadu - 
sugar; Mojogedang - jute; Kerjogadungan - coffee) and also 
managed all former Dutch plantation enterprises in Surakarta.
39 Sukoharjo was formerly one of the districts of the kabupaten 
kota Mangkunegaran. In early 1946 it became a regency. See
DPRD /Pdntja Warsa Daerah Swatantra Sukohardio 1950-1955 (Sukohardjo, 
DPRD Kabupaten Sukohardjo, 1955), p.66.
40 Penerangan Rakjat, no.67, 4 November 1947; no.69, 6 November 
1947; no.75, 15 November 1947.
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Because of local and national tensions, and the state of relations 
between the Dutch and the Republic, the role of both the Resident 
and the BPR continued to be regarded as less important than those 
of the DPD and the military government.
The municipality of Surakarta replaced the two former
kabupaten kota (city regencies), the kabupaten kota Kasunanan
and the kabupaten kota Mangkunegaran. The administrative integration
of these two regencies marked the end of the governmental authority
of the Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro within the city. The municipality
was headed by a mayor (walikota), with the same status as a regent.
The first mayor was R. Sjamsuridjal, the mayor of Bandung early
in the revolution. The central government hoped that Sjamsuridjal's
reputation as the fiery mayor of Bandung would enable him to cope
with the social and political conflicts of Surakarta. He was inaugurated
41on 1 November 1946 by the resident of Surakarta. Sjamsuridjal
42had been a youth movement activist during colonial times, and 
after August of 1945, as revolutionary leader in Bandung, he was 
closely associated with Colonel Nasution, first commander of the 
Siliwangi Division.4  ^ Sjamsuridjal began his term of office 
determined to create a changed society in Surakarta. In his inaugural 
speech, he stated:
The society of Surakarta, which has been for many 
years under the influence and the authority of the 
colonial system, has to be transformed into a 
democratic society.^
41 Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
42 Sjamsuridjal was born on 11 October 1903 in Karanganyar,
Central Java. In 1925 he graduated from Law School. In 1924 
he was the Chairman of the Jong Java, and in 1925 of the Jong 
Islamieten Bond. In 1942 he worked in the office of the 
Bandung law court. See 45 Tahun Sumpah Pemuda (Jakarta, Yayasan 
Gedung-Gedung Bersejarah Jakarta, 1974), p.354.
43 John R.W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946:
A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution 
(Ithaca, Cornell University, 1964), pp.148-49.
Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta (Surakarta, Djawatan 
Penerangan Kota Besar Surakarta, 1953), p.7.
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Trouble surfaced in Surakarta when local PKI leaders became 
dissatisfied with having Iskaq and Sudiro as the top officials of 
Surakarta, seeing them as too inclined to back Sukarno’s government 
in Jogjakarta. The three key PKI leaders were Ahmad Dasuki (former 
member of the Directorate and a pre-war communist prisoner at Digul), 
Djuwardi (member of the former Directorate and Surakarta KNI and of 
the DPD), and Sujono (member of the former Surakarta KNI and of the 
DPD). Sujono and Djuwardi planned to replace Iskaq and Sudiro with 
PKI men, and thereby gain control of the executive. This had to be 
done by military means, since as shown above the Surakarta PKI had 
more representatives in the DPD than other organizations, whereas 
in the BPR, the PKI was given only four seats against twelve, seven 
and nine respectively held by the Masyumi, PNI and PBI. Nevertheless, 
the leftist coalition consisting mainly of the PKI and PBI still 
held a strong position in the BPR.
On 9 November 1946 the PKI leaders in Surakarta used their
supporters in an army unit of the Senopati Division to kidnap both 
45Iskaq and Sudiro. According to the Barisan Banteng's sources, 
the two men were held in a building in the city, guarded by a few 
soldiers. On the same day, Ahmad Dasuki took over as Vice-Resident 
and Sodjas, a PKI man who was a close friend of Amir Sjariffudin, 
began to act as Resident.
Popular reaction to the kidnapping came mainly from the
Barisan Banteng leaders. A few days after the kidnapping they
demanded that the commander of the Senopati Division help to release
Iskaq and Sudiro. When they were finally released in the middle of
November, however, they had lost their positions as Resident and
Vice-Resident respectively. On 6 December the central government
reacted by appointing Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, governor of the
province of Central Java, to act also as Resident of Surakarta,
46replacing both Sodjas and Ahmad Dasuki. Sodjas was moved to the
office of the Ministry of State by Amir Sjarifuddin, and Ahmad Dasuki 
returned to his former role as member of the BPR.
45 Interviews with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 2 August 1979; Sastrolawu, 
13 October 1979.
46 Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta, p.7.
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During the short term in office enjoyed by Sodjas and Ahmad
Dasuki, the residency government was in the hands of those two men
and of the Executive Board of the Surakarta BPR, consisting of five
members, representing PNI, Socialist Party, PBI, Masyumi and the pemuda
47group respectively. One of the major programs of Ahmad Dasuki's 
period in office was to accelerate the transfer of Susuhunan and 
Mangkunegoro officials, to bring them under the auspices of the 
residency government. However, his period of office was too short 
to achieve all that he had hoped for here.
For six months, the Sutardjo government seemed relatively
successful in normalizing the residency government. The Surakarta
PKI group, as well as leftists like Amir Sjarifuddin at the national
level, were reluctant to oppose the Sutardjo government, apparently
48because of Sutardjo's leading role in the nationalist movement.
However, local PKI men remained determined to hold Surakarta in 
their hands. Because Sutardjo was required to devote all his time 
to governing the province of Central Java, however, he was withdrawn 
from his position as acting Resident of Surakarta in the middle of 
July 1947. Sudiro, who was still backed by the Barisan Banteng and 
was the most influential figure in the DPD, was then again entrusted 
by the Central Government with the administration of Surakarta as 
Resident.
Different Dutch and Republican interpretations of the Linggajati
Agreement of 25 March 1947 caused relations between them to deteriorate 
49rapidly, and this finally resulted in the Dutch beginning their
47 Ibid. , pp.6-7.
48 Sutardjo was born in 1892 in Blora, Central Java. He graduated 
from ELS (1907) and OSVIA (1911). From 1912-13 he was an official 
of Blora regency. From 1936 to 1938 he tried to push his
famous petition for greater Indies autonomy through the 
Volksraad. See Prang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa, p.48.
49 For discussions of the Dutch-Republican crisis from March to 
July 1947, see C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaestie (Leiden,
E.J. Brill, 1952), pp.124-38.
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first aggression against the Republic on 21 July. Dutch targets
included many of the major cities of the Republic in Java and Sumatra.
From their base in Semarang, the Dutch launched attacks against the
cities of Central Java, including Surakarta, whose airport of Panasan
was attacked by the Dutch air force on 21 July. The Senopati Division
and other Republican troops concentrated their defence around Salatiga
50and Tengaran and successfully resisted the southward Dutch movement.
The Dutch troops had still not occupied the city of Surakarta when
51a cease-fire was achieved on 4 August 1947.
The regional government of Surakarta responded to the 
Dutch attack by attempting to strengthen both civil and military 
defence. Sutarto's chairmanship of the DPD was terminated so that he 
could concentrate his efforts on his Division, and he and the BPR 
agreed to place the chairmanship of the DPD in the hands of Sudiro, 
regarded as a strong man when it came to organizing civil defence, 
because he was fully supported by the Barisan Banteng. Moreover, he 
was backed by President Sukarno, who had been closely associated with 
Sudiro in the Barisan Pelopor.
The function of Surakarta in regional defence strategy
was to screen the Republican Government in Jogjakarta from Dutch attacks.
This became the justification for the Minister of Defence's decision
to include the region of Surakarta as a special military administrative
authority - the so-called Daerah Militer Istimewa (Special Military 
52Region) or DMI. Politically, however, the formation of the 
Surakarta DMI provided an opportunity for Amir Sjarifuddin as Minister 
of Defence to get his own man into power in Surakarta. The DMI of
50 See Panitya Pembangunan Monumen Perjoangan '45 Klaten (ed.), 
Sejarah Perjuangan Rakyat Kabupaten Klaten (Klaten, 1976), p.122.
51 The Dutch and the Republic agreed to end the war on 4 August 1947. 
See C. Smit, op.cit., p.144; A.H. Nasution, Sedjarah Perdjuangan 
Nasional Dibidang Angkatan Bersendjata (Djakarta, Mega Bookstore, 
1965)', p.112.
52 There were three DMIs in Java: The DMI of Jogjakarta, consisting
of Jogjakarta, Kedu, Banyumas and Pekalongan; the DMI of 
Surakarta consisting of Surakarta, Madiun, Bojonegoro, Semarang 
and Pati; the DMI of East Java consisting of Surabaya, Kediri 
and Malang. Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
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Surakarta was inaugurated by Amir Sjarifuddin on 22 August.
He personally appointed Wikana, a non-military PESINDO leader and
the Minister of State for Youth in Amir's cabinet, as the first
54Military Governor of the Surakarta DMI. Wikana had been a member
of the underground PKI, at least since his days in the left-wing
pemuda group associated with the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka (Dormitory
55for Free Indonesia) of 1944-45 in Jakarta.
In terms of the power struggle, Amir's policy seems to 
have been to seek supporters in the army and the badan perjuangan, 
who could stand up to such opponents of his as PNI and Masyumi.
As will appear below, the conflicts between Dr Muwardi and Wikana 
were based on the political opposition between Amir's leftist group 
and their antagonists.
Wikana as military governor was assisted by a fifteen-man 
staf pembantu gubernur militer (staff assisting the military governor). 
Eight of the staff members were officers of the Senopati Division, 
including Major General Sutarto, the Division commander. Three were 
members of the PNI, including Sudiro, the resident of Surakarta and 
head of the DPD. Two nobles from the Kasunanan and two from the 
Kangkunegaran were appointed by W i k a n a . I n  addition, Wikana had 
an advisory board which consisted of four members, including Dr 
Muwardi and Sjamsuridjal, the walikota of Surakarta city.
53 See 'Verslag Singkat Rapat Pelantikan Gubernur Militer dengan 
Staffnja', Typescript, Surakarta, 22 August 1947.
54 Penetapan Pemerintah, No.559/A/I, 20 August 1947.
55 Wikana had in fact headed the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka, intended 
to 'prepare students for the task of national leadership,
in line with the Japanese promise of Indonesian independence 
in the future.' J.M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of 
Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver,
University of British Columbia Press, 1965), pp.308-09.
56 Kusumojudo and Mangkubumi were from the Kasunanan, but 
neither was among the conservative senior pangerans who had 
resisted the abolishing of Swapraja. Similarly, Surjosulardjo 
and Surjosumarno were from the Mangkunegaran, but not from the 
Mangkunegoro's clique. Interview with KRT Darjonegoro,
7 October 1979.
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The appointment of Wikana as military governor raised
protests from the PNI and the Masyumi on the grounds that Wikana was
57not a military man and was a militant PES1ND0 leftist. The rise 
of Wikana to prominence in Surakarta particularly angered the leaders 
of ehe Barisan Banteng, and Dr Muwardi was far from satisfied with 
his position as Wikana's adviser. This conflict became more intense 
when Wikana became the coordinator of PEPOLIT in Surakarta. As 
mentioned above, PEPOLIT was a political cause designed by the leaders 
of the Sayap Kiri and was largely based on Marxist ideology. The 
conflict between Dr Muwardi and Wikana climaxed with the resignation 
of Muwardi as a member of the advisory board in September 1947.
On 1 October, Wikana sent a letter to the Prime Minister explaining 
Muwardi's resignation:
When the staff and advisory board of the military 
governor made a tour, Dr Muwardi was also invited 
to join it, but he gave no answer. When one of the 
staff assisting the governor asked him about this 
matter in a friendly way, we only got the impression 
that he was not satisfied with his position as 
adviser. From the resident himself (Sudiro) the 
military governor received a report that the action 
of the leaders of the Barisan Banteng was less than
satisfactory.^8
When Sudiro received a copy of Wikana's letter he was very
angry with Wikana, because he had given no such report as described
in the letter. He wrote to Wikana on 8 October 1947 protesting:
It never occurred to me to give a report about 
Dr Muwardi and still less did I report to you that 
the actions of the leaders of the Barisan Banteng 
were less than satisfactory.^
We can trace the political tensions between the leaders 
of the Barisan Banteng and Wikana back to PESINDO's hostility to all
57 The PNI's protest was presented in the meetings of the Working 
Committee of KNI in November 1947. A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, 
vol.6, pp.94-96.
58 Wikana to the Prime Minister, 1 October 1947, no.l22/10/U.
This may be found in the Bendel Ketentaraan 1947, AMN.
59 Resident of Surakarta to Military governor of Surakarta,
8 October 1947, no.529 Rahasia, Bendel Ketentaraan 1947, AMN.
143
Japanese-sponsored organizations, including Barisan Banteng. When 
earlier the local-level Marxists had been able to cooperate with 
Barisan Banteng in the anti-Swapraja movement of 1946/ the attempts 
of national-level Marxists to obtain control of Surakarta through 
Wikana greatly increased the tension.
The Surakarta region under the military administration 
of the DMI was organized as part of a strategic defence to protect 
the Republican capital of Jogjakarta from Dutch attack. Since this 
defence was to involve all pro-Republican forces, Wikana shared 
his authority with other leaders in the DMI, Sutarto heading the 
Battle Strategy section, Sudiro the Civil Defence section, Sudibjo 
the Equipment section, and Sumarto the Security section.60
Wikana had in mind mobilizing the people as a whole for
defence. He established a section of the military government called
Penerangan Pertahanan Total (Total Defence Information) or PPT.
In November 1947 the PPT began to tour the region, conducting meetings
for 'the officials and the people' of the regencies and subdistricts.
These meetings were intended to raise the popular spirit of struggle
against the Dutch, through performing sandiwara and adaptations of
Javanese traditional drama. For instance, one play presented was
called Jaman Merdika (The era of freedom), in which actors portrayed
Indonesians with enough spirit to defeat the Dutch. Jaman Merdika
represented a period of struggle when everybody had to participate to
achieve independence.62 In addition to this the people had to be made
6 3more 'aware' of defence (penginsyapan pertahanan). Thus the DMI
See Rentjana Pembagian dalam staf Gubernur Militer DMI Surakarta, 
stencilled, Surakarta, 5 October 1947, pp.1-2.
Penerangan Rakjat, no.79, 20 November 1947; no.86, 28 November 
1947; no. 88, 6 December 3.947.
In L.he case of the subdistrict of Kedawung the actors consisted 
of five men. Their dialogue referred to both Indonesian and 
Javanese. They dressed in kain sarung, one of the Javanese 
dress fashions. Interview with Soekardi, 8 July 1979.
63 Apakah jang disebut Perang Total (Surakarta, 1947).
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military government, in its efforts to resist Dutch aggression, 
sought to develop a concept of people's war (perang rakyat) in which 
the people assisted the army.
After the fall of the traditional rulers the people could 
participate, at least through political party representatives in the BPR, 
in controlling the executive branch of government. Representation was 
based on consultation among the leaders of each party rather than 
a general election. As a residency Surakarta was under a resident 
but militarily this region was able to be regarded as a unit of 
military administrative government under the auspices of a Division 
commander and a Military governor. As a unit of civil defence this 
region was headed by the head of the Regional Defence Council. The 
majority of the new civil and military leaders of Surakarta previously 
belonged to the badan perjuangan. Till the end of 1947 local authority 
in Surakarta was in the hands of three leaders, Sudiro (Resident and 
leader of the Barisan Banteng), Wikana (military governor, PESINDO) 
and Sutarto (former head of the AMT and commander of the local 
division). All three had a strong anti-Swapraja leaning.
THE GERAKAN POKOSO
Before discussing the Gerakan Pokoso (the Pokoso movement),
this section will first treat other peasant organizations which
appeared during the revolution. For while the Pokoso was part of
a peasant organization formed in 1935, which was reborn during the 
64revolution, there were a number of other peasant organizations of 
various political persuasions also active in rural Surakarta after 
1945, and it is useful to know of their aims and activities if the 
Pokoso is to be understood in the proper context. Among those other 
organizations were the Barisan Tani Indonesia (the Indonesian Peasant 
Front) or BTI, closely linked to the PKI, and the Sarekat Tani Islam 
Indonesia (Indonesian Islam Peasant Union) or STII, tied to Masyumi.
64 The word Pokoso is derived from PKS, the abbreviation of 
Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta. In Javanese, the abbreviation 
PKS is pronounced Pokoso.
65 For the re-establishment of the PKI, see Kedaulatan Rakjat,
8 November 1945. For instance, the Klaten BTI was formed in 
October and started as a branch of the Surakarta BTI. Kedaulatan 
Rakjat, 30 October 1945.
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Established in October 1945, abouc the same time as the
66PKI and PS, the BTI was at first led mainly by Sjahrir s followers.
It grew rapidly in various regions of Java in the last months of
1945, after representatives from the conference of Workers and
Peasants held in October in Solo returned home and formed BTI
67branches in their own regions. The Surakarta BTI was also formed
in October, with its members concentrated in four regency branches
68at Wonogiri, Sragen, Boyolali and Klaten.
The Sragen BTI held its first congress on 29 December 1945.
Present were 223 representatives from villages, including villages
in our sample subdistrict of Kedawung. The congress took several
decisions, the key one being to demand that the Directorate of
Surakarta carry out land reform in the region so that landless
69peasants could gain proprietary rights to land. At almost the same 
time, on 6 January 1946, the Surakarta BTI held its first congress in 
Solo. This congress discussed the special question of land reform 
in the Surakarta region. The BTI argued that the formier land regulations 
of Surakarta did not give proprietary rights to the people. Therefore 
the BTI congress requested the Directorate to form a committee for
land reform which would investigate the former land regulations of
, 70Surakarta.
Most BTI members were landless peasants. They were mainly 
abangan peasantry, who followed a Javanese life-style comprising 
animist, Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic elements.71 Many of the non- 
hangar^ peasants eventually joined the STII. In the Surakarta region
66 Reid, op.cit., p.99.
67 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 8 November 1945.
68 Ibid.
69 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 1 January 1946.
70 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 8 January 1946.
71 For a clear analysis of the Javanese abangan, see Clifford 
Geertz, The Religion of Java (Illinois, The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1960), pp.11-112.
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the STII was formed in early 1947 by the Masyami. Haji Buzairi,
one of the leaders of ehe Masyumi in Klaten and a prominent adviser
72of the Hizbullah of Delanggu, began the formation of the STII. *" He
followed the example of the STII which had been formed by Masyumi
73in late 1946 in Ked.iri, East Java. STII members consisted of 
landowners and landless peasants who followed the life pattern of the 
santri, pious Moslems concerned with Islamic teachings.
Where BTI members were mainly landless peasants, the STII 
consisted of landowners as well as landless peasants. The Masyumi 
leaders encouraged the STII to collect zakat (religious tax) from 
every landowner. Under the guidance of Masyumi leaders, the STII 
utilized its zakat funds to help landless peasants. This was an 
obvious reason why the STII attracted landless peasants as well as 
landowners. The BTI held to a Marxist ideology while the STII 
sought to improve the lot of the peasants on the basis of Islamic 
teachings. Culturally the BTI was inclined to an abangan orientation 
while the STII held firmly to a santri one..
As was discussed in a previous chapter, Pokoso was a 
late-1930s organization of the people of Surakarta whose members, 
including many peasants, were generally opposed to Dutch colonialism. 
During the occupation Pokoso, like other political organizations, 
was disbanded by the Japanese authorities. Many of its members then 
joined Japanese-sponsored organizations such as Barisan Pelopor, 
Seinendan and Keibodan. A few of them became members of Heiho.
In the early months of revolution, former Pokoso people, in the spirit 
of the struggle for independence, had readily participated in various 
lasykar organizations such as Barisan Banteng and Lasykar Rakyat.
The former members of Pokoso, who for the great part were inclined 
to the abangan orientation, were naturally not interested in the 
Hizbullah’s Islamic elements.
In early 1946 many former leaders of the Pokoso in rural 
areas of Surakarta began to be interested in the BTI organization.
72 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979. In early 1947 he 
was ordered by the Central Masyumi to form the STII.
73 Kahin, op.cit., pp.307-08.
147
Apparently the BTI program inspired them to reorganize Pokoso as 
an affiliate of the BTI, for there were indeed similarities between 
the BTI programs and the main goals of Pokoso in the colonial period. 
In early 1946 the Surakarta BTI launched its programs for land reform, 
such as the demand for individual property rights to land. The 
Pokoso movement from 1935 to 1942 had also launched demands to achieve 
individual land rights to land, though without success.
Some of the early Pokoso leaders, including Mr Singgih 
and Pringgowinoto, had already joined the PNI, apparently feeling 
that their former party, the Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (PBI) , 
had a similar platform to the PNI's. Pringgowinoto was very active 
in making contacts with former local leaders of Pokoso. In early 
1946 Pringgowinoto suggested in various local meetings at Sukoharjo 
and Jumapolo that Pokoso join the PNI. Sunardi, former leader of 
the BPRI of the Sukoharjo regency, drew about 200 former members of 
the Sukoharjo Pokoso into the PNI.74
The central Pokoso Executive of Surakarta was not reorganized 
by its former leaders.7 The re-establishment of the Pokoso only 
took place at local levels in accordance with the steps of its former 
local leaders. Two former leaders, Pawiro Granggang and Sastrodijono, 
rebuilt the Kedawung subdistrict Pokoso. Both men were literate 
farmers, landholders in Kawis village, and graduates from the sekolah 
desa (village school).76 In the middle of 1946 the two men met 
Kusen, one of the leaders of the Surakarta PKI, who had been very 
active in the colonial period. Kusen urged Pawiro and Sastro to 
rebuild their former Pokoso. They were assisted in this by two other 
former leaders of Pokoso, S&ikrdmo and Soeroredjo, and had successfully
74 Interview with Sunardi, 6 August 1979.
75 Similarly the PKM was not brought back to life, evidently because 
the leaders were intimidated by the strength of the anti- 
swapraja movements. Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 30 June 1979.
In 1936 Pawiro was the head of Pokoso in the village of Kawis 
He is now eighty years old. He had been arrested twice by the 
Dutch. Interview with him, 27 August 1979.
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set up the new Pokoso organisation by the end of 1946. On the one
78hand its former organizational structure and symbol were still used, 
while on the other its programs now followed the BTI programs.
The revitalization of the Kedawung Pokoso coincided with
the re-establishment of other Pokoso branches, such as those in
Jumapolo and Bendosari. In February 1946 the BTI decision which tried
to re-establish the Surakarta Pokoso had an effect in rural areas of
all three subdistricts of Kedawung, Jumapolo and Bendosari. The
BTI leaders had believed that the Pokoso as a former peasant organization
would simply fall into line and support the BTI. In fact, however,
the allegiance of former Pokoso members was often determined by
individual circumstances. Bei Bowopranoto, a former Pokoso leader
of Bendosari subdistrict, successfully reformed Pokoso there at 
79the end of 1946, but he had since early in that year been active 
in Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan and his members, following him, 
embraced the cause of that organization. Likewise in Jumapolo 
the BTI did not gain automatic support from the Pokoso. There 
Pokoso was re-established by Donoredjo, its former leader and an 
associate of Mas Pringgowinoto; under his guidance the Jumapolo 
Pokoso was closely connected with the PNI. _ ____ ___
By 1947, however, the leadership of the Pokoso movement was
generally inclined toward the BTI. The Bendosari Pokoso, more deeply
influenced by BTI, changed its name from Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta
to Persatuan Kekuatan Sebangsa (Union of the Power of Common
80Nationality) or PKS. The Kedawung Pokoso replaced its name with
77 Interview with Sastrodijono, 27 August 1979. Soikromo was a *
former Pokoso leader of Pengkok, an illiterate, and a landholder 
farmer. Soeroredjo was illiterate; he, was a landholder farmer
of the Wonokerso village. Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979; 
Atmosukimin, 23 August 1979.
78 Interview with Sastrodijono, 27 August 1979.
79 Bei Bowopranoto was an official of Bendosari, pensioned in 1943 
as vice wedono. Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
80 Interview with Muljadi, 6 August 1979; Martodihardjo, 20 
August 1979.
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Sarekat Rakyat Indonesia (People's Association of Indonesia) or 
81SRI. This linked the Kedawung SRI with the SRI elsewhere, though 
it still firmly followed local BTI programs. These changes of name
signified the way Pokoso was being brought into contact with national 
politics.
In Bendosari, the local BTI leader, Sabarno, launched the 
BTI programs in a series of meetings from February to April 1946.
Ihe Bendosari BTI programs consisted simply of two points. Firstly, 
to distribute tanah kas desa (land owned by the village as an entity, 
income from which went into the village treasury) to landless peasants. 
Secondly, to strengthen the peasant union through working together 
with the PKI. The Sragen BTI shortly after its first congress in 
December 1945 also launched its programs in the first months of 1946.
This was then followed by local BTI branches, including the Kedawung 
BTI.
Sabarno hoped for full support from the Pokoso members,
and worked closely with a prominent Pokoso leader of Sugihan village
to distribute the tanah kas desa of Sugihan and neighbouring villages.
In Kedawung it was a Surakarta City PKI activist named Kusen who
introduced:--the radical-ideas of BTI. Villagers still remember his
persuasive address to the SRI in the village of Pengkok.^^ He
gave his address the special title, Wahyu Cemlorot (wahyu - divine
revelation; cemlorot - very bright). He identified the Wahyu
Cemloro_t with communist ideology, which could transform the condition
of society for the better. Javanese, particularly the abangan people
of Surakarta, believe that to receive the wahyu during a period
of meditation (tapa brata) means one will become an extraordinary 83person. Apparently Kusen aimed to convey BTI ideas through
81 Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979.
Kusen was a fine orator, who always spoke in Javanese so that 
the peasants could follow ail his speeches. Interview with 
Madijo, 31 August 1979.
83 For instance, wahyu kraton marks a person who will become
king; -wahYU pangkat marks a person who will have high rank 
in government; wahyu kadonyan marks a person who will be rich.
indigenous Javanese thought which could appeal to the mass of the
84peasantry.
Kusen particularly identified the Wahyu Cemlorot with two 
programs of the BTI - to replace lurahs who did not support the BTI; 
and to distribute the tfmah kas desa to poor and landless peasants.
The SRI, as the new form of the Pokoso, moved to realize these two 
programs at the end of 1947. The SRI successfully distributed the 
tanah kas desa of Pengkok village, and twenty-three members of 
SRI occupied this land for their house buildings. The SRI called 
this action the aksi perumahan (housing action). The movement also 
temporarily succeeded in replacing the lurah of Pengkok village with 
the local Pokoso leader, but a few weeks later the subdistrict officer 
reapx^ointed the former lurah. The distribution of land was then 
followed in other villages such as Jenggrik, Kawis and Wonokerso.
In the village of Kawis, Pawiro Granggang, after reaching agreement 
with other leaders at Jenggrik and Pengkok, successfully distributed 
a few hectares of former estate land. There was less opposition to 
these moves in the Kedawung area than some other areas, partly 
because the STII, which increasingly became the instrument of wealthier 
village^to oppose such redistribution, was there very small.
Politically, the Surakarta peasantry was coming to see
itself as divided into three socio-political groups: wong ijo
(literally, green people), wong abang (red people) and wong ireng 
85(black people). This division became marked during 1947, when 
Pokoso activities were more intense in the Surakarta rural areas,
The wong ijo were oriented to Islamic ideology. Members of the 
Masyumi and the STII, and of other Islamic organizations, were regarded 
as wong ijo. The term ijo originally referred to the Islamic symbol, 
a green banner with a crescent moon and star (Bulan Bintang). Wong abang
84 In the 1960s the leaders of the PKI also adopted this style, 
identifying themselves with the wayang hero figures, the 
Pendawa; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: 
Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1974), pp.13-14.
85 Interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979; Pawiio Granggang,
27 August 1979; Sastrodijono, 27 August 1979; Madijo, 31 August 
1979.
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referred to the followers of the communist ideology such as PKI,
BTI and the BTI supporters among Pokoso members. The term abang 
originally referred to the red hammer and sickle (Palu Arit) on rhe
85abanner of the PKI. The wong ireng were the followers of the ideology 
of the PNI and held to the PNI1s philosophy, Marhaenism. As defined 
at the congress of Partindo in 1933, the concept of Marhaenism was 
as follows:
Marhaenism, that is socio-nationalism and socio­
democracy. Marhaenism is the principle which seeks 
a social structure of society that protects the 
marhaon (small independent peasant) in everything.
Marhaenism is Lhe method of struggle in order to 
achieve this soci^ structure, therefore it must 
be revolutionary.
Culturally, the three socio-political groups could be 
grouped into two: HauliI and ahumjan. Both wong abang and wong flung
were counted as abangan peasantry. Politically, the implications of 
santri-abangan are, of course, not enough to understand the conflicting 
groups of Javanese peasantry. Use of the terms wong abang and wong 
ireng clearly indicated that the abangan had two political streams 
(aliran politik): a communist and a nationalist ideology.
ARMY CONFLICTS, JUNE-DECEMBER 1947
In addition to the conflicts in rural society, conflicts 
were also deepening within the army, both reflecting and exacerbating 
wider social polarization. The formation of the TNI (Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia - Indonesian National Army) and the integration of Badan 
Perjuangan unde^ its organizational structure, the rise of Brigade 
XXIV of Surakarta, the rise of the left-sponsored TNI Masyarakat and 
the growth of the TP (Tentara Pelajar - Student Army) , all became 
political components which caused army conflicts in Surakarta.
The Presidential Decree of 3 June 1947 originally had two 
principal bases of reorganization of the regular and irregular army: 
the formation of the TNI, and the integration into it of all former
85a The term ireng (black) originally referred to the PNI symbol, 
the black colour of the wild buffalo head.
86 Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, vol.l (Djakarta, Panitya 
Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1964), p.253.
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army and badan pcrjuangan units- At the end of June 194 7 the
implementation of the Presidential Decree in Surakarta was sponsored
by Iskandar, chairman of the Surakarta Lasykar Rakyat and younger
brother of Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, the commander of Regiment 27 of
the Senopati Divisi.on and former chairman of the Surakarta BKR.
In the middle of June Iskandar held a meeting to drscuss his plan
with Sutarto, the commander of the Senopati Division, and with his
own brother Sunarto Kusumodirdjo. At this meeting it was decided to
coordinate the Surakarta badan perjuangan into a new brigade called
Pi i.gade XXIV. Sunarto Kusumodirdjo proposed to Sutarto, on the
b'isis oi; personal friendship, that he appoint Iskandar as commander
88of this new brigade, which he duiy did.
Brigade XXIV had six regiments containing twenty-three
battalions. Regiment One was the former Lasykar Rakyat; Regiment
Two was the former Barisan Banteng; Regiment Three was the former
Surakarta BPR.T; Regiment Four comprised the former LBI, Lasykar
Merah and PESINDO; Regiment Five was the former Salatiga BPRI;
89Regiment Six was the former Lasykar Hizbullah.
Outside Brigade XXIV there was also a student organization, 
the so-called Tentara Pelajar (Student Army) or TP. This TP was 
rooted in a former student organization, the IP1 (Ikatan Pelajar 
Indonesia - Indonesian Student Association), set up in September 1945. 
The Surakarta IPI branch consisted mainly of students from sixteen 
schools continued from the Japanese period, both Junior High School 
(SMP) and Senior High School (SMT). The SMP students were from thirteen 
to fifteen years old, and those of SMT from sixteen to eighteen.
The IPI at both national and regional levels, including the Surakarta
87 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang, vol.4, p.445; see also 
Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Komando Daerah Militer 
VII Diponegoro, op.cit., pp.111-12.
88 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
89 'Sedjarah TNI Didalam Daerah Karesidenan Surakarta: Periode
Pertama Tahun 1942-1948', Typescript, Surakarta, 15 September 
1950, pp.26-29. One regiment comprises three or more 
battalions. One battalion consists of some 700 men.
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IPI branch, had a defence section, the so-called IPI Pertahanan 
90(IPI Defence).
The IPI Pertahanan changed its name into Markas Pertahanan
Pelajar (Headquarters of the Student Defence) or MPP in February 1946.
Thus, the MPP coordinated the student battalions of various student
organizations. As a result of the Presidential Decree of 3 June 1947,
the MPP was changed into the so-called MTP (Markas Tentara Pelajar -
Headquarters of the Student Army). This decree indicated that student
army battalions would bo integrated into one brigade, the so-called
Brigade XVII. However, the student battalions in Central Java and
East Java were organized under Hielt: names TP and TRIP (Tentara
Republik Indonesia Pelajar - Student of the Indonesia Republican
91Army) respectively. In West Java, battalions such as these were 
under several names, Banten Battalion, Ceribon Battalion and Priangan 
Battalion.
The Surakarta TP consisted mostly of former students of
Lasykar Kere and two small revolutionary student groups, Lasykar
92Alap-Alap and Lasykar Garuda. By 1947 the members of the Surakarta 
TP numbered some 500, and its leadership was in the hands of Achmadi 
and Prakosa. Achmadi was a Central Javanese, born in 1927 at Ngrambe, 
and a HBS graduate. During the occupation he joined the underground 
1anti-Fascist1 movement. His close friend, Prakosa, describes Achmadi 
as follows :
Achmadi's personality is tough (keras) and he was 
very disciplined in organization. He was at the 
same time very friendly both in school and in the 
organization. Like other Javanese young m^ rj at that 
time, Achmadi enjoyed watching the wayang.
90 in I oi view with mum! jura of TP; Sujctlima, 3 May 1979; Sunctruo, October 
1979; Errol Sudibjo, June 1979.
91 For details about TP in Central Java, see Marsudi, 'Tentara 
Peladjar di Djawa Tengah Dalam Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia,
1945-1951', MA thesis Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, 1970.
92 For details about Lasykar Kere see Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 December 
1945. They were mostly SMT students who had fought against the 
British in Semarang, Central Java. Interview with Prakosa,
20 February 1979; Farodhal, 24 July 1979. Kere means beggar, reflecting 
the student attitude to an austere life. Alap-alap means hawk and 
garuda means eagle, both seen by Japanese as powerful, wild, and free.
93 Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979.
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In the last months of the occupation, Achmadi and Prakosa had spread 
the idea of a student union through their underground movement.
As leaders of the TP both men were constantly inspired by the wayang 
teachings and the so-called watak satriyo (knightly manner). These 
two leaders jointly represented a symbol of leadership for the TP 
members until the post-revolutionary demobilization.
Politically, the TP as a student organization had not
affiliated with any political organization. The TP members were
rather impelled by a sense of duty as expressed by their motto,
be Lajar dan berjuang (to learn and to struggle). Their solidarity
as students, as an army corps and as Solonese, all helped to strengthen
the unity of the TP organization. This TP organization succeeded
in creating an esprit de corps among its members. Apparently the
TP's neutrality between the political streams made it possible for
the Hizbullah to work together with it. In fact the Hizbullah often
shared its funds with the TP when they were fighting in the front
line. This partnership means that the TP in 1947 and 1948 was
indirectly aligned with Hizbullah against the oppositionist element
94increasingly composed of the Left. The TP was inclined to support 
the Government rather than the opposition, and the role of Achmadi 
as the security commander for Surakarta city further inclined the 
TP to the side of the Government. Despite the intention of the TP 
not to follow any political stream, its political role became clear 
after the implementation of Hatta's rationalization program in early 
1948. In fact, the Siliwangi Division in Surakarta put the TP 
directly under its own auspices. The TP was included in the Brigade 
1W  and functioned as Kesatuan Reserve Umum (General Reserve Unit) 
or KRU. Thus, the TP became openly on the side of the Government.
Brigade XXIV was under the leadership of the Senopati 
Division. This Brigade was intended to contain various social forces, 
and therefore could not escape political tensions. One political 
phenomenon which sharpened the political tensions within the Surakarta
94 Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979; Haji Bakri, 15 and 
17 August 1979.
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Brigade XXIV was the rise of the TNI Masyarakat. In early August
1947, after the Dutch aggression had begun, Amir Sjarifuddin
established an auxiliary organization, the TNI Masyarakat. The
rationale for this was to 'organize popular defence on a local basis
95to supplement the /.eg alar army'. Sakirman , one of the top lefrist
96leaders, was appointed by Amir Sjarifuddin to lead the TNI Masyarakat. 
Since Sakirman was the head of Lasykar Rukyat for the whole of Java 
and Madura, he was expected to be able to mobilize the members of 
the Lasykar Rakyat to support the TNI Masyarakat.
The Surakarta TNI Masyarakat consisted mainly of the LBI, 
the Lasykar Merah and the Lasykar Rakyat. In practice, they broke away 
from Brigade XXIV, appearing to have more political freedom of action 
than Brigade XXIV which was split by rivals such as the Hizbullah, the 
BPRI and the Barisan Banteng. The LBI and the Lasykar Merah joined 
the TNI Masyarakat because it was set up by the leftists. The
97Lasykar Rakyat, on the other hand, was ordered by Sakirman to join.
The other leftist organization, PESINDO, was also among the strongest 
supporters of the TNI Masyarakat, because Wikana was leader of 
PESINDO and also one of the builders of the TNI Masyarakat.
The Surakarta TNI Masyarakat in particular was strongly 
supported by Wikana. His position as Military Governor and PESINDO 
leader enabled him to mobilize the lasykar organizations which were 
pro-Amir Sjarifuddin to support the TNI Masyarakat. At least 
sever, battalions, from Regiment 1 and Regiment 4 of Brigade XXIV, 
strongly supported the formation of TNI Masyarakat. In theory 
these battalions still formed part of the Brigade, but most members 
of the seven battalions withdrew from Brigade XXIV and entered the
95 Kuhin, op.cit., p.261.
96 Ir. Sakirman was born on 11 November 1911. He graduated from
HIS (1926), Mulo (1930), AMS (1933) and Technological University (1940). 
In 1940 he joined Gerindo. See Qrang Indonesia jang terkemoeka 
di Djawa, p.206.
97 According to Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, his younger brother Iskandar 
who was the head of the Surakarta Lasykar Rakyat, received 
Sakirman's orders at the end of August 1947. Iskandar died at 
the end of 1948, shortly after the Madiun uprising. The Hatta 
Government identified him as a leftist who joined this uprising. 
Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
TNI Masyarakat. The leadership of the Surakarta TNI Masyarakat was 
in the hands oi Lieutenant-Colonel Suhurinan, leader of the Surakarta 
PESINDO, who was very close to Wikana during Wikana's term of office 
as Military Governor. These battalions tended to support the left.98
In many Surakarta rural areas the TNI Masyarakat was also
successfully established. In the Sukoharjo region, Major Gunadi, the
local regular army commander and a former PESINDO activist, built
the TNI Masyarakat from members of Lasykar Rakyat and PESINDO from
the subdistricts of Gatak, Baki, Tawangsari, Weru and Bendosari.
99Its total membership was about 200 men. in Delanggu subdistrict,
Lue TNI Masyarakat was restricted to PESINDO, and its membership
100was not over 200 men. In the other subdistricts, Kedawung and
Jumapolo, the TNI Masyarakat was not set up, largely because none 
of the local regular army officers supported the TNI Masyarakat.
Major Panudi, commander in Sragen regency, and Sastrolawu, commander 
in the regency of Karanganyar, both resisted the rise of TNI 
Masyarakat. They believed that the TNI Masyarakat was not yet an 
official program of the government, and in fact the TNI Masyarakat 
was still the subject of serious debate between the Minister of 
Defence and the PNI and Masyumi representatives in the KNIP.1"^
Once the TNI Masyarakat was established, Wikana intensified 
the PEPOLIT program. In practice the implementation of PEPOLIT had 
deviated from its original syllabus, which had been intended to 
include politics, religion, psychology, and social and general knowledge. 
By late 1947 , PEPOLIT was effectively limited to Marxist ideology 
and the PKI's doctrine. During the last months of 1947, Wikana 
had coordinated PEPOLIT training for the officers of the Panembahan 
Senopati Division, the leftist groups of the Brigade XXIV, and the TNI
98 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
99 Interview with Sunardi, 6 August 1979.
100 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
101 Interview with Panudi, 27 July 1979. Panudi graduated from 
Kweekschool (Teacher School). In 1944 he joined Peta training 
in Bogor and became a member of Peta. He was also a student of 
Sekolah Guru Laki-Laki (Male Teachers School). In the early 
revolution he joined the BKR and the AMS (Angkatan Muda Sukawati).
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Masyarakat. Alimin Prawirodird^o, an old PKI veteran of Lhe 1926
uprising, became vJikuna's adviser and took part in the political
102training of the Surakarta PEPOLIT. This had trained more than
1,000 men, mainly members of Panembahan Senopati Division and the
103supporters of Amir m  the Brigade XXIV.
PEPOLIT and TNI Masyarakat created a political schism in
the local regular army of Surakarta. The Twenty-seventh Regiment
of the Senopati Division, which consisted of four battalions (battalions
17, 18, 19 and 20) refused absolutely to have PEPOLIT in its Division.
Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, as commander of the Twenty-seventh Regiment,
had objected on the grounds that both the PEPOLIT and the TNI
Masyarakat were sponsored by leftists in the armed forces aiming
104to spread communist ideology.
Three former lasykar organizations of Brigade XXIV - 
Barisan Banteng, Hizbullah, and BPR1 - for their own reasons also 
did not follow the PEPOLIT training. Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah 
felt a deep rivalry with PESINDO arising from PESINDO's opposition 
to all Japanese-sponsored organizations such as themselves. The 
BPRI had from the beginning been inclined to the ideology of Tan 
Malaka's Murbaism, so this organization was not interested in the 
communist ideology of Amir's group. The TP insisted on its neutrality 
from competing political ideologies and for this was not interested 
in the communist ideology of Amir's group. The TP insisted on its 
neutrality from competing political ideologies and for this was not 
interested in the political training of PEPOLIT. Politically the 
TP only entered the political arena in 1947, when conflicts arose 
within the army and the badan perjuangan along the lines of national 
politics.
Thus PEPOLIT and the TNI Masyarakat marked the polarization 
of political forces in the army and the badan perjuangan. Through
102 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
103 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
104 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 2 August 1979.
158
PEPOLXT the influence of communist ideology deepened in the Senopati 
Division. The polarization of Surakarta society was tending towards 
political schism both in the city and the countryside, with society 
dividing into aliran (streams) .
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CHAPTER SIX
SURAKARTA AS A CRUCIBLE OF CONFLICT 
FOR THE REVOLUTION
NATIONAL POLITICS, JANUARY-OCTOBER 1948
Throughout 1948 the political atmosphere of the Republic was 
one of tension, as the crisis which had begun in the first months of 
1946 approached its climax. In the early months of the year, a series 
of events took place which put the Republic in a dangerous situation 
owing to tensions between the Sayap Kiri (Left Wing) and the Sayap Kanan 
(Right Wing), the core of which was Masyumi and its affiliated organizations 
such as the Hizbullah and the STII. In a broad sense, Masyumi also 
enjoyed the support of the PNI and other minority parties, such as 
Catholic and Protestant parties, against uhe leftists.
On 17 January 1948 the Renville Agreement was signed by the 
government of Amir Sjarifuddin, although without the full support of 
many cabinet members, notably the representatives of Masyumi and PNI.
A few daiys later an anti-Amir demonstration, under the leadership 
of Masyumi and PNI, took place in the Republican capital, Jogjakarta.
Amir's followers responded in turn with a show of force in the form of 
a big parade.’* When Masyumi and PNI then withdrew their members from 
his cabinet, Amir resigned on 23 January. President Sukarno immediately 
appointed Hatta to form a coalition cabinet, During negotiations for 
its formation, Amir insisted that Hatta provide ten seats in the new 
cabinet for Amir's men. Hatta rejected this demand, allotting only one 
seat for Amir's socialists? Amir felt he could not accept this offer.1 2
When the Hatta cabinet was formed on 29 January, therefore,
Amir's men had no ministerial seats, so that the left was unrepresented 
in Hatta's cabinet. In fact the Hatta cabinet consisted mostly of
1 Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.523-24.
2 Ibid,, p .525.
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prominent leaders from Masyumi and the PN1, along with a few influential
Catholic and Protestant leaders. On the same day Amir's Sayap Kiri
.launched a protest against Hatte'.-3 government in various residencies
and regencies, including Madiun and its surrounding areas.^ A few
1 l&ter t.he Surakarta Sayap Kiri followed the example of the Madiun
^11 1 ; an : staged a demonstration. The demonstration consisted
most y of PESTNDO, Amir's supporters in Brigade XXIV, and Sarbupri
(Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia - Union of Plantation
5W< -rkers of the Indonesian Republic).
Tho resignation of Amir vvus of course one of the major 
turning points of the revolution, as the leadership passed from the 
left to the right for the first time. It appears to have led Amir 
to concentrate on his own political forces in the Sayap Kiri. On 
11 February the Socialist Party, which had previously consisted of 
Communists and Socialists, split, with Sjahrir's followers setting up 
a new party, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia or PSI,3 4*6 and Amir retaining 
the leadership of the old Socialist Party. On 26 February .Amir's group 
set up a new organization, the so-called Front Demokrasi Rakyat 
(People s Democratic Front) or FDR, which gained strong support from 
Amir's Socialist Party, the Labour Party and the PKI. Two other 
organizations, PESINDO and Sobsi (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh 
Indonesia - All-Indonesia Secretariat of Labour Organization) also 
joined it. Thus all the Sayap Kiri groups, except Sjahrir's PSI and 
Tan Malaka's former Persatuan Perjuangan, joined together in the FDR 
which constituted a major political force in opposition to the Hatta 
cabinet.
3 Hatta's cabinet is listed in ibid., p.524.
4 Bekerd j a , 30 January 1948.
6 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bodronojo, 26 September 
1979.
6 Justus van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, p.32.
See also Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945- 
1950, p.130. ~  ~
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In early March, shortly after the formation of the FDR,
Amir launched his campaign for national unity and new democracy,
touring East Java in an attempt to arouse mass support for opposition
7to the Hatta cabinet. Meanwhile the FDR held a series of meetings 
throughout Eiist and Central Java. In June the FDR campaign reached a 
peak in Surakarta with various meetings in the regencies and in the city. 
The FDR launched programs which concentrated on the abolition of bengkok 
(village land a]located in lieu of salary to village officials) and of 
various taxes, and on reformation of the agrarian system.* On a 
different tack, the FDR and Hatta's cabinet had come into serious 
disagreement on a key policy. Hatta, feeling that the army was not 
functioning properly, initiated a program called Rera (reorganization 
and rationalization) which would reduce the size of the aimed forces 
and make them more sensitive to Republican government control."* The 
FDR, seeing that the implementation of Rera would demobilize many 
soldiers, particularly in the badan perjuangan where support for the 
Sayap Kiri was strong, opposed Hatta's plan and attempted to resist 
Rera.
The return of Musso in August 1948 acted to intensify the 
political tensions between the left and the Sukarno-Hatta government. 
Musso on his return passed himself off as one Suparto, the secretary 
of Suripno, a PKI member who had represented the Republic in eastern 
Europe, and began to correct what he saw as the fault of Amir's policy, 
compromise with the Dutch through agreements. Musso introduced instead
7 Bekerdja, 3 March 1948.
8 Suara Ibu Kota, 22 June 1948.
9 Mohammad Hatta, op.cit., pp.527-58.
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his 'Jalan Baru' (New Road) for the Republic.^ Ideologically, Musso's 
policy was one of total confrontation of imperialists. Tactically, 
it involved an uncompromising fighc against the Dutch and against those 
Indonesian politicians who were inclined to the diplomasi policy.
The PKI accepted Musso’s policy and when a new PKI Politburo was announced 
on 1 September, Musso became one of the principal members of the 
General Secretariat."^ Musso's 'Jalan Baru' seemed to create a new 
political role for the PKI, and in response the Partai Sosialis, PBI 
and PKI merged in August into one enlarged PKI, with Amir Sjari.fuddin 
declaring himself to be a communist.
The Musso leadership sparked an increase in the mass support 
for the new PKI and its policy. PKI leaders, including Musso, made 
speeches concerning the 'Jalan Baru' at mass meetings in many cities 
of East and Central Java, such as Madiun, Kediri, Bojonegoro, Jogjakarta 
and Surakarta. After the arrival of Musso, political tension in society 
increased dramatically, with both sides indulging in kidnappings, 
killings and gang rivalries. The climax of this was the Madiun rebellion 
on 18 September 1948, when Musso's challenge was militarily crushed 
by forces loyal to the Sukarno-Hatta government. The collapse of the 
PKI meant that the revolutionary leadership of the Republic had 
fallen securely into the hands of th§ rightist group.
10 For details of Musso's 'Jalan Baru' see van der Kroef, op,cit. , 
p .33; Reid, op.cit. , p.137. Musso was born in 1897 in Pegu,
a village in the residency of Kediri, East Java. He was a close 
friend of Alimin since their high school days in Batavia and in 
Tjokroaminoto's boarding house in Surabaya he met Sukarno, He 
had been involved in political activities with Insulinde, Sarekat 
Rakyat and ISDV, and he attended the Lenin School for several 
years after he went to Russia following his key role in the 
planning of the 1926-27 PKI uprisings. See Ruth T. McVey,
The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp.169, 202; Harry A. Poeze,
Tan Malaka: Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945 ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1976), p.254.
11 For the members of the new PKI Politburo, see Pinardi, Peristiwa 
Coup Berdarah PKI September 1948 di Madiun, p.44.
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MILITARY CONFLICT IN SURAKARTA
Two points of the Hatta cabinet programs created military
conflict in the Republic - the implementation of the Renville Agreement,
and the rationalization of the array. Almost the first step Hatta's
cabinet took was the withdrawal of most of the Republic's crack troops
from West Java. This was a result of the government's recognition of
the so-called van Mook line, between the Dutch and Republican territories,
which required most of the Siliwangi Division to withdraw in February
1948 from pockets (kantong) in West Java to Republican territory in
13Central Java. This retreat, popularly known as the hijrah was 
a very bitter experience for the Siliwangi Division, whose members 
were assembled in the city of Cirebon and transferred to Central Java 
by cargo ships and trains, guarded by the Dutch military. Their arms
had to be surrendered until their arrival at their destination in the
 ^ , 14towns of Central Java.
On 22 February 1948 about 29,000 men of the Siliwangi Division
15left West Java for Central Java. One of the daily newspapers in
Surakarta reported in early February that 13,000 men of the Siliwangi
16Division had already entered Central Java. The total figure for
12 The van Mook 1ine arose from the Linggajati Agreement of 1947 
as a policy of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East- 
Indi.es, II.J. van Mook. This line separated the Dutch-occupied 
territories and the Republican territories. As a result the 
Republic was driven back to the most densely populated and 
poorest areas of Sumatra and Java. This action coincided with an 
economic blockade. See Kahin, op.cit. , pp.220-21; T.B. Simatupang, 
Report from Banaran; Experiences During the People's War
(Ithaca, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), 
pp.115-17.
13 The term hijrah here refers to the imitation of the Prophet 
Mohammad's flight to Medina before his return to Mecca. The 
Siliwangi Division, in using this term for its evacuation from 
West Java to Central Java, thus prophesied its own triumphant 
return to West Java. See Simatupang, Report, p.35, n.18.
14 For details see Siliwangi dari masa ke masa, pp.129-44.
15 Siliwangi dari masa, p.129. Anthony Reid, op.cit., p.134, has 
given the different figure of some 22,000 men.
16 Merdeka, 3 February 1948.
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the hijrah was about 35,000 men, not including army families who 
followed the hijrah to Central Java. Thereafter the army of the 
Siliwangi Division was popularly called the Tentara Hijrah or the
Tentara Kantong (the Kijrah Army or the Pocket Army) by the people of
, 18 Central Java.
In Surakarta there were, by March 1948, four battalions of
the Siliwangi Division which had been withdrawn from the 'pockets’
in West Java. These were the Rukman Battalion, the Sentot Iskandardinata
19Battalion, the Umar Battalion and the Sambas Battalion. Like other 
Siliwangi battalions, they had been relatively well disciplined during 
the first Dutch aggression. Other Siliwangi units were stationed in
areas near Surakarta, such as Madiun (4,000 men), Bojonegoro (3,000
20 21 men), Pati (4,000 men), and Jogjakarta (four battalions).
The Siliwangi division in Surakarta, as in other parts of
Central Java, faced many difficulties. These were classified by the
hijrah committee of Surakarta into five main categories: security,
22transportation, funds, health and housing. Funds from the local 
community were collected to support their daily needs. Apparently, 
though, the committee could not provide adequate transportation and 
health facilities. The chief reason for this was that Surakarta, like 
other parts of Java, had been suffering from the Dutch economic blockade.
17 Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949 (Jogjakarta, Kementerian 
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1949) , p.200. See also A .H.
Nasucion, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol.2, p.123.
18 The Siliwangi did not like the term Tentara Kantong, because it 
was associated with a setback for the Republican army, caused by 
the Renville Agreement. Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
19 Siliwangi dari masa, pp.125, 140, 141. Interview with Sastrolawu,
13 October .1979.
20 Merdeka, 3 February 1948.
21 Siliwangi dari masa, p.125.
22 Merdeka, no.416, 9 March 1948. For the hijrah committee of Surakarta 
see also Was!to, no.7 , 6 February 1948; no.13, 20 March 1948.
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Various imported goods, including medicines and motor vehicles, were 
very difficult to find.
The arrival of the Siliwangi Division in Central Java became 
a major political issue for the FDR. Within the PKI, the Siliwangi 
Division was viewed as loyal to the Ilatta government, since it had 
obeyed Hatta1s orders to evacuate West Java and to move into Republican 
territory. The FDR accordingly feared that the Siliwangi Division, 
vvhich was well disciplined and sympathetic to Tslam, might outweigh 
the TNI Masyarakat and the Sayap Kiri's other supporters in the Senopati 
Division. A consequence of the arrival of the Siliwangi Division in 
Central Java was, therefore, that the schism in the army leadership 
became more obvious.
Another factor which sharpened the hostility within the
military in Surakarta was the implementation of the rationalization
program of the Hatta cabinet. This reorganization, or Rera, would
demobilize some of the regular TNI as well as the lasykar units which
had nominally been included within TNI since June 1947. Nasution
reckoned there were 350,000 men in the regular army and 470,000 men
23in lasykar units in Java alone.
One reason for the rationalization was that the Republic was
incapable of financing a large standing army, since the Linggajati
Agreement, the first Dutch aggression, and the Renville Agreement had
placed it in a very difficult economic position. In addition, the
rationalization was aimed at developing a well-armed and well-trained
regular army, which would be prepared to operate at battalion strength
in a mobile, hard-hitting guerrilla war against the Dutch. The
rationalization, which was implemented in February and March 1948,
was partially successful. There were, however, only four divisions
(Divisions II, III, V, and VII) which completed the rationalization.
In March General Sudirman himself, in view of the danger of Dutch
attacks, ordered the commanders of divisions to delay temporarily the
24implementation of the reorganization.
23 A .H . Nasution, Tentara Nasional, vol.2, p.130. See also Reid,
op.cit. , p.134.
24 Nasution, Tentara Nasional, vol.2, pp.123-259; Kahin, op.cit.,
pp.261-66.
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The rationalization program was a blow against FDR strategy, 
which was Largely premised on a strong power base within the army. 
Moreover, the TNI Masyarakat, which was dominated by FDR supporters 
and had strong roots in rural areas, would also be disbanded. For 
those reasons, the FDR resisted the Hatta rationalization strongly 
and made a series of protests against the government.
On 20 May, the occasion of the commemoration of the foundation 
of Budi Utomo (the event in 1908 which was regarded as the birth of 
the Nationalist movement), the commander of the Senopati Division 
led his army in a big parade through the main streets of Surakarta.
His aim was to improve the morale of the local armed forces and to 
indicate their repudiation of rationalization within the army.
This open defiance intensified the political unrest which had been 
simmering since the arrival of the Siliwangi Division in February.
The effect of the Rera program in Surakarta was to raise
political tensions within the Senopati Division. Sutarto, under the
influence of his leftist officers and the FDR, pursued his own
rationalization policy by demobilizing only those battalions which
had not yet accepted the PEPOLIT or which did not support the Sayap 
25Kiri and the FDR. For instance, the demobilizing of Sastrolawu's 
Regiment 27 was based on these considerations. Another possible 
reason, in the eyes of Sastrolawu himself, was a plan by the leftist 
officers to replace Sastrolawu with a pro-FDR officer.
The Barisan Banteng, the Hizbullah, and the BPRI, three 
lasykar units which had rejected the PEPOLIT and opposed the FDR, 
were also officially demobilized. In reality, however, these 
organizations continued to exist, though with only the few weapons 
they were able to hide. One of them, the Barisan Banteng, had a 
fair number of weapons which were secretly kept in its headquarters, 
so that it could still be regarded as a strong lasykar organization 
in Surakarta. In addition the Barisan Banteng associated itself with
24 Nasution, Tentara Nasional, vol.2, pp.123-259; Kahin, op.cit.,
pp.261-66.
25 For the PEPOLIT political indoctrination course, see Chapter Five.
26 Interview with Sastrolawu, 12-13 October 1979.
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with GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat - the Movement of People's 
Revolution), formed in February 1948 under Dr Muwardi's leadership.27 
Part of the purpose of the GRR was to balance the seemingly growing 
strength of the FDR (and especially PESINDO, the perpetual rival of 
the Barisan Banteng).
The TP was also reorganized under Rera, becoming a new 
brigade, Brigade 17, under the auspices of the Siliwangi Division. 
Prakosa, one of the TP leaders, later observed that the main reason 
why the TP was placed under the control of the Siliwangi Division was
to avoid the political conflict which had continually afflicted the
2 8Senopati Division throughout 1947. J This step made it clear that 
the TP had become the partner of the government against the opposition.
On 15 June Lieutenant-Colonel Sudiarto and Major Kusmanto,
the commanders of Regiments 24 and 25, following orders from Sutarto,
disarmed the two strongest battalions of the Sastrolawu Regiment,
Battalion 17 based in Karanganyar and headed by Major Sugijarto,
29and Battalion 20, based in Sragen and headed by Major Panudi.
Battalion 20 was disarmed by forces from Regiment 25 at 5 o'clock 
that morning. Panudi was confused by this action because Major 
Kusmanto did not bring written orders from Sutarto. Kusmanto informed 
Panudi that he brought only Sutarto1s oral orders. Nevertheless 
Panudi believed him and therefore agreed to sign a letter transferring 
the battalion weapons and ammunition. All weapons were then collected 
in the Division headquarters.30 Only a part of Battalion 17 was 
disarmed, because most of its members, including the battalion commander 
were not at their barracks at the time.
Among the battalion commanders of the Sastrolawu Regiment
27 Merdeka, 15 February 1948. For the GRR, see also below, 
pp. 190-91.
28 Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979.
29 Interview with Panudi, 6 July 1979; Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979. 
See also 'Pelapuran Pendek Kedjadian Penting dalam Karesidenan 
Surakarta', typescript, pp.2-3, Bundle B, 4/13, ANRI.
30 Interview with Panudi, 6 July 1979.
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only Major Panudi protested formally against the events of 15 June.
On 22 June he wrote to General Sudirman, the commander-in-chief 
of the TNI, protesting:
It is impossible that Lieutenant-Colonel Sudiarto 
would have disarmed it (the Sastrolawu Regiment) if 
he had not received orders from above (the Division 
Commander). Indeed, Sutarto was unfair in dealing 
with the units of his Division. He gave priority 
to his own clique.^
According to Panudi his protest had no effect on General Sudirman's
attitude toward resolving tensions in the Senopati Division.
However, Panudi argued, Sudirman must have known about Sutarto's
demobilization policy and how it had arisen from the demands of the 
32leftist officers.
In contrast with the presumed intentions of the government, 
the demobilization carried out in the Sutarto Division strengthened 
the elements of the PKI. In fact the leftist officers demobilized 
the battalions which had not supported the Sayap Kiri or the FDR.
The Hatta government thus failed to reduce the influence of the Sayap 
Kiri in Sutarto's Division.
The Hatta government bitterly denounced the Sutarto
Division for resisting its rationalization program and identified
it as a Division of the left. The climax of the political crisis
in the Division was the killing of Sutarto on 2 July 1948. He was
shot by unknown men at about 7.30 p.m. as he left his car in front
33of his house in Timuran, in the centre of the city. There were at 
least two explanations of the killing of Sutarto. The first pointed 
to the kidnapping of Sjahrir in June 1946 in which Sutarto had 
directly supported the kidnappers. Local sources reported as follows:
31 Surat Komandan Batalyon 20 Res.27. Div.IV kepada Penglima 
Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia 22 June 1948, no.21/B/49/BC/20, 
Rahasia, typescript, Bundle B. 31/35, ANRI.
32 Interview with Panudi, 6 July 1979.
33 'Kemungkinan lain tentang peristiwa Solo', typescript, Surakarta, 
9 July 1948, Bundle B.18/19, ANRI.
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The killing of Sutarto must clearly he related 
to the kidnapping of Sjahrir, when Karto and 
Sastrolawu hid Sjahrir, perhaps on SuLurto's 
orders. When the commander-in-chief asked 
Sutarto to go to headquarters, he did not do
In addition, Sutarto was known to be against Hatta's rationalization
program and to lean toward the left wing. In the eyes of the
communists, at least, the killing of Sutarto had been implicit from
the beginning in plans for the implementation of the rationalization
35policy of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government. Aidit, a young
communist leader in 194b, subsequently wrote:
The commander of Division IV, Sutarto, was killed 
by a shot in the back. The people generally suggested 
that the attack on Sutarto was because he was a 
senior officer who did not agree with the rationalization 
of the army which was being carried out by the Hatta- 
Sukiman-Natsir government at the time. Many people 
concluded that the killing of Sutarto was included 
in the implementation of the rationalization policy 
of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government in a special
The second explanation was that the killing of Sutarto was
the work of the Sayap Kiri itself. An anonymous report, written on 
3720 July 1948, explained that the killing of Sutarto was carried 
out by the leftists. Wikana, the military governor, seemed to give 
his moral support to this killing. The leftists had doubted Sutarto's 
loyalty and feared he would leak the secret plans of the communists.
34 Ibid.
35 D.N. Aidit, who was a member of the PKI Politburo from 1 September 
1948, blamed the Hatta government for being involved in the 
kidnappings and killings in Surakarta. See D.N. Aidit, 
Konfrontasi Peristiwa Madiun 1948 - Peristiwa Sumatera 1956 
(Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp.9-10; D.N. Aidit,
Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun (Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 
1964), pp.17-18.
36 Aidit, Aidit Menggugat, pp.17-18.
37 'Pembunuhan Sutarto. Laporan-Tindjauan: Rahasia', Surakarta,
20 July 1948, typescript, Bundle B.18/9, ANRI.
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This second version, however, is patently impossible. We can argue 
as follows: in May the Division's show of force was planned by its
leil wing, which appeared to be at its peak of influence in Sutarto's 
Division at that time. On 15 June Sutarto disarmed the battalions 
considered anti-Sayap Kiri, such as Sastrolawu's Regiment, some units 
of the BPRI, the Barisan Banteng and the Hizbullah, thus making it 
clear that he continued to oppose the government's rationalization 
policy. Given this, it is understandable that the first explanation 
was the one generally believed in Surakarta.
Apparently, however, the killing of Sutarto was not based
on a decision of the Hatta government at Jogjakarta, but was a
result of rivalry between local army units. Well-informed Barisan
Banteng sources insist that the main perpetrators of the attack on
3 8Sutarto were members of the Siliwangi Division, who, as a pro- 
Hatta force, were moving against the leader of the anti-Rera Senopati 
Division. Sutarto's assassination therefore acted to sharpen political 
tensions between the Siliwangi Division and the Senopati Division 
during the months before the Madiun uprising.
A feature of army conflict in Surakarta was the rivalry
over control of supplies, which often took the form of simple gang
fighting. At the end of March 1948, a two-day battle had already
taken place between the badan pcrjuangan units (Barisan Banteng and
BPRI) and the Senopati Division, assisted by the TP, after the
Barisan Banteng and the BPRI were accused of corruptly managing a
cloth store in Surakarta. They had seized the store in 1947 in
response to a plan of tire communists to use it to supply PESINDO.
The communists argued that this store had been legally set up for
the purpose by Amir Sjarifuddin at the time he was Prime Minister
39and Minister of Defence. Amir also stored other important trade
38 Interview with Ilagn jawigati, 30 July 1979; Hartono, 17 August 
1979.
39 Interview wich Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979; Sudijo, 29, 30 
October 1979.
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goods in Solo, particularly quinine and rubber, and apparently 
the proceeds from the sale of these items were to be used to supply 
funds for the political parties of Amir's Sayap Kiri.
Thus tliis action by the Barisan Banteng and BPRI appeared
to be motivated by political animosity towards the PESINDG. On the
other hand, the TP regarded the action of the Barisan Banteng and
BPRI as a question of the morality of the badan perjuongan. Surakarta
BPRI members were known to have committed robberies in the countryside
41in 1947 in order to supply the requirements of the organization.
The TP argued that this could undermine the values of the struggle
(nilai-nalai perjuangan) of the pemuda in the eyes of society. The
question of morality therefore became the main reason for the TP
to carry out an on-the-spot execution of Lieutenant-Colonel Mardjuki,
the commander of BPRI, in March 1948. About three months later, a
battle also took place in Tasikmadu, in the regency of Karanganyar,
between the Rukman Battalion (Siliwangi Division) on one side and
the Singowareng Battalion (Senopati Division) and the TP on the other.
The reason for this was quite simply that the members of the Rukman
Battalion had expropriated the regional government's stores a few
4ndays before Hari Raya Idulfitri to provide for their families.
Although the TP was under the supervision of the Siliwangi Division, 
the TP became involved in the battle against the Rukman Battalion 
because of the moral involved. On questions such as these, the 
TP held firmly to its neutral political orientation.
National political rivalry was adding tension to local gang 
rivalries, which in turn embittered the political schism, so that 
kidnapping and killing became commonplace during the revolution.
40 'Laporan Djawatan Kepolisian Negara Jogjakarta', 2 March 1948, 
typescript, Bundle B.35/35, ANRI.
41 See my 'Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950', 
translated by Benedict Anderson, Indonesia, no.17, April 1974, 
p.107.
42 Idulfitri is the feast at the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan, 
on the first day of Syawal. In Java, both observant Muslims
and abangan people celebrate it as a major festival, demanding 
their best clothes.
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DELANGGU AFFAIR, MAY-JULY 1948
The condition of the estates in 1948 had significantly
improved over that of the late Japanese period. For the planting
period 1947-1948, the Surakarta government projected the extent
of sugar, tobacco and cotton estates as 9,105 ha, 2,925 ha and 4,000 ha 
42arespectively. The importance of this estate production in time presented
political problems for the political parties, as evidenced by the Delanggu 
Affair of May 1948.
Since the early months of the revolution, the local
revolutionary leadership in the rural areas of Delanggu had been
inclined to the left. The workers of the cotton plantation and the
sack factory established during the Japanese period continued at
their tasks in the early months of the revolution. The BBI, as
explained in the previous chapter, was the first workers' organization
in Delanggu and also functioned as a badan perjuangan organization.
Since 1946 the political activities of these workers were under
the leadership of the Delanggu branch of Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh
Perkebunan Republik Indonesia - Plantation Workers Union of the
Republic of Indonesia) and Sobsi. According to J.M. van der Kroef,
Sarbupri was affiliated with Sobsi while retaining autonomy in 
43its operations.
Two weeks after the Hatta cabinet was formed, Maruto
Darusman, the chairman of Sarbupri, opened the national conference
44of that organization in Delanggu on 17 February 1948. The 
conference was attended by representatives of Sobsi and the BTI, 
as well as by many branches of Sarbupri (including the Delanggu 
branch), and was designed to strengthen the unity of the peasants 
and the workers. Alimin, a close friend of Musso, was one of the 
speakers. Bodronojo, a prominent PKI leader and former BBI leader 
in Delanggu, who also attended the Sarbupri conference, summarized 
Alimin's speech as follows:
42a Penarangan Rakjat. no, 92, 6 December 1947«
43 Van der Kroef, op.cit. , p.311, n>.14.
44 Merdeka, 19 February 1948. Maruto was already Marxist-oriented when 
he~wäi—one of the members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland in 
1932. Since 1946 Maruto was a member of the PKI; Kahin, op.cit., 
pp.88, 161. In July 1947 he was a Minister of State in Amir's cabinet
and was also a member of the PKI's executive; van der Kroef, op.cit., p.33
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The pillars of the Indonesian Revolution were the 
proletarian class and the peasants. The revolutionary 
group had to work for the national revolution.
This conference also decided that Sarbupri would support the BTI 
programs, namely its struggle to abolish the rights of estates to 
land (tanah konversi).4& In fact the conversion rights on land were 
an important element in the agrarian law of the new Republic, for 
the Republic was pledged to protect the interests of plantations with 
regard to conversion rights. Since this meant that the government 
ignored the landless peasants, it is not surprising that peasant 
bitterness should have been aroused by the tanah konversi question, 
bitterness directed especially against the plantation owners, including 
the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, whose administration aided and 
benefitted from the maintenance of the plantations.
By Law Number 13 of 26 April 1948, however, the conversion 
rights were completely abolished,47 and the term 'tanah konversi' 
came to refer to land which had earlier been placed under conversion 
rights. There were two kinds of tanah konversi, tanah konversi 
glebagan (rotation land, e.g., for sugar and tobacco plantations) 
and tanah konversi terus-menerus (permanent land, for perennial plantation 
crops such as rubber and tea). The tanah konversi glebagan under 
the new law of 1948 was to be distributed to farmers, and particularly 
to occupiers of the land whose names were registered with the village 
administration. The implementation of this law, however, did not 
fully satisfy the BTI, for most landless peasants did not get rights 
to the distributed land. This situation pushed the BTI to launch
15 rsr-rsr-s; s.'rtrÄ’ s m
the Sarekat Islam, Insulinde, and ISDV. Between 1913 and 
1921 he stayed in Tjokroaminoto's boarding house m  Surabaya 
where he met Sukarno and Musso. See Ruth T. McVey, op.c±__. , 
pp 43-46, 363, no.36; Poeze, op.cit., p.254. During 016 
revolution he became a close friend of Sutarto, the commande 
of the Senopati Division. Merdeka, 4 July 19 .
46 Merdeka, 22 February 1948.
47 Kementerian Pertanian (ed.), Agraria (Djakarta, Pusat Kantor 
Urusan Tani, n.d.), pp.293-95.
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another propaganda campaign demanding that the Dengkok (.Land allowance 
for the village officials) and the kas-desa land (village-owned land, 
the proceeds from which went into the village treasury) be distributed 
to landless peasants. Tanah konversi terus-menerus was declared to 
be tanah negara (state land) by the Republic.
Apparently this February congress inspired the Delanggu
branch of Sarbupri in its struggle on behalf of the workers. The
Delanggu Sarbupri consisted mostly of the workers in the cotton
48plantation and the sack factory. Most of them were originally
landless peasants, though a few were well-to-do and rich peasants
who had rights to land (sanggan). The total number of workers in
the sack factory and the seven adjacent plantations areas was more
49than 15,000 men and women.
The central activity of the Delanggu Sarbupri after the
conference of 17 February was its campaign for the Badan Tekstil
Negara (State Textile Agency) or BTN to increase the workers' wages
and to distribute rice and clothes for workers and their families.
In fact the wage of daily workers was only two rupiahs per day,
considerably be low the wage paid to daily workers elsewhere, which
had-been estimated to average more than five rupiahs per day.
Moreover the BTN had not yet distributed clothing material for ehe
50second term of 1947. From 26 February Sarbupri's campaign obtained 
the full support of Sobsi. Sobsi directly discussed the workers' 
demands in meetings with the BTN_ which acted as representative of 
the government. The Delanggu Sarbupri was led by Dibjosardjono and 
Suhari. Dibjosardjono was also head of the PBI of Delanggu and a former
48 The workers on the cotton plantation were called buruh jaba 
(lit. buruh = worker; jaba = outside) and the workers in the 
sack factory were called buruh jero (lit. jero = inside).
The buruh jaba comprised monthly workers, daily workers, 
permanent contract workers, and pemaro (peasants who shared 
half the yield of the crops they cultivated for the plantation). 
Interview with Gondowidjojo, 18 August 1979.
49 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979.
50 Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979; Gondowidjojo,
14 August 1979; Bodronojo, 13 September 1979.
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member of the local KNID. Suhari was an administrator of the sack factory 
and a good organizer. Both men were Mulo graduates. Like Dibjosardjono,
51Suhari divided his political activities between Sarbupri, the PKI and Sobsi.
The FDR, as the only party with systematic programs in the economic
field, naturally atrracted Sarbupri to support its program of opposition
to the Hatta government. Moreover Sobsi, which had already joined the FDR
and was affiliated with Sarbupri, could also influence Sarbupri to support
the FDR programs. The FDR's economic programs consisted of abolishing the
estates' right to land (konversi), distributing the bengkok and demanding
52a maximum of eight working hours a day for the workers. These programs 
were close to Sarbuxcri's own programs. The economic programs of the FDR 
became the main theme of various meetings in the villages to gain mass 
support for opposition to the Hatta government. In April the propaganda 
section of the Surakarta FDR began to hold rural mass meetings to explain 
its programs to the peasants.
In May the Surakarta FDR encouraged the Delanggu Sarbupri to strike 
in the hox:>e that this would enable the FDR to achieve its political goals in 
national politics. Preliminary si t ikes, directly ordered by Lite head of 
Delanggu Sarbux^ri, took x:>laco in the last week of May. About 9,000 workers 
from the cotton plantaLion and the sack factory stopx^od work for several 
hours a day.^^
The Delanggu strike immediately became an important national 
problem. In June the central government formed a commission to 
investigate it. Sartono, a PNI representative in the KNIP, led this 
commission, which was to visit Delanggu and Surakarta city to 
investigate the whole background to the strike. In early June, 
while Sartono's commission was collecting information, a 
series of meetings were held between BTN and Sarbupri to try 
to solve the problem of strikes. These meetings were held in 
tliroo pUo’otj, the bTN office in Surakarta, the Sarbupri
51 Dibjosardjono was killed by the Tentara Ilijrah in the district 
of Walikukun, East Java, a few days after the Madiun rebellion 
on 18 September 1948. He was a close friend of Soemodihardjo, 
head of the Surakarta PBI. Dibjo had also been a member of 
Gerindo. Interview with Slarnet Muljono, 13 August 1979; 
Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
52 Djamal Marsudi, Menjingkax^ Pomberontakan PKI dalam Peristiwa 
Madiun (Djakarta, Merdeka Press, 1966), pp.4-5.
53 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979.
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office at Delanggu and the office of the Republican Government in 
Jogjakarta. Most of the meetings were also attended by representatives 
of Sobsi and Perbutsi (Persatuan Buruh Tenun Seluruh Indonesia - 
Textile Workers Union of Indonesia). The meetings discussed the 
demands of Sarbupri on behalf of the workers, but with no success.
The BTN agreed to only one of Sarbupri's demands, namely that BTN 
would distribute, to permanent workers only, the three metres of 
clothing material which had not yet been distributed in the second 
half of 1947. In addition, the BTN would provide a rice allowance 
for workers, but not for their families. The BTN decision was 
rejected by Sarbupri and Sobsi.
This stalemate produced a simmering hostility between the
BTN and the Sarbupri. The Lembaga Buruh dan Tani (the Board of
Workers and Peasants) or LBT, which functioned to handle various
problems of the workers M d  peasants, became more deeply involved
in attempting to solve the crisis. The LBT was formed by the
leaders of BTI and Sarbupri, and ultimately came to be controlled by
Sobsi. On 14 June the LBT sent a letter to the BTN in Surakarta
with three main demands: a new scale of wages for the workers;
cloth distribution for all workers; and rice.distribution for both
54the workers and their families. Meanwhile the Komite Kesatuan
Aksi Delanggu (Action Front Committee of Delanggu), which had already
been set up by the leaders of BTI and Sarbupri in February and was
under the influence of Sobsi, held a general meeting of representatives
55of its branch on 15 June. This meeting was attended by representatives 
of seven branches who attempted to get definite decisions from the 
BTN, which had still not replied to the previous discussions. The 
leaders of LBT at this meeting agreed to present to the BTN a motion 
which could be summarized as follows:
54 This let ter may be. found in 'Berkas-Berkas Sekitar Perist.iwa 
Solo dan Delanggu', Bundle B. 83/7, ANRI.
55 A report ol' this meeting is in no.B.83/7, ANRI.
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The negotiations have already taken a long time, 
causing concern to the Komite Kesatuan Aksi.
Therefore, further negotiations must be carried out 
during the three days from 17 to 19 June 1948.
Komite Kesatuan Aksi may have to carry out further 
actions.^ 6
This ultimatum had some effect. On 17 June the meeting
between the BTN and LBT recommenced in Delanggu. The chairman of the
LBT, Suparno, addressed the meeting to explain why the workers'
demands should be fulfilled by the BTN:
The workers were an important factor in production.
The fulfilment of the workers' demands would mean 
that the total defence of the state could be achieved 
against the Dutch. Corruption had taken place in the 
BTN while the workers had been suffering. If the 
government refused to fulfil the workers' demands, 
as appeared likely, then the government itself would 
s ooil co 11 aps e.
This meeting did not succeed in reaching a compromise
between the demands of the BLT and the plans of the BTN. The BTN
reaffirmed its position of distributing textiles for permanent
workers only and rice for the workers but not their families. In
this deadlock the representatives of the Ministry of Welfare and
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, who always attended the
meetings, proposed that discussions be handled by the Minister of
Welfare, on the grounds that the BTN administration was under the
control of the Ministry of Welfare. Both BTN and LBT agreed to this
proposal, hoping that the Minister, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, could
solve the crisis. On 19 June Sjafruddin wrote to the LBT of Delanggu
to answer its demands. The Minister agreed to provide textiles
58for only, 8,823 workers, thereby excluding seasonal workers.
The LBT continued to demand that BTN provide textiles for 13,872
56 Ibid.
57 See 'Uraian djalannja perundingan antara delegasi2 Lembaga 
Buruh dan Tani (L.B.T.) dan Badan Tekstil Negara (B.T.N.)
di Delanggu pada harai Kamis tanggal 17 Juni 1948', Bundle B. 
83/7, ANRI.
58 Letter of the Minister of Welfare, 19 June 1948, no.3833/C.3, 
Bundle B. 83/7, ANRI.
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workers from seven plantation areas. The Minister gave as his 
reason the impossibility of providing textiles for all categories 
of workers, because the government simply did not have sufficient, 
textiles. The Minister also argued that the action of LBT was motivated 
by political rather than sociiil considerations. The LBT, alleging 
corruption in the BTN, regretted the Minister's proposals. A further 
confrontation could not therefore be avoided between the BTN and 
the LBT.
The following day, 20 June, a general meeting of the 
workers was called by the LBT in Delanggu. It was attended by 
8,000 workers. They decided to entrust the LBT campaign to Sobsi, 
which as a national workers union could discuss the crisis between 
the BTN and the LBT with the government at national level. Moreover 
Sobsi could mobilize the support of workers beyond the cotton 
plantation areas and the sack factory.^ On 23 June a strike of 
more than 15,000 workers took place. They put red flags in the cotton 
plantation areas and at the sack factory, to indicate that no-one 
was allowed to continue work.^
On 26 June two STII members in the village of Sribit, 
Martosudjud and Sumardjo, who were working on the cotton plantation, 
were attacked by thirty strikers armed with three carbines and three 
revolvers. The strikers threw stones at the two men and prevented 
them from working in the cotton plantation. Martosudjud and Sumardjo 
were held for a couple of hours in the office of Delanggu Sarbupri 
where they were warned that they had to join the strike action of 
Sarbupri. The strikers recaptured the two men on 29 June in order 
to make a public example of them. They took pictures of Martosudjud 
and Sumardjo and displayed them in public, shouting that they would
59 'Uraian djalannja', Bundle B.83/7, ANRI.
60 Nasution, Sekitar Perang, vol.8, p.33.
61 'Pelaporan Pendek Tentang Kedjadian Penting Dalam Karesidenan 
Surakarta', Laporan Djawatan Polisi Negara Surakarta, July 
1948, typescript, Bundle B.4/13, ANRI.
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kill thorn it they continued to work on the cotton plantation.
This incident appeared to have political rather than economic causes.
Apparently the STII was trying to break the strike by using its own
members in the fields. In nine villages in Juwiring subdistrict,
which borders Delanggu, members of STII succeeded in replacing the
63strikers on the cotton plantation. In Juwiring the STII organization 
was stronger than elsewhere, perhaps because many farmers there were 
also small traders and were active in Masyumi.
The conflict between the STII and Sarbupri. became more
intense when the STII obtained the backing of Hizbullah and the
Tentara Hijrah. This caused the Komite Kesatuan Aksi and the LBT
to put placards which read:
The strikers are not rebels.
The LBT will maintain security.
Don't disturb us when we are on strike.
May the police and the army unite with us.^J
These placards angered units of the Tentara Hijrah. They fired
taeir rifles in the air and began to haul down the red flags at the
sack factory and other places. The strikers did not react, probably
bocause they feared the Siliwangi Division, which was known to be
well-trained.
On 10 July a small battle took place between the STII and 
tae strikers. Some members of the STII who had been working on a 
cotton plantation, guarded by the Hizbullah, were suddenly attacked 
b/ the strikers. More than 500 strikers staged a show of strength 
to break up the working STII group. Two prominent leaders of the 
SHI, Haji Buzairi and Abing Sjarbini, were injured. Buzairi was 
hit by more than twenty strikers, and the villagers of Sabrang 
thought he had died. However Buzairi and Sjarbini were brought to
62 Ibid.
63 ibid.
64 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979.
65 'Pelaporan Pendek Tentang Kedjadian', Bundle B. 4/13, ANRI.
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hospital at Delanggu, where they recovered.
The Delanggu strike had become a major political problem
for the llatta government. While the incident of 10 July was taking
place, the Working Committee of KNIP held a series of meetings
specifically to discuss the Delanggu strike. Three days of meetings,
from 9 to 11 July, failed to resolve the issue. The representatives
of FDR, Sobsi and the LBT proposed that the government fulfil the
principal demands of the LBT without further discussions with the BTN.
On the other hand the representatives of PNI, Masyumi and the Christian
Party suggested that Sobsi and the BTI hold further meetings in 
67Jogjakarta. On 12 July the FDR issued a two-point political statement
endorsing all actions of the strikers in Delanggu, and regretting
68the STII involvement in these strikes. For its part, the STII
defended its action on a number of grounds. The STII believed that
the strike inflicted an economic loss upon tire government, and feared
that many hundreds of hectares of cotton would be demaged. Politically,
since the FDR had backed tire strikes and armed the strikers with various
kinds of weapons, the Hizbullah had responded by guarding the security
69of the STII members from this politically-motivated threat.
By the time the FDR political statement was issued,, the Delanggu
affair had become a major political question. One of the newspapers
in Surakarta, Pacific, described the affair as follows:
The strike is a dispute which has developed into a 
mass political conflict, though it arose from 
tension between the Sobsi and the BTN.7^
The Suara Ibu Kota, one of the popular newspapers of Jogjakarta, was
more strident in its comment.
66 Interview with Haji Buzain, 19 August 1979.
67 Nasution, Sekitar Perang, vol.8, pp.40-42.
68 This statement was signed by Amir Sjarifuddin (Socialist Party), 
Aidit (PKI), Asmu (PBI), and Sudisman (PESINDO), ibid., p.45.
69 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979.
70 Pacific, 14 July 1948.
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From t h e  e v e n t s  o f  D e la n g g u ,  i t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  
t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ,  w h ic h  a r e  g u a r a n t e e d  by  
th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  h a v e  o n c e  a g a i n  n o t  b e e n  
p r o t e c t e d .  The p e o p l e  demand fo o d  and  c l o t h e s ,  and  
a r e  o p p r e s s e d  by t h e  g u n . 7*-
As t h e s e  n e w s p a p e r  r e p o r t s  i n d i c a t e ,  t h e  D e la n g g u  a f f a i r  
was e s s e n t i a l l y  a  p o l i t i c a l  d i s p u t e  a l o n g  t h e  l i n e  w h ic h  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
d i v i d e d  s o c i e t y  b e tw e e n  l e f t  an d  r i g h t ,  b e tw e e n  o p p o s i t i o n i s t s  and  
t h e  H a t t a  g o v e rn m e n t .  I t  was by  no m eans s i m p ly  an  ec o n o m ic  m a t t e r ,  
and  t h e  H a t t a  g o v e rn m e n t  was o b l i g e d  t o  g i v e  t h e  s t r i k e  a t  D e la n g g u  
i t s  s e r i o u s  a t t e n t i o n .
On 16 J u l y  H a t t a  h e l d  a  s p e c i a l  m e e t i n g  w i t h  t h e  members o f
t h e  KNIP, t h e  BTN and  t h e  D e la n g g u  LBT. A t  t h i s  m e e t i n g  t h e  BTN
a c c e p t e d  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  dem ands o f  t h e  LBT, a g r e e i n g  t o  d i s t r i b u t e
two m e t r e s  o f  c l o t h  p e r  p e r s o n  t o  a l l  w o r k e r s  an d  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  r i c e
f o r  w o r k e r s '  f a m i l i e s .  The LBT on i t s  p a r t  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  new
72r e g u l a t i o n  on w o r k e r s '  w ages c o u ld  b e  p o s t p o n e d .  The same e v e n i n g ,
t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  a n n o u n c e d  o v e r  R a d io  J o g j a k a r t a  t h a t  t h e  LBT' s  demands
h a d  b e e n  a c c e p t e d  by  th e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  and  t h a t  t h e  w o r k e r s  w o u ld  s t a r t  
73w ork  on 18 J u l y .
The D e la n g g u  s t r i k e s  h ad  i n f l i c t e d  a  h e a v y  l o s s  on t h e  
g o v e rn m e n t .  P a c i f i c  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  h a d  l o s t  1 3 ,9 0 1 ,0 5 0  
r u p i a h s  b e c a u s e  o f  damage done  t o  t h e  c o t t o n  p l a n t a t i o n . 74 P o l i t i c a l l y ,  
t h e  D e la n g g u  s t r i k e s  w e re  a  t a c t i c  o f  t h e  FDR t o  f u r t h e r  i t s  cam p a ig n  
a g a i n s t  t h e  H a t t a  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e re  was some t r u t h  i n  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n  
01 I n d o n e s i a  R a y a , a M u s l i m - o r i e n t e d  J o g j a k a r t a  n e w s p a p e r ,  t h a t  t h e
—j f~
s t r i k i n g  p e a s a n t s  o f  D e la n g g u  w e re  o n l y  b e i n g  u s e d  by  t h e  F D R . ' °
71 S u a r a  I b u  K o t a , 14 J u l y  1948 .
72 T h i s  was r e p o r t e d  b y  J o g j a k a r t a  r a d i o  on  16 J u l y  1 9 4 8 .  See f i l e  
B u n d le  B . 8 3 / 7 ,  ANRI. C f.  N a s u t i o n ,  S e k i t a r , v o l . 8 ,  p p . 4 6 -4 7 .
73 See  ' S u r a t  P e r i n t a h  P u s a t  P im p in a n  Lembaga B uruh  dan  T a n i ' ,
16 J u l y  194 8 ,  B u n d le  B. 8 3 / 7 ,  ANRI.
74 P a c i f i c , 23 A u g u s t  1948.
75 I n d o n e s i a  R a y a , n o . 39 ,  26 J u l y  1948 .
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Hit-1 Delanggu strikes could be regarded as a form of opposition to the 
government and in fact as the last weapon of the opposition against 
the Hatta government. In the eyes of the Communists, the Delanggu 
strike was regarded as a corrective action to force the government 
to continue the national revolution. In addition, however, the FDR 
aimed to create a political situation in which it would be able to 
topple the Hatta government.
Hatta himself had no doubt that the Delanggu strike was 
a political action of the leftists to oppose his cabinet. This was 
also recognized by the leftists themselves. Buruh, one of the leftist 
newspapers, asked rhetorically:
Wiiy did this strike not occur in the period of 
Amir's and Sjahrir's cabinet? It is clear that 
one of its aspects was a reaction to the Hatta 
cabinet.
In revising their options with regard to the Delanggu 
strike, Hatta's supporters appear to have included consideration of 
aimy units, particularly Siliwangi units, when it came to estimating 
their own strength. This was in response to the fact that the strikers 
were already supported by PESINDO armed units. The head of the 
Surakarta police office reported that political confusions at Delanggu 
were obviously tied up with the existing military tensions and the 
widening gap between Hatta's supporters and the leftists.77
The Delanggu affair was the first instance of what was to 
become a deeply rooted conflict between Muslims and leftists in rural 
areas. It demonstrated that the leftists were able to mobilize their 
rural supporters against the attacks of their political opponents.
The left, soon to be politically united under the PKI umbrella, had 
improved the power base from which it could continue its opposition.
76 Buruh, 20 July 1948.
77 'Laporan Pendjagaan Disekitar Delanggu', Bundle B.18/19, a n r i. 
See also Berita Delanggu, no.l, 1 July 1948.
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A U  RAN CONFLICT IN RURAL AREAS
The use ot: the term 'aliran conflict' in this section is
78confined to the conflict between leftists and Muslims. The term 
leftist xn this case refers specifically to the organisations which 
became affiliated to the enlarged PKI in August 1948, and their 
supporters. The concept of aliran may help to explain the nature of 
the rural conflicts which culminated in the Madiun rebellion, in 
which communists and Muslims seemed ready to fight to the last drop 
of blood.
The conflict was not just between political parties, but 
between a whole set of affiliated organizations, such as youth and 
peasant groups. The communists had the support of the peasant 
organization, BTI, while Muslims had the STII, oriented to Islamic 
ideology. The communist youth organization was the PESINDO, which 
had previously been under the auspices of the Socialist Party.
The PESINDO had a large popular following in both urban and rural 
areas of Surakarta, as it did throughout Java. Hizbullah, a youth 
organization of strict Muslims, represented an old enemy of the 
PESINDO.
Conflicts between leftists and Muslims in the rural areas 
of Surakarta had roots in the polarization of Surakarta society in 
1947. Further instances of rural conflicts took place in 1948,
78 Aliran (stream) conflict in Javanese society has also been
described in terms of the distinction among santri, abangan and 
priyayi, notably by Clifford Geertz, The Religion of~Java 
(London, University of Chicago Press, 1976). In the political 
context we may also apply the term aliran conflict to the three 
major political groups: nationalist, communist and Muslim,
including modernist Muslims and conservative Muslims, together 
in this last group. The literature on aliran conflict is extensive. 
See, for example: Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural 
Centra] Java (New Haven, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 
1903); w.F. Wertheim, 'From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in 
the Countryside of Java', Pacific Viewpoint, vol.lC, no.2, 1969, 
pp.1—17; Donald Bindley, 'Aliran and the Fall of the Old Order', 
Indonesia, no.9, April 1970, pp.23-66; R. William Liddle,
Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia (Singapore, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977) ," esp. pp.2-14.
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reflecting the bitter contests between leftists and Muslims at the 
central government .Level when the two elements struggled to obtain 
cabinet seats and argued vociferously over the policy of diplomasi.
A major reason was that the communists, through their affiliated 
organisations, endeavoured by every means possible to obtain mass 
support to oppose the Hatta government. By ail accounts, it was 
the. act ions of the communists which were the most inffdvnrnat-ory  
mass-oriented, and dynamic.
In the early months of 1948, the BTI launched its propaganda
campaign to replace those village headmen who were identified as
Masyumi members. This occurred, for example, in the villages of
Pengkok, Kawis (Kedawung subdistrict) and Toriyo (Bendosari subdistrict).
According to Martodihardjo, village head of Toriyo, BTI leaders
addressed rural mass meetings and severely criticized Muslim village
headmen, saying they were antek (followers) of the Hatta government
79which had compromised with the Dutch. In the two subdistricts the
BTI could draw political support through the Pokoso, and in Kedawung,
the Pokoso endeavoured to replace Muslim village headmen with a
system known as pasuel (anonymous letter). This involved circulating
negative rumours about the village headmen, alleging such things as
80corruption and manipulation of official village land.'
In villages in Gemolong subdistrict, Sragen regency,
communists also incited villagers to replace village headmen who
81were not communists. This political campaign, however, failed to 
achieve any concrete results and some reasons may be indicated here.
Many villagers refused to turn against the village headmen they had 
originally elected. The village headmen who were under attack also
79 The term antek was widely used for the follower of a political 
stream; for example, ant^k Masyumi, antek PKI. Interview 
with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
80 Interview with Soekardi, 31 July 1979.
81 See 'Laporan Mengenai Siasat Letkol Soejoto', Surakarta 1948, 
Bundle B.18/19, ANRI. Lieutenant-Colonel Soejoto led a new 
Brigade in the Senopati Division consisting mostly of former 
members of the Navy who had joined the PKI. See 'Keadaan 
Kota Solo Panas1, Bundle B.2/5, ANRI.
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obtained backing from anti-communist political parties and their 
affiliated organizations. For instance, the Muslim village headmen 
of Kaw.is, Pengkok and Toriyo, along with those of several villages in 
Delanggu and such adjacent areas as Juwiring, were firmly backed by 
Masyumi, the STII and the Hizbullah. It was therefore not easy to 
replace village headmen in accordance with the communist plan. 
Apparently, a political system based on aliran was becoming an important 
determinant of the role of village headmen in Surakarta in the first 
months of 1948.
The political cleavages between leftists and Muslims were 
clearly seen in the case of the Delanggu strike, from May to July 
1948. Viewed in the context of the aliran conflict, the strike 
obviously reflected a political contest between the leftists and 
Muslims. The communist-affiliated organizations, FDR, BTI, Sarbupri, 
Sobsi, PESINDO and other affiliated groups such as LBT and Komite 
Kesatuan Aksi, confronted the STII and the Hizbullah and the Masyumi. 
Small battles took battles during the strikes. The Tentara Hijrah, 
which was known to have strong Islamic elements, also stood behind 
the STII and the Hizbullah and armed those two organizations.
That there was also a class element in the conflict between
the leftists and Muslims in the Surakarta rural areas, including
Delanggu, is suggested by the following cases. Haji Buzairi, a
prominent Muslim of Delanggu and a leader of the STII and Masyumi,
had taught Muslim peasants that the richer had to help the poorer.
He implemented the program of the STII to collect zakat (religious
tax), which he then distributed to landless peasants. Ideologically,
the STII followed the Masyumi, whose modernist Islamic ideas
included a rational approach to economics. Haji Buzairi himself was
not only a prominent Muslim but also a rich peasant, landowner
and local business man. We may also take another example for
comparison. Haji Dullah, a leader of the Bekonang STII and Masyumi
and an influential figure in the Bendosari STII, was also a rich
82peasant, a landowner and a local merchant. In 1948 rich members
82 Haji Dullah was an important leader of the Bekonang Masyumi 
who successfully built the Bendosari STII. Bendosari was 
close to Bekonang, so the Bekonang STII could easily influence 
Muslims of Bendosari to form a branch there. Interview with 
Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
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of the Bekonang STII were also involved in the local batik industry,
which was closely connected with the centre of the batik industry 
01in Surakarta. Ln Juwiring the richest members of the STII were 
also local business men.
Members oi the STII themselves appeared to recognize that
the programs of the BTI had been more successful them those of the
STII in attracting landless peasants. The actions oi the BTI seemed
to be more agitative and mass-oriented. Its political slogans such
as distributing official lands, opposing the rich peasants, and
abolishing taxes, easily won the support of the landless peasants.
Bodronojo, a prominent communist who actively joined the Madiun
rebellion, said that the Indonesian communist ideology was actively
opposed to the rich peasants. When the PKI used the term 'peasant'
as one of the basic forces behind the Indonesian Revolution, it
84meant landless and middle peasants. According to D.N. Aidit, a 
young communist in 1948 who came to lead the party from 1950 to 1965, 
the landless and middle peasants were a part of the Indonesian 
proletariat and could accept socialist ideology. They wore opposed 
to imperialism.^
In July and August communist propaganda in the rural areas, 
as presented by the FDR and PES1NDO, sux^ported the BTI programs at 
the local level and opposed the Hatta government and the Tentara 
Hijrah at the national level. All of this was clearly observable in 
Delanggu and Sukoharjo. In Sukoharjo various placards concerning 
the distribution of land for the landless peasants and opposing Hatta's 
government had been put in public x^laces. Hizbullah placards supporting 
the Hatta government also appeared.
83 In 1948 the Batik merchants of Surakarta formed a cooperative 
known as Batari (Batik Asli Rex^ublik Indonesia). Most of its 
members were Muslim merchants.
84 Bodronojo was active in the BBI and Sarbupri and was familiar 
with the communist literature of the time; see bibliography 
for biographical details.
85 D.N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution 
(Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 1958), pp.60-62.
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During August and September 1948 actions for agrarian reform 
by the FDR and the BTI seemed to grow more intense. The chief reason 
was Musso's 'Jalan Baru' policy, accepted by the PKI, which emphasized 
agrarian reform. It included a plan to abolish the system of bengkok 
and kas desa land, and turn this village land over to be worked by 
the peasants. This policy was of course supported by the FDR and 
the BTI leaders, who had already seen the popularity of land reform 
proposals during their action for abolition of tanah konversi in the 
principalities.
As a result of Musso's 'Jalan Baru' policy, peasants
began almost immediately to attempt to take over bengkok, official
village land and tanah konversi. Anthony Reid cites various cases
of peasant action both in East and Central Java, for example in
86Blitar, Pacitan, Jogjakarta and Surakarta. In Surakarta the action 
of the peasants appears to have been coordinated by the FDR. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Soejoto, u prominent leftist officer of the Senopati Division 
who also led the Surakarta FDR, outlined the policy of agrarian reform.^ 
During August and September a series of peasant actions took place:
1. In Pajang about 22 ha. of village land began to be worked
, x 88by the Sarekat Rakyat (SR).
2. In Boyalali 95 ha. of kas desa was distributed to landless
89peasants.
3. In Kedawung subdistrict, one-fifth of 300 ha. of tanah
konversi was worked by landless peasants and labourers
of the rubber factory. A few hectares of kas desa in
the village of Pengkok were also taken over by the 
90Sarekat Rakyat.
86 Anthony Reid, 'Marxist Attitudes to Social Revolution, 1946-1948', 
Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs (RIMA), vol.8, no.l,
(Jan.-June 1974), pp.54-55.
87 'LaiJoran Mengenai Siasat Letkol Soejoto', Bundle B. 18/19,
ANRI.
88 Reid, 'Marxist Attitudes', p.54.
89 Ibid.
90 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
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In the villages in which the Muslims seem to have been
very strong, such as those of Bekonang subdistrict in
Sukoharjo, the BTI failed to take the kas desa in their
hands. The Muslim peasants through their political
organizations, Masyumi and STI1, strongly opposed the action
91of the leftist peasants.
5. In other villages of Sukoharjo regency, including those
of Bendosari subdistrict, the communists fully controlled 
the area during the Madiun rebellion in September, and 
took by force various official lands.
THE SURAKARTA AFFAIR, 13 SEPTEMBER 1948
By early September gang rivalries had grown more intense
and were more obviously affected by political tensions. On 1 September
Slamet. Widjaja and Pardijo, two prominent leaders of the Surakarta
FDR, were kidnapped by a small army group led by Alip Hartojo
which happened to be opposed to the FDR. The reason may have been
that Alip Hartojo, who was very loyal to Bung Tomo1s BPRI, sought
revenge against Idle FDR leaders who had demanded that Colonel Sutarto
92disarm the Surakarta BPRI in June 1948.
Thus the Surakarta PKI lost Slamet Widjaja, who headed
its propaganda section, and Pardijo, who was an important man in the
93secretariat of the FDR. On 7 September five officers of the Navy 
Brigades which had been included in the Senopati Division were 
kidnapped by members of the Siliwangi Division. These Brigades were
91 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
92 Alip was an activist pemuda who had supported the Barisan 
Pelopor in its move to disarm the Kempeitai at Timuran in 
Surakarta city in October 1945. He subsequently became an activist 
of BPRI. In November 1945 Alip fought with other BPRI members 
against the British in Surabaya. This is based on an interview 
with Sudijo, 30 October 1979.
93 See 'Perihal Pentjulikan Solo', typescript, Surakarta, 15 
September 1948, Bundle B.3/5, ANRI. Cf. Aidit, Aidit Menggugat,
p . 18.
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v e r y  l o y a l  t o  Amir S j a r i f u d d i n ,  and th e y  n a v e  moved f ro m  t h e  van  
Mook l i n e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  PKI and t h e  FDR i n  S u r a k a r t a .  They w e re  
t h e  S e v e n th  B r i g a d e  and  t h e  N i n t h  B r i g a d e ,  l e d  b y  L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  
Yadao and  L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  S o e j o t o  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Once a g a i n  A l i p  
m a s te rm in d e d  t h e  k i d n a p p i n g .  The f i v e  w e re  known t o  b e  among t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  o f f i c e r s  r e s i s t i n g  H a t t a ' s  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  p r o g r a m .  They 
w e re  s u b s e q u e n t l y  k i l l e d  by  members o f  t h e  S i l i w a n g i  D i v i s i o n . 95
On 10 S e p te m b e r  L i e u t e n a n t —C o l o n e l  S u a d i ,  t h e  commander o f  
t h e  PPS ( P e r te m p u r a n  Panem bahan S e n o p a t i  -  S e n o p a t i  B a t t l e  Command), 
s e n t  an u l t im a t u m  t o  t h o s e  who h a d  k id n a p p e d  h i s  o f f i c e r s  on
7 S e p te m b e r .  I t  c o n t a i n e d  o n l y  one p o i n t ,  t h a t  t h e  k i d n a p p e d  o f f i c e r s  
h a d  to  b e  r e t u r n e d  b y  4 p .m .  on 13 S e p te m b e r  a t  t h e  l a t e s t .  The 
u l t im a t u m  h a d  t h e  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  o f  G e n e r a l  S u d irm an  t o  whom S u a d i  
h a d  r e p o r t e d  i n  J o g j a k a r t a  a b o u t  t h e  k i d n a p p i n g  o f  h i s  o f f i c e r s . 95 
J u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  u l t im a t u m  e x p i r e d ,  a m e e t in g  was h e l d  i n  S u r a k a r t a  
i n  t h e  a f t e r n o o n  o f  13 S e p te m b e r  b e tw e e n  G e n e r a l  S u d irm a n ,  S u a d i
an d  L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  S a d i k i n ,  t h e  commander o f  t h e  S i l i w a n q i
97 ^
D i v i s i o n  i n  S u r a k a r t a .  I t  f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  S a d i k i n  c l a i m e d  t h a t  he  knew
94 ' S e k i t a r  P e n t j u l i k a n  dan  Tembak-Menembak d i  S u r a k a r t a ' ,  t y p e s c r i p t ,  
r e p o r t e d  by  D jaw a tan  K e p o l i s i a n  N e g a ra  J o g j a k a r t a ,  16 S e p te m b e r  
1948 , B u n d le  B . 3 4 /3 5 ,  ANRI. The names o f  t h o s e  k i d n a p p e d  
may b e  fo u n d  i n  'K ead aan  K o ta  S o lo  P a n a s 1, t y p e s c r i p t ,  B u n d le  
B . 2 / 5 ,  ANRI.
The S i l i w a n g i  D i v i s i o n  c o n t i n u e d  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  i t s  members w e re  
n o t  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  k i d n a p p i n g  o f  7 S e p te m b e r  194 8 .  See  
S i l i w a n g i  d a r i  m asa ,  p . 1 4 3 .  A i d i t  s t r o n g l y  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  
t h e  S i l i w a n g i  was d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  e v e n t .  See  
A i d i t  M e n g g u g a t , p . 2 1 .  My i n f o r m a n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o rm e r  
B a r i s a n  B a n te n g  l e a d e r s  an d  TP m em bers,  h a v e  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
S i l i w r a i g i  was d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  k i d n a p p i n g  o f  t h e  
l e f t i s t  S e n o p a t i  o f f i c e r s .  S a s t r o l a w u  a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  members 
o f  t h e  S i l i w a n g i  D i v i s i o n  w e re  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  k i d n a p p i n g ;  
i n t e r v i e w ,  12 O c to b e r  1979 .
96 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  S a s t r o l a w u ,  13 O c to b e r  1979 .
97 S a d i k i n  was b o r n  i n  P u r w o k e r to ,  C e n t r a l  J a v a ,  i n  1 9 1 6 .  He 
was a member o f  KNIL and  d u r i n g  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  was a  h e i h o .
D u r in g  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  he  j o i n e d  t h e  S i l i w a n g i  B r i g a d e ^ T d “ l a t e r  
commanded i t s  u n i t s  w h ich  h a d  r e t r e a t e d  t o  S u r a k a r t a  i n  1948 .
See T .B . S im a tu p a n g ,  o p . c i t . , p . 3 5 ,  n . 1 5 .
190
98nothing about the kidnapping of Suadi's officers. Suadi, on the
basis of a report of the state police, was sure that members of the
9 9Siliwangi Division were involved. Communist sources allege that 
members of the Siliwangi Division were involved in a plan of the 
Hatta government to clean out the prominent communists of Surakarta.100
The same afternoon, before his meeting had finished, a
small battle took place between the members of the Siliwangi Division
101and Suadi s troops from the Yadao and Soejoto Brigades. The
Siliwangi troops at the Srambatan post were from the Second Company
of the Fourth Battalion of the Siliwangi Brigade. This Company was
headed by Oking and it had originally been a special unit of Brigade 
102Thirteen. The Komir Company of the Second Battalion of the
Siliwangi, based at Kleco (about ten km west of Srambatan), quickly
came to the aid of the Oking Company. At Pasar Slompretan (in the
city) the Komir Company met the members of the Yadao Brigade, who
were all wearing red armbands.103 A battle was inevitable. The
fighting ceased at 6.30 p.m., after General Sudirman ordered a
104cease fire between the two army units. During the incident
105fourteen of Suadi's troops and two of the Siliwangi were killed.
There was no doubt that the Srambatan affair really had 
broader political causes, and the ideological conflict behind it 
burst at the same time into open fighting between lasykar units.
PESINDO had long been opposed to Barisan Banteng because of the latter's 
original sponsorship by the Japanese. The conflict between these two
98 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.225.
99 'Sekitaz Pentjulikan dan Tembak-Menembak di Surakarta'1, op.cit
100 Aidit, Aidit Menggugat, pp.18-19.
101 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
102 Siliwangi dari masa, pp.141, 143.
103 The red band was worn by members of the lasykar units 
army who were pro-PKI. Interview with Sastrolawu.
and tiie
104 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.225.
105 'Sekitar Pentjulikan1, op.cit.
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organizations became more intense with the establishment by Dr Muwardi 
cf GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat) in February. The primary concern
of the GRR was to discredit the FDR leaders on the grounds of their 
responsibility for signing the Linggajati and Renville Agreements.
It brought together several organizations opposed to the FDR, 
including the Barisan Banteng, and its formation sharpened the rivalry 
between PESINDO and the Barisan Banteng. The GRR was also supported 
by Tan Malaka's followers, who were old enemies of the PKI, which in 
turn denounced them as ideologically unsound 'Trotskyists'.
The climax to this intense rivalry was reached with the 
kidnapping of the leaders of the Barisan Banteng, Dr Muwardi,
Darmosalimin and Tjitromargoso, on the afternoon of 13 September.
Muwardi was kidnapped by members of PESINDO while he was operating 
on a patient in the Jebres hospital. One of the leaders of the 
kidnappers was Sutaryo, an activist of the Surakarta PESINDO who had 
been close to Wikana. The three kidnapped men were subsequently 
killed, with two bodies later being found at Wijipinilihan, in the 
southern part of Solo city. Muwardi's body was never found. (He
107may nave been buried in Kaliyoso, about fifteen km north of the city.)
On 15 September the Barisan Banteng retaliated by attacking the
headquarters of PESINDO at Singosaren, but PESINDO had already evacuated
the place. The combined forces of a Siliwangi Division unit, the
Barisan Banteng and the Hizbullah were, however, able to defeat
some units of the Surakarta PESINDO on 16 September.108 This combined
force still continued to pursue the Surakarta PESINDO. From 18 to
19 September the Siliwangi unit, headed by Sadikin, moved against
Surakarta PESINDO and against the Naval units, which, headed by
] G9Yadatt and Soejoto, supported Amir Sjarifuddin. ’ Meanwhile on
106 Merdeka, 15 February 1948.
107 Interview with the Barisan Banteng leaders: Hagnjawigati,
30 July 1979; Hartono, 17 August 1979.
108 1Keadaan Kota Solo Panas', Bundle B.2/5, ANRI.
109 'Surakarta: Kronologis September-Oktober 1948', typescript,
Bundle B.26/48, ANRI.
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The GRR placards contained attacks to the 
groups who had kidnapped Dr. Muwardi. 
(Lukisan Revo1usi Rakjat Indonesia
1945-1949, p.233 ).
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13 SepLember, the government carried out an operation against 
PESINDO forces at Blitar and Nganjuk in East Java.110 The defeat 
of the Surakarta PESINDO gave rise to worries about the security 
of the Twenty-ninth Brigade TNI Masyarakat in Madiun led by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Duhian, who strongly supported the Communists.* 111 It also 
shocked the communist armed forces in Madiun.
General budirman had paid special attention to the events 
of September in Surakarta. In the middle of September a series of 
meetings had been held in Jogjakarta between General Sudirman, A.H. 
Nasution, (Commander of the Java Headquarters of the Armed Forces) 
and Colonel Gatot Subroto (Commander of Military Police Corps er CPM). 
These meetings dealt mainly with a plan for restoring order in 
Surakarta and for stopping conflicts among the military units and 
badan perjuangan organizations. For this purpose Sudirman and Nasution 
asked the government that Gatot Subroto be appointed as Military 
Governor of Surakarta and its surrounding areas. Both President 
Sukarno and the cabinet accepted Sudirman*s and Nasution's proposal.112
On 17 September President Sukarno declared a state of 
martial law for the region of Surakarta, aiming to avoid further 
conflicts there and to control the oppositionist groups which had been 
most intense in their criticism of the Hatta government. On IS 
September Gatot took up his new position in Surakarta and his CPM 
duties were transferred to Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Mokoginto, a senior 
officer of the Siliwangi Division, who was close to Nasution in 
Armed Forces headquarters in Jogjakarta. On the same day Gatot 
issued m s  first orders, meant to bring about a cease-fire among all
110 Kahin, op.cit., p.290; Pinardi, op.cit., p.72.
111 Dahlan was ex-chairman of DKDS (Dewan Kelasykaran Daerah 
Surabaya - Surabaya Area Lasykar Council), which had been 
set up at the end of 1946. Most members of the Twenty-ninth 
Brigade were former members of DKDS. See David Charles Anderson,
The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair', Indonesia, no 21 
(April 1976), p.23. ---------
112 ^asution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.233; A.H. Nasution, Sedjarah 
Perdjuangan Nasional Dibidang Angkatan Bersendjata (Djakarta,
1965;, pp.129-30); David Charles Anderson, ’Military Aspects', 
Indonesia, pp.17-38.
The Surakarta city was suddenly quiet when the
Srambatan affair broke out on 13 September 1948.
(Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia 1948-1949,
P* 233 ) . “
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fighting groups. The cease-fire had to be carried out at the 
latest by midnight on 20 September. In addition, all commanders of 
fighting groups, both in and outside the city, had to call on the 
Military Governor by 21 September at the latest. Those who did not 
obey these orders would assume the status of traitors to the Republic, 
and the government would take severe action against them. In
faci, GaLot's orders had no effect: shortly after they were issued
the Madiun uprising broke out.
New political developments took place in Madiun when 
Sumarsono, a prominent PESINDO leader, held a secret meeting on 
17 September at his house at Rejoagung, north of Madiun.114 This 
meeting was attended by only a few of the communist leaders. J.t 
was decided there to take over the Republican Government of Madiun.
The first steps to be taken would be to disarm the Military Police 
Corps (CPM), the Siliwangi units and the Mobile Brigade.11" Djokosujono 
and Supardi, who both attended this meeting, played a leading role in 
taking over the Government of Madiun.116 In the meantime, the top
113 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.233, 297; Nasution, Sedjarah, p.130.
114 'Madiun, Laporan Pembantu Dinas Kepolisian Negara', typescript,
18 September 1948, Bundle B.26/48, ANRI. Sumarsono was born in 
1921, became a Protestant Christian, and was close to Amir 
Sjarifuddin since the days when both were in Gerindo (1939-41).
Based on Anthony Reid's interview with Sumarsono, August 1981.
115 See 'Madiun', Bundle B.26/48, ANRI.
116 Djokosujono was one of the members of the Leadership Committee 
of the TNI which was formed in June 1947. See Nasution, Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia, vol.2, p.86. Djokosujono was Amir Sjarifuddin's 
close colleague and was appointed as head of the Central Biro 
Berjuangan by Amir. Djokosujono also took charge of the TNI 
Masyarakat. He was a former Peta member. Mohammad Hatta,
Memoir, p.527. Supardi was a civilian, Deputy Mayor of Madiun 
city, who sympathized with the PKI. See Nasution, Sekitar, 
vol.8, p.238; cf. J.M. van der Kroef, op.cit., p.40T
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communist leader^ such as Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Setiadjit
and Wikancv were still campaigning in several places in Central Java
Lo gel mass support for their opposition to the Hatta government.
The Surakarta affair, which resulted in the defeat of part of the
Leftist forces, seemed to have hastened Lhe decision of the PKI
leaders in Madiun to take the revolutionary leadership into their
own hands. The Madiun uprising broke out on 18 September at 3 a.m.,
and the Dahlan Brigade successfully disarmed the three key government
forces - the Siliwangi unit, the Military Police and the Mobile
Brigade. Most of the local Republican leaders and army officers
were arrested, and some of them were killed by the communist forces.
The key officers and other vital buildings of the Republic were
occupied by the communist armed forces without resistance. The
National Front Government was set up under the leadership of Sumarsono
as Military Governor, Djokosujono as Military Commander of Madiun
118city and Supardi as resident. The communist rebellion had begun,
and the top communist leaders had come out in open resistance to the 
government's armed forces.
Shortly after the uprising took place, political tensions 
between the leftists and their opponents in areas surrounding Madiun, 
such as Ponorogo, Magetan, Pacitan, Ngawi and Surakarta, surfaced 
in local communities and reciprocal kidnappings and killings took 
place in all these areas.
Since March 1948 the communists had planned for Surakarta 
to be the principal stronghold for their operation, and even though
117 Setiadjit had been one of the members of the Perhimpunan
Indonesia (Indonesian Union) in Holland, where he met Hatta. 
Setiadjit was attracted by Marxism and in 1934 he studied at 
the Lenin Institute in Moscow* From 1936, he studied at 
the Lenin Institute in Moscow. From 1936, he appeared to follow 
the communist line. Kahin, op.cit., pp.88-89, 161, 273. In 
Amir's cabinet of 1947-48 Setiadjit was Deputy Prime Minister.
He was also chairman of the Labour Party.
Pinardi, Peristiwa Coup Berdarah P.K.I. September 1948 di 
Madiun (Djakarta, Inkopak-Hazera, 1967), pp.80, 94; Nasution, 
Sekitar, vol.8, p.238.
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events had not transpired that way, the Surakarta region continued
to play an important role in the political strategy of the communists
119immediately after the uprising. A few days after the uprising
the Surakarta communists selected the Sukoharjo area, including 
rural Bendosari, as their local stronghold. Geographically, this 
region was in easy communication with communist territories in East 
Java, particularly Pacitan, Magetan and Ponorogo. The region of 
Sukoharjo was about twenty-five km to the north of Wonogiri, and 
both were accessible from the communist strongholds around Madiun.
A.l i ran tensions in the Surakarta rural areas reached a
climax with kidnappings and killings between PESINDO and the Hisbullah,
which were symptomatic of the wider ideological conflict between the
communists and Muslims. Moreover the communists took the village
official lands by force and distributed them to landless peasants.
The communists, under the protection of the Tentara Merah (Red
120------------------------------------- - -----------Army), distributed the kas desa land to landless peasants who had
been BTI members.
The Red Army had established a stronghold at Grogoi, a 
village about ten km to the north of Sukoharjo, on 18 September.
Here the communist armed forces consisted mainly of PESINDO and the
19 1navy units of Soejoto's Brigade and Yadao's Brigade. These
forces were joined by units of the Red Army from Ponorogo which had 
established themselves at Bendosari in the region of Sukoharjo on 
22 September. At Bendosari the Red Army kidnapped the leaders 
of Masyumi, PNI and some village headmen, including Martodihardjo, 
the village headmSwfl of Toriyo and the local leader of STII.'5'22
119 'Laporan Djawatan Kepolisian Negara Jogjakarta', typescript, 
2 March 1948, Bundle B.35/35, ANRI.
120 The term Tentara Merah was applied to armed units under the 
PKI at the time, at least by non-PKI people, mainly because 
their members wore red bands on the head and arm. They were 
also referred to as the Tentara Musso.
121 'Surakarta', Bundle B.26/48, ANRI.
122 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
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From 22 to 26 September, the Red Army continued to kidnap prominent 
pamong praja, from regents down to subdistrict officers, as well 
as political leaders who were not leftists.
A detailed plan had been made by Sadikin's Siliwangi
Brigade in Surakarta to occüpy the strongholds of the PK1 in the
areas of Sukoharjo and Wonogiri, and then to move down to the coastal
region of Pacitan in East Java. Sadikin ordered two Siliwangi
battalions to attack the PKI strongholds in these areas, and these
were strengthened by Battalion 14 from the Fifth Brigade of Senopati
Battle Command (PPS), which was based in the Pacitan area and
headed by Major Slamel Rijadi, who was not among the communist-
123influenced Senopati officers.
As the Siliwangi battalions began to attack the PKI
strongholds at; Grogol and Bendosari, the Red Army withdrew to the
south into Wonogiri regency. At the village of Tirtomoyo, one of
the PKI strongholds in Wonogiri, about seventy km south of Surakarta
124city, the Red Army killed their prisoners. The new Military
Governor of Surakarta, Colonel Gatot Subroto, publiclyAnnounced the
mass killing at Tirtomoyo. Most of the victims were policemen
125and pamong praja, and a few were prominent Muslims. According
to the report of the Nasuhi Battalion, at least fifty-six policemen
■j 2  0and pamong praja had been killed by the Red Army. There were about
200 prisoners at Tirtomoyo. A captured PKI document stated that
123 Interview with the members of Barisan Banteng in July /August 
1979; Sastrolawu, 12, 13 October 1979. The lasykar units
of the Barisan Banteng, the Hizbullah and a portion of the 
Sastrolawu Battalion were ordered to assist Umar Wirahadikusumah 
in taking the PKI stronghold at Ngawi, about sixty-five km 
to the east of Surakarta city.
124 The Sukoharjo prisoners who were killed were Tjitrohupojo 
Honggopati (regent), Hardjodiningrat (deputy regent),
Prodjosonto (district officer), and Tantopranoto (subdistrict 
officer). Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
L25 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.312.
126 Siliwangi dari masa, p.159.
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Yadao Brigade intended to kill these prisoners also, but owing to the
12 7sudden attack of the Siliwangi troops many of them were released.
In the early weeks of Oclober the Communists withdrew their
forces from rural areas of Wonogiri and concentrated on defending
their stronghold in Pacitan, which was taken by Siliwangi troGps on 
12 815 October. ~ The mopping-up operation by the Nasuhi Battalion
in Wonogiri was completed by the last week of October. The majority
of the communist armed forces at Wonogiri had consisted of members of
the Yadao Brigade, the Soejoto Brigade and a portion of the Red
Array from Madiun. The Nasuhi and Slamet Rijadi Battalions went on
to capture the leading pro-PKI officers of the Senopati Battle
Command at the PKI stronghold of Baturetno, Wonogiri. Among those
taken were Lieutenant-Colonel Yadao, Lieutenant-Colonel Samsudin,
an active promotor of the Surakarta PEPOLIT training, and Major
Suwitojo, the PESINDO commander of the Ninth Brigade of the Senopati 
129Battle Command. By early November Sukohardjo and Wonogiri
were completely free of armed communists.
According to official sources in Surakarta, about 2,500
members of the Surakarta PKI had been captured by the Republican
130government troops. For the most part, captives were taken in the
last week of September and early weeks of October, so t-hat by mid-
131October there were hardly any more prisoners coming in. Some
PESINDO members had in fact already been captured a few days after 
the uprising broke out. The captures were mainly carried out by 
Siliwangi troops and by Senopati soldiers who remained loyal to the
127 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.312.
128 Siliwangi dari masa, p.160.
129 Interview with Sastrolawu, 12, 13 October 1979.
130 Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953, Surakarta.
131 Interview with former prisoners of the Manahan camp, Sardjono, 
August 1979; Bodronojo, September 1979; Pawiro Granggang, 
September 1979.
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government, particularly members of the Slamet Rijadi Battalion.
In their duties, these were helped by the TP, the Hizbullah and the
Barisan Banteng. The captured PKI supporters were collected in an
emergency camp at Manahan, a wide square in the city of Surakarta,
132where they were closely guarded by Siliwangi troops. Prisoners'
families could visit them only by standing on the street surrounding 
the camp and could provide meals for them only through the camp 
office. This was necessary because the government could not give 
proper meals as the local budget was concentrated on the expenses of 
the army units and the badan perjuangan which still continued to 
suppress PKI supporters hiding on the slopes of Mount Lawu and Mount 
Wilis.
The Surakarta PKI prisoners consisted mostly of members of 
PESINDO and the FDR, pro-PKI elements of the Senopati Division, 
activists of Sarbupri and Sobsi, prominent members of the BTI and 
pro-PKI Pokoso activists. In less than three months most of the 
PKI prisoners were released by the government, for on 19 December 
the Dutch initiated their second military action, attacking the 
territories of the Republic. All, however, were not freed; according 
to two of the prisoners, Sardjono and Bodronojo, tens of captives 
were killed, particularly prominent members of FDR and PESINDO.
The operations of the Republican armed forces had
completely defeated the PKI uprising. The most senior communist
leaders were captured by the Republican armed forces, or in some
cases killed during the battles. Amir Sjarifuddin, Maruto Darusman,
Suripno, Djokosujono and seven other leaders who had been in prison
were simply shot at the village of Ngalian, Karanganyar regency, at
133midnight on 19 December 1948. Musso himself was killed in a
132 Originally, Manahan was a horse-racing track and a football 
field. In the Manahan camp there were more than 3,000 prisoners. 
Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
133 The seven other leaders were Oey Gie Hwat, Katamhadi, Ronomarsono, 
D. Mangku, Sardjono, Harjono and Sukarno. See Sedjarah Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro (Djawa 
Tengah) (Semarang, Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII, Diponegoro, n.d.), 
p.190.
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skirmish at the village of Semanang, Ponorogo, on 31 October. His
134corpse, at the request of the Madiun people, was burned in Madiun.
Although the climax of the internal revolutionary conflict 
is associated with Madiun, Surakarta was in reality the main centre 
in which the building-up of tensions occurred. Because the conflict 
was resolved through military not political means, it resulted in 
the creation of a much higher degree of unity in the army, on the 
basis of a nationalist and anti-communist ideology. At the same 
time, however, a deep-seated division within society at large 
continued. In Surakarta, as elsewhere, revolutionary leadership moved 
to the right.
134 A detailed contemporary report about the capture of Musso was 
made by Soemarno. See Djamal Marsudi, op.cit., pp.102-06.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE GUERRILLA PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH
THE DUTCH ATTACK: DECEMBER 1948
By early December 1948, relations between the Republic 
and the Dutch had reached a critical stage. Both informal discussions 
and more formal negotiations between Hatta's cabinet and the Dutch 
were deadlocked. A series of meetings held at Kaliurang near 
Jogjakarta in early December between Hatta, Stikker, the Dutch Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, and Sassen, Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories, 
did not produce anything. Sassen demanded that the Republic disband 
the TNI and exercise only police duties within the projected Federal 
Indonesian Government. Hatta and other Republican leaders refused 
this demand, stating that it would be impossible to disband the TNI 
because it had struggled for independence since the Republic of 
Indonesia was born.^
On 11 December the Dutch announced officially that theie
would be no more negotiations with the Republic, for neither formal
negotiations nor informal ones through the mediation of the Three
Nations Commission would be of any further use.^ This decision
was designed to accelerate Dutch plans for the formation of the
federal United States of Indonesia. On 18 December at 6 a.m. the
Dutch radio in Jakarta announced that the Dutch would proceed with
3their plans to form a federal Indonesia without the Republic.
On the same date Merle Cochran, the US representative on the Three 
Nations Committee, brought before that body a letter from the Dutch
4stating that Holland was terminating the Renville Agreement.
1 For details about the negotiations of Hatta with Stikker and 
Sassen see Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.536-38.
2 Republik Indonesia: Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta ( Kernenterian
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1952), p.294.
3 Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, p.539.
4 Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution, p.296.
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The crisis in relations between the Republic and the Dutch
was quickly followed by a Dutch attack. The Dutch air force began
to attack the Jogjakarta airport, Maguwo, on 19 December at 6 a.m.
The Dutch dropped paratroops on the airport, and special troops
5then began to move on the city of Jogjakarta.
While the Dutch attack was going on, President Sukarno 
held an emergency cabinet meeting which could be attended by only 
a few Ministers: Dr Leimena (Minister of Health), Djuanda (Communi­
cations) , Laoh (Public Works), Sultan Hamengkubuwono (Minister of 
State), II.A. Salim (Foreign A f f a i r s ) O t h e r  Ministers were 
unavailable, witn Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Minister of Welfare, 
on tour in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, and Maramis, the Minister of
7Finance, with other Republican leaders in India. The cabinet made
a number of important decisions. Firstly, President Sukarno and
Vice-President Iiatta would stay in Jogjakarta so that they could
retain contact with the Three Nations Committee. Secondly, the
Vice-President was authorized, as Minister of Defence, to announce
that the army and the people must continue to carry out guerrilla
warfare against the Dutch army. Thirdly, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,
since he was in Sumatra, was authorized to form an Emergency Government
and to take over the authority of the central government at Jogjakarta.
On the same date the radio of the Republic at Jogjakarta announced
9these government decrees.
There was little resistance to the Dutch occupation of the
5 For details on the Dutch attack and the situation of the 
Republican Government at Jogjakarta, see Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, 
pp.540-42; also, A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia, vol.9, pp.186-90.
6 See Major-General T.B. Simatupang's report, Laporan Dari
Banaran: Kisah Pengalaman Seorang Prajurit Selama Perang
Kemerdekaan, new edition (Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1980), p.8. 
See also Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.541, 543.
7 Repubiik Indonesia: Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, p.295.
8 Mohammad hatta, Memoii, pp.541-42.
9 The full text of these decrees may be found in Daerah Istimewa 
Jogjakarta, pp.295-97.
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capital, except for a small battle around the Presidential palace.10 
Most of the Republican troops, in accordance with the previously 
planned guerrilla policy, had been leaving the city to establish 
their strongholds in rural areas. The Dutch captured Sukarno, Hatta, 
Sutan Sjahrir and other Republican leaders who still remained in 
the city. On 22 December all of them were imprisoned either on 
the island of Bangka or in the town of Prapat, Sumatra. Fortunately, 
General Sudirman had left the city on the afternoon of 19 December 
and was able to take direct charge of the guerrilla troops.1^
Sultan Hamengkubuwono remained in his kraton, but refused an invitation 
to cooperate with the Dutch, and later he even actively financed 
guerrilla troops and Republican officials who still coerated in the13city.
ihe fall of Jogjakarta left other Republican territory
open to attack by Dutch troops. On 19 December the Dutch air force
also bombed the radio station at Delanggu,14 and made aerial drops of
pamphlets urging the people to see that the TNI would be much better
15tff handing over their weapons to the Dutch. On the morning of 
20 December the Dutch air force attacked the radio transmitter 
building at Tawangmangu, in Karanganyar regency. Most of its equipment 
was damaged, but some was successfully evacuated to Balong, a village
10 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.9, pp.186-87.
11 For details, see Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.542-50.
12 During the next five days, General Sudirman and his army 
guard contacted guerrillas in areas in Surakarta and East Java 
in the course of an extended march; Nasution, Sekitar, vol.9, 
pp.187-90.
13 Ibid., p.192.
14 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979.
15 Interview with Haji Bakri, 15 August 1979; Haji Suradji,
11 August 1979.
16 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
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on the slopes of Mount Lawu. Under the control of the 'radio struggle
group', BaJong became the radio station of the Republic during the
17s e cond Dutch aggression.
On 20 December Lieutenant-Colonel Slamet Rijadi, the
commander of the Fifth Brigade at Surakarta, under the broader authority
of Gatot Subroto, ordered the army, the pemuda and the people to
carry out a scorched-earth (bumi hangus) policy in the region of
Surakarta. At six p.m. the army and the student army (TP) began to
burn all important buildings, such as the post office, the army
18headquarters, government offices and the markets. in the regency
of Klaten most tobacco factories, sugar factories, texnle factories,
and other important buildings were completed gutted by the local 
, 19people. In Sragen the regency office and other government buildings
were also burned down. Because of a lack of dynamite, the army and
the pemuda did not succeed in blowing up the whole of the Sragen sugar 
_ 20factory. The scorched-earth policy was carried out in all regencies 
of Surakarta before the Dutch entered the regency towns.
On 21 December Dutch troops occupied a damaged city of 
Surakarta. The Republican army, led by Colonel Gatot Subroto, the 
Military Governor of the Surakarta region, had left the city, accompanied 
by most Republican officials, and formed a guerrilla government in 
the rural areas. Neither the Susuhunan nor the Mangkunegoro, however, 
left the city, and in fact both rulers seemed to welcome the Dutch 
return. Pakubuwono XII, under the strong influence of his mother and 
°f KRT Sosrodiningrat, the experienced patih under Pakubuwono XI who 
had returned to that position in late 1946, decided to help the Dutch
17 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah (Djakarta, Kernenterian
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), pp.160-61.
18 Interview with Sudijo, 31 October 1979. According to this 
informant, TP, Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah all took an important 
part in the scorched-earth policy.
19 Panitya Monumen Perjoangan '45 Klaten (ed.), Sejarah Perjuangan 
Rakyat Kabupaten Klaten (Klaten, 1976), p.153.
20 Interview with Panudi, 27 July 1979. In Sragen the AMS 
(Young Generation of Sukowati) took the leading role in the 
scorched-earth tactics.
ri ■:
■
■
. m
The army and the pemuda burned the Surakarta 
municipality building shortly before the Dutch 
entered the Surakarta city.
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.221.
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government in the city rather than the Republic Government. Although 
the Susuhunan himself had considered joining the Surakarta guerrilla 
government, he was too weak to defy the opposition of his mother 
and the patih. The patih set up a so-called Ontvangst Comite 
(Reception Committee) in order to welcome the Dutch,21 and the patih 
of the Mangkunegaran appeared to take his cues from Sosrodiningrat.
A few weeks after the Dutch occupation the rulers secretly allowed 
the Dutch to visit their kratons. This contrasted sharply with the 
attitude of the Jogjakarta rulers, who steadfastly refused to allow 
any Dutch visits to the kratons.
Within a week the Dutch occupied the regency towns in 
Surakarta. Most of their forces were based in Klaten regency, so 
as to control the largest plantation areas in Surakarta, and most 
of the place where Dutch troops were garrisoned, such as Ketandun,
Ceper, Gondangwinangun, Tegalrejo, Karanganom, Cokrotulung and 
Delanggu, were centres of plantations and factories.22
While the Republican troops and the pemuda carried out 
guerrilla war against the Dutch, the Republican leaders endeavoured 
to continue their diplomacy. Indeed, from a diplomatic point of 
view, the second Dutch military action did not much help Dutch plans 
to defeat the Republic. Most of the federal states, although they had 
been set up under Dr H.J. van Mook, did not support the Dutch action/3 
After February 1949 the Dutch allowed Republican politicians who were not 
imprisoned, to visit Sukarno, Hatta and the other leaders in Bangka. 
Apparently this resulted from urgings of the Three Nations Committee 
and the United Nations that the Dutch continue their diplomacy with 
the Republic rather than their aggression. The republican politicians 
discussed a transfer of sovereignty as planned by the Dutch. The 
Republican Government would agree to discuss such a transfer if the
21 interview with KRT Darjonegoro, 30 December 1979.
Panitya Monomen Perjoangan '45 Klaten, op.cit., p.154.
According to this source, the Dutch troops in the region of 
Klaten constituted some two battalions.
23 Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia (London, The Cresset 
Press, 1955), pp.250, 252.
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R e p u b l i c  r e g a i n e d  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  a t  J o g j a k a r t a . “ H ow ever ,  t h e  R e p u b l i c  
c o n t i n u e d  h e r  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  D u tch  t h r o u g h  d i p l om asi  and  p e r j u a n g a i  
u n t i l  a  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  was a c h i e v e d  i n  A u g u s t  1950
NATURE OF THE DUTCH OCCUPATION, DECEMBER 1948-MARCH 1949
The s e c o n d  D u tch  a g g r e s s i o n  c o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  an  e f f o r t
t o  d e s t r o y  th e  R e p u b l i c  by  f o r c e  and  t o  im p le m e n t  t h e  D u tch  s t r a t e g y
and  t a c t i c s  o f  b u i l d i n g  a f e d e r a l  s y s t e m .  M i l i t a r y  a g g r e s s i o n  w as
c o m p le m e n te d ,  h o w e v e r ,  by  t h e  o l d  D u tch  p o l i c y  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  l o c a l
25
a r i s t o c r a t s  t o  commit t h e m s e l v e s  t o  an a n t i - R e p u b l i c a n  s t a n c e .
A l th o u g h  t h e  D u tch  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  w in  t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e r s  
i n  J o g j a k a r t a ,  t h e y  s u c c e e d e d  w i t h  t h e  r u l e r s  o f  t h e  S u r a k a r t a  
p r i n c i p a l i t i e s .
The f i r s t  D u tch  p l a n  i n  S u r a k a r t a  was t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  f o r m e r
a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  r u l e r s  t h r o u g h  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  l o c a l  f e d e r a l
s t a t e  u n d e r  t h e  t i t l e  N e g a ra  M a ta ra m , a im in g  t o  ev o k e  t h e  g l o r y  o f
t h a t  s t a t e  i n  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  I t s  g o v e rn m e n t  was t o  be
c h a i r e d  by  t h e  S u s u h u n a n ,  and  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  w o u ld  e m b ra ce  t h e  fo r m e r
t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  b o t h  t h e  K a su n an an  and  t h e  M a n g k u n e g a ra n . T h i s  p l a n
f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  M angkunegoro  dem anded t h a t  t h e  D u tch  s e t  up  two
s e p a r a t e  l o c a l  g o v e rn m e n ts  i n  S u r a k a r t a .  The D u tch  t h e m s e l v e s ,  a s
a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  p r e s s u r e  from  t h e  g u e r r i l l a  t r o o p s ,
a b a n d o n e d  t h i s  p l a n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  more im m e d ia te  g o a l s .  The D u tch
a l s o  f a i l e d  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a Dewan I s l a m  ( I s l a m i c
C om m ittee )  f o r  S u r a k a r t a .  The Dewan I s l a m  was i n t e n d e d  t o  e n r o l  t h e
p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  o f  Moslem l e a d e r s ,  an d  i t  was f i r s t  a p p l i e d  i n
S u r a k a r t a .  A f t e r  i t s  f a i l u r e  t h e r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  was n o t  a t t e m p t e d
e l s e w h e r e  i n  J a v a .  Two p r o m i n e n t  Moslem l e a d e r s  o f  S u r a k a r t a ,  I d r i s
and  M u l j a d i  D jo jo m a r to n o ,  b o t h  f o r m e r  P e t a  o f f i c e r s ,  r e j e c t e d  t h e
D u tch  o f f e r  t o  l e a d  t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  p r o m p t i n g  t h e  D u tch  t o  i m p r i s o n  
26b o t h  men b r i e f l y .
24 H a t t a ,  M em oir , p . 5 4 9 .
25 S ee  C. S m i t t ,  De I n d o n e s i s c h e  Q u a e s t i e  (L e id e n ,  E . J .  B r i l l ,  
1 9 5 2 ) ,  p p . 1 0 4 -1 2 ;  c f .  0 .  Damste and  B. J i l d e r d a ,  N e d e r i a n d -  
I n d o n e s i e  ( B a t a v i a ,  N o o r d h o f f - K o l f f , 1 9 4 8 ) ,  p p . 8 8 - 9 1 .
26 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  H a j i  B a k r i ,  15 A u g u s t  1 9 7 9 .
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The Dutch were more successful in forming the TBS (Territoriale 
Bataljon Surakarta). The TBS was an auxiliary military force of 
the Dutch, and its existence strengthened the alliance between the 
Dutch and. the Mangkunegaran in Surakarta. The TBS consisted mostly 
of former members of the Mangkunegaran Legion, the traditional 
armed force loyal to the Mangkunegoro. As part of the Dutch armed
2 7forces it was under the control of the Dutch Resident of Surakarta, 
and its members made up two battalions.
The Dutch also strengthened the Semut Ireng ('Black Ants') 
force which had been recruited by the Mangkunegaran prior to the 
Dutch occupation to guard the security of the palace. Most of the 
members of this force, which was expanded to almost 500 men under 
the Dutch, had also been members of the Mangkunegaran legion.
They were conspicuous by the black uniforms they wore.
The Dutch also armed these Semut Ireng troops specifically
to enable the Mangkunegoro to guard his sugar plantations and factories.
Although the rulers' estates had been taken over by the Republic 
2 8since May 1946, the Dutch occupation enabled the rulers, particularly
the Mangkunegoro, to regain control of these estates. Some workers,
who wished to continue to labor on the plantation estates and the
factories, accepted positions under Dutch control. Most of them,
however, such as those at the Mangkunegoro's Colomadu and Tasikmadu
sugar factories, left their jobs, with some of them returning to
their former peasant status and a few joining the guerrilla troops 
29in their villages. The assistance given by the Semut Ireng force 
to the Dutch armed forces intensified the resentment of the people 
of Surakarta toward the Mangkunegoro. API, a Surakarta newspapar
asserted:
27 Berita Solo, no.23, April 1949. According to Mangkunegaran 
sources, the TBS was outside the Mangkunegaran's responsibility. 
Surakarta revolutionaries, however, believed the TBS was 
planned, jointly by the Dutch and the Mangkunegoro.
28 See above, pp.135-36.
29 This data is taken from interview with former Mangkunegaran
officials: KRMT Sanjoto, 6 July 1979; Soedjono, 9 July 1979;
Marjono, 9 July 1979; Sudarjo, 14 July 1979.
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Do you know that Semut Ireng which is fully armed, 
intends to confront your own nation and to help 
protect the security of the Dutch. We (the people 
of Surakarta) warn you tt^ gt the people may attack, 
burn and rob the palace.
The Dutch were successful in attracting the support of the
Susuhunan, who provided facilities for Dutch administrative offices
in the Gladag area of the kraton. In April the Dutch convened a
meeting among the nobles of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran at
Sidi.koro, a special meeting room inside the kraton of the Susuhunan.
About 1U0 men attended. The Dutch were represented by Colonel J.H.
de Vries, the military commander in Surakarta, Resident Linck and
Major Bajetto. The meeting discussed a plan for the development of
the region of Surakarta, as a way of obtaining popular support to
31strengthen the Dutch government.
Administratively, some of the functions of the rulers, 
under the categories of general affairs, economic affairs, social 
affairs, and government affairs, were restored by the Dutch. Only 
security affairs remained in the hands of the Dutch armed forces, 
so that they could respond directly to the changing situation in the 
Surakarta region. New kepala kampung (hamlet heads) were appointed 
in each area of the city by the two rulers, in the hope of strengthening 
their authority. This caused some confusion, for it meant that 
certain areas, such as the Banjarsari neighbourhood, now had two 
types of kepala kampung, those appointed by the Republic and those 
by the Susuhunan.
The Dutch, seeing the situation in constitutional terms, 
planned to establish the principalities of Surakarta as an autonomous 
area which would join the projected Indonesian Federation. The 
rulers, seeing in this the reincarnation of their swapraja hopes, 
responded positively to the Dutch plan. Within a few months, in 
August 1949, this issue once again created intense conflicts between 
pro- and anti-swapraja forces.
3° API, no.3, 3 March 1949.
31 Berita Solo, no.23, 12 April 1949.
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As was the case generally in Republican Java, the region
of Surakarta had suffered seriously from life's hardships since the
first Dutch action on 21 July 1947. This was caused by the Dutch
blockade, preventing the Republic from importing vital goods, such as
cloth, rice and oil. The Surakarta official source, Penerangan Rakjat,
reported that the people of Surakarta were experiencing difficulties in
32obtaining clothing and foodstuffs. Most markets in the regency towns
had no more stocks of clothing or food. In November 1947 the Surakarta
government had launched a great movement to induce peasants co plant
33cotton, aiming to boost stocks of cloth. In early 1948 the food
shortage became so acute that foodstuffs were effectively controlled by
the Panitya Pembagian Bahan Makanan (Foodstuffs Distribution Committee) of
Surakarta. This was chaired by Sndiro, the head of the DPD, who imposed a
34policy prohibiting merchants from accumulating food supplies.
Several weeks before the second Dutch aggression, the rice
merchants in the city markets had been ordered by the walikota of
Surakarta to sell their rice to the local Republican government.
Compensation for the rice was given in the form of petroleum and 
35refined sugar. The main goal of this move was to retain rice 
stocks in the hands of the Republican Government so that Chinese 
merchants could not control the rice trade.
In the first months of 1949 the price of rice was very 
high in most regions of Java. This was chiefly because of the 
war, which made it difficult for agricultural produce to enter 
the cities. The Surakarta evidence shows that after the occupation 
trade relationships between villages and regency towns did not run 
smoothly. Only a few shops remained open, most of them owned by 
Chinese. Many city people left the towns for the villages to be 
secure from the Dutch attacks, and this influx added to the fear 
village merchants had about entering the towns. All of this 
interrupted normal commercial transactions between town and country.
32 Penerangan Rakjat 
1947.
, no.83, 25 November 1947; no.85, 27 November
33 Penerangan Rakjat , no.83, 25 November 1947.
34 Wasita, no.13, 20 March 1948.
35 Pengumuman Walikota Surakarta, no.15, 2 November 1948.
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The price of goods was unstable. Already several months before the 
Dutch occupation of December 1948 the price of rice in many cities 
of Java was between f. 160 and f. 185 per quintal, rising to f. 185 
in January 1949. As a result of Dutch controls the price then began 
to decrease till it reached f. 60 per quintal in May.
The Dutch also suffered from the high prices for rice, 
particularly in supplying food for their soldiers. Therefore the 
Dutch commander in Surakarta, Colonel de Vries, issued a decree in 
January attempting to regulate the price of foodstuffs in the city.
For instance, the price of rice was fixed at 50 guilder cents per
o nkg, refined sugar at 20 cents per kg and corn at 25 cents per kg.
As a result of the Dutch occupation the people of Surakarta
used both the federal (Dutch-recognized) currency and the Republican
currency, the so-called ORI (Oeang Repoeblik Indonesia - Indonesian
Republic Currency). This situation created difficulties for both
sellers and buyers in their commercial transactions. In some cases
the urban pemuda of Surakarta prohibited merchants from using the
federal currency. Apparently the Dutch in Surakarta tried to decrease
the rate of exchange for the ORI, or even to replace it altogether
by the federal currency. The Dutch collected the ORI, aiming to
reduce the amount in circulation so that the federal currency could
gradually replace the ORI. In retaliation the Surakarta guerrilla
troops issued a decree fixing the rate of exchange between ORI and
39federal currency in the ratio of 10 to 1.
The Surakarta rural case studies show that villagers had
difficulty getting the Ori. They fulfilled their daily needs with
40a barter system in the local markets. The federal currency had been 
prohibited from circulating in rural areas by the village guerrillas.
36 Economische Weekblad voor Indonesie, no.15, 9 April 1949.
37 Pengumuman Pemerintah Pendudukan Belanda: Territorial Onder-
Commando Surakarta, no.3, 5 January 1949.
38 Interview with Eaji Bakri, 15 August 1979.
39 Pengumuman Pasukan Gerilya Surakarta, no.l, 12 March 1949.
40 interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Darmanto, 8 October 
1979; Bahkran, 11 October 1979.
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In addition, the Republican subdistrict government prohibited the 
sale of rice production in large amounts in the city markets. This 
policy was intended to build local stocks of rice so that no area 
was excessively dependent upon other areas to fulfil its needs, but 
it was also one of the reasons why the price of rice in the towns 
was unstable. The Republican military government of Surakarta 
prohibited Chinese traders from living in the subdistrict centres.
In many cases Chinese traders had been compelled by the Dutch to 
support their economic policy, particularly Dutch efforts to accumulate 
a food supply. For instance, the family of Babah Kidjang, a rich 
Chinese in Sragen, had to sell their large stock of food to the 
Dutch at prices lower than the normal rate.
Such Chinese actions, even though they were insisted on
by the Dutch, gave rise to a negative feeling againsL the Chinese in
Surakarta, when the people of Surakarta thought that the Chinese were
supporting the Dutch. As a result, an anti-Chinese movement appeared.
In the early months of 1949 n few Chinese merchants were killed in
Gondang and Kedawung, two subdistricts of Sragen regency. Many
Chinese houses in the subdistrict of Baturetno (Wonogiri regency;
41were burned by Republican forces. In early February 1949 the
Eng Bo shop, the biggest Chinese shop in Surakarta, was burned by
42pemuda and guerrilla troops.
Apparently the unstable economic conditions, compounded
by the war, caused social unrest in both urban and rural areas of
Surakarta. Some villagers suffered from malnutrition, for example
43in Jumapolo, one of the dry areas in Surakarta. The same problem
occurred in the city of Surakarta, particularly in Pasar Kliwon,
44Tipes, Joyotakan, Joyosuran, Semanggi and Sangkrah. Robbery 
also increased during the Dutch occupation, as a response to the war
41 1Laporan Pemerintahan Distrik Baturetno', 1948, AMN.
42 API, no.l, 17 February 1949.
43 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
44 Berita Solo, no.59, 27 May 1949.
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and the economic hardship. Cattle theft occurred in many rural
areas of Surakarta. The Surakarta weekly, API, classified the
robbers into three categories: professional robbers; supporters of
the Republic, consisting mostly of guerrilla troops who robbed richer
pro-Dutch city people, for instance Chinese traders; and kaki tangan
(supporters) of the Dutch, who stole the property of the people to
create a chaotic situation in the territories of the Republic. This
45was planned by the Dutch, according to API.
in short, the Dutch aggression succeeded in occupying 
!he cities and towns, forcing the Republican Government out into 
I he countryside. In Lire economic field, tills had the effect ol 
disrupting trade relationships between urban and rural areas.
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION 7vND ITS OPERATION
The basic idea behind the system of guerrilla warfare
pursued by the Republic was derived from Colonel A.H. Nasution's
experiences of fighting against the Dutch in West Java during the
46first Dutch action in 1947. With the outbreak of the second Dutch 
action on 19 December 1948, Nasution as Commander of the Army find the 
Java lerritorium issued, on 22 December, a decree establishing a 
Military Administration for the whole of the island of Java.47 
This was amplified by a working instruction dated 25 December dealing 
with the formation of new military government authorities.4  ^ There 
were also civil authorities in Java, such as resident, regent, camat 
(subdistrict officer) and village headman.
45 API, no.3, 3 March 1949.
46 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, vol.6, 
pp.97-122, 332-35.
47 A.H. Nasution, Pokok2 Gerilya (Djakarta, Pembimbing Masa, 1964), 
P-118. See also A.H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla 
Warfare (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p.119.
48 The new military government authorities were as follows: 
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces; Commander of the Army 
and Java Territorium; Military Governor; Military Regional 
Commands or Sub-territorial Commands (STC); Military District 
Commands (KDM) ; Military Subdistrict Commands (KODM) ,- Village 
Cadre (Kader Desa); and Hamlet Cadre (Kader Dukuh). Nasution, 
Pokok2, p .120; Nasution, Fundamentals, p.121.
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The military government of Central Java, following Nasution1s
working instruction, was divided into two authorities. The Second
Military Governorship or the Second Division, headed by Colone] Gatot
Subroto, consisted of STC Semarang, STC Pati, STC Surakarta and STC
Madiun. The Third Military Governorship or the Third Division,
headed by Colonel Bambang Sugeng, consisted of STC Banyumas, STC
Pekalongan, STC Kedu and STC Jogjakarta. Each STC delineated an area
49of the guerrilla operation and was called a Wehrkreise . Each 
wehrkreisc was divided into sub-wehrkreise. The Wehrkreise Surakarta 
consisted of seven sub-wehrkreise, each operating in a different 
regency, including one in the city of Surakarta itself.
On the other hand, military control of government was 
exercised through the PMKB (Pemerintahan Militer Kabupaten - Regency 
Military Government) and PMKT (Pemerintahan Militer Kecamatan -• 
Subdistrict Military Government). In addition, there was also a 
civil administration which followed the lines of the former divisions - 
regency, district, subdi.strict and village.
Thus the region of Surakarta, under the system of guerrilla 
government, had three different authorities: the operational
authority, the military territorial authority and the- civil administrative 
authority. The last two functioned as the agent of the Republic, 
carrying out the tasks of government in the fields of general affairs, 
economic affairs, community affairs and defence. In practice the 
two authroties united in the PMKB at regency and PMKT at subdistrict 
level, both of which therefore contained both military men and civilians.
Apparently the PMKT groups in Surakarta played a leading
role in orgemizing the guerrilla troops in rural areas. For instance,
Lieutenant Kasimo, a former Peta officer and the head of the Bendosari
KNID, who was the head of the Bendosari PMKT from 1948 to 1950,
explained that the Bendosari PMKT set up Pager Desa (Pasukan Gerilya
50Desa - Village Guerrilla Troops) in February 1949. This was based
49 'Wehrkreise' is a German term for a defence area (wilayah
pertahanan), T.B. Simatupang, Laporan, p.257. Cf. Nasution, 
Fundamentals, p.121.
50 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
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on Nasution's instruction to the Military Governors on 25 January
511949 that Pager Desa had to be formed for the whole of Java. The 
Bendosari Pager Desa was comprised mostly of rural pemudas who had 
experienced military training at the Lasykar Rakyat1s dormitory at 
Bendosari. Some of them had received military training in the Seinendan 
during the Japanese occupation. The leader of the Bendosari Pager 
Desa was the commander of the sub-wehrkreise of Sukaharjo.
The Pager Desa of other subdistricts, such as Kedawung and 
Jumapolo, were made up of rural pemuda who had joined the Barisan 
Banteng. A few of them were former members of Lasykar Rakyat. Most 
were illiterate pemuda. The Pager Desa of Kedawung was under the 
auspices of the sub-wehrkreise of Sragen, and that of Jumapolo 
Pager Desa under the sub-Wehrkreise of Karanganyar. Apparently 
the Pager Desa at Delanggu had a more varied membership, consisting 
of Hizbullah, Lasykar Rakyat, leftist pemuda such as PESINDO members, 
and students of the High School. It was under the auspices of the 
sub-wehrkreise of Klaten.
The distribution of army units in each subdistrict was
based on the demands of military strategy, not on the importance of
the subdistrict. To see this, we can compare four of our, .selected^ ___
subdistricts in the context of military strategy. In Jumapolo,
because its location was far from the Dutch headquarters, there was
only a small army unit consisting mainly of soldiers of the PMKT
52and other mobile troops from other subdistricts. The subdistrict
of Delanggu, on the other hand, needed a force of more than one company.
The main reason for this was to face the Dutch troops who made their
53headquarters in the factory of Delanggu. The Bendosari subdistrict, 
with its surrounding area, was considered the ideal place to resist 
the advance of Dutch troops to areas south of the city of Surakarta.
51 A.H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol.3 (Djakarta,
Seruling Masa, 1971), pp.139-41.
52 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
53 Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979.
54Several companies were therefore located there. There was only
one platoon for the subdistrict of Kedawung, apart from mobile army
55units from other PMKT.
The Surakarta Wehrkreise consisted in all of over 6,000
men, including TP members, who were distributed in more than 100
56subdistricts. The Surakarta Wehrkreise concentrated its defence
in Klaten regency. The Dutcii had placed two battalions there in
order to control the biggest concentration of estates in Surakarta,
and the Republic countered by stationing more than one battalion
57in the Klaten region.
These army unius in their guerrilla operations were closely 
integrated with the Pager Desa. The Surakarta evidence shows 
that Pager Desa were coordinated by lurahs assisted by kebayan (heads 
of hamlet). There were small units of Pager Desa located at the
(hamlet) level. The Pager Desa's main function was to guard 
village security. Pemuda members of the Pager Desa were usually 
veterans of various badan perjuangan organizations. During the 
guerrilla period, however, they became very close to army units, 
assisting them actively in various tasks. A characteristic Pager 
Desa role was to barricade roads, either with crossbars or by digging 
ditches acioss them. Special targets were the roads connecting 
Surakarta city with regency towns or the regency towns with the 
subdistrict centres. tor instance, the roads between Sragen and the 
subdistrict centres of that regency — Kedawung, Masaran, Gondang, 
Tangen and Sambirejo -- were completely destroyed by the guerrilla 
troops. Pager Desa also participated alongside army units in small 
night attacks on the Dutch garrisons. The preparations for night 
attacks were summarized by one Kedawung guerrilla as follows:
54 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
55 Interview with Soekardi, 23 July 1979.
56 For details see Mengenang Palagan Empat Hari di Surakarta 
tanggal 7 s/d 10 Agustus 1949 (Surakarta, Panitva Seksi 
Penggali Sedjarah Monumen dan Sedjarah Militer Dam Diponegoro, 
1965), pp.24-30.
57 Perjoangan Rakyat Klaten, p.154.
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The members of the village guerrilla troops came 
in secret to a pre-determined place around dusk.
The members of the army had already arrived.
They dressed in black and green uniforms and tied 
red and white flags on their heads. After getting 
all the necessary information about the plan of 
attack, they shouted 'merdeka'. Then they simply 
left their base and went to the city in which the 
Dutch headquarters were.^8
Certain members of the Pager Desa, selected on the basis of education 
and experience, had responsibilities as couriers to link one post 
to the others. It is important to note that the members of the Pager 
Desa did not live in barracks but at their own houses, and regular 
soldiers as well were lodged at the villagers' houses.' Through 
the public kitchen system, coordinated by the lurahs and the PMKT, 
the villagers provided meals for the army.
In a broader context, the guerrillas also guarded the security 
of village markets, and attempted to control the fluctuations in 
prices of goods. As a result of speculation by the sellers, the price 
of goods nevertheless rose dramatically, particularly goods normally 
distributed from the city, such as dried salted fish, salt, petroleum, 
coconut oil and sugar. The sellers of these items were usually city 
traders who sold in the villages, and the price increases were simply 
caused by the danger of moving in and out of the cities. The Dutch 
sometimes seized people on the roads whether they were really merchants 
or guerrillas. Indeed it sometimes happened that guerrillas disguised 
themselves as merchants to try to investigate the strength and 
disposition of Dutch forces in the cities.
The relationship between the villages and the guerrillas 
was also influenced by the role of the village jago or the guru ngelmu 
who advised the army leaders on th pdtungan Jawa. In addition the 
3agt s house, in the case of Soekardi, was also a place of secret
58 Interview with Soekardi, 23 July 1979. Soekardi's house became 
a piace of night meetings of the guerrilla troops. Soekardi 
joined the PMKT in the section of food supply and headed the 
dapur umum at his village. See fuller notes in Bibliography.
59 I he Kedawung -use suggests that each family could look after 
only one or two soldiers. Interview with Soekardi, 8 July 1979.
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night meetings of the guerriJlas before trie launching of an attack
on a Dutch base.<jU The jago or the guru ngelmu advised the whole
guerrilla organization on moral questions, especially the so-called
waler (prohibition). The waler prohibited fighting men from having
illicit sexual relations or damaging people's property. Anyone who
61broke the waler would die a useless death (mati konyol).
One of the other problems in organizing guerrilla warfare
was finance. In the Surakarta case this was partly solved by the
dana perjuangan (struggle funds) system, which consisted of several
sources of income. Firstly, there might be a village market tax,
directly collected by the PMKT, as occurred at Tawangmangu, Kedawung,
and Delanggu. Another source was a tax collected from the production
6 2of agriculture, representing about 5 per cent of production.
This aimed to replace a land tax which had previously been collected 
by the lurah. This contribution, however, was apparently more than 
the normal land tax, for the peasants in these three subdistricts had 
in fact paid land tax in cash yearly to the amount of only 1 or 2 per 
cent of production. A third source of revenue was general contributions, 
such as the donation by the batik making cooperative of Surakarta,
Batari, of clothing and money for the city sub-wehrkreise.
All kinds of revenue sources had to be authorized by the 
Military Regional Government or by the PMKT. Moreover, there was a 
claim bureau which solved various problems of collecting funds, 
particularly if persons were not satisfied with the amount levied.^
64The struggle funds were often embezzled by the army members of PMKT.
In the use of the struggle funds, moreover, conflicts often took 
place between soldiers and civil administrators. Civil administrators 
were very critical of army men who misused the struggle funds.
60 For Soekardi's role with regard to the petungan Jawa, see above, p.76
61 Cf. Nugroho Notosusanto, 'The Effect of the "Gerilya" on the 
Military and Society', RIMA, vol.8, no.l, Jan.-June 1974, p.66.
62 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
63 Berita Solo, 21 November 1949.
64 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
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These army men were commonly called t.akang catut, a t-erm popularly 
used during the Japanese occupation to refer to corrupt people. One 
of the Surakarta newspapers, Waslta, referred to corrupt elements of
the revolutionary period as golongan sampali masyarakat (scum of
65society group). This group had neglected the poor (si miskin) 
and forgotten religion and the national struggle (perjuangan negara).
The spirit of guerrilla warfare was strengthened by radio
broadcasts, directed by Maladi, a pemuda who had been active in the
66Surakarta AMRI. During the Dutch occupation the transmitter was
at Balong, a village on the slopes of Mount Lawu. it broadcast news
of the guerrilla situation in Indonesian, English ana Dutch, about
four times a day. The balong transmitter could be picked up throughout
Java and Sumatra. Because its location was surrounded by hilly areas,
Dutch attacks on Lhe transmitter were unsuccessful until just before
the cease-fire in August 1949, when the Dutch air force bombed the
67Balong area, damaging part of the radio equipment.
The gerilya government, which secretly mobilized in the
villages, greatly increased the participation of the rural community
in the independence struggle. The rural community grew closer to the
Republican leaders. Ministers, governors, residents and regents
led their mobile government. An outstanding example was the experience
of Susanto Tirtoprodjo, the Minister of Justice. In his book,
Najaka Lalana, Susanto lias described his experience of joining the
guerrilla government which moved from one village to another in East 
68Java. The lurahs and other villagers looked after Susanto's and 
his friends' meals, in the spirit of the guerrilla struggle.
65 Wasita, no.i, x5 February 1948; no.6, 8 March 1948.
66 In 1934 Maladi had been a member of Solosche Radio Vereeniging
(SRV). During the occupation he headed the Surakarta radio 
station. See Republik Indonesia : Propinsi Djawa Tengah,
pp.155-63. Maladi was born on 31 August 1912 in Surakarta and 
was a graduate of AMS. See The Asia Who's Who (Hongkong,
1960), p.259.
67 For details about the Dutch attack at Balong see Republik
Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, pp.161-62.
68 Susanto Tirtoprodjo, Najaka Lalana (Djakarta, PP dan K, 1955).
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Susanto recalls military leaders, civilian administrators, village 
heads and villagers discussing important points with him. Such 
discussions would include consideration of how best to keep the 
guerrilla government's civil administrators safe while moving them 
about in areas threatened by Dutch attacks and Dutch spies.
Participation in such talks obviously would help to strengthen
69villagers' feelings that this government was their government.
At the local level throughout the Surakarta region, the 
bupatis and their staffs also secretly led their mobile government. 
Sometimes they met camats who were also mobilizing their loccil 
government. They slept and ate in the houses of the lurahs and the 
villagers. They always ate in village style - with sayur (vegetables), 
tempe (soya bean cake), gereh (dry, salted fish) and sambal (chili 
sauce). Like the villagers, the bupatis and their staffs had a 
simple breakfast of cassava (ketela pohon) and sweet potato (ubi).
Ac each house they stayed no more than five days. This served both 
to elude Dutch spies and to avoid placing too heavy a burden for 
meals on certain villages.
In practice the relations between civilian administrators 
and military leaders were conducted within the military government 
system, in such institutions as the PMKB and the PMKT. This meant 
that civilian administrators had less power than those who were 
military leaders. Most statutes regulating local security, identity 
cards for local travel, local market taxes and others were produced 
and legalized by the PMKT and signed by the military men who headed 
this PMKT.
The role of military men in the villages, however, seems to 
have been a more popular one than that of civilian leaders during 
the guerrilla period. Apparently this was because the military government 
system, through the PMKB and the PMKT, made military men seem more 
than civilian administrators to be wielding the actual power of 
government. Moreover the military men could be seen protecting the 
villagers from Dutch attacks and from other disturbances, such as
69 Ibid, pp.39-49.
Situation of the Surakarta city during the Dutch 
occupation December 1948-1949.
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p .1 /1.
One of city markets in Surakarta damaged as the result 
of battles between the Dutch and the guerrillas ,
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p .171.
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robberies and theft. And the PMKB and PMKT, through military 
government which was implemented, in fact designated the pamong praja 
as assistants in carrying out the guerrilla government. The dominance 
of the military in the government ended only in August 1950, when the 
Minister of Interior announced a decision that the government should 
be transferred to the hands of civilians.
During the guerrilla period, then, the military both 
controlled and appeared to control the civilian administration.
In these circumstances, relations between civilians and the military 
elite worsened as the status of the pamong praja dropped rapidly in 
comparison with the military. This had a serious effect in later 
periods, when the 1dwifungsi' of the army became an obvious fact in 
the Indonesian government bureaucracy, and laid the basis for political 
conflicts between civil administrators, particularly those who joined 
political parties, and the military elite in contemporary Indonesian 
society.
RETURN OF THE GUERRILLAS TO THE CITY
The Dutch occupation became a major issue at the United
Nations during January 1949. A United Nations Resolution of 28 January
placed the Netherlands Indies under the guardianship of the United
Nations, thereby frustrating The Hague's policy of keeping the
70Indonesian problem outside the Security Council.
Six meetings of the United Nations in March 1949 prompted 
the Dutch to advance a drastic new scheme. This featured two points:
1. sovereignty would be transferred earlier than the United 
Nations Resolution had demanded;
2. during the transitional period all difficulties would
71be reduced.
To this end discussions began in April in Jakarta between J.H. van 
Royen, the chief of the Netherlands Delegation, and Vice-President Hatta,
70 For details on the United Nations Resolution of 28 January
1949, see Alasfair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the 
United Nations (London, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1960), pp.186-95.
71 Ibid., pp.201-02.
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Van Royen agreed to Hatta's demand that authority be returned to
72the Republican Government at Jogjakarta.
Meanwhile guerrilla act:ons stepped up throughout Java and 
Sumatra. The Dutch were increasingly obliged to use their troops 
defensively to guard the security of the towns against the guerrilla 
attacks. In turn, they periodically launched surprise attacks on 
villages surrounding the cities in the hope of capturing guerrillas. 
From January to May, day and night battles were frequent in Java and 
Sumatra between the Dutch army and the guerrillas. In Surakarta, 
too, the months between January and May were marked by frequent Dutch 
sorties against villages which were assumed to be guerrilla centres. 
Dutch spies, both Chinese and Javanese, entered villages trying to 
obtain information about the guerrillas' headquarters. On the other 
hand, the guerrilla troops expanded their activities, destroying 
roads and carrying out sudden attacks on Dutch patrols around the 
regency towns.
Hatta's meetings with representatives of the Three Nations 
Committee subsequently led to the Roem-Royen Agreement of 13 May 
1949. This stipulated a cease-fire between the two opposing forces, 
the release of all Republican prisoners, and the return of the 
Republican Government to Jogjakarta. Further negotiations between 
the Republic and the Dutch reached the compromise that a cease-fire 
would be achieved before the Round Table Conference, designed to 
finalize plans for a sovereign, federal Indonesia, opened in Holland 
on 23 August 1949. This cease-fire was to come into effect on 
11 August 1949.
The guerrilla leaders argued that general attacks ought to 
be made on Dutch bases during the days immediately before the cease­
fire, in order to show that the Republican armed forces were still 
strong. In addition, victory in those attacks would enable the 
guerrillas to capture Dutch arms, which might well be of use in the 
future. The plan of general attack also arose from the strategic 
situation of the guerrillas, who had already surrounded many cities
72 Hatta, Memoir, p.549.
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of Java during the first days of August 1949. In the city of
Surakarta, as in many other cities in Java, therefore, heavy fighting
took place just before the date the cease-fire would become effective.
From 7 to 10 August a series of battles took place in the city
between the Dutch army and the Surakarta guerrillas. Lieutenant-
Colonel Slamet Rijadi, the commander of the Fifth Brigade of Surakarta,
oßcoiid Division, issued an oral order to the troops of sub—Wehrkreise
7 3  -------------- ---------:-106 on 7 August 1949. This contained a plan for general attacks
on Dutch headquarters in the city, to begin on 7 August and end on
10 August at midnight. Slamet Rijadi argued that this would be the
ideal moment to show the Dutch the strength of the guerrillas. The
offensive should also be regarded as an attempt to destroy the Dutch
before the cease-fire, and to win the moral support of the people for
the Indonesian army.
Two thousand guerrillas, consisting mainly of the sub-
wohrkreise 106 troops and the Student Army (TP), entered the city of
75Surakarta from all directions on 7 August at 4 a.m. Apparently the
Dutch were prepared, since their spy agency had already learned of
Slamet Rijadi's plan. The guerrillas, their anti-Dutch spirit now
at high pitch, could no longer delay and began to attack the Dutch
77headquarters at 9 a.m. The battle spread rapidly during four days.
The daily Kedaulatan Rakjat, reported that three-quarters of the city
78were under the guerrilla troops on 8 August. The guerrillas occupied 
most of the neighbourhoods in the south, east and north of the city.
In practice, the Dutch controlled only the Surakarta city highway
and their own strongholds of Beteng, Gladag, Penumping and Mangkubumen.
73 See Mangenang Palagan Empat Hari, p.52.
74 Ibid, pp.50-52. This oral command of 7 August was supplemented 
by a written order the following day.
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.54; see also,
Perjoangan Rakyat Klaten, p.178.
76 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.54.
77 Mengenang Palagan, p.52.
78 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 August 1949.
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All the fighting ended at midnight on 10 August when the cease-fire 
agreement was reached between the Republic and ehe Dutch.
During these battles the Dutch enjoyed tiie advantage of
modern military equipment. Their tanks rolled up and down the
streets. Their air fcrce bombed areas of the city occupied by
the guerrillas. The Dutch also used cannons, mortars, and automatic 
79titles, causing heavy civilian casualiti.es in the neighbourhoods 
of Pasar Kembang, Pasar Nongko, Kadipolo, Gajahan and other places.QQ
During the fighting more than 1,800 Surakarta civilians died.
Immediately after the cease-fire, on 11 August, a preliminary
di scussion was held between Slamet Rijadi and Colonel Gill, tire Dutch
commander in Surakarta. They agreed that the TNI should be withdrawn
from the city and relocated around its periphery. The Dutch would
end their reprisals, return their troops to their former posts,
and plan to transfer the city of Surakarta quickly to the control 
81of the TNI.
These Dutch undertakings were immediately violated. On
11 August, the Dutch 'Green Berets', consisting mostly of Ambonese,
carried out mass killings at Gading, a centre for the Indonesian 
82Red Cross. Skirmishes continued between the Green Berets and
79 Their military equipment, based on an estimate of May 1949, 
comprised 24 cannons, 24 mortars, 40 machine guns, 496 carbines, 
97 pistols, 496 other guns, 34 tanks, 119 trucks and 58 jeeps. 
The Dutch troops consisted of 1,050 men, 352 of them Dutch and 
the remainder Indonesian (including many former Heiho); see 
Mengenang Palagan, p.23. This number excluded the TBS and 
Semut Ireng, most of whom had defected from their positions 
alongside the Dutch armed forces a few weeks before the cease­
fire. Some Dutch reinforcements also came from Semarang during 
the fighting.
80 Mengenang Palagan, pp.53-54; Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 August 1949; 
Perjoangan Rakyat Klaten, p.179.
81 Mengenang, pp.56-57.
82 These Green Beret troops came from Semarang to assist the Dutch 
forces in Surakarta during the battles. See 'Pelapuran Minggon 
Kawontenan2 tuwin Kadodosan2 ing wewengkon Mangkur.egaran' , 
typescript, 31 July-20 August 1949, AMN. These reports are 
subsequently cited as 'Pelapuran Minggon', followed by the dates 
covered in the report.
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83guerrillas until early September in many places within the city.
On 12 November 1949 the Dutch authorities transferred the
city of Surakarta to the control of the TNI. On the same date the
Republican army, police corps, and military police corps entered the
city. The Dutch began to withdraw their troops to Semarang, their
principal headquarters in Central Java. On 29 November Resident
Linck transferred all administrative offices of the civil government
84to Sudiro in his capacity as Republican Resident of Surakarta.
The transfer of civil administration gave rise to many 
problems. The so-called golongan ko-operator (co-operator group) had 
worked in Dutch government offices during the occupation, although 
they had previously been Republican officials. Those officials 
who had joined the gerilya government now refused to allow these 
co-operators to participate in the new Republican civil administration.
In many cases the co-operators could not be appointed as Republican 
officials.
Action against co-operators took place chiefly in rural
areas of the Mangkunegaran.• In line with earlier revolutionary
experience, kidnappings again became a popular way to attack the
traditional authorities. On 11 August the village administrative
staff of Selogiri (Wonogiri regency) were kidnapped by military
men hoping to force the breaking off of relations with the Mangkunegaran 
85government. The military commander of Colomadu subdistrict
86(Karanganyar regency) ordered all village headmen there to stop work.
Apparently the village headmen had cooperated in defending Mangkunegoro1s
sugar plantation and factory at Colomadu, which the Dutch had jointly 
n 87managed. In September 1949 the kidnapping actions expanded to rural 
areas of Wonogiri regency, such as Jatisrono, Baturetno and
83 'Pelapuran Minggon', 2-9 September 1949.
84 Sari Radio-Pers, no.23, 30 November 1949.
85 'Pelapuran Minggon', 31 July-20 August 1949, AMN.
86 Ibid.
87 Interview with Totosardjono, 8 August 1979.
Surakarta guerrilla troops entered the city 
shortly alter a cease-fire of August 1949. 
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p .223.
(X) Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Rijadi in tne reception 
of transfer of authority from the Dutch hands. 
Repub1ik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p .172.
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P r a c i m a n t o r o .  V i l l a g e  headmen an d  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n t s  t h e r e  w ere
88
k i d n a p p e d  by  f o r m e r  g u e r r i l l a s .
I n  t h e  r e g e n c y  o f  K a ra n g a n y a r  t h e  k i d n a p p i n g  a c t i o n s  w e re
f o l l o w e d  by  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s u g a r  p l a n t a t i o n .
89 On 18 an d
19 S e p te m b e r  t h e  v i l l a g e r s ,  l e d  by  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s ,  b u r n e d  t h e
90
s u g a r  p l a n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  M angkunegoro  e n t e r p r i s e .  I n  t h e
s u b d i s t r i c t  o f  K a r t o s u r o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  an d  t h e  pem udas r e p l a c e d  t h o s e
v i l l a g e  g o v e rn m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  who h a d  o p e n l y  c o o p e r a t e d  w i t h  t h e
S u su h u n an  i n  d i s t r i b u t i n g  c l o t h i n g  r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  d u r i n g  th e  
9]D u tch  o c c u p a t i o n .  T h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  h a d  a c t u a l l y  b e e n  p l a n n e d  by 
t h e  D u tch  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  sy m p a th y  f o r  t h e  
S u s u h u n a n .  By c o n t r a s t ,  i n  t h e  s u b d i s t r i c t  o f  D e la n g g u  t h e  D u tch  
h a d  n o t  b e e n  a b l e  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  c l o t h i n g  t o  t h e  p e o p l e ,  b e c a u s e  m o s t  
o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  headmen a c t i v e l y  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  v i l l a g e  g u e r r i l l a s  and
r e f u s e d  t o  a c t  a s  an arm o f  t h e  D u tc h . The same p a t t e r n  o c c u r r e d
i n  two o t h e r  s u b d i s t r i c t s , Kedawung an d  B e n d o s a r i .
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A few o f  t h e
Juruapo lo  v i l l a g e r s  r e c e i v e d  c l o t h i n g  d i s t r i b u t e d  from  t h e  D utch
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a g e n c y  a t  T a s ik m a d u .
In  S u r a k a r t a  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  d i d  n o t  c o n f i n e  t h e i r  r o l e  t o
m i l i t a r y  d e f e n c e  b u t  a l s o  to o k  some i n i t i a t i v e s  t o  s o l v e  t h e  s o c i a l
p ro b le m s  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t s .  T h e re  was u n r e s t  among l a n d l e s s  p e a s a n t s
who r e s i d e d  on t h e  s l o p e s  o f  Mount M e ra p i  a n d  Mount M erb ab u ,  i n  t h e
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r e g e n c y  o f  B o y o l a l i , an d  c o m p la in e d  a b o u t  t h e i r  s h o r t a g e  o f  fo o d .
88 'P e l a p u r a n  M in g g o n ' ,  2 -9  S e p te m b e r  1 9 4 9 ,  AMN.
89 'P e l a p u r a n  M in g g o n ' ,  1 7 -2 3  S e p te m b e r  194 9 ,  AMN.
90 'V e r s l a g  Wedono K a r a n g a n j a r ' ,  t y p e s c r i p t ,  4 O c to b e r  194 9 ,  AMN.
91 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  T o t o s a r d j o n o ,  8 A u g u s t  1979.
92 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  S la m e t  M u l jo n o ,  13 S e p te m b e r  1979.
93 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  S o e k a r d i ,  31 J u l y  1 9 7 9 ;  K asim o, 28 J u l y  1979 .
94 I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  D a rm a n to ,  8 O c to b e r  1979 .
95 R e p u b l ik  I n d o n e s i a :  P r o p i n s i  Djawa T e n g a h , p p . 2 1 1 -1 2 .
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On 7 April 1949 the Regional Military Government (PMKB) of Boyolali
held a special meeting to discuss the critical condition of the
landless peasants and decided that the land formerly worked by European
96plantations would be distributed to them. An Emergency Regulation 
of tlie Boyolali sub-wehrkreise, dated 13 April, distributed the rights 
to work such land. The peasants who were given such rights, however, 
had to deliver part of the production to the government, to be used 
for village defence and the budget of the Regional Military Government.97
When the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to the independent 
federal Indonesian government (RIS) was carried out on 27 December 1949, 
the RIS in turn had to implement the terms of the Round Table Conference. 
These included restoring the rights of former Dutch estates, at 
Boyolali as elsewhere. It was not surprising that the landless 
peasants who had obtained the right to work the land of former 
plantations were bitter about losing it.
In fact the discontent of the landless peasants of Boyolali 
rapidly led them to noin the Gerakan MMC (Merbabu-Merapi Complex 
Movement) which arose in early 1950. The MMC movement consisted
of the victims of Hatta's rationalization, the irregular armed 
forces who could not become members of the APRIS (Angkatan Perang 
Republik Indonesia Serikat - the Armed Forces of RIS).9  ^ A few of 
them were communists who had joined the Madiun uprising. The MMC 
had its stronghold in the forest areas of Mount Merbabu and Mount 
Merapi, and its main activities were to plunder the property of 
people living on the slopes of Mount Merbabu and Mount Merapi, in 
such areas as Boyolali, Kopeng, Ungaran, Bawen and Salatiga. The 
Republican armed forces completed the suppression of the MMC movement 
only in 1955.
Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Komando Daerah Militer 
VII Diponegoro (Djawa Tengah) (Semarang, Kodam VII/Diponegoro, 
n.d.), p.327.
97 Ibid., pp.328-33.
98 ibid., pp.337-39.
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To a certain degree relations between military and civilian
leaders were strained, although this never broke out into open
conflict. Apparently problems arose from ehe civil administration
continuing to be under the authority of the military government.
Many military men had been f’onctioning in the civil administration.
A regulation of die military governor of Surakarta dated 1 December
1949 stated that the Resident, as head of the civil administration
99staff, was under the control of the military governor. Accordingly 
the military governor authorized all sections of the civil administration.
On 10 February 1950 the military governor issued an instruction 
aimed at the reconstruction of the civil administration of Surakarta.
This contained four basic articles:
1. simple government;
2. appointment of persons appropriate for their task;
3. selection from among multiple candidates for each post;
4. representation of the younger generation who had supported 
the Republic among those appointed as officials.100
The major source of conflict was removed in April 1950.
The military governor's decree of 19 April 1950 stated that civilians 
could take over all sections of the civil government from the 
military. In addition all military officers who had functioned in 
the civil administration were withdrawn from their civil functions 
and removed to their former military functions.101 Moreover, the 
subdistrict level military governments (PMKT) in Surakarta were 
abolished on 25 April 1950.
PRO- AND ANTI-SWAPRAJA MOVEMENT
The Dutch occupation encouraged the pro-swapraja movement 
to pursue its former plans for the formation of special regions for
'Surat Keputusan Gubernur Militer Daerah Militer Istimewa II', 
typescript, 1 December 1949. no.019/Pmt/GM 11/49, Bendel 
Kemiliteran 1949, AMN.
'Instruksi. Gubernur Militer DMI II Surakarta', typescript, no.
2/GM II/St.Civ./50, 10 February 1950, Bendel Kemiliteran 1950, AMN.
'Surat Keputusan Gubernur Militer', typescript, no.283/Ph. 50,
19 April 1950, Bendel Kemiliteran 1950, AMN.
Surakarta. The formation of TBS and the Semut Ireng troops, and the 
cooperative attitude of the rulers towards the Dutch, encouraged 
certain priyayis who were pro-swapraja to revive their former plans. 
Their hopes increased further as the draft Constitutional Law for 
an independent federal Indonesia were negotiated at the Round Table 
Conference in Holland, concluded on 2 November 1949. After their 
second military action the Dutch had attempted to extend their 
policy of federalism into the former Republican heartland of Java, 
placing their major hopes on the traditional rulers there, just as 
they had in South Sulawesi, East Sumatra, and Maluku. As we have 
seen, the rulers of Jogjakarta refused t:o cooperate with the Dutch 
plans, whereas the rulers of Surakarta, who had lost their authority 
since July 1946, hoped to regain it through the 'special regions' with 
Dutch support. Since the rulers cooperated with the Dutch during 
the occupation, the Dutch in return attempted to protect their position 
during the final negotiations.
Apparently the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, who both
attended the Round Table Conference, were optimistic about realizing
their plans for the formation of the Surakarta swapraja (the new
Republican term for a special region governed by a traditional ruler).
The draft of the RIS Constitutional Law recognized the continued
existence of the swapraja through four of its articles. Article 64
stated that the former swapraja regions were still recognized.
Article 65 forbade the abolition or reduction of the swapraja except
in the interests of general welfare (kepentingan umum). Article 66
specified that former regulations for the swapraja would continue
while new ones were being prepared. Article 67 stated that conflicts
between other federal states and the swapraja would be decided by
102the Indonesian Supreme Court.
This constitutional situation formed the backdrop to the 
renewed movement to re-establish special regions in Surakarta. Two 
organizations intimately connected with this movement were Paguyuban
102 See 'Rantjangan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat', in
Hasil-Hasii Konperensi Medja Bundar Sebagaimana Diterima pada 
Persidangan Umum Jang Kedua Terlangsung Tanggal 2 Nopember 1949 
di Riderzaal dikota 1s-Gravenhage ('s-Gravenhage, Sekretariat- 
Umum Konperensi Medja Bundar, 1949), p.19-
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Pasemeden Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran Meditation Association) or PPM,
and the Gerombolan Sarasehan Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran Meeting
Group) or GSM. Both organizations were set up in 1949 by people who
had been prominent in a movement established in 1947 by a certain
103Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo. Sunardjo had earlier been chairman of
the Mangkunegaran youtn organization Yoga Pinardi Utama and had 
graduated from Mulo in 1933. In November 1947, now a middle-level 
priyayi, Sunardjo began to lead a small group of priyayi in the 
practice of traditional Javanese meditation. Sunardjo himself had 
been extensively trained in the refined manners of the Javanese by 
his father, also a Mangkunegaran official. He also, like many 
Javanese, steeped himself in the lore of the wayang, and from wayang 
stories he drew certain moral lessons. Chief among those lessons 
was that if officials were to carry out their tasks properly, they 
had to act with watak satriyo (knightly bearing), which required that 
they be jujur (honest) and that they practise tapa brata (asceticism) .
Ihe main goal of Sunardjo's movement was to put into practice among 
officials the ideals that all of them, as educated Javanese adults 
from the priyayi tradition, should have embraced.
The central point of the Sunardjo movement rested on the 
teachings of kejawen. Sunardjo explains that the teachings of 
kejawen derive from the stories of the wayang and from such traditional 
Javanese writings as Serat Centinl and Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati.
Sjech Amongrogo, a figure in the Serat Centini, had given examples of 
how to communicate with God through meditation. Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati 
also contained the secrets of inward—directedness, the practice of 
which is so important in Javanese society. Sunardjo and his colleagues
practised sernedi (meditation) and tapa (asceticism). Through these 
means, as loyal officials, they tried to seek supernatural aid so that 
the ruler would not lose the divine inspiration (wahyu) of the kraton.
103 Interview with Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, 2 July 1979. Sunardjo 
described his movement in a report entitled 'Serat-Serat 
Saking Demang Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo 1947-1952', AMN.
104 Interview with Sunardjo, 2 July 1979.
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ßy performing semedi and tapa they sometimes obtained sasmita, spirit105 -------guidance which could pass information to them. According to
Sunardjo's experiences the sasmita could be in the form of miraculous 
v'oices, dreams, or visible events. All such experiences were 
discussed and their meaning interpreted by the members.
The members of the Sunardjo movement, like many Javanese 
who are still close to kejaw^n, believed that the ancestors had magical 
spirits which still maintained connections with the human world.
Their meditations were therefore carried out on the graves of the 
ruler s ancestors in order to get the ancestral spirits to strengtnen 
the powei of the rulers. The most important grave at which Sunardjo 
meditated was that of Mangkunegoro I, on the hill of Mdngadeg, 
Karanganyar regency.
Most members of the PPM and GSM were middle and lower
pnyayis who had been members of the Sunardjo movement. Sunardjo
estimated that the members of the two organizations numbered less
than 200 persons. PPM and GSM did not limit themselves to meditation
activity like the Sunardjo movement but appear to have moved into
political activity to realize their demands for the formation of
special regions, encouraged by the RIS Constitutional Law's recognition
of swapraja. Both PPM and GSM were politically under the direct
control of the Mangkunegoro himself. On 8 April 1950 the PPM sent a
resolution to President Sukarno requesting that the Mangkunegaran
swapraja be restored with a democratic nature in harmony with the 
~ _ 106onstitution. On 14 April the same resolution came from the
members of GSM, signed by seventy-four members. They demanded that
the Republican Government restore the swapraja of the Manqkuneraaan
107separately from the Kasunanan.
10j Sunardjo also used the term wisik and tayuh to replace the
term sasmita.
106 'Resolusi Pagujuban Pasemeden Mangkunegaran', 8 April 1950, 
typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.
107 'Resolusi Gerombolan Sarasehan Mangkunegaran', 14 April 1950, 
typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.
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The p r o - s w a p r a j a  movement i n  r u r a l  a r e a s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s u p p o r t e d  by v i l l a g e s  i n  w h ic h  t h e  S u n a r d j o  m ovement h a d  become r o o t e d  
s i n c e  t h e  en d  o f  1947 . Ronggo P an am b an g a n , f o r  e x a m p le ,  who r e s i d e d  
a t  P an am b an g an ,  K a ra n g a n y a r  r e g e n c y ,  a n d  was an a c t i v e  member o f  t h e  
S u n a r d j o  m ovem ent,  m anaged  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  p e a s a n t s  t h e r e  t o  s u p p o r t  
a  p l a n  f o r  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a M angkunegaran  s w a p r a j a .  The Panam bangan  
a r e a ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a s  a lo n g  t r a d i t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  M an g k u n e g a ra n ,  
(Panam bangan  v i l l a g e r s  h a d  h e l p e d  Raden Mas S a i d ,  who l a t e r  becam e 
M angkunegoro  I ,  t o  r e b e l  a g a i n s t  t h e  S u su h u n an  i n  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,
an d  Raden Mas S a i d  h a d  e v e n  s t a y e d  t h e r e  f o r  many y e a r s  d u r i n g  h i s
108
r e b e l l i o n  ) so  i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  Panam bangan  p e o p l e
w e re  s t i l l  v e r y  l o y a l  t o  t h e  M an g k u n eg aran  d u r i n g  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n .
In  M arch 1950 t h r e e  s o c i a l  an d  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
K a su n a n an  h a d  a l r e a d y  dem anded t h a t  t h e  RIS g o v e rn m e n t  g u a r a n t e e  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  s w a p r a j a  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  RIS C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h ese  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w e re  a s  f o l l o w s :  N arpow andow o, a  n o b l e s '  o r g a n i z a t i o n
w h ic h  h a d  f o r m e r l y  h a d  c l o s e  t i e s  t o  B udi Utomo; t h e  P e rh im p u n a n  
P r a d j u r i t  K r a to n  (C o u r t  Army A s s o c i a t i o n ) , c o n s i s t i n g  m o s t ly  o f  f o r m e r  
K a su n a n an  s o l d i e r s  (many o f  them  ex-TBS m em bers) who g u a r d e d  s e c u r i t y  
i n s i d e  t h e  k r a t o n ;  an d  t h e  S a r e k a t  S e k e r j a  K r a to n  ( C o u r t  W o r k e r s 1 
U n i o n ) , c o n s i s t i n g  o f  o f f i c i a l s  who s t i l l  a c t i v e l y  w o rk e d  i n  t h e  
k r a t o n .  A l l  o f  them  r e c e i v e d  t h e i r  s a l a r i e s  f ro m  t h e  S u s u h u n a n ,  whose 
s o u r c e  o f  incom e was h i s  c o u r t  a l l o w a n c e  f ro m  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  G o v e rn m en t .  
T h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w e re  n o t  i n v o l v e d  i n  m e d i t a t i o n  l i k e  PPM and  GSM, and  
w e re  p o l i t i c a l l y  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  p a n g e r a n s  who h ad  
s u r r o u n d e d  t h e  S u su h u n an  s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  h i s  r e i g n .  D u r in g  
t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  m o s t  members o f  t h e s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a p p e a r  t o  h av e  
c o o p e r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  D u tc h .
T h e r e  w e re  a l s o  s o c i a l  an d  c u l t u r a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  t h e  K a su n an an  w h ic h  j o i n e d  t h e  p r o - s w a p r a j a  movement i n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e i r  own s u r v i v a l .  T h ese  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h e  c u l t u r a l  o n e s ,  w e re  o r i g i n a l l y  f i n a n c e d  by  t h e  K asu n an an  g o v e rn m e n t .  
W i th o u t  t h e  s w a p r a j a  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  s u r v i v e .  I n  e a r l y  1950 a t  l e a s t
108 Y a y asan  M angadeg S u r a k a r t a  ( e d . ) ,  S e r a t  B abad  P an am b an g a n , 
s t e n c i l l e d ,  S u r a k a r t a ,  1976 .
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ten organizations sent letters to the RIS government v/ith demands for
109the formation of swapraja in Surakarta.
Meanwhile most political organizations in Surakarta, notably
the Socialist Party, Murba, PNI, Sobsi and BTI, firmly supported
Residency government for Surakarta and rejected the swapraja concept.
These organizations even set up Panitya Anti Swapraja (Anti-Swapraja
111Committee) or PAS in January 1950.' Soon after the establishment 
of PAS, the Working Committee of the Republican Parliament sent a 
team, led by Hutomo Supardan of the PKI, to investigate the political 
situation in Surakarta, particularly in relation to opinions about the 
swapraja. His duties started in January and his preliminary observations 
were that:
1. the rulers insisted on two separate swapraja in Surakarta;
2. the military was opposed to the traditional authorities,-
3. pro- and anti-swapraja movements had emerged rapidly in
this region, apparently caused by the relevant articles
112(64, 65, 66 and 67) of the RIS Constitution.
The political organizations began to be active in opposing 
the restoration of the swapraja, evidently as a reaction to the rapid 
emergence of pro-swapraja movements after the establishment of RIS 
in December 1949. In February 1950 the leftist organizations which 
had joined PAS sent a telegram to Parliament demanding that the RIS 
government abolish swapraja government in Surakarta, on the basis 
of 'general welfare' as specified in Article 65 of RIS Constitution.
This ensured that the government did nothing to promote the swapraja
109 There are four cultural organizations: Rombongan Kridonggo
(Sragen regency), Rukun Reksa Sentosa, Perkumpulan Kesenian 
Tari Merdi Budaya and Rombongan Santi Suara. The others were 
social organizations. See Ichtisar Parlemen, no.50, 20 April 
1950.
110 Djarum Masa, 21 February 1950.
111 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 6 January 1950.
112 'Laporan Pertemuan Fihak Mangkunegaran dan BP KNP 21 Januari 
1950', typescript, Bendel Swapraja 1950, AMN. See also Nasional, 
9 February 1950.
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in Surakarta, 113 In April, moreover, a conference of the Sarbupri
of Delanggu took a decision to oppose the formation of swapraja in
, 114Surakarta.
Indeed the representatives of the leftist political parties
in Parliament were all opposed to the traditional rulers. For instance
in a meeting of 25 May 1950 between the Working Committee of the RIS
Parliament and the Minister of Interior, the leftist representatives
led by Hutomo Supardan demanded that the region of Surakarta be a
115normal residency within the province of Central Java. A similar
decision was made on 24 July 1950 by the Working Committee of the 
KNIP (assembly) of the Republic, which was dominated by leftists (i.e., 
PKI, Sobsi, PESINDO and nationalists) and included no swapraja 
representatives. This meeting accepted a motion by Tjoegito to be 
forwarded to the RIS government, calling for the rejection of all 
efforts for the formation of the Surakarta swapraja. Tjoegito and 
his supporters argued that the formation of swapraja deviated from the 
goal of the Indonesian Revolution, which was against imperialism and 
feudalism.
Tjoegito's motion had the effect of stopping the plans of 
the Republican Government for a plebiscite to decide the form of 
the Surakarta local government. Tjoegito argued that the plebiscite 
would have created a serious conflict among the people. Moreover 
Surakarta had already been legally constituted as a Residency by 1948.
113 Djarum Masa, 21 February 1950.
114 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 13 April 1950.
115 See 'Verslag Rapat Kerdja BP KNP dengan Menteri Dalam Negeri', 
typescript, 25 May 1950, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.
116 The list of men who signed the Tjoegito motion are as follows: 
Tjoegito (PKI), Sidik Djojosukarto (PNI), Djokosudjono (Sobsi),
S. Sardjono (BTI), Raka (Partai Rakyat), S. Hadikusumo (PNI), 
Soedijono (Murba), W. Wondoamiseno (PNI), Suhardjo (PSII), 
Krissubanu (Persatuan Progresif), Tedjosukmono (Labor Party),
S. Utojo (PKI) and S. Rasjad (PNI). See 'Usui Mosi Tjoegito
cs Tentang Pengembalian Swapradja Didaerah Surakarta', typescript, 
Jogjakarta, 24 July 1950, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.
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The rulers responded to Tjoegito's motion by demanding
that this motion be re-discussed by the government of the unitary
Republic of Indonesia which would be set up in August 1950. However,
the government never acted on the rulers' demand. The rulers and
117prominent pro-swapraja figures were left to lament in vain.
The Tjoegito motion appeared to end all efforts to form a 
swapraj-a in the Surakarta region. The leftists at national level 
were finally successful in abolishing the system of monarchy in local 
government. Surakarta b'ecame simply one of the residencies in General 
Java. The rulers continued to receive monthly court allowances from 
the government to support .their court expenses and building maintenance, 
but. they had no authority when the unitary. Republic of Indonesia was 
established ■•in August 1950.
117 Their chronic complaints may be found in Notosoeroto, Pro
Swapradja (Solo. Penerbit Mataram, 1950); Notosoeroto, Wedaran 
Sawatawis Bab Swapradja (Solo, Penerbit Mataram, 1950).
Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII (left) and Mangkunegoro VIII (right) 
in 1950.
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CONCLUSION
Why was the revolution in Surakarta so fundamentally 
radical, particularly in comparison to that in Jogjakarta? The 
rebellious nature of society in this region dates back to the colonial 
era. Before the war there was already a strong tradition of political 
protest in Surakarta, represented in the city by such figures as 
Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Haji Misbach and in the countryside by the 
PKS as well as by messianic movements. Both Tjipto and Misbach also 
successfully provided leadership for peasant protest movements on the 
Klaten sugar estates, particularly the Delanggu estates, against the 
colonial authority. These movements were increasingly alienated 
from the kratons, tending to see the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro 
less as traditional rulers than as agents of colonial exploitation, 
partly because (unlike Jogjakarta's rulers) they also acted as owners 
of sugar estates.
The relationship between Misbach's leadership in Surakarta
rural politics and the beginnings of the communist movement is more
obvious. George D. Larson, in his thesis, asserts:
The communist movement in Surakarta began shortly 
after the release of Haji Misbach from the 
Pekalongan jail in August 1922 and petered out 
after the well-known abortive uprising in November 
1926.1
The strong influence of the Misbach agitation in plantation areas 
generated a political awareness amongst the peasants which made them 
receptive to the ideas of affiliated communist organizations during 
the Indonesian Revolution. In fact, during the Dutch colonial period 
there was always latent unrest on the sugar estates.
During the occupation (1942-45), the Japanese used the 
rulers to extract labour and produce from Java, and in doing so they 
reaccentuated the rulers' authoritarian character and distanced them 
still further from the Javanese people over whom they ruled.
1 George Donald Larson, 'Prelude to Revolution: Palaces and
Politics in Surakarta 1912-1942', Ph.D thesis, Northern Illinois 
University, 1979, p.230.
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The Japanese occupation also created a polarization between two forces: 
on the one hand, the kraton and the priyayi who had become instruments 
of Japanese administration and levies of labour; on the other, the 
Japanese-sponsored youth qroups, such as Barisan Pelopor, Peta, Seinendan, 
Hizbullah, etc., which were imbued with intense patriotic spirit but 
had no x->&rt in administration. Accordingly there were two antithetic 
social groux^s, and this became one of predominant aspects in the social 
conflicts in Surakarta during the revolution.
The Surakarta revolution was not started from the bottom, 
at village level, but was initiated by leaders in Surakarta city.
The pemuda and pre-war politicians, taking cues from the revolutionary 
leadership in Jakarta, set up, enthusiastically and simultaneously, 
the principal elements of the revolutionary government: the KNID,
the BKR and the badan perjuangan organizations. The elements which 
first established Republican power in the city of Surakarta deliberately 
excluded members of the kraton establishment from their ranks, because 
of the poiarizaticn mentioned above.
In comparison with Jogjakarta, the kratons in Surakarta 
were unfortunate, in that both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro 
were new and youthful rulers, with no experience, little personal 
prestige, and little capacity to stand up to their conservative 
ministers. Moreover, between the two rulers there was never the 
unity of action demonstrated in Jogjakarta under the Sultan’s direction. 
These personal factors, however, should not overshadow the elements 
of social conflict which had for some time been more evident in 
Surakarta than in Jogjakarta. The Sultan of Jogjakarta, in playing 
host to the Republican Government from January 1946, ensured that 
the revolution in Jogjakarta would continue to have a vertical and 
orderly character from the top down. Surakarta, meanwhile, partly 
because of its rival claims to national leadership and partly because 
of the populist forces which were already strong there - especially 
the Barisan Banteng - became the focus for national movements of 
opposition to the government. In particular, the establishment of 
the Persatuan Perjuangan headquarters in Surakarta accentuated the 
city’s oppositionist character.
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T h ese  f a c t o r s ,  t h e  l i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  S u r a k a r t a  and  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  r a d i c a l ,  p o p u l i s t ,  a n t i ­
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  f o r c e s  i n  t h e  c i t y ,  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  r u l e r s  f rom  pow er i n  M arch  1946 . A f t e r  t h e  h u m i l i a t i o n  t h e y  
s u f f e r e d  a t  t h i s  t im e ,  i t  w o u ld  b e  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them  t o  r e c o v e r  
a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  y e a r s  t h a t  f o l l o w e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a s  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
e l e m e n t s  on w h ic h  th e y  h a d  t o  r e l y  b ecam e t o o  c l o s e l y  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  
t h e  D u tch  c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n  i n  1 9 4 8 -4 9 .
The f o r m a t i o n  o f  v a r i o u s  l a s y k a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  b o t h  in  
t h e  c i t y  an d  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e s  was a  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  in d e p e n d e n c e  
p r o c l a m a t i o n  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  s p l i t s  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y .  T h ese  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n v a r i a b l y  c l a i m e d  a l l e g i a n c e  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  v a l u e s  
o f  r e v o l u t i o n ,  su c h  a s  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  d e m o c ra c y ,  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m ,  
an d  a n t i - f e u d a l i s m .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  e a c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n  h a d  
i t s  own p o l i t i c a l  s t a n c e  an d  i d e o l o g y ,  i t s  own g o a l s  an d  p r o g r a m s .
The a t t i t u d e s  o f  members o f  t h e  l a s y k a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  S u r a k a r t a  
w e re  o b v i o u s l y  d e f i n e d  b y  t h e  c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s  o f  J a v a n e s e  s o c i e t y ,  
an d  w i t h i n  e a c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e r e  w e re  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  members 
a n d  l e a d e r s ,  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  b a p a k is m  ( p a t r o n - c l i e n t )  t e r m s  so  f a m i l i a r  
i n  J a v a .  T h i s  c o m m o n a l i ty  o f  c u l t u r a l  b a c k g r o u n d  and  o f  i n t e r n a l  
a d h e s i o n  c o u l d  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o v e r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  w e re  s e r i o u s  
d i v i s i o n s  and  r i v a l r i e s  among t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  E ach  l a s y k a r  was 
made up o f  y o u t h s  who s h a r e d  a  common b a c k g r o u n d ,  a  common o r i e n t a t i o n ,  
a n d  common g o a l s ,  and  d i f f e r e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s p r a n g  f ro m  d i f f e r e n t  
g r o u p s  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y  and  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h o s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
h e l p e d  to  make t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  g ro u p s  m ore n o t i c e a b l e .
The c o n d u c t i n g  o f  b a n d i t - l i k e  a c t i v i t y  by  some g ro u p s  made t h e  
d i v i s i o n s  s t i l l  c l e a r e r ,  and  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 4 7 -4 8  t h e  p o l a r i z a t i o n  
was i n t e n s i f i e d  by d e v e lo p m e n ts  w i t h i n  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .
R u r a l  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  p r o c l a m a t i o n  i m i t a t e d  
w h a t  h a d  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  t h e  c i t y .  L o c a l  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  l e a d e r s  s e t  
up  KNIs a t  t h e  s u b d i s t r i c t  l e v e l ,  an d  i n  some c a s e s  KNIs w e re  fo rm ed  
a t  t h e  v i l l a g e  l e v e l .  V a r i o u s  b a d a n  p e r j u a n g a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w e re  
l i k e w i s e  fo rm e d  by  r u r a l  pem uda who h a d  g a i n e d  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  J a p a n e s e -  
s p o n s o r e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  The g u l f  b e tw e e n  u r b a n  an d  r u r a l  a r e a s  
c o u l d  n o t  b e  m a i n t a i n e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  f o r  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  r u r a l  KNIs
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and of rural badan perjuangan began to involve rural society directly 
in national politics. The rural KNIs acted as the rural revolutionary 
government, carrying out the orders of the new Republican Government. 
This disrupted the flow of orders from the rulers, through their own 
administrations, a pattern that had held for many years. The 
villagers who aligned themselves with the new Republican Government 
commenced to measure former village heads with new values which 
were ushered in by the Indonesian Revolution.
Although it began in the city, the revolution found 
sympathetic ground in the rural areas, where it was carried out by 
the Barisan Banteng and BTI in particular from late 1945 onwards.
Many villages spontaneously overthrew their village heads in 1945-46, 
and subsequently villagers supported programs by left-wing parties and 
organizations for the redistribution of land and the abolition of the 
rights of sugar estates.
In the course of 1947 and 1948, the rural areas were 
caught up in the polarization which was taking place in Surakarta 
ciuy along political lines. The sharpening division between badan 
perjuangan organizations increasingly resulted in political conflicts 
in rural Surakarta. The peasant organizations BTI and STII affiliated 
with the PKI and Musyumi respectively, existed in a state of mutual 
hostility, and the Delanggu affair of July 1948 brought that hostility 
into open conflict.
A large section of the abangan peasantry was effectively 
mobilized by left-wing organizations and succeeded, tc a greater extent 
than elsewhere in Indonesia, in reducing the rights of the rulers and 
of estates over land. The BTI in particular, because of its radical 
program on agrarian reform, succeeded in reaching landless peasants, 
the majority of whom were abangan. As a result of the BTI1s national 
campaign, the government, by the law of 26 April 1948, abolished 
conversion rights on land. This meant that rulers and estates no 
longer had claims to conversion land, though the law still left 
something to be desired in that it granted rights to land only to 
peasants whose names had already been registered as landholders with 
the village administration. The discontentment of the BTI with the 
implementation of this law and the support which the FDR gave to BTI
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programs gave renamed impetus to the BTI campaign for agrarian 
reform in the period between April and September 1948. The program 
now, however, concentrated more on bengkok land and kas desa land, 
planning to distribute these lands to landless peasants.
These BTI efforts made the organization's position very 
strong in rural Surakarta during this period. Reflecting the breakdown 
of traditional society, the B T I 's success also furthered the deterioration 
of the surface unity that had characterized rural Surakarta for some 
time.
Unlike the situation in other parts of Java which underwent 
a 'social revolution' (Banten, the Tiga Daerah, Central Java, etc.), 
events in Surakarta's rural areas showed a widening split between 
abangan and santri villagers. The majority abangan peasants were 
attracted by the radical agrarian reforms advocated by the leftists, 
and they remained members and sympathizers of the leftist groups, 
particularly the BTI, right up to the Madiun uprising. The santri, 
however, took an opposite course, with the STII advocating delay m  
approaching the subject of agrarian reform and with most rural santri 
leaders taking a pro-government stance opposed to radical change.
As the rift widened at the national level between the 
government and the Marxist in 1948, Surakarta city once again attracted 
the main opposition forces, with PESINDO establishing its headquarters 
in the city from 1947 on. Wikana, the top PESINDO leader and the 
military governor of the Surakarta region, specifically set out to 
make both the leftists and PESINDO very strong in Surakarta. In 
the early months of 1948 Surakarta became the main battle ground 
between groups on the left and right, culminating in virtual civil 
war in August and September 1948. Although the political and military 
aspects of Surakarta obviously indicated an oppositionist city and 
the oppositionist groups were very strong there, they had never 
dominated Surakarta society. Partly this was because the pro-government 
groups, including the Siliwangi forces brought in from West Java, 
were strong too, and partly because the influence of the rulers within 
certain groups of Surakarta society also continued. No single force, 
therefore, was able to dominate Surakarta society up until the Dutch 
attack on the city in December 1948.
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During the Dutch occupation of Surakarta city, the kratons 
and the conservative priyayis were given much encouragement, even 
though the rulers were not restored to autonomous power by the 
Dutch. The personal ambition of the rulers, and particularly that 
of the Mangkunegoro, who wanted a special region of his own, and the 
threat of danger from the guerrilla troops made the Dutch unsuccessful 
in forming a Dutch-sponsored special region of Surakarta. Most 
conservative priyayis, however, firmly cooperated with the Dutch, 
voluntarily joining Dutch offices, and the Dutch occupation prompted 
the conservative elements to try to restore the swapraja through the 
federal system which emerged from the Round Table Conference. Once 
again this gave rise to radical actions by political organizations, 
particularly the PKI, BTI, Sobsi, PNI and others, opposing ail efforts 
to establish the swapraja, at both national and local levels.
The rapid destruction of the federal system and the 
establishment of the Unitary State of Indonesia in August 1950 
lowered the role of the kratons drastically and brought about the 
permanent demise of the royal houses of Surakarta as political entities. 
The guerrilla opposition to the Dutch and the close relations between 
the guerrillas and the rural community had shown that the Surakarta 
peasantry was more devoted to the new ideals of independence and 
democracy than to the old ideal of loyalty to the ruler. The 
Surakarta peasantry began to abandon the pattern of kawulo-gusti 
that had marked the classical relationship between people and ruler.
During the guerrilla period the role of the army had become 
a dominant element in Surakarta society. The military elite gained 
firm control over the civil administration in 1949 and had presided 
over a drastic decrease in pamong praja functions. The 1dwifungsi' 
of the army thus occurred for the first time during the Indonesian 
Revolution and through it included a negative element, in that the 
military in some cases was responsible for corruption. It also 
created a strong sense of the identity between people and army on 
the part of both these forces.
The Surakarta revolution, in the general context of the 
Indonesian Revolution, was both anti-imperial and anti-feudal, with an 
unusually radical and complex character of its own. It brought profound 
and irreversible change to the area once considered the heartland of 
Javanese traditional aristocratic values.
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LIST
Abangan
Abdi dalorn 
AMGL
AMI
AMPTT
AMR!
AMS
AMS
An tek 
API
Arit
Asrama
Badan Perjuangan 
Bambu Runcing 
Barisan Banteng 
Barisan Pelopor 
Bau Suku 
BBI
Bengkok
BKR
BPH
BPKKP
OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY
Nominal(ly) Moslem influenced by Hinduism, 
Buddhism and animist elements
The king's servant; state official
Angkatan Muda Gas dan Listrik; Younger Generation 
of Gas and Electricity
Angkatan Muda Indonesia; the Indonesian Younger 
Generation
Angkatan Muda Post, Telegrap dan Telepon; Younger 
Generation of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone
Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia; Younger 
Generation of the Republic of Indonesia
Algemene Middelbare School; Dutch Senior 
High School
Angkatan Muda Sukawati; Sukawati Younger 
Generation
Follower, e.g., antek PKI, etc.
Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia; Younger Generation 
of Indonesia
Grass knife
Dormitory, training place 
Struggle Organization 
Bamboo Spear 
Buffalo Corps 
Pioneer Corps 
Villagers' labour force
Barisan Buruh Indonesia; Indonesian Labour Front-
Village headman's allowance, official land
Badan Keamanan Rakyat; People's Security Council
Bendoro Pangeran Haryo, high pangeran's title 
in Javanese society
Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang; 
the Board of Assistance for the Families 
of War Victims
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B P R B a d a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t ;  P e o p l e ' s  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  C o u n c i l
BP R I B a r i s a n  P e m b e r o n t a k a n  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a ;  
I n s u r g e n t  C o r p s  o f  the R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a
BTI B a r i s a n  T a n i  I n d o n e s i a ;  I n d o n e s i a n  P e a s a n s t '  
F r o n t
B u m i  Han<jus S c o r c h e d - E a r t h
B u n d a n S q u a d  in t h e  P e t a
B u p a t i R e g e n t
C a b a n g B r a n c h
C a c a h A m o u n t  o f  L a n d
C a m a t S u b d i s t r i c t  h e a d
C h ö Head; c h i e f
C h o k a n G o v e r n o r ,  t h e  h e a d  o f  r e s i d e n c y
C h u d a n C o m p a n y  in t h e  P e t a
C h u d a n c h ö H e a d  o f  C h u d a n
D a e r a h  I s t i m e w a S p e c i a l  R e g i o n
Dai.dan B a t t a l i o n  in t h e  P e t a
D a n a  P e r j u a n g a n S t r u g g l e  F u n d s
D a p u r  U m u m P u b l i c  K i t c h e n
D a u l a t ,  M e n d a u l a t F o r c i b l y  r e m o v e  f r o m  o f f i c e  d u r i n g  the  
R e v o l u t i o n  ; k i d n a p p i n g ,  s m a l l  c o u p
D e w a n  D e s a V i l l a g e  C o u n c i l
D j a w a  H ö k ö k a i P e o p l e ' s  S e r v i c e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o n  J a v a
D M I D a e r a h  M i l i t e r  I s t i m e w a ;  S p e c i a l  M i l i t a r y  
R e g i o n
D P D D e w a n  P e r t a h a n a n  D a e r a h ;  R e g i o n a l  D e f e n c e  C o u n c i l
D P R T D e w a n  P e m e r i n t a h a n  R a k y a t  d a n  T e n t a r a ;  
P e o p l e  a n d  M i l i t a r y  G o v e r n m e n t  C o u n c i l
D w i f u n g s i D u a l  f u n c t i o n
E L S E u r o p e e s c h e  L a g e r e  S c h o o l ;  E u r o p e a n  P r i m a r y  
S c h o o l
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' \Elmu kejawen Science of Javanism
FDR Front Demokrasi Rakyat; People's 
Democratic Front
Fujinkei Women's Association
Gerindo Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia; Indonesian 
P e o p l e 1s Movement
Glebagan Rotation system of using land between 
the peasants and the Dutch estates
GPU Gusti Pangeran Haryo; title of high 
pangeran (prince)
Gugur Gunung Labour duty owed by peasants (villagers) 
to government
Ilaji A title for person who has made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca
HBS Hoogere Burger School; Dutch Senior 
High School
lleiho Auxiliary soldiers of the Japanese 
armed forces
HIS Hollandsch-Inlandsche School; Dutch 
Native School
Hizbullah Allah's Army
Inti ran Compulsory agricultural work on the 
plantations
Jago Literally, fighting cock; a person who 
knows well the elmu kejawen or is 
expert in Javanese self-defence
KAD Kesatuan Aksi Delanggu; Action Front 
of Delanggu
Kadipaten Internal palace administration headed 
by the prince
Kasunanan The polity ruled by the Susuhunan
Kauman The quarter for pious Moslems in 
Javanese cities
Kecamatan Subdistrict headed by camat
Keibodan Vigilance Corps
Kelompok Group
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Kempeitai Military Police Corps
Ken Regency (kabupaten)
Kenchö Regent
Kepala Kampung The head of hamldt
Kepatihan External administrative office headed 
by the patih (grand vizier)
Keris Creese
KIM I Komitc Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian 
National Committee
KÖ Head of principality
Kochi Principality
Kraton Palace of Javanese kings
KRT Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung; high priyayi 
title
Kuchö Village head
Kuduran Compulsory labour by the peasants for 
the village headman
Kuli Pancbn Villagers who provided occasional labour 
to native officials
Kumiai An association or cooperative
Kumichö Head of Tonari Gumi
Kweekschool Teachers' training school
Kyai A title for holy persons or sacred 
objects
Lasykar Irregular troops
LB I Lasykar Buruh Indonesia; Indonesian 
Labour Militia
LBT Lembaga Buruh dan fani; Board of 
Workers and Peasants
Lurah Village head
Mancanegara Dependencies outside the core area 
of the Mataram kingdom
Mangkunegaran The polity ruled by the Mangkunegoro
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Markas Besar Headquarters
Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin; the Consultative 
Council of Indonesian Moslem
Morah putih Red and white
Merdeka Free
MMC Merbabu-Merapi Compleks, a political 
movement of early 1950 in the regency 
of Boyolali, Surakarta
Mulo Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs; Dutch 
Junior High School
Mutih Literally, white; a form of physical 
training in the elmu kejawen
Narapraju Officials
Ngelmu Kawedukan Science of invulnerability
Ngrowot A form of ascetic training, fasting 
from rice and meat
Nguier Literally, caterpillar; a form of 
ascetic training in the ^lmu kejawbn 
in which one can only eat fruit
NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
Ningrat Nobles
Pager Desa Pasukan Gerilya Desa; Village Guerrilla 
Troops
Pamong Praja The term for the Republican officials 
used after 1946. This comes from the 
term pangreh praja
Panewu Subdistrict officer
Pangeran Prince, son of the King
Parang Sword
Pasuinbang Gifts, including labour force
Pati Geni Literally, death fire; a form of 
physical training in the elmu kejawen 
in which one cannot eat or drink anything 
and must sleep in a dark room
Pd tuh Appanage holders
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PBI Partai Buruh Indonesia; j  Indonesian 
Labour Party
Pejuang Revolutionary activist
Pemuda Youth, especially activist youth
Pengajian Recital of the Koran
Pengulon Religious office headed by pengulu
PEPOLIT Pendidikan Politik Tentara; Political 
Education for the Army
Perjuangan Struggle
Pesantren Religious school in Islam; pondok
PESINDO Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian 
Socialist Youth
Peta Pembela Tanah Air: Defenders of the
fatherland
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian 
Communist Party
PKS Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta; Surakarta 
People's Union
PMKB Pemerintahan Militer Kabupaten; Regency 
Military Government
PMKT Pemerintahan Militer Kecamatan; Sub­
district Military Government
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian 
National Party
PPKI Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia; 
Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence
PPT Penerangan Pertahanan Total; Total 
Defence Information
Priyayi Javanese official class
PS Partai Sosialis; Socialist Party
PS I Partai Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian 
Socialist Party
PS 11 Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; 
Indonesian Islamic Union Party
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PUTERA Pusat Tenaga Rakyat; Centre of People's 
Strength
Rakyat People
Ranting Sub-branch
Renseitai Training unit
RMTH Raden Mas Tumenggung Haryo; title of 
high priyayi (or prince)
R Ng. Raden Ngabehi; middle priyayi title
Romusha Labourer
RT Raden Tumenggung; high priyayi title
Sandiworo Javanese traditional drama
Sanggan Right to land
Sayap Kanan Right Wing, refers to Islamic and non- 
Marxist groups
Sayap Kiri Left Wing, refers to socialist and 
communist groups
SBNS Serikat Buruh Negeri Surakarta; Surakarta 
State Labour Union
Seinendan Youth Corps
Sekolah Desa Village School, equivalent to primary 
school
Sentono Dalem King's family
SMP Sekolah Menengah Pertama; Junior High 
School
SMT Sekolah Menengah Tinggi; Senior High 
School
SPNS Serikat Pegawai Negeri Surakarta; 
Surakarta State Official Union
STII Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia; Indonesian 
Islamic Peasant Union
Swapraj a New Republican term for a region 
governed by a traditional ruler
Tanah Kas Desa Village official land
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Tanah Konversi Conversion land, referring to the 
former land of the Dutch plantation 
estates in the principalities
Tatakrama Politeness
Tentara Hijrah The Siliwangi Division which withdrew 
from pockets in West Java and transferred 
to Republican territories in Central 
Java
Tentara Merah Red Army or Musso's Army
TKR Tentara Keamanan Rakyat; People's 
Security Army
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian 
National Army
TNI Masyarakat TNI of Society (under Left-wing control)
Tombak Spear
Tonari Gumi Neighbourhood association
TP Tentara Pelajar; Student Army
TRI Tentara Republik Indonesia; Indonesian 
Republican Army
Tukang Catut Corruptor, a term used during the 
occupation
Ulama Religious Scholar
Wahyu Divine revelation
Walikota Mayor
Wayang Javanese puppet
Wonc abang Red people, i.e., followers of PKI 
and BTI
Wong Cilik Little man
Wong Ijo Green people, i.e., the followers of 
Islam
Wong Ireng Black people, i.e., the followers of 
PNI
Zakat Religious tax in Islam
248
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. ARCHIVAL SOURCES
A . ARSIP MANGKUHEGARAN (AMN) , SURAKARTA
The documents listed below are deposited in the Reksopustoko Library, 
Mangkunegaran. These documents are collected in bundles. The 
following are some important documents used in this work.
Bendel Djaman Djepang 1942-1945
'Aanteekeningen Omtrent de Mangkoenegaran in de Maart dagen 
1942', typescript, 1942
'Atoeran Baroe Tentang Beras, Gabah, dan Padi Boeat Tahoen 
1943', stencilled, 2603 (1943)
'Bendel Kaibodan dan Seinendan 2603 (1943)', no.56
'Daftar Adanja Heiho dan Peta Dalam Daerah Kawedanan Djoemapolo', 
typescript, Laporan Wedono Djoemapolo, 12 September 1945
'Djoemlah Ringkasan Adanja Bekas Pradjoer.it Heiho dan Peta Dalam 
Daerah Kaboepaten Pangreh Pradja Wonogiri', Laporan Boepati 
Wonogiri, 4 October 1945
'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soekarela Pembela Tanah Air dan Heiho', 
no. 56
'Hal Tonari Gumi', no.29
'Laporan Ketoea Sidang Gaboengan Solo dan Mangkoenegaran Kooti 
Hookookai', typescript, 24 March 2605 (1945)
'Laporan Rapat Tonari Goemi Pemerintah Mangkoenegaran', 
typescript, 30 September 1945
'Kepoetoesan Soerakarta Koochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan 1944', 
Kepoetoesan no.693
'Makloemat Dai Nippon Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta', 10 June 2602 
(1942)
'Makloemat
'Makloemat
'Makloemat 
1942
Pembesar Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta', 8 June 2602 (1942) 
Mangkoenegoro Koo', no.l, 20 August 1942 
Oendang-Oendang Balatentara Dai Nippon', Batavia,
'Makloemat Soerakarta Koochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan', 5 November 
2602 (1942)
249
'Pengoemoeman Harga Tetinggi Barang-Barang di Soerakarta',
Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 8 June 1942
'Pengoemoeman Kantor Besar Poelisi Balatentara Dai Nippon di 
Soerakarta', 29 September 2602(1942)
'Pengoemoeman Mangkoenegoro Koo', 31 December 1942
’Perdagangan Beras', 1943-1944
Soekiinan Martowirono, 'Laporan Pemeriksaan Barisan Pelopor', 
typescript, 7 December 1944
'Tjara Membagi Minjak Tanah kepada Orang-Orang Jang Menjerahkan 
Boeah Djarak', Bendel Roepa-Roepa 1943-1944, no.29
'Verslag Persidangan Meningkatkan Basil Boerni Didaerah Soerakarta 
Koochi', typescript, 27 October 1943
Bendel Ketentaraan 1945-1950
'Apakcih jang diseboet perang total', Soerakarta, 1947
'Bahan-Bahan Penerangan Pertahanan Total', Bagian Penerangan 
Pertahanan Total Soerakarta, printed, 16 September 1947
'Instruksi Gubernur Militer Daerah Militer Istimewa Surakarta', 
typescript, 1950
'Makloemat Dewan Pertahanan Daerah Soerakarta', no.5, 24 May 1947 
'Makloemat Menteri Dalam Negeri ', 29 May 1946
'Makloemat Kepala Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia Daerah Soerakarta', 
no.2, 1 June 1946
'Makloemat Wakil Pemerintah Poesat di Soerakarta', no.2,
13 June 1946
'Pengumuman Komandan Tentara & Teritorial Kota Surakarta', 
typescript, no.32/Kttr/Peng.50, 24 April 1950
'Pengumuman Komando Militer Daerah Kota Surakarta', typescript, 
no.15/XI/KMDH/Peng.49/1, 14 November 1949
’Pengumuman Komando Militer Daerah Kota Surakarta', typescript, 
no.16/KMDK/Peng.49, 16 November 1949
'Pelapuran Minggon Kawontenan-Kawontenan tuwin Kadadosan- 
Kadadosan ing Wewengkon Mangkunegaran tuwin sakiwo tengenipun', 
July-October 1949, typescript
'Peraturan Pemerintah Pendudukan Belanda di Surakarta: 
Territoriaal Onder Commando Surakarta', printed, no.3,
5 January 1949
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1Peraturan Residen Surakarta’, no. 1 , 6 January 1947
•Peraturan Dewan Pertahanan Daerah Surakarta', no.5, 26 July 
1947
'Pidato Staf Gubernur Militer Pertahanan Total di Surakarta' 
(P.H. Soerjcsoemarno), typescript, Wonogiri, 21 September 1947
'Rentjana Pembagian Tugas dalam Staf Gubernur Militer 
DMI Surakarta', stencilled, Surakarta, 5 October 1947
'Sekedar Pendjelasan tentang Gobnor Militer Surakarta', Bagian 
Penerangan Pertahanan Total, 1947
'Siaran Kilat Pemerintah Militer Daerali Kota Surakarta', 
no.5, 2 September 1949
'Surat Angakatan Darat TRI kepada Sunan dan Mangkunegoro', 
typescript, no.49/V/C-II/Sc./DV X, 2 June 1946
'Surat Keputusan Persiapan Penghapusan Gubernur Militer DMI 
II Surakarta', typescript, no.256/Ph.50, 14 April 1950
'Surat Gubernur Militer Daerah Militer Istimewa Surakarta 
kepada Perdana Menteri', typescript, no.l22/10/U, 1 October 1947
'Surat Residen Surakarta depada Pemerintahan Mangkunegaran', 
typescript, no.3038/0/24, 19 November 1946
'Surat Residen Surakarta (Sudiro) depada Gubernur Militer Daerah 
Istimewa Surakarta (Wikana)', no.529/0/Rahasia, 8 October 1947
'Verslag Rapat Staf Gubernur Militer Surakarta 22 Agustus 
1947', typescript
Verslag Singkat Rapat Pelantikan Gubernur Militer dengan 
stafnja’, typescript, Surakarta, 22 August 1947
Bendel Serikat Sekerdja 1945-1950
'Anggaran Dasar Roemah Tangga Barisan Boeroeh Indonesia 
Poesat Daerah Soerakarta', Soerakarta, 15 October 1945
'Daftar Anggota BBI, Tjabang Sindoeredjo Mangkoenegaran', 
typescript, 1945
'Laporan Rapat PBI Poesat Daerah Soerakarta di Soons Harmonie 
pada tanggal 14 Djanoeari 1946', typescript, dibuat oleh 
Soedarjo dan Anggoro
'Pratelan dari adanja pengoeroes Barisan Boeroeh Indonesia 
Daerah Kawedanan Karanganjar 20 Oktober 1945', typescript
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Peringatan Rapat Perikatan Sarekat Sekerdja Negeri Mangkoenegaran 
koetika pada canggal 25—1—1946 digedoeng Sonosoeko1, typescript
Singakatan Poe tcesan Rapat BBI pada canggal /, 8, 9, Nopember 
1945 di Soerakarta', stencilled
Soarat Panicya Konggres BTI Daerah Sragen kepada Mangkoenegoro 
VII tanggal 20 Desember 1945', typescript
'Soerat Mangkonegoro VII kepada Panitya Konggres BTI Daerah 
Sragen tanggal 26 Desember 1945', typescript
'Verslag Singkat Rapat Wakil2 Sarekat Boeroeh dan Sarekat 
Sekerdja pada hari Sabtoe malam Minggoe, 29/30 Desember 1945 
di Habripojo', typescript
Bendel Swapradja 1945-1950
'Daftar Adanja Rapat Rakjat Pada Tanggal 13 Mei 1946 Dari 
Masir^g2 Kaloerahan Daerah Karanganjar Jang Menjetoedjoei 
Berdirinja Langsoeng Daerah Istimewa Keradjaan Mangkoenegaran', 
Laporan Wedono Pamong Prodjo Karanganjar, typescript
'Laporan Pertemuan Fihak Mangkunegaran dan BP KNP 22 Djanuari 
1950', typescript
'Laporan Panitya Rapat Pegawai Negeri Mangkoenegaran 21 Nopember 
1945', typescript
'Makloemat Komisaris Tinggi', no.l, 1 boelan Nopember 1945
1 Makloemat Soenan Pakoeboev/ono XII 30 April 1946', no.2, 
typescript
'Pedoman oentoek menentoekan kedoedoekan dan kewadjiban Komite 
Nasional Daerah Soerakarta', Soerakarta, 3-IX-1945
'Penetapan Pemerintah 15 Djoeli 1946', no.l6/SD
Pengumuman Menteri Dalam Negeri Dalam Konperens.i Wakil2 Partai- 
Partai Digedung Kongtong-Solo 21 Djanuari 1950'
Pontjosoetjitro, 'Mosi Mohon Tetap Berdirinja Daerah Istimev/a 
Mangkoenegaran dari Rakjat Daerah Kawedanan Karanganjar', 
Karanganjar, 15-5-1946
Resolusi Pagujuban Pasemeden Mangkunegaran', typescript,
Surakarta, 8 Spril 1950
Kcoolusi Gerombolan Sarasehan Mangkunegaran’, typescript 
14 April 1950
soerat Kantor Karesidenan Soerakarta kepada Mangkoenegoro 
VIII 11 Nopember 1946', no.111726/0/29, typescript
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'Soerat Kantor Karesidenan Soerakarta kepada Mangkoenegorc VIII 
2 Desember 1946', no. 12350/0/29, typescript
'Soerat Penetapan Menteri Dalam Negeri Mengenai Pengangkatan 
Boepati2 Karesidenan Soerakarta', typescript, 7 September 1946
'Soerat Mangkoenegoro VIII kepada Menteri Dalam Negeri 17 Maret 
1947', typescript
'Soerat Amin Singgih Anggota KNI Daerah Kabupaten Mangkoenegaran 
tanggai 30-III-1946 kepada Amir Sjarifuddin (Menteri Pertahanan 
RI)', typescript
'Tentang Direktorioem','typescript, Soerakarta, 1945
'Usui Mosi Tjoegito cs Tentang Penolakan Usaha Pengembalian 
Swapradja D.idaerah Surakarta 24 Djuli 1950', typescript
'Verslag Rapat Direktoerioem Repoeblik Indonesia Daerah Soerakarta 
7 Nopember 1945', typescript
B • ARSIJ? NAS I ON AL REPUBLIK INDONESIA (ANRI) , JAKARTA
'Keadaan Kota Solo Punas', typescript, September 1948, Bendel B. 
no.2/5
'Keterangan dari pihak Badan Tekstil Negara (BTN) tentang perundingan 
antara Lembaga Buruh dan Tani (LBT) 18 Juni 1948', (soal pemogokan 
Delanggu), typescript, Bendel B. no.83/7
'Lampiran: Pendjelasan Djawaban Ketua BTN kepada LBT Delanggu
19 Juni 1948', typescript, Bendel B. no.83/7
'Laporan Pendek tentang Kedjadian Penting dalam Karesidenan Surakarta', 
naporan Kepolisian Negara Karesidenan Surakarta 2 Jui8 1948, typescript, 
Bendel B. no.18/19
'Laporan Siasat Letkol. Soejoto Untuk Merebut/Menguasai Karesidenan 
Surakarta*, typescript, 26 September 1948, Bendel B. no.18/9
'Laporan Tentang Perdjalanan Didaerah Jogjakarta dan Surakarta', 
typescript, September 1947, Bendel A. no.28/29
'Laporan Tindjauan Rahasia', typescript, Bendel B. no.18/19
'Mosi LBT Delanggu', typescript, Bendel B. no.83/7
'Pelapuran Pendek Tentang Kedjadian Penting Dalam Karesidenan 
Surakarta', Laporan Kepolisian Negara Karesidenan Surakarta Juli 
1948, typescript, Bendel B. no.4/13
'Pembunuhan Sutarto: Laporan Tindjauan Rahasia1, typescript,
Surakarta, 20 July 1948, Bendel B. no.18/9
'Pengumuman Pemerintah Penetapan Daerah Solo Sebagai Daerah Militer', 
September 1948, Bendel A. no.35/9
Pengumuman Pemerintah Perihal Penje.lesaia.ri Seal Delanggu', Jogjakarta,
16 July 1948, Bendel B. no.83/7
'Perihal Pentjulikan Solo', typescript, 15 September 1948, Bendel B. 
no.3/5
'Kemungkinan Lain Tentang Peristiwa Solo', typescript, 9 July 1948,
Bendel B. no.18/9
'Sekitar Pentjulikan dan Tembak-Menebak Di Surakarta', Laporan 
Djawaban Kepolisian Negara Jogjakarta 16 September 1948, typescript,
Bendel B. no.34/35
Sidang BTN dan LBT Delanggu di Jogjakarta 18 Juni 1948', stencilled, 
Bendel B. no.83/7
'Surakarta: Kronologis September~Oktober 1948', Bendel B. no.26/48
'Surat Dewan Pimpinan BTN kepada LBT di Delanggu (no.1436/Tex/Tu,
19 Juni 1948), 8, Bendel B. no.83/7
'Surat Komandan Batalyon 20, Res.27, Div.IV kepada Panglima Besar 
TNI (no.21/B IV/48.BC/20, 22 Juni 1948)', Bendel B. no.31/35
'Surat LBT Delanggu kepada Delegasi Dewan Pimpinan BTN Solo 14 Juni 
1948', Bendel B. no.83/7
'Tentang Diri Raden Sutarto', typescript, Bendel B. no.18/9
'Uraian Djalanja Perundingan antara Delagasi LBT dan BTN di Delanggu 
pada hari Kamis 17 Juni 1948', typescript, Bendel B. no.83/7
COLLECTIONS OF THE SENSI SEJARAH MILITER ANGKATAN DARAT (SEMAD), SURAKARTA
Keterangan Susunan Markas Besar Barisan Banteng sampai Markas 
Daerah di Karesidenan2, Kabupaten2 dan Ketjamatan2', typescript, 
Surakarta, 1959
'Mengenang Palagan Empat Hari di Surakarta Tanggal 7 s/d 10 Agustus 
L948', Panitya Seksi Penggali Sedjarah Monumen dan Sedjarah Militer 
Kodam Diponegoro, 1965
’Riwajat Singkat Pemerintahan Karesidenan Surakarta', bypescript, 
Surakarta, Pemerintahan Umum Karesidenan Surakarta, 15 September 
1950 (compiled by Moh. Saleh)
'Sedjarah Pedjuangan Barisan Pelopor/Barisan Banteng Daerah Surakarta', 
bypescript, Surakarta, 1959
Sedjarah Singkat BPRI Daerah Surakarta', typescript, Surakarta 
20 April 1959
Sedjarah TNI Didalam Daerah Karesidenan Surakarta: Periode Pertama
Tahun 1942-1948', typescript, Surakarta, 15 September 1960
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'Sedjarah TNI. Dida.lam Daerah Karesidenan Surakarta: Periode Kedua
Tahun 1948-1950', typescript, Surakarta, 1961
'Sedjarah Terbentuknja Batalyon 444 Rinf. 15', typescript, Surakarta, 
12 September 1959
II. COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS IN PRIVATE HANDS
A. DIARIES
Sardjono - former head of the Barisan Buruh Indonesia and Sarbupri, 
subdistrict of Kedawung
Sastrolawu - former commander of Regiment 27, Senopati Division
Sastrosuwarno - village head of Gayam, Sukoharjc, during revolution
Soekardi - former secretary of the Badan Urusan Makanan in the 
Kedawung subdistrict during the Japanese occupation
Sumodiningrat - former chairman of the Surakarta KNI 
B. MEMOIRS AND RECOLLECTIONS
Sardjono, 'Situasi Peralihan Pimpinan Perkebunan Tarik Ngarum', 
manuscript, Kedawung, n.d.
Sastrolawu, 'Sekelumit Cuplikan Sejarah Perjuangan Pisik Di daerah
Surakarta Sejak Prolkamasi 17 Agustus 1945 s/d 1950', typescript, 
Karanganyar, 1 Januari 1979
_____, 'Catatan Peristiwa Yang Terjadi Di wetan Bengawan Daerah
Karanganyar Di lereng Gunung Lawu (Tawangmangu) Semenjak 
Kemerdekaan Negara Republik Indonesia', typescript, Karanganyar, 
n.d.
Sumodiningrat, 'Riwayat Hidup/Perjoangan', typescript, Surakarta, 1977
Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, 'Kawontenan Prodjo Mangkunegaran Watawis 
Wulan Nopember 1947', typescript, Surakarta, 1947
HI. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH 75 INFORMANTS
Personal interviews as a method of oral history will produce oral 
historical sources of contemporary Indonesia. The following are the 
list of chief informants, who had taken various important roles in 
Surakarta society, particularly during the time of the Indonesian 
Revolution.
BACHRAN was born in 1917 in Jatipuro. His fatner was a farmer.
Bachran was educated at the Primary School of Jumapolo subdistrict.
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During the occupation he set up the Barisan Pelopor of Jumapolo. 
During the revolution he led the Jumapolo branch of Barisan 
Banteng.
BAKRI was born in 1922 in Solo, of a pious Moslem family from Kauman. 
During the occupation he joined the Hizbullah training at Bogor.
When he returned to Solo, he began to form the Surakarta branch 
of Hizbullah. When the revolution broke out he reformed the 
Hizbullah and became one of its important leaders from 1945 to 
1948. From 1946 to 1948 he was a member of the Surakarta KNID.
Since 1948 he was involved in the cooperative of the Surakarta 
batik industries, Batari
BUZAIRI was born in 1904 in Delanggu. His education was in various 
pesantrens in Jamsaren, Solo (1918), Termas, Pacitan, East 
Java (1925), Watucengkal, Central Java (1925-31). In 1929 he 
made a pilgrimage to Mecca. His father, Kyai Haji Mansur, 
led Tarekat Naksibandiyah at Jatinom, Klaten. Buzairi also 
joined this Tarekat. During the occupation he led the Delanggu 
Hizbullah. During the Revolution he led the STII and Masyumi 
in the Delanggu area.
BODRONOJO wau born in 1919 in Delanggu. He graduated from HIS at 
Delanggu. At the end of 1945 he was one of the leaders of 
Delanggu BBI. He also shared his activity in the BPRI. Since 
1946 he was very active in Sarbupri. Since 1948 he was known 
as a PKI leader at the Delanggu area, and was indicated as an 
activist of the Madiun uprising in September 1948. As a result 
of the Gerakan 30 September 1965 Bodronojo was in prison for many 
years.
DARJONEGORO, KRMT. He was born on 12 February 1912 in Surakarta.
His father, RMTP Hadisurjo, was a Bupati during the reign of 
Paku Buwono X and Paku Buwono XI. In 1945 Darjonegoro began 
to serve in the Susuhunan's kraton. In 1936 he was a junior 
official of the kraton secretariat office. In 1946 he became 
secretary of the advisory board for the Susuhunan. In 1947 
he became a senior official in the Sasono Wilopo office.
DARMANTO was born in Jumapolo. His father was an illiterate farmer. 
Darmanto graduated from the Sekolah Desa. In 1939 Darmanto, 
as a young man, joined the PKS. During the occupation he joined 
the Barisan Belopor. During the revolution he became one 
of the Jumapolo Barisan Banteng leaders.
FARODHAL, Lieutenant-Colonel. He was born in 1922 in Delanggu,
Klaten and graduated from Mulo and Sekolah Menengall Tinggi 
(SMT) Surakarta. At the end of 1945 he joined Kasykar Kere.
Until early 1946 he was active in the front line against the 
British in Semarang. In 1947 he joined the TP till its 
demobilization in 1950. He then became a member of the TNI.
GONDOWIDJOJO was born in 1894 in Delanggu. He graduated from HIS
and took private management courses. During the Japanese occupation 
he was a junior manager of the gunny factory of Delanggu, and
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became its manager from 1945 to 1949. He was also active in 
Saibupri during the revolutionary period.
HAGNJAWIGATI was born in 1913 in Surakarta. He graduated from HIS 
His father was a lower priyayi who worked inside the kraton of 
the Susuhunan. During the Japanese occupation, Hagnjawigati 
joined the Barisan Pelopor, and subsequently was a prominent 
activist of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng branch. In 1947 he 
joined the PNI.
JUDOSASTRO was born in 1910 in Sukoharjo. During the occupation he 
was the head of the Committee for Food Supply in the Sukoharjo 
region. In 1946 he established the Sukoharjo PNI branch. In 
1949 he joined the guerrilla troops in the food supply section.
KASIMO was born in 1922. He was educated at HIS. On 26 December 1943 
he joined the beta and became budanchö. During the revolution 
he chaired the Bendosari KNID. He also joined the TNI and became 
the head of the PMKT of Bendosari in 1949. During the second 
Dutch aggression he led the guerrilla troops in the Sukoharjo 
regency.
MARTODIHARDJO was born in 1903. In 1924 he became carik desa
(secretary of village government) of Toriyo, Bendosari subdistrict 
In 1930 he was elected village headman. During the occupation 
he was very active in the Keibodan in his village. During the 
revolution he was a member of the Bendosari KNID. In 1946 he 
led the Bendosari STII branch. During the Madiun uprising he 
was arrested by the Communists.
MULJADI was born in 1923. He was educated at Vervolgschool in 1935. 
During the occupation he led the Bendosari Seinendan. During 
the revolutionary period he led the Lasykar Rakyat and was the 
head of the information section of the Bendosari subdistrict 
government. At the same time he was active in PESINDO till 1948.
PANUDI was born in 1926. He was educated at the Kweekschool (teachers' 
college) in Sragen. In 1944 he joined the Peta training at Bogor 
and became shodanchö. In the early revolution Panudi joined 
other Sragen pemuda leaders to set up AMS (Angkatan Muda Sukowati) 
Since 1946 he joined the Senopati Division and later became the 
battalion commander based in Sragen.
PAW1R0 GRANGGANG was born in 1899 in Kedawung and educated at the 
Sekolah Desa. He was one of the leaders of the PKS Kedawung 
branch since its foundation in 1932. Because he refused the 
desadienst, he was often arrested by the Dutch. When the Madiun 
uprising broke out he was regarded as a supporter of the PKI.
PRAKOSA, Brigadier-General. He was born on 22 June 1927 in Ciamis,
West Java, whure his father, Diran, was a Javanese doctor.
Prakosa was educated at SMP and SMT in Surakarta. In 1960 he 
graduated from the Faculty of Medical Sciences, Gajah Mada 
University. In the early revolution he joined the Surakarta 
branch of IPI. When Lasykar Kere was formed on 11 December 1945
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Prakosa was one of its leaders. Together with Achmadi, he 
led the TP from 1947 until its demobilization in 1950. He 
then joined the TNI.
RAMELAN was born at Bendosari. During the occupation he joined the 
Seinendan, Since the early revolution he had been an activist 
of the Lasykar Rakyat. In 1949 he began to work in the Bendosari 
subdistrict government.
SARDJONO was educated at HIS in Sragen. In 1940 he became an
administrator of the rubber factory of Kedawung. During the 
occupation he joined the Barisan Pelopor and was also treasurer 
of the Badan Urusan Makanan for the subdistrict of Kedawung.
In the early revolution he set up the Kedawung branch of the BBI.
He also chaired the Kedawung Sarbupri. In 1947 he attended 
political courses in Sragen held by the Communist leaders.
When the Madiun uprising broke out he was regarded as a supporter 
of the PKI and imprisoned for three months (October-December 
1948) in Solo.
SANJOTO SOETOPO KOESOEMOHATMODJO, KRMT. He was born on 26 December
1921 in Jogjakarta. His maternal grandfather was KPH Soerjokoesoemo, 
the Mangkunegaran pangeran. Sanjoto was educated at ELS,
Surakarta (1937), Mulo, Surakarta (1940). From 1945 he worked 
in the Mangkunegaran government.
SASTRODIJONO was born in 1919 in the village of Jenggrik, subdistrict 
of Kedawung, and educated at a Sekolah Desa. He was the vice- 
chairman of the Kedawung PKS branch. During the Revolution he 
led the re-formed PKS at Kedawung.
SASTROLAWU was born in 1912. He was educated at HIS, Surakarta.
During the occupation he joined the navy-sponsored Gyugun in 
Surabaya. When the revolution broke out he set up the BKR 
of the Karanganyar regency. He joined the Senopati Division as 
commander of the Seventeenth Battalion and later became commander 
of Regiment 27. In June 1946, on the orders of Colonel Sutarto 
(of the Senopati Division), he was involved in kidnapping Sjahrir. 
During the Madiun uprising Sastro actively joined in defeating 
the communists.
SASTROSUWARNO was born in 1907, in Sukoharjo. He was educated at 
a village school. From 1926 to 1943 he worked in the sugar 
plantation enterprise of Sukaharjo. In 1943 he was elected 
as the village headman of Gayam, Bendosari. In 1949 he joined 
the village guerrilla troops in the supply section.
SLAMET MULJONO was born in 1929, in Delanggu, where he also attended 
the HIS (until 1943). During the Revolution he was a prominent 
member of the Lasykar Rakyat and an organiser of the village 
guerrilla troops. In 1949 he began to work in the Delanggu 
PMKT.
SOEDARMO was born on 11 November 1928 in Solo. He was educated at 
HIS, SMP and SMT in Solo. During the Revolution he joined
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the Surakarta BRR in 1945 and the TP in 1947. He also took 
an important role in disarming the Japanese armed forces at 
Timuran and went to the front line against the British in the 
last months of 1945.
SOEDJONO was born in 1908 in Surakarta. He was a member of the pre-war 
Mangkunegaran Legion. In 1947 he joined the TRI. During the 
Mudiun uprising he was involved in the TNI operation to capture 
Amir Sjarifuddin arid his followers at Purwodadi, Central Java.
SOEKARDI was born on 2 May 1916 in the village of Bendungan, in 
the subdistrict of Kedawung. His father, who was the lurali 
in the 1930s, was a re-elected lurah in 1946. Soekardi was 
educated at the Sekolah Goebernemen, and then became a teacher 
at Sekolah Desa (1933-34). In 1937 he worked in the Dutch 
irrigation office. During the occupation he chaired the Badan 
Urusan Makanan in the subdistrict of Kedawung (1944-45).
On 21 July 1945 he attended a short course on cooperatives in 
Sragen. When the Revolution broke out he joined the Barisan 
Banteng. For a while he also shared his energies with PESINDO. 
During the second Dutch aggression he joined the guerrilla 
troops. On 6 February 1949 he became the carik desa (secretary) 
of the Wonokerso village government.
SOEPENO was born on 3 February 1930, and educated at SMP and SMT
in Surakarta. In the early revolution he joined the Surakarta 
IPI branch, and in 1947 the TP.
SUHARSO was born on 3 June 1927 in Sragen. He was educated at a HIS 
and Technical School in Surakarta. In the early revolution he 
joined the Surakarta IPI branch and the AMS in Sragen. He 
also joined the pemudas fighting against the British in Surabaya. 
Subsequently he joined the TP and became a close friend of 
Prakosa and Achmadi. Since childhood Suharso had enjoyed the 
wayang.
SUMODININGRAT, BPH. He was born on 7 May 1904 in Surakarta. His
father, KGPH Kusumojudo, was the son of Susuhunan Paku Buwono X. 
Sumodiningrat was educated at the Europese Lagere School (ELS) 
in Bandung; the HBS in Bandung; and the Faculty of Law,
Leiden University (1935). From August 1935 to September 1940 
he worked in the Kepatihan office. From 1936 to 1942 he was 
vice-chairman of the Surakarta branch of Parindra. From 1937 
to 1942 he was a prominent member of Narpowandowo. During the 
occupation he joined the PETA training at Bogor. On 17 January 
1944 he became a chudancho of Peta. In September 1945 he became 
chairman of the Surakarta KNID. In October 1945 Sumodiningrat, 
with other politicians, led the Surakarta pemuda to disarm the 
Japanese armed forces in Surakarta.
SUNARDI was born in 1915 in Solo. He was educated at the HIS
Wonogiri, Central Java. During the occupation he worked in the 
Kabupaten Kota of the Mangkunegaran. In 1946 he moved to 
Sukoharjo and became the chief leader of BPRI. He was also 
active in the PNI.
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SUNARTO KUSUMODIRDJO was born on 11 February 1908 in Surakarta.
He graduated from HIS, Surakarta. In 1926 he became an official 
of the Boyolali. regency. During the Japanese occupation he 
joined the ].vtu and was trained at Bogor together with Sumodiningrat 
When the revolution broke out he became vice-chairman of the 
Surakarta BKR and in October 1945 commander of the Second Regiment 
of the Surakarta TKR. He was also a member of the KNID as 
representative of the army. In 1947 he became the commander of 
Regiment 27, Senopati Division. Later he was replaced in this 
position by Sastrolawu, when he moved to join the TNI at Biora, 
Central Java.
SURADJI was born on 15 January 1923 in Surakarta, of a pious Muslim 
family. He was educated at HIS (Muhammadiyah) in 1937 and 
Teachers' Training School in 1942. In 1944 he joined the Barisan 
Pelopor. During the Revolution he joined the Barisan Banteng 
and became one of its leaders, particularly in the spy section.
TOTOSARDJONO was born in 1919 in the village of Makamhaji, Kartosuro.
He graduated from HIS in 1934. From 1939 to 1949 he was carik desa 
of Singopuran village, Kartosuro. Together with his younger 
brother, Sudijo, and Anwar Santosa, he led the Barisan Pelopor 
in the Kartosuro subdistrict. During the revolution these 
three all became leaders of the Barisan Banteng in Surakarta.
WIRODININGRAT, RMT. For many years he worked in the Kepatihan
where he was a close friend.of Sutosundoro, an official who 
became very anti-monarchical after 1945, when he headed the 
Sarekat Pegawai Negeri Surakarta (SPNS). Wirodiningrat was a 
Kepatihan official who remained loyal to the Susuhunan.
IV. NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER SERIALS
The majorxty of the Surakarta serials are found in the Reksopustoko 
Library, Mangkunegaran. A few serials could be found in the Kasunanan 
Library.
API (weekly, Surakarta) , 1949 
Asia Raya. 1942-1943
Bekerdja (daily, Surakarta), 1948 
Bentd Delanggu, 1948 
Berita Republik Indonesia, 1946 
Berita Solo (daily, Surakarta), 1949 
Bestuurs Vraagstukken, 1949
Dwiwarna (weekly, Surakarta), 1950
Gula (daily, Surakarta), 1947
Indra Prastha (twice-monthly, Surakarta), 1950
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Kedaulatan Rakjat (daily, Jogjakarta), 1945-50
Mordekg (daily, Surakarta), 1948-50
Pantja Sila (weekly, Surakarta), 1948 
Pacific (daily, Surakarta), 1948 
Penerangan Rakjat (daily, Surakarta), 1947
Poestaka Warti Pradja Mangkoenegaran(twice-monthly. Surakarta), 
1946 ~~
Republikexn (twice-monthly, Surakarta), 1948
Sari Radio Pers (daily, Surakarta), 1949 
Sedhiya Tama (weekly (?), Surakarta), 1942 
Seniman (daily, Surakarta), 1947
Soeara Dueroeh ( daily, Soerakarta), 1945 
Soeara Moeda (daily, Soerakarta), 1947 
Suara Pers (daily, Surakarta), 1948
Udaya (monthly, Surakarta), 1947-48
Wasita (weekly, Surakarta), 1947-48
V. PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES
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